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Including Reverse Break-Up Fees
Summary
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Covers
financing conditions for sponsor-led buyouts
- Historically
US buyouts have been conditioned on
private equity firm sponsors obtaining necessary financing
- So that closing of deal is subject to a
financing condition
- Reflects market reality that providers of debt or
bank financing will always re-assess the target company
and its prospects before closing on their financing
- Reflects fiduciary concerns that sponsors have
when committing their investors' funds
- Selling companies relied on sponsors reputation
- Even though sponsor-led buyouts weren't certain
to close
- Witness the failed buyout of School Specialty
2005
Recent
deals show change in practice
- Some large deals haven't had a financing
condition
- Sponsors have agreed to express contractual
liability
in the event deal doesn't close because of financing
- Sometimes called a reverse break-up fee
- As amount of sponsor liability is sometimes
equated to
the amount of seller break-up fee in event it accepts
a competing superior proposal
- This trend follows practice in hotel buyouts
Financing
condition is often structural
- As Buyer is a shell company organized by the
sponsors
- As sponsors have limited or no contractual
liability for breach by the shell company
- So that Seller has no recourse against the
sponsors
In
typical sponsor-led buyout, the shell company Buyer
- Represents that it has received debt commitments
or highly confident letters from financing sources
- May represents that it has received equity
commitments from sponsors
- Covenants that it will act to close on debt and
equity commitments
- Commitments will have their own set of conditions
Compare
acquisitions by strategic buyers
- Where buyer typically has wherewithal to fund any
cash portion of the purchase price through its own devices
- So that buyer typically represents that it has
(and will have) sufficient funds to fund the required cash payment
- E.g., no financing condition
Examples
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Precedent - Limited or No Financing
Condition
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HCA
2006
Burlington
Coat Factory 2006
- $70mm reverse break-up fee
- Covers specified breaches by acquisition vehicle
but not failure to obtain financing
- 3.4% of a $2.06B deal
- Company break-up fee is also $70mm
Hertz
2005
- $125 mm reverse break-up fee
- 2.23% of a $5.6B deal
- Expressly tied to failure to obtain financing
- Liability for other breaches capped at $300 mm
Neiman
Marcus Group 2005
- $140.3 mm reverse break-up fee
- 2.75% of a $5.1B deal
- Company break-up fee is also $140.3mm
- Supported by equity commitment letters from
sponsors
- Triggered by failure to obtain financing
- Target could also pursue damage claims up to $500
mm
SunGard
Data Systems 2005
- $300mm reverse break-up fee
- 2.7% of an $11B deal
- Pro rata guaranty from sponsors
- Triggered by acquiror breach
- Buyer closing condition uses both
Market MAC and Lender MAC
- Company break-up fee is also $300mm
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Precedent - Hotel Buyouts
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Meristar
Hospitality - Blackstone 2006
- Guaranty by Blackstone Real Estate Partners
La
Quinta Hotels - Blackstone 2005
- $275mm guarantee from Blackstone
Wyndham
- Blackstone 2005
SEC_CODE_REF_0090001192884
- $275mm guarantee from Blackstone
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Precedent - Subject to Financing
Condition
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Serena
Software 2005
- $52.3mm guarantee from Silver Lake fund
- Covers specified breaches by acquisition vehicle
but not failure to obtain financing
- $1.2B deal - 4.4%
- Company break-up fee is $35mm
Linens
N Things 2005
- $70mm reverse break-up fee
- Covers specified breaches by acquisition vehicle
but not failure to obtain financing
- $2.06B deal - 3.4%
- Company break-up fee is also $70mm
Party
City
- $140.3 mm reverse break-up fee
- $5.1B deal - 2.75%
- Company break-up fee is also $140.3mm
- Supported by equity commitment letters from
sponsors
- Triggered by failure to obtain financing
- Target could also pursue damage claims up to $500
mm
UICI
- $140.3 mm reverse break-up fee
- $5.1B deal - 2.75%
- Company break-up fee is also $140.3mm
- Supported by equity commitment letters from
sponsors
- Triggered by failure to obtain financing
- Target could also pursue damage claims up to $500
mm
SS&C
Technologies 2005
- $30mm guarantee from Carlyle Group (3.1%)
- Covers specified breaches by acquisition vehicle
but not failure to obtain financing
- $941mm deal - 3.2%
- Company break-up fee is also $30mm
Toys
R Us 2005
- $140.3 mm reverse break-up fee
- $5.1B deal - 2.75%
- Company break-up fee is also $140.3mm
- Supported by equity commitment letters from
sponsors
- Triggered by failure to obtain financing
- Target could also pursue damage claims up to $500
mm
Select
Medical 2004
- Reciprocal agreement to pay $10mm in event of
breach
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Commentary
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Law
firm mailings
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Related Topics
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