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Release No. 33-7607 Release No. 34-40633 Release No. IC-23520 63 Fed. Reg. 67331 - Dec. 4, 1998
 Regulation of Takeovers and Security Holder Communications
Sections II.A. - II.C.
ACTION: Proposed Rules
Table of Contents
II. Discussion of Proposals A. Overview of the Regulatory Schemes
It may be useful to discuss the regulatory schemes for different
methods of business combination before addressing how our proposals
would affect the current procedures. This release discusses two primary
business combination methods: tender offers and mergers.
31 Tender offers may be made either by
the issuer of the securities sought or by a third party.
32 The essence of a tender offer is
that the offeror, or bidder, can go directly to security holders of the
target company with an offer to buy their shares. Each security holder
makes an individual decision whether or not to tender. A tender offer
may or may not have the cooperation of the target companys board of
directors. Even if the tender offer is successful, the bidder is
unlikely to receive 100% of the shares. In contrast, a merger is a
collective, voting decision.
33 The
acquiror acquires the entire company if security holders of the target
company approve the merger.
34 The
acquiror generally needs the approval of the targets board of directors
in order to present the transaction for a security holder vote.
In either a tender offer or a merger, the offeror may offer cash,
securities, or a combination. If the consideration consists all
or partly of securities, the offeror generally will have to register
them under the Securities Act.
35 The
offeror will have to give more information to security holders of the
target company than if it were offering cash, since the investment
decision is more complex. Security holders of the target need
information about the issuer whose securities they will receive if the
transaction is consummated, which really means information about the
surviving, combined entity (the issuer plus the acquired company).
The following summarizes the regulatory process for the four basic
business combination methods. These examples assume that the tender
offers and proxy solicitations discussed are subject to our filing and
dissemination requirements:
1. Cash tender offer either issuer or third party. The
bidder commences the offer by disseminating tender offer material to
security holders, including a request that they tender their shares. On
the same day, the bidder files this material publicly with the
Commission, along with a tender offer schedule that contains additional
information.
36 Unlike the other three
transactions discussed below, the Commission staff does not have the
opportunity to review the tender offer material until after the tender
offer has begun. If the staff decides to review the filed material, and
has comments, the staff gives comments to the bidder during the tender
offer and the bidder addresses the comments appropriately. (For example,
the bidder may need to send additional information to the security
holders of the target and the offer may have to be extended.) The offer
must remain open for at least 20 business days, and then the bidder can
purchase the shares if all conditions to the offer have been satisfied
or waived.
37 2. Exchange offer (stock tender offer) either issuer or third
party.
38 The bidder files a
Securities Act registration statement containing a preliminary
prospectus covering the securities it is offering to security holders of
the target in exchange for their shares. The prospectus also contains
the information about the exchange offer required by the tender offer
rules. This is a public document. The bidder may disseminate the
preliminary prospectus to security holders of the target company, but it
usually does not do so because it cannot request tenders or buy any
shares until the registration statement is declared effective. If the
staff decides to review the registration statement, it may give comments
to the bidder. After these comments are resolved, the bidder requests
that the staff declare the registration statement effective. Once the
registration statement is effective, the tender offer may "commence"
the bidder disseminates the combined final prospectus/tender offer
document to security holders, and requests that they tender their
shares. On the same day, the bidder files with the Commission the same
tender offer schedule as for a cash tender offer.
39 The offer must remain open for at least
20 business days from this point before the bidder can purchase any
shares. 3. Cash merger. The offeror files a preliminary proxy
statement with the Commission that describes the transaction. This is
usually a public document, but the offeror can request that the
preliminary merger proxy statement be treated confidentially, with some
exceptions. The offeror may mail the preliminary proxy statement to
security holders, but often waits until the proxy statement is final, or
"definitive." This is because the offeror can send the proxy card only
with the definitive proxy statement. The offeror may mail the definitive
proxy statement ten days after the preliminary proxy statement is filed.
However, if the staff decides to review the proxy material, in most
cases offerors wait to receive staff comments before mailing. Once all
comments have been resolved, the offeror mails the definitive proxy
statement along with a proxy card for security holders to mark and
return. There is no federally mandated time period between the date the
offeror mails the proxy material and the date of the security holder
meeting,
40 but state law generally
requires security holder notice of the meeting a specified time before
the meeting. If the vote at the meeting is to approve the merger and all
conditions have been met, the merger can close. 4. Stock merger. The offeror files a Securities Act
registration statement with the Commission that contains a preliminary
prospectus as well as the information required in a proxy statement.
Registration statements are filed publicly, but the material may be
filed as a confidential proxy statement if the offeror so chooses. The
registration statement is then filed as a "wrap around" the proxy
statement when the offeror is ready to make the information public. The
offeror may disseminate the preliminary prospectus/proxy statement, but
ordinarily will not do so because the offeror may not include the proxy
card. If the staff decides to review the filing, it gives comments to
the offeror. After comments are resolved, the offeror requests that the
staff declare the registration statement effective. Once the
registration statement is effective, the offeror can mail the combined
final prospectus/definitive proxy statement along with a proxy card. The
process then continues as it would for a cash merger.
Any of the above transactions also could be a "going-private"
transaction if it meets the criteria set forth in the "going-private"
rule.
41 In this case, the offeror and
any other party engaging in the transaction must file another schedule
and provide additional information to the Commission and security
holders, in addition to complying with the other regulatory requirements
discussed. Usually this information is combined into a single disclosure
document with the proxy statement, tender offer material or prospectus.
B. Expand Communications Permitted In Tender
Offers and Mergers 1. Overview and General Considerations
As discussed above, the fast pace of todays securities markets and
the ready accessibility of information through electronic media have
caused changes in the mergers and acquisitions environment. We
understand that participants in many merger and acquisition transactions
are providing extensive, deal-related information to the marketplace
immediately following the execution of a definitive merger or purchase
agreement. Frequently, parties to a merger or other similar transaction
release information to the press containing pro forma financial
information on the combined entity, as well as estimated cost savings or
"synergies." The parties generally issue this type of information
through press releases, analyst conferences, and meetings with
institutional investors and the press.
42
The information provided to analysts often goes beyond the information
disseminated to all security holders through press releases.
Parties to merger agreements have asserted several reasons for the
need to disclose deal-related information at an early stage, including
the duty to make "full disclosure" of material information under Rule
10b-5.
43 Under Rule 10b-5, it is
unlawful to make any misstatement or omission of material fact in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security. The rule applies to
mergers, exchange offers and other extraordinary transactions. The duty
to disclose can be triggered by, among other things: (1) line-item
disclosure requirements in filings with the Commission; (2) the issuer
or insiders duty to "disclose or abstain" from trading while in
possession of material, non-public information;
44 (3) the duty to provide full and complete information when
disclosing information to the markets;
45
and (4) the duty to correct false or misleading statements made by the
company.
46 Companies also may be
required by the particular rules of the stock exchange or inter-dealer
quotation system upon which their securities trade to inform the
marketplace in a timely manner of material corporate developments,
including proposed mergers.
47
We understand that parties involved in extraordinary transactions may
have certain economic reasons as well for disclosing more information to
the markets before a registration, proxy or tender offer statement is
filed with the Commission. These reasons include: the need to maintain
an orderly market for the securities to be offered as consideration;
48 the need to satisfy the markets
increased demand for information regarding a proposed transaction;
49 and the need to inform customers,
employees or other constituencies.
While there may be certain regulatory and economic reasons for early
disclosure of deal-related information, provisions of the Securities Act
and Exchange Act, including the Williams Act,
50
restrict the type of information that may be disseminated before the
filing of a registration, proxy or tender offer statement. The flow of
information to investors is constrained primarily by the concepts of
"offer"
51 and "prospectus"
52 under the Securities Act, "solicitation"
under the Exchange Act, and "commencement" under the Williams Act.
53 Each of these concepts reflect a judgment
that the information needed to make an informed voting or investment
decision should be provided within the four corners of a prescribed
disclosure document.
We believe that alleviation of these regulatory constraints may be
appropriate in todays marketplace, particularly given technological
advances in communications. Information regarding a planned
extraordinary transaction can be provided to all security holders on a
more equal and timely basis. Restricting communications to one document
may in fact serve to impede, rather than promote, informed investing and
voting decisions. Of course, any proposed safe harbors permitting
increased communications must be balanced to assure investor protection.
Modifications to the existing regulatory scheme include conditions
designed to provide full and fair disclosure to all investors and
the broader marketplace and not simply to a limited audience of analysts
and financially sophisticated market participants. Todays proposals are
designed to reduce selective disclosure by permitting the widespread
dissemination of information through a variety of media calculated to
inform all security holders about the terms, benefits and risks of a
proposed extraordinary transaction.
It is important to note that the proposals do not change the current
requirement that before security holders are asked to vote or tender
their shares, they must receive a mandated disclosure document a
prospectus, proxy statement, or tender offer statement that sets forth
complete and balanced information.
54
Our long-standing concern about communications conditioning the market
before the dissemination of mandated disclosure documents (i.e.,
"gun-jumping") is alleviated by continuing to require this disclosure
document before the investment decision, as well as by the liability
that could attach to knowingly false offering materials.
2. Eliminate Restrictions on Pre-filing
Communications
We propose to eliminate the current restrictions on communications
about an upcoming merger, tender offer, or other business combination.
Each of the regulatory schemes would provide for a safe harbor, as
described below, for oral and written communications about the
transaction before the registration, proxy or tender offer statement is
filed. Recognizing that deal-related disclosure, including
forward-looking information, is important to a complete understanding of
a transaction, we do not propose any content limitation on the
communications. However, we request comment on whether any content
restrictions should be included in the proposed safe harbors. Of course,
even without content restrictions, the antifraud rules will continue to
apply.
We do not propose to limit eligibility for the proposed safe harbors
to transactions involving large or seasoned issuers. We considered
making distinctions by size and seasoned status along the same lines as
in the Securities Act Reform Release (i.e., Form A and Form B),
but believe that those distinctions are not as important as other
considerations in the case of business combination transactions. In
these transactions, the market does not need information about the
offeror alone, but rather the combined entity, with which the market is
unfamiliar in any case. Thus, the need for freer disclosure stems in
large part from the fact that the offeror is, in essence, becoming a new
company. Therefore, the market-driven disclosure is not company
information but "synergies" and similar information about the combined
entity. Further, we believe that regardless of seasoned status, the
reasons for full and timely disclosure in a business combination still
exist.
Nevertheless, we request comment as to whether the size and seasoned
status of the parties to the transaction should determine the
availability of the free communication safe harbors. Should the safe
harbor be limited to Form B companies?
55
If the safe harbor were based upon the size and seasoned status of the
parties, should it be the status of the acquiror or the target that
would govern, or both? If the status of the acquiror controlled,
different acquirors for the same target could be subject to different
rules. Would the lack of a level playing field for competing acquirors
have adverse effects on competition or the targets security holders?
While we believe that the parties involved in a business combination
transaction should be permitted to rely on the free communications safe
harbors regardless of size, certain safeguards to protect investors are
necessary. All written communications by those parties from the date of
the first announcement of the transaction would be required to be filed
with the Commission upon first use.
56
Although there would be no requirement to deliver this information to
security holders, written communications would have to be filed upon
first use in order to assure that the information is available to all
security holders not just analysts and institutional investors at
the same time. Furthermore, written information about a proposed
combined entity or the "synergies" that are expected to result from a
proposed transaction could be verified or confirmed, and corrective
disclosure could be required if needed.
Each communication would be required to include a prominent legend
advising investors to read the registration, proxy or tender offer
statement.
57 We solicit comment on
whether certain basic information, including the name and description of
the acquiror, also should be required in each communication.
58
We believe that bidders would welcome the opportunity to disclose
deal information earlier in the process and that the filing on first use
requirement would not "chill" disclosure of forward-looking information
because of continuing market demands. We request comment, however, as to
whether parties involved in tender offers would be reluctant, in light
of the filing requirement, to disclose forward-looking information
absent a safe harbor from liability for that information. The safe
harbor established by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
currently applies to merger transactions but does not apply to tender
offers. We discuss below the possibility of expanding by rule the scope
of that safe harbor to tender offers.
59
Would parties to a transaction communicate more freely if the written
communications could be filed at a later date, whether along with the
mandated disclosure document
60 or some
other date, instead of filing upon first use? If so, should the
communications required to be filed be limited to those made during a
specified period of time, such as 30 calendar days or 30 business days
before the disclosure document is filed? In addition to the filing
requirement for written communications, would any market conditioning
effect of the pre-filing communications be cured by the built-in time
period between delivery of the disclosure document and the final voting
or tendering decision? Would offerors tend to shorten this time period,
to the extent permitted by law, if they could engage in more extensive
communications at an earlier point? We also ask whether security holders
would tend to sell into the market on the basis of pre-filing
communications, rather than waiting for the disclosure document.
As noted, the proposed free communications safe harbors would apply
to oral as well as written communications. We do not propose to require
that oral communications be reduced to writing and filed. As one
objective of the proposal is to reduce selective disclosure, we solicit
comment on whether liberalizing oral communications would remove
incentives for offerors to file information and disseminate it in a
widespread manner.
61 Should the safe
harbors be available to oral communications?
62
If so, would the need to provide information to the markets generally
provide a sufficient incentive for offerors to disseminate full, fair
and balanced information in a widespread manner? Should a "notice"
filing be required when oral communications are made?
As proposed in the Securities Act Reform Release, business
information that is factual in nature and relates solely to ordinary
business matters, not to the pending transaction, would be exempt from
the prohibition on offers and would not be required to be filed. This
type of information generally does not have the potential for
conditioning the market before an extraordinary transaction and, as the
dissemination of such information is usually routine, we do not view it
as specifically related to the transaction.
63
The proxy and tender offer rules would provide the same exclusion.
64
3. Waiting Period and Post-Effective Period
Communications
In the Securities Act Reform Release, we propose to permit free oral
and written communications during the period between filing and
effectiveness of the registration statement, in order to provide an
opportunity for open dialogue between the company and its potential
investors.
65 This Securities Act safe
harbor also would apply to the period after effectiveness of the
registration statement.
66 The rule
would be available for business combinations as well as for
capital-raising transactions. We also would extend this safe harbor to
the proxy and tender offer rules.
67
Like pre-filing communications, written communications during these
periods would be required to be filed upon first use. Free
communications during the waiting period would be particularly important
if our proposal to permit exchange offers to commence before
effectiveness is adopted.
68
4. Alternative Communications Proposals
We are considering alternatives to the free communications safe
harbors that would provide more limited flexibility for pre-filing
communications. In particular, we are considering whether to allow the
companies conducting the transaction to make deal-related disclosure
only during a 48-hour period following the public announcement of a
definitive merger agreement or takeover plan. Similar to the "free
communications" proposal, there would be no content restrictions on the
companies communications during the proposed 48-hour period, other than
the antifraud provisions. After the 48-hour period, the companies would
be required to remain quiet regarding the transaction until a
registration, proxy or tender offer statement is filed. If this
alternative proposal is adopted, should the 48-hour time period be
shorter or longer (e.g., 24 or 72 hours), or should it be based
on a number of business days, such as one, three or five business days?
Under this alternative proposal, the safe harbor would not be
available to a company if it disclosed deal-related information after
the 48-hour period without the relevant disclosure document on file. The
company, however, could take steps to regain protection under the safe
harbor by discontinuing communications related to the transaction for at
least 30 calendar days (the "30-day quiet period") before a registration
statement is filed. The 30-day quiet period would serve to cure any
conditioning effect that the communications may have had on the market
for the companies securities.
As a third alternative to the free communications proposal and the
48-hour model, we also solicit comment on whether to permit free
communications for an unlimited period of time after the deal is
announced, so long as the parties observe a 30-day quiet period before
filing the registration statement, proxy statement or tender offer
material. This would be similar to the treatment of Form A companies in
capital-raising transactions, as proposed in the Securities Act Reform
Release. We ask commenters whether it would be practicable in the
business combination context to require a minimum of 30 days between
announcing the deal and filing the registration statement, proxy
statement or tender offer material.
We request comment on whether, under the alternative proposals, the
30-day quiet period would be sufficient to cure any conditioning effect
that earlier communications may have on the market. Is a longer quiet
period necessary (e.g., 45 days), or would a shorter period
suffice (e.g., 15 or 20 days)? We also solicit comment on whether
the time period for staff review should be included in the 30-day quiet
period. Should companies be permitted to file the relevant disclosure
document as soon as it is prepared despite disclosure of deal-related
information outside the 48-hour period? How should the announcement of a
hostile transaction affect the type of communications permitted during
the 30-day quiet period? Should the type of communications permitted
outside the 48-hour period be different for friendly and hostile
transactions? Should the communications be filed on first use, or not
filed until the mandated disclosure document is filed?
Finally, we request comment as to whether either of the alternative
proposals is preferable to the free communications safe harbors.
69 Commenters should keep in mind that we
would conform the proxy rules and tender offer rules to whatever scheme
we adopt under the Securities Act for business combinations.
5. Free Communications Under the Securities
Act
To implement the overall scheme discussed above, we propose new
Securities Act
Rule 166(b) to permit free communications in connection with any
registration statement for a business combination. As discussed above,
this rule would not contain any content restrictions so that
deal-related information could be disclosed to analysts and security
holders alike. Given the potential breadth of the communications, these
communications still would be considered offers under the Securities
Act.
As discussed above, Section 5(c) of the Securities Act prohibits
offers unless a registration statement is on file. In 1996, the
Commission was granted exemptive authority under Section 28 of the
Securities Act.
70 For the reasons
stated above including the need to reduce selective disclosure and
provide deal-related information to all security holders on an equal
basis we believe that an exemption from Section 5(c) of the Securities
Act for persons making offers in business combination transactions is in
the public interest and is consistent with the protection of investors.
The proposed safe harbor under this exemption would be available to
the acquiring company the offeror of the securities. The company to be
acquired would not ordinarily be subject to restrictions on
communications under the Securities Act, but under some circumstances it
could be viewed as joining the acquiring company in making the offer. In
this event, it also could avail itself of the safe harbor. In addition,
we request comment as to whether any other parties should be exempted
from Section 5(c) and eligible to rely on the proposed safe harbor for
pre-filing communications. For example, should the parties affiliates,
dealer-managers and others acting on behalf of the parties to the
transaction be permitted to take advantage of the safe harbor?
71
In cases where deal-related information is disclosed before filing a
registration statement, the current practice has been to file the
communications on Form 8-K
72 and then
incorporate these filings by reference into the registration statement.
As a result, these communications are subject to Section 11 liability.
73 As a condition to the proposed free
communications safe harbor, written communications relating to the
transaction would be filed upon first use as pre-filing prospectus
supplements
74 that are subject to
Section 12(a)(2) liability.
75 This is
because we believe Section 12(a)(2) liability would adequately protect
investors while not chilling parties willingness to make these
communications. However, we request comment on whether all written
communications related to the transaction should be incorporated into
the registration statement and subject to Section 11 liability under the
Securities Act.
76 Would this encourage
offerors to rely more on oral communications? We also ask whether it is
necessary to condition the availability of the safe harbor on the timely
filing of these communications, as proposed.
We note that relatively free written and oral pre-filing
communications already are permitted under the current scheme for
contested proxy solicitations. Such solicitations, if written, currently
are not deemed offers under the Securities Act.
77 Written communications must be filed in accordance with
proxy Rule 14a-12(b), as discussed below.
To harmonize treatment of all merger transactions, whether contested
or friendly, we propose to eliminate the provision that such
communications are not offers under the Securities Act.
78 Thus, pre-filing communications in
contested transactions also would be considered offers and pre-filing
supplements to the prospectus subject to liability under Section
12(a)(2) of the Securities Act. We do not believe that communications
would be chilled by this modification because of the heightened need for
communications in hostile or competing transactions. In addition, we
note that such communications already are subject to antifraud
liability. We request comment, however, as to whether treating this
information as offers imposing Section 12(a)(2) liability under the
Securities Act would chill communications in hostile transactions.
Rule 135 notices are not currently, and are not proposed to be, filed
with the Commission. We solicit comment, however, on whether Rule 135
notices involving prospective business combinations should be filed,
since they could contain the initial public announcement of the
transaction. The filing would be made under Rule 425, but since these
notices are not considered "offers" they would not have liability as
such; Rule 425 would be modified to make this clear.
79
In the Securities Act Reform Release, the proposed scheme for
capital-raising transactions for Form A issuers contemplates that
communications more than 30 days before the filing of a registration
statement do not constitute offers.
80
In contrast, the proposed scheme for business combinations treats all
communications related to the transaction as offers, starting with the
first communication relating to the transaction (except for
communications among the participants in the transaction).
81 Thus, these communications would be
subject to Section 12(a)(2) liability even if made more than 30 days
before filing the registration statement. Should we treat business
combinations the same as capital-raising transactions and apply the
30-day rule to both?
82 If we did this,
we could still require communications before the 30-day window to be
filed, but they would not have Securities Act liability as offers. We
ask commenters to address whether the status of deal-related
communications as offers should depend on how soon they are followed by
the filing of a registration statement.
We also solicit comment on whether, if we do retain the first public
announcement standard, we need to define "public announcement." We could
define this as the first public communication about the transaction that
gives more information than permitted by Rule 135. Alternatively, we
could have a broader definition that includes any public communication
identifying the offeror, the target company or class of securities, the
number or percentage of securities sought, and the price or range of
prices. Should the definition clarify what is meant by "public" (i.e.,
communications that go beyond the participants to the transaction)?
6. Free Communications Under the Proxy Rules
a. Expand Rule 14a-12 Safe Harbor
In 1992, we significantly enhanced security holders ability to
communicate with one another regarding corporate matters without
furnishing a proxy statement, so long as no proxy card or other
authorization is furnished to or requested from security holders.
83 The enhancements have worked well to
improve the quality and amount of information flowing to and among
security holders. Under the current regulatory scheme, however, there
are still some restrictions on communications. For instance, management
or security holders seeking proxy authority may not communicate without
first furnishing a proxy statement, unless the solicitation is either in
connection with an election contest under Rule 14a-11
84 or in opposition to an earlier
solicitation, invitation for tenders, or certain other publicized
activity under Rule 14a-12.
85 Both
rules permit solicitations before furnishing security holders with a
written proxy statement, so long as: (i) no form of proxy (i.e.,
proxy card) is furnished until a written proxy statement is furnished;
(ii) the identity of the participants in the solicitation and a
description of their interests are included in any communication
published, sent, or given to security holders; and (iii) a written proxy
statement is provided to security holders at the earliest practicable
date. The rules apply to both oral and written solicitations.
86 Written soliciting material must be filed
with, or mailed for filing to, the Commission no later than the date the
material is first published, sent, or given to security holders.
87
Despite the 1992 amendments, some have contended that the current
rules may continue to unnecessarily restrict communications among
security holders and/or between a company and its own security holders.
Recent developments in information technology have enabled companies to
engage in more frequent, direct and timely communications with their
security holders about matters of particular interest. As the pace of
the securities markets increases, there appears to be a greater need for
some flexibility in the proxy rules to permit communications before
filing and delivery of a written proxy statement. Accordingly, we
propose to broaden the safe harbor in Rule 14a-12 to apply to all
solicitations, not just to those involving opposed matters.
The other provisions in Rule 14a-12, including the condition that no
form of proxy is furnished, the obligation to disclose participant
information, and the delivery of a written proxy statement to all
solicited security holders as soon as practicable, would be retained. We
also would continue to require that written solicitations be filed upon
first use. In addition, consistent with proposed changes to the
Securities Act and tender offer rules, each communication would be
required to prominently advise security holders to read the proxy
statement.
88 These requirements,
together with the antifraud provisions in Rule 14a-9, appear sufficient
to assure the integrity and adequacy of the information and protect
against misleading solicitations.
89
Filing of written communications upon first use also would assure
consistency with the requirements we propose for extraordinary
transactions under the Securities Act. We request comment, however, on
whether the filing upon first use requirement should be modified if
under the Securities Act we permit filing later than upon first use (i.e.,
when the disclosure document is filed). We also request comment on
whether to retain the requirement to disclose the identity of
participants and their interests if we do not adopt a corresponding
requirement under the tender offer rules and the Securities Act
requirements for tender offers. If we change either the filing
requirement or the participant information requirement, should the
change apply only to proxy statements relating to business combinations?
We proposed expanding Rule 14a-12 in 1992 to permit solicitations
before filing and delivering a written proxy statement regardless of the
existence of an opposing solicitation.
90
We ultimately determined not to adopt the proposal because "the broad
scope of current Rules 14a-11(d) (now Rule 14a-11) and 14a-12 reach
virtually all contested and responsive solicitations."
91 We further noted that the need to extend
Rule 14a-12 to all solicitations was mitigated by the proposal to allow
registrants and other persons planning a solicitation to begin their
solicitation on the basis of a publicly filed preliminary proxy
statement.
92 However, given the
pressures both regulatory and market-induced to disclose
deal-related information immediately upon announcement, we now believe
that the current rules may overly restrict communications among security
holders and/or between a company and its own security holders. Based
upon our experience with the 1992 liberalization of communications, we
do not believe that further easing of restrictions would lead to abuse.
Under the proposed expansion of Rule 14a-12, management could engage
more freely in communications regarding a prospective or pending
acquisition. However, this proposal is not limited to takeover-related
matters. For example, management could rely on the proposed safe harbor
to obtain security holders views in connection with certain corporate
governance items that may require a security holder vote, such as the
adoption or amendment of executive and director compensation plans, an
increase in the number of authorized shares that may be issued, and the
adoption or redemption of a security holder rights plan. We believe that
managements ability to disseminate information on a more timely basis
may result in more informed voting decisions by security holders and may
increase the amount and quality of information generally available to
all security holders.
We request comment as to whether there are certain instances when the
requirement to deliver a proxy statement as soon as practicable would be
too burdensome. In addition, are there any circumstances under which
management or other parties may want to communicate that should not
trigger the obligation to deliver a proxy statement at the earliest
practicable date? For example, if a merger transaction was only under
consideration by management, and no formal agreements were entered into,
should it be necessary to send a proxy statement to security holders if
the transaction does not materialize? As another example, management
might find the proposed safe harbor useful to "road-test" an executive
compensation proposal with large security holders, but not present the
matter for a security holder vote if the reaction was negative. What
impact would this have on smaller security holders?
We invite comments on whether the expansion of Rule 14a-12 to
non-contested situations would have the intended effect of permitting
management to communicate more freely with security holders and whether
this would enhance the timing or quality of information given to
security holders. One effect of the proposed expansion of Rule 14a-12
may be to eliminate any need for Rule 14a-11.
93
Would it be appropriate to eliminate Rule 14a-11 if we expanded Rule
14a-12 to cover all matters, whether or not they are contested?
As discussed above, one "check" on any conditioning effect that free
communications might have on security holders is the fact that security
holders will receive a mandated disclosure document in extraordinary
transactions before making their tender or voting decision. In a tender
offer, there is a mandated minimum 20-business day period between the
time the disclosure document is disseminated and the expiration of the
offer. As a general rule, however, there is no federally mandated time
period for disseminating a proxy statement.
94
Many state laws, however, dictate that there be at least 10 and no more
than 60 days between notice of the meeting and the meeting date.
Generally, the state law notice and the federally mandated proxy
statement are mailed together to security holders. During this period,
security holders are able to assess the relevance and credibility of all
written communications in light of the mandated disclosure. In some
cases, state law permits a period so short that security holders may not
have enough time to consider the information.
We request comment as to whether there should be a federally mandated
solicitation period for mergers and similar transactions, given the free
communications proposals and the need to digest the mandated disclosure
in light of earlier communications. This period also would assure that
record holders and beneficial owners alike would have enough time to
consider the proxy materials. If a federally mandated solicitation
period is adopted, how long should it be? Would 20 business days make
sense so that it is harmonized with the mandated tender offer time
period? Should it be 20 calendar days to conform with the information
statement requirement, or should the information statement requirement
be changed to 20 business days? Should the solicitation period be
required only as a condition of the free communications safe harbor?
Should it apply only to votes on business combinations?
We are particularly concerned about giving security holders time to
consider proxy material in the case of street name holders beneficial
owners of securities who obtain their proxy material through banks,
broker-dealers, or other nominees holding record title to the
securities. Do street name holders receive correcting or updating
material in a timely fashion? Would modifying the security holder
communications provisions of the proxy rules to permit direct delivery
of proxy statements and other soliciting materials to non-objecting
beneficial owners facilitate more timely and fully informed voting
decisions?
95
b. "Test the Waters" Proxy Solicitations
We also are considering a broader exemption from the proxy rules that
would not require delivery of a proxy statement after communicating with
security holders. The only condition would be that no proxy card or
other authorization be requested or sent. In effect, such a rule would
permit both written and oral "test the waters" proxy solicitations.
96 Such an exemption would be crafted as
part of Rule 14a-2,
97 which sets forth
a number of solicitations that are exempt from the proxy statement
disclosure and dissemination requirements. Would a broad exemption
remove the need for any of the current exemptions in Rule 14a-2?
98 Would it remove the need for Rules 14a-11
and 14a-12? Would the same purpose be accomplished by amending Rule
14a-2(b)(1) to eliminate the exceptions, so the rule could be used by
the company itself and interested parties?
99
Should the "test the waters" communication be required to include any
minimal information?
Unlike Rule 14a-12, the "test the waters" proxy rule would not
require that written communications be filed with the Commission.
100 However, we are considering requiring
communications to be filed in order to harmonize with the treatment of
written communications under the Securities Act and the Williams Act.
Commenters should address whether the need to file material would reduce
the usefulness of the "test the waters" proxy exemption. Would a filing
requirement provide benefits to security holders by assuring that
information is available on a widespread basis? If we do require filing
of material under this exemption, should it be a "notice" filing only as
opposed to requiring the communication itself to be filed? Should the
filing requirement be limited to the business combination context? Or
should the "test the waters" proxy solicitation be unavailable for
business combination communications, leaving Rule 14a-12 as the sole
safe harbor for these communications?
We request comment on whether a "test the waters" proxy rule would
benefit security holders. This change would be consistent with the
general theme of easing restrictions on communications under the
Securities Act as expressed in this release and the Securities Act
Reform Release. On the other hand, does the current requirement to
follow up communications with delivery of a proxy statement impose a
beneficial discipline on the solicitation process by discouraging
premature insupportable communications? Should we require a "cooling-off
period" (e.g., 20 or 30 days) between the "test the waters"
solicitation and a request for a proxy card? Commenters should advise
whether they think the "test the waters" rule would work, not just in
the context of takeover-related matters, but also in the context of any
corporate governance matters or other topics that are likely to be the
subject of a proxy solicitation.
c. Eliminate Confidential Treatment of
Merger Proxies
Currently, preliminary proxy material relating to certain
reclassifications and business combinations, other than going-private or
roll-up transactions,
101 may be filed
confidentially with the Commission.
102
In that case the proxy material is not filed on EDGAR and is not
available for public inspection.
103
Due to the changing realities of todays markets, and the expressed need
by many companies for an expanded safe harbor permitting early
disclosure of information before a registration statement is on file, we
propose to eliminate confidential treatment for merger proxy statements.
104 Often companies that invoke
confidential treatment for their merger proxy statements already have
made extensive pre-filing disclosure of information beyond what is
permitted by current Securities Act Rule 145(b) and the proxy rules. It
is unclear to us why a company that broadcasts extensive deal-related
information to the securities markets soon after a definitive merger
agreement is executed needs confidential treatment for the same
information contained in its proxy materials. In some instances, the
information disclosed to the market is more extensive than the
information disclosed in the preliminary proxy statement filed
confidentially.
We previously proposed to eliminate confidential treatment for all
preliminary proxy statements, including those relating to mergers, in
1992.
105 The Commission ultimately
decided to preserve confidential treatment for merger transactions in
light of commenters concerns that the inability to file documents
relating to business combinations or acquisitions on a non-public basis
would cause premature disclosure of information. The concern articulated
was that merger negotiations might not be ripe at the time of filing and
public disclosure "would adversely affect the timing of such
transactions and thereby their costs, since they could not obtain
Commission review of the offering documents while the participants were
preparing for the public announcement of the transaction."
106 In light of the current practice of
disclosing extensive deal-related information before the filing of a
proxy statement, we do not believe that preliminary merger proxy
materials continue to merit confidential treatment.
The elimination of confidential treatment of merger proxy statements
would harmonize the treatment of preliminary proxy statements with
preliminary prospectuses and tender offer materials, which are publicly
available when filed. In addition, security holders would obtain faster
access to information concerning extraordinary transactions. Without
confidential treatment, security holders also would have more time to
consider and respond to proposed mergers and acquisitions.
We request comment on whether confidential treatment should be
retained under any limited circumstances. Should confidential treatment
be available if the parties to the merger transaction do not rely on the
new safe harbors permitting increased communications?
Some have expressed the view that confidential treatment makes
registrants more comfortable with amending their materials to comply
with staff comments, as the marketplace is not aware of the nature of
the changes. If a proxy statement is filed publicly, the trading markets
may act on the information disclosed and there may be liability concerns
if the information disclosed is revised. Do commenters believe that
these concerns outweigh the benefits of public filing? If so, how are
merger proxies different from exchange offers and other types of filings
that are not accorded confidential treatment?
We note that when the wrap-around procedure is used, registration
statement exhibits are filed on a delayed basis. Would registrants be
put at a significant disadvantage if they were required to file all
exhibits when they filed their registration statements publicly, or
would they continue the practice of filing exhibits when available?
Should we continue to permit the filing of a proxy statement before the
wrap-around registration statement, even though the proxy statement
would be public?
d. Timing of Filings
In addition to the substantive changes to the proxy rules proposed
above, we propose procedural amendments to the proxy filing
requirements. Rule 14a-6(b) requires definitive material to be "filed
with, or mailed for filing to, the Commission not later than the date
such material is first sent or given to any security holders." Several
other proxy and information statement filing rules contain similar
language.
107 The option to mail proxy
materials to the Commission is no longer relevant because companies that
are subject to the proxy rules are now required to file electronically.
108 We propose to update these filing
rules to eliminate the "mailed for filing" language in the rules. Filers
would be required to file definitive material with the Commission no
later than the date they send or give proxy materials to security
holders.
We believe that making definitive material available to security
holders, the market and the staff as promptly as possible is important.
EDGAR, and other sources of electronic filings, including the Internet,
have become essential in supplying the investment community with public
information. Any discrepancy between the time information is first
disseminated and the time it is filed with the Commission could place
those who rely on our filings for public information at a disadvantage.
Filers (particularly those in time zones later than the Commissions)
have argued that filing proxy materials on the same day is a hardship.
It is not clear why this is the case, in view of the treatment of tender
offer materials. Such materials must be filed "as soon as practicable"
on the date the tender offer commences, and filers comply with that
requirement without any apparent difficulty.
109
While the proposed electronic filing rule acknowledges that some
information may be released when it is not possible to file it with the
Commission, we believe that material distributed during Commission
business hours should be available at that time to the public through
our filing system.
110
In connection with this change to the proxy filing rules, we propose
to update our electronic filing rules to provide guidance to filers as
to when to file material that is disseminated outside normal Commission
business hours. The issue of when to file this type of material arises
most often in the context of proxy soliciting material, although it may,
on occasion, arise for tender offer filings. Our electronic filing rule
already requires material that may be "mailed for filing" to be filed on
or before publication or distribution; in the event of publication or
distribution on a non-business day, the rule permits filing "as soon as
practicable on the next business day."
111
We propose to modify this rule to eliminate "mailed for filing" and
refer to material that is required to be filed on the same day it is
disseminated. The revised rule would continue to permit filing as soon
as practicable on the next business day if the material was disseminated
on a non-business day, but would make it clear that dissemination after
the Commissions business hours is treated the same as dissemination on
a non-business day. The revised rule would apply to tender offer filings
as well as proxy filings.
We solicit comment on the nature and extent of problems encountered
with the timing requirement for filing proxy and tender offer material.
Commenters should consider whether the proposed rule provides adequate
guidance to filers disseminating materials outside of our business
hours. Alternatively, the rule could be amended to require filing within
one business day of dissemination instead of "as soon as practicable on
the next business day," or by a certain time on the next business day (e.g.,
9:00 a.m. or 12:00 noon). We believe security holders and the public in
general should be able to access public filings at the earliest possible
time. Currently, filings are accepted on EDGAR as late as 10:00 p.m.,
although filings submitted after 5:30 p.m. receive a filing date of the
next business day and are not available to the public until the next
business day. We could amend Rule 13(d) of Regulation S-T to require
submission of proxy material by 10:00 p.m. on the same day it is
disseminated to security holders, unless dissemination occurs on a day
that the Commission is not open.
7. Free Communications Under the Tender Offer
Rules
A bidders ability to communicate with security holders and the
markets in general regarding a proposed offer is limited by the concept
of "commencement" in the tender offer rules. A bidder is required to
file and disseminate information regarding its offer upon
"commencement." Commencement is the date an offer starts for purposes of
the tender offer rules. A bidders public announcement of certain
minimal information about an offer may trigger commencement and can
result in certain filing and disclosure obligations for the bidder,
depending upon whether cash or stock is offered.
112 Similarly, the target cannot make a
recommendation regarding the offer without triggering filing and
disclosure obligations.
a. Disclosure Triggering Commencement
Currently, a third-party cash tender offer is deemed to commence on
the date the bidder discloses certain information ("announcement"),
113 unless the bidder does one of
two things within five business days of the announcement date. If the
bidder files a tender offer statement with the Commission, and
disseminates specified information to security holders, the offer is
deemed to commence on the date of filing and dissemination, not on the
date of announcement.
114 If the
bidder makes a subsequent public announcement that it has determined not
to proceed with the offer, the initial announcement will not be deemed
to commence an offer.
115 If the
bidder neither complies with the tender offer rules nor withdraws the
offer, the offer is deemed to commence upon public announcement,
resulting in filing and disclosure violations. We refer to this
requirement as the "five business day rule."
Stock tender offers are not subject to the same five business day
rule. Instead, stock offers are deemed to commence when a final
prospectus is first disseminated to security holders.
116 A bidder can publicly announce its
intention to make a stock offer, so long as the announcement contains
only the limited information permitted by the Securities Act.117 This announcement will not
constitute commencement of the offer if the bidder promptly files a
registration statement relating to the securities offered.
118
In 1979, we recognized the "unsettling and disruptive effects" that
cash tender offers can have on the trading markets when we proposed the
five business day rule.
119 In
adopting the rule, we noted it was common practice for bidders to
publicly announce the material terms of their cash offers in advance of
formal commencement.
120 We observed
that pre-commencement public announcements regarding cash tender offers
can trigger market mechanisms, such as arbitrageur activity, and cause
security holders to make investment decisions with respect to a tender
offer on the basis of incomplete information. The five business day rule
was designed to prevent bidders from publicly announcing the material
terms of an offer before formally commencing the offer.
Based on our experience with tender offers and the factors
influencing the treatment of communications discussed earlier, we now
believe that the communications restrictions imposed on bidders in both
cash and stock tender offers may unnecessarily restrict communications
with security holders. We believe that the reasoning behind easing
restrictions on communications for other types of business combinations
applies equally to tender offers. Unrestricted communications should
result in the availability of more information to security holders on a
timely basis. As a result, security holders should have a greater
opportunity to inform themselves and assess the specific terms of a
proposed offer. In light of the fact that tender offers generally remain
open for a short period of time, usually 20 business days, advance
notice of an offer should benefit security holders.
In an effort to increase bidders ability to communicate with
security holders, we propose to amend the provisions relating to
commencement. Specifically, we propose to eliminate the obligation to
commence or withdraw a cash offer within five business days of making a
public announcement. We also propose to eliminate the requirement to
promptly file a registration statement after public announcement of a
stock offer. The revised rule would permit bidders to engage in free
communications before commencement.
121
The communications permitted under the safe harbor, however, would not
include a transmittal form or instructions on how to tender into the
offer.
In place of the five business day rule and the requirement to
promptly file a registration statement, we propose to require bidders to
file and disseminate the required information when tenders are first
requested. The Williams Act and the tender offer rules were designed to
assure that there is adequate information available to security holders
so that they can make an informed investment decision before tendering
into an offer. The public announcement of an offer should not trigger
the need to file or disseminate information. Instead, the focus should
be on when security holders are provided the means to tender their
shares into the offer. That is the time when information required by the
tender offer rules must be available to security holders.
122
Under the proposal, we would require bidders in both stock and cash
tender offers to satisfy the filing and dissemination requirements upon
first disseminating transmittal forms (the tender offer equivalent of a
proxy card) or disclosing to security holders instructions on how to
tender into an offer. For example, if a bidder published an
advertisement that instructed security holders how to contact the bidder
and receive information on tendering securities in the offer (e.g.,
by publishing a telephone number for security holders to call to receive
more information on how to tender), then the bidder would be required to
comply with the filing and dissemination requirements at that time. The
20 business day period would begin to run at this time.
The five business day rule and the requirement to file a registration
statement promptly may serve as a protection against bidders making
tender offer announcements without the intent or ability to follow
through. In order to prevent the development of such practices if these
requirements are eliminated, we propose a new rule to make it clear that
such conduct would be prohibited as fraudulent under the tender offer
rules.
123 The rule would prohibit a
person from announcing a tender offer: without the intent to commence
and complete the offer; with the intent to manipulate the price of
either the bidders or the targets securities; or without a reasonable
belief that the person will have the means to purchase the securities
sought. Are there other provisions that should be included to prevent
inappropriate use of the free communications safe harbor, while not
deterring legitimate communications?
We solicit comment on whether the five business day rule or the
requirement to file a registration statement promptly provide investors,
bidders, targets or security holders with any benefits that the proposed
rule would not provide. Do these requirements cause bidders to provide
security holders with needed information sooner?
We also ask whether the proposed rules increase the risk that
investors will make investment decisions based solely on a bidders
pre-commencement communications without adequate information. Security
holders might sell into the market based on a bidders pre-filing
communications. This risk, however, exists today under the current
rules, although for a more limited time. Should the tender offer rules
focus on this risk? Is the risk of market activity, based on incomplete
information, greater for cash offers than it is for stock offers? If so,
is it more important to maintain the five business day rule than to
harmonize cash tender offers with other types of business combinations?
Would the proposed obligation to file and disseminate information when
security holders are first solicited to tender using a transmittal form
adequately protect security holders? Is there less of a need to permit
bidders to provide information to the marketplace before filing than
there is for other types of business communications because cash tender
offer material may be prepared and disseminated so quickly?
Currently, bidders are required to hand deliver a copy of the tender
offer statement and additional tender offer materials to the target
company and any other bidder for the same class of securities.
124 In addition, we propose to require
delivery to the same parties of the first written communication a bidder
makes that sets forth its identity, that of the target company, the
amount and class of securities sought, and the price or range of prices
offered.
125 Is this needed, or would
the fact that the communication must be filed with the Commission
provide adequate notice to the target company and any other bidders?
Each communication made in reliance on the safe harbor would be
required to prominently advise security holders to read the complete
tender offer material, consistent with the Securities Act and proxy rule
proposals.
126 Should we require any
additional information in these communications? For example, should a
bidder be required to disclose information such as its identity, the
targets identity, the form and amount of consideration offered, any
conditions to the offer, and the bidders interest(s) in the target,
including security ownership? This would be similar to the current
requirement in Rule 14a-12 that specified information be contained in
any communications made before the filing of a proxy statement.
Currently, the tender offer rules require specified information to be
included in any communications made after the bidder has
commenced the offer and disseminated the complete tender offer
disclosure document. These "additional tender offer materials" must
include basic information about the identity of the bidder and subject
company, the terms and the expiration date.127
We propose to retain this requirement. Does the requirement serve a
useful purpose in preventing confusion, particularly where there are
competing offers? Would it be more important to require specific
information in pre-commencement communications than in post-commencement
additional material?
We also propose to revise the rules to permit targets the same
freedom to make pre-commencement communications as bidders. A target (or
other person who makes any solicitation or recommendation to security
holders regarding the offer) must provide specified information to
security holders and file a Schedule 14D-9 with the Commission on the
same date that it makes a recommendation regarding the offer.
128 This obligation is triggered by the
targets communications even if the bidder has not yet commenced the
tender offer. We propose to amend the rule so this obligation is not
triggered by communications made by the target before the bidder has
filed its tender offer statement and commenced the offer. Targets would
be required to file pre-commencement communications on first use. This
would put the bidder and target in an equal position to engage in free
pre-commencement communications. We solicit comment on whether there is
any reason to treat bidders and targets differently. We also ask whether
the targets communications should be required to contain a statement
advising security holders to read the complete recommendation when it is
available.
b. Methods to Disseminate an Offer
The tender offer rules currently provide for several non-exclusive
methods to "commence" an offer. If one or more of the specified methods
are followed,
129 the tender offer
will be deemed "published, sent or given to security holders" for
purposes of Section 14(d)(1) of the Exchange Act. The methods of
disseminating information that will commence an offer include: (i) long
form publication;
130 (ii) summary
advertisement;
131 (iii) summary
advertisement or long form publication using stockholder lists and
security position listings;
132 and
(iv) if securities are to be offered as consideration, publishing,
sending, or giving copies of a final prospectus to security holders.
133 While a tender offer can be
commenced in other ways,
134 the
methods listed above are generally regarded as safe harbors and will
give the bidder comfort that the offer has commenced under the tender
offer rules. Commencement is important because if an offer is not deemed
to commence, the required 20 business day period will not begin to run.
135
Long form publication requires the bidder to publish extensive
information regarding the tender offer in a newspaper.
136 Before we adopted the summary
advertisement method in 1979,
137 long
form publication was the accepted means of dissemination. Due to
escalating costs and scheduling problems associated with long form
publication, summary publication has replaced long form publication as
the common means of disseminating a tender offer. Given that long form
publication is not viewed as cost-effective and is rarely used by
bidders, we propose to eliminate it as a means of disseminating
information about a tender offer.
138
We solicit comment, however, on whether the method should be retained,
perhaps in connection with publication on the Internet in combination
with other methods of dissemination.
Under the summary publication method, a bidder must publish an
advertisement in a newspaper and furnish its tender offer materials with
reasonable promptness to any security holder who requests a copy. The
advertisement must contain, and is limited to, certain specified
information.
139 Bidders are not
permitted to include a transmittal form with the summary advertisement.
140 Security holders therefore must
request and receive complete information from the bidder before they can
tender into the offer.
Summary advertisements alone usually are not sufficient to prompt a
large number of security holders to request a copy of the tender offer
materials. Therefore, bidders generally will supplement their
solicitation of tenders with a request for a stockholder list under Rule
14d-5, in addition to publishing a summary advertisement. Under this
rule bidders can request a stockholder list from the target. The target
has the option of either mailing the offering materials to security
holders at the bidders expense, or providing the bidder with a
stockholder list of record holders prepared as of the most recent
practicable date.
141
We solicit comment on whether we should eliminate dissemination by
summary advertisement alone (without the use of stockholder lists) to
make the cash tender offer regulations more comparable to other business
combination methods. Should the stockholder list requirement apply to
amendments disclosing material changes as well as to initial tender
offer material? We note that delivery is required if registered
securities are offered, given that prospectuses must be delivered as
required by the Securities Act. Similarly, delivery of a disclosure
document would be necessary if security holder approval was solicited
under the proxy rules.
142 While we
note that bidders typically use stockholder lists, we solicit comment on
whether there are circumstances when the use of stockholder lists is
impracticable.
In addition, we solicit comment on whether to retain the current
requirement that bidders using stockholder lists also publish summary
advertisements. The summary advertisement serves as an additional means
of publicizing tender offer information while it is in the process of
being mailed to security holders. This may be particularly useful in the
short time frame of a cash tender offer.
Finally, we request commenters views on whether we should permit
means of disseminating tender offer material other than those described.
The increasing use of electronic media, particularly the Internet,
provides an avenue for widespread access to information. On the other
hand, many security holders rely on more traditional sources of
information, such as newspapers and the mail. We do not want to put
these security holders at a disadvantage in obtaining tender offer
information. Therefore, we are not proposing that electronic media be
permitted as a sole means of dissemination. We are, however, interested
in comment as to how electronic media are currently used in the tender
offer area and whether there are electronic sources of information that
are as commonly available and widely followed as the newspapers of
general circulation used for summary advertisements.
143
C. Permit Exchange Offers to Commence On Filing
1. Early Commencement
The Commission first adopted the requirement for an effective
registration statement before commencing an exchange offer in 1979.
144 In proposing the requirement, we noted
that we intended to codify "the current practice of commencing the
bidder's offer when its registration statement under the Securities Act
becomes effective."
145 In 1983, a
Commission Advisory Committee
146
noted the regulatory disincentives to offering securities as
consideration
147 in a tender offer
and recommended that exchange offers be permitted to commence as soon as
the registration statement is filed.
148
In order to put cash and stock tender offers on a more level playing
field, we propose to permit "early commencement" of third-party exchange
offers. Currently, stock tender offers commence on the date the related
registration statement becomes effective. Under todays proposal,
exchange offers could commence upon the filing of a registration
statement, or on a later date selected by the bidder.
149 As a result, the regulatory bias
against stock offers would be reduced. We request comment as to whether
the current regulatory scheme is a significant factor in deciding how
offers are structured. Is it important to harmonize the regulatory
treatment of cash and stock offers? If so, does the proposal accomplish
this goal while continuing to protect investors?
Under the proposal, a bidder that wished to "commence" an exchange
offer by requesting tenders would have to satisfy several requirements.
First, the bidder would have to file a registration statement relating
to the securities offered. The preliminary prospectus would need to
include all information, including pricing information, necessary to
allow security holders to make an informed investment decision.
Information could not be omitted under Rule 430 or Rule 430A of the
Securities Act.
150 Second, the
prospectus would have to be disseminated to all security holders. Third,
a tender offer statement would have to be filed with the Commission. The
filing of a registration statement alone would not suffice. The bidder
would have to file both a registration statement and a tender offer
statement
151 and furnish a
preliminary or final prospectus to security holders.
152 Security holders would have the right
to withdraw shares tendered at any time until they were purchased, and
bidders could not purchase shares until after the registration statement
was effective.
153
The "early commencement" proposal is limited to third-party exchange
offers because the need to put cash and stock offers on a more level
playing field appears to arise most often in that context. We ask for
comment, however, on whether issuer exchange offers present the same
timing and competitive concerns. Should the proposal be expanded to
issuer exchange offers?
Going-private and roll-up transactions involving exchange offers
would not be permitted to commence before the effectiveness of a related
registration statement. These types of transactions often involve
material disclosure issues. We continue to believe that the staff should
have a full opportunity to review and comment upon the documents filed
in connection with these transactions before commencement of an exchange
offer in order to ensure that the rules are complied with and the
appropriate level of disclosure is made to security holders.
Under the proposal, early commencement would be at the option of the
bidder. The filing of a tender offer statement would serve as notice to
the Commission and the public that the offer commenced and a prospectus
was disseminated to security holders. A bidder could commence upon
filing the registration statement, or wait for staff comments or
effectiveness before actually commencing its offer.
We request comment on whether a bidder should be required to commence
its offer as soon as it files a registration statement. Alternatively,
should bidders be free, as the rule proposes, to determine when a stock
offer commences? If we do not require bidders to commence on filing the
registration statement, should there be an outside date on which the
exchange offer must commence (e.g., no later than effectiveness
of the related registration statement or no later than five or ten
business days after effectiveness)?
The early commencement proposal is intended, in part, to provide
bidders with an incentive to disseminate their offering materials
broadly to all security holders at the earliest practicable date. The
proposal would not prohibit bidders from making selective communications
in addition to or instead of using the early commencement procedure to
disseminate material to all security holders. When combined with the
proposals above regarding communications, however, the availability of
early commencement should encourage full and fair disclosure to all
security holders. We request comment as to whether bidders would
continue to communicate with large institutional investors to the
exclusion of small retail investors. Is it necessary to require bidders
to disseminate a prospectus to all security holders as soon as it is
filed with the Commission? If we require delivery, however, the
preliminary prospectus might include certain information that is not
complete or accurate. In light of the inherent limitations on the
information available to bidders that could be included in a preliminary
prospectus, would mandatory dissemination to all security holders
benefit or harm small retail investors?
The ability to commence upon filing may not be sufficient to level
the playing field if bidders are not assured of having an effective
registration statement within a reasonable period of time. While cash
offers can expire after a minimum of 20 business days, stock offers
could not expire under the proposal until the related registration
statement became effective. Therefore, we solicit comment on whether
expedited staff review is necessary to effectively harmonize the
regulatory treatment of cash and stock tender offers. If so, how short
would the Commission staffs review and comment period need to be in
order to assure timely completion of a stock tender offer? Would it be
helpful if the staff committed to an expedited review of stock tender
offers whenever a competing cash tender offer emerges? Would it be
necessary to provide for some form of accelerated effectiveness for
stock offers to fully balance the treatment of cash and stock offers?
One way to achieve this balance would be to allow or require some or
all exchange offers registered on Form C and Form SB-3
154 to become effective on filing,
155 or allow the bidder to specify the date
after filing on which the registration statement would become effective.
156 This approach would provide
bidders with greater certainty as to when their offer could close and
shares could be accepted in the offer. "Early commencement" would then
be unnecessary. This approach would allow bidders to freely decide
between offering cash or stock without concern for regulatory delay. Of
course, the staff would not have an opportunity to review the
information before it is disseminated to security holders, but could
review it after effectiveness just as it now reviews cash tender offer
materials after they are mailed to security holders. We would not extend
this approach to going-private or roll-up transactions. If this approach
were permitted, should it be limited to third-party tender offers or
also extend to issuer tender offers? Do the same timing concerns apply
to mergers? If so, and this approach is adopted, should it apply to
mergers as well? Should automatic effectiveness be limited to bidders
entitled to use Form B?
We also are considering whether to harmonize the proxy rules with the
tender offer rules by providing a proxy analogue to the "early
commencement" proposal. If we did this, we would permit proxy cards in
connection with mergers and similar business combinations to be sent
with a preliminary proxy statement/prospectus, rather than requiring
that they accompany only a definitive proxy statement/final prospectus.
Proxies may be revoked at any time before the vote, just as tenders may
be withdrawn before the offer expires. The vote could not take place
until after the proxy statement was definitive or the registration
statement was effective, and security holders would have to be given
information about material changes in sufficient time to act on it, as
discussed below in connection with exchange offers. Would this procedure
be useful in mergers? Is the merger situation different from the tender
offer situation; would there be greater risk that security holders would
vote on the basis of premature or incomplete information and not receive
updating or corrective information in a timely fashion? In particular,
would street name holders receive this information in sufficient time to
make an informed voting decision?
We have considered how the "early commencement" proposal interacts
with our rules regarding stock purchases outside a tender offer.
Regulation M
157 prohibits purchases
of the bidders securities during an exchange offers restricted period,
while Rule 10b-13
158 prohibits
purchases of the targets securities once the offer is publicly
announced. The Regulation M restricted period begins as of the date that
the exchange offer is commenced, i.e., when the bidder has first
published, sent or given security holders the means to tender. In
contrast, the restrictions of Rule 10b-13 start as of the time the offer
is first publicly announced to security holders, which can be before the
offer commences. We believe these rules would operate appropriately in
the "early commencement" context, but solicit commenters views.
2. Dissemination of a Supplement and
Extension of the Offer
The Division of Corporation Finance staff decides whether to review a
registration statement after it is filed, along with a related tender
offer statement, based upon its selective review criteria. Under the
"early commencement" proposal, the bidder already may have disseminated
the combined prospectus/tender offer before staff comments are received.
If the staff had material comments, the bidder would be required to file
and disseminate a prospectus supplement, or possibly a post-effective
amendment to the registration statement.
We propose to require bidders using "early commencement" to
disseminate supplements to disclose any material changes, whether as a
result of staff review, or due to any other material changes in the
information previously disclosed. If a supplement contained material
information, the exchange offer would need to remain open for a minimum
period of time after a supplement was sent, as discussed below. The
proposed rule would require a bidder to provide sufficient time for
security holders to reconsider their investment decision (i.e.,
by withdrawing previously tendered shares or tendering shares not yet
tendered) based upon the additional information.
The tender offer rules do not currently establish a specific minimum
time period with respect to the disclosure and dissemination of material
changes, except for those relating to price or the amount of securities
sought.
159 In an interpretive release
relating to the tender offer rules, however, the Commission provided the
following guidelines:
As a general rule, the Commission is of the view that to allow
dissemination to shareholders in a manner reasonably designed to inform
(them) of such change (17 CFR 240.14d-4(c)), the offer should remain
open for a minimum of five business days from the date that the material
change is first published, sent or given to security holders. If
material changes are made with respect to information that approaches
the significance of price and share levels, a minimum period of ten
business days may be required to allow for adequate dissemination and
investor response. Moreover, the five business day period may not be
sufficient where revised or additional materials are required because
disclosure disseminated to security holders is found to be materially
deficient. Similarly, a particular form of dissemination may be
required. For example, amended disclosure material designed to correct
materially deficient material previously delivered to security holders
would have to be delivered rather than disseminated by publication.
160
Under the "early commencement" proposal, if the bidder had to send a
supplement containing material changes either before or after
effectiveness of the registration statement, the offer would need to
remain open for at least a specified minimum period.
161 The original expiration date would have
to be extended if necessary. The offer would need to remain open at
least:
five business days for a supplement containing a material change
other than price or share levels;
ten business days for a supplement containing a change in price, the
number of shares sought, the dealers soliciting fee, or other similarly
significant change;
ten business days for a supplement included as part of a
post-effective amendment; and
20 business days for a revised prospectus when the initial
prospectus was materially deficient; for example, failing to comply with
the going-private rules or filing a "shell" document solely to trigger
commencement and staff review.
162
We invite comment on whether these time periods are appropriate, and
if not, what periods should be substituted. Would the ready availability
of this information in electronic format (e.g., on the
Commissions or the bidders Internet web site) mean that these time
periods could be shorter? On the other hand, would shortening these
periods deprive security holders of essential information if they are
not willing or able to take advantage of electronic media? As proposed,
this rule would apply only to exchange offers where "early commencement"
is used. Should it instead replace Rule 14e-1(b) and thus apply to all
tender offers?
We also solicit comment on whether bidders would be likely to take
advantage of "early commencement" before receiving staff comments or a
notification that the filing would not be reviewed. Would the risk of
having to disseminate additional information and possibly extend the
offer deter bidders from using this procedure? Or would they take those
uncertainties into account as they now do for cash tender offers?
The Securities Act Reform Release proposes to eliminate the
requirement that a final prospectus be delivered to investors who have
received a preliminary prospectus.
163
This exemption would not apply to business combinations, which have a
distinct scheme for delivery of information. However, we solicit comment
on whether bidders who use the "early commencement" rule should be
required to deliver a final prospectus after effectiveness. The
informational purpose of the prospectus may be best served by requiring
security holders to be given supplements setting forth significant
changes, rather than by requiring the prospectus to be re-delivered.
3. Tenders into an Offer Exempt from Sale
Requirements of the Securities Act
Under the "early commencement" proposal, once a bidder commenced an
offer, security holders could tender into the offer before the related
registration statement became effective, but the bidder could not
purchase securities tendered until the offer expired. Security holders
would have the right to withdraw tenders until the offer expired, as
they do now. As discussed above, expiration always would be after
effectiveness of the related registration statement. In order to prevent
the tendering of securities into an offer from being viewed as a "sale"
without an effective registration statement, we propose a new rule to
address this issue.
164 We would use
our new exemptive authority
165 to
provide that transactions involving tenders during the "waiting period"
when the early commencement rule is complied with would be exempt from
the Securities Act requirements for sales.
The purpose of this rule is to place cash and exchange offers on a
more equal footing by allowing them to operate on a more comparable time
schedule and minimizing any regulatory factors that may influence a
bidders decision to offer cash instead of securities in a tender offer.
The proposed exemption is necessary to assure bidders that they would
not be viewed as violating Section 5 of the Securities Act
166 when security holders tender into an
exchange offer during the waiting period. Investors would continue to
receive disclosure before making an investment decision. We believe that
it is consistent with the public interest and the protection of
investors to reduce the regulatory bias towards cash so that the
bidders choice of consideration is not unduly affected by concerns
about timing. However, we solicit comment on whether this is an
appropriate use of the Commissions exemptive authority.
FOOTNOTES
SEC_CODE_REF_0090001192884
|
31 |
The discussion of "business combinations" in
this release includes all mergers and tender offers addressed by
our rules, including those that do not necessarily result in a
"combination," such as issuer tender offers and tender offers
where the bidder is not seeking control of the target. |
|
32 |
An offer by the company to purchase its own
outstanding securities is an "issuer tender offer," while an
offer by someone other than the issuer is a "third party tender
offer." Third-party tender offers for a class of equity
securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act (15
U.S.C. 78 l ) must comply with the requirements of Regulation
14D. In addition, whether or not an offer is subject to
Regulation 14D (17 CFR 240.14d-1 through 240.14d-101), the offer
must comply with Regulation 14E (17 CFR 240.14e-1 through
240.14e-7) and the antifraud requirements of Section 14(e) of
the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78n(e)). Issuer tender offers for
the equity securities of a public reporting company must comply
with Rule 13e-4. Whether or not the issuer is a public reporting
company, the issuer tender offer must comply with Regulation 14E
and Section 14(e). |
|
33 |
Throughout the release, where we discuss
mergers we also include reclassifications, consolidations and
transfers of assets where security holders are asked to vote or
consent. See Rule 145(a) (17 CFR 230.145(a)). |
|
34 |
The security holders of the target company
almost always must vote on the merger; sometimes the acquiring
companys security holders also must vote. This is determined by
state law, the companys governing instruments, and requirements
of applicable self-regulatory organizations. If either voting
partys securities are equity registered under Section 12 of the
Exchange Act, the voting party must comply with the proxy or
information statement rules (Regulation 14A or 14C) (17 CFR
240.14a-1 through 240.14a-104 and 17 CFR 240.14c-1 through
240.14c-101). |
|
35 |
T he offeror also must comply with the tender
offer and proxy rules, if applicable. All business combination
methods described in this release also are subject to the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. See
Securities Act Section 17 (15 U.S.C. 77q); Exchange Act Section
10(b) (15 U.S.C. 77j(b)); Rule 10b-5, Rule 14a-9 (17 CFR
240.14a-9), and Exchange Act Section 14(e) and the rules under
that section. |
|
36 |
T hird-party tender offer statements are
filed with the Commission on Schedule 14D-1, while issuer tender
offers are filed on Schedule 13E-4. |
|
37 |
In a third-party tender offer, t he target
company must respond to the offer with a recommendation to its
security holders. This recommendation is disseminated to the
security holders and filed with the Commission along with a
Schedule 14D-9 containing additional information. The staff may
review the material and comment on it after it is filed, the
same as with the bidders material. |
|
38 |
In this release we sometimes refer to "stock
tender offers" and "stock mergers," but in both cases it is
possible for the consideration offered to be either equity or
debt . |
|
39 |
The target company has the same obligations
as in a cash tender offer. |
|
40 |
But see note 94. |
|
41 |
See Rule 13e-3 and Schedule 13E-3. This rule
covers specified transactions where a company may cease to be a
public reporting company or a class of equity securities may
cease to be registered or publicly traded. |
|
42 |
"The boundaries of the gun jumping
prohibition are being pushed in the current environment. A
careful balance must be made between deal announcement
activities and broader disclosures, which may serve legitimate
disclosure issues, covering expected timetables, managements
financing plans, integration (of) operations and synergy
expectations. Deal participants frequently are pressured for
such information by analysts, reporters and institutional
investors, and it is not uncommon for corporations to have full
analyst presentations that announce, among other things,
aggregate synergies/cost savings and CEO succession plans at the
time of the announcement of an exchange offer, merger or
spin-off transaction." See Brownstein & Cohen, "Navigating the
M&A Waters: Greater Options, Greater Challenges," N.Y.L.J.
(February 18, 1997), at p. 6 ("Brownstein & Cohen"). |
|
43 |
The Commission has long recognized the need
for issuers to communicate with their security holders with
respect to important business and financial developments. See
Releases No. 33-4697 (May 28, 1964) (29 FR 7317) and 33-5180
(August 16, 1971) (36 FR 16506). See also Release No. 33-5927
(April 24, 1978) (42 FR 18163), in which the Division of
Corporation Finance noted that compelling policy reasons exist,
as reflected in the Williams Act disclosure requirements, to
permit disclosure of information regarding contemplated
"back-end" mergers in order to aid investors confronted with a
tender offer investment decision that would otherwise "jump the
gun" on a merger. |
|
44 |
See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. , 401 F.2d
833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). |
|
45 |
Id. at 862; Basic v. Levinson ,
485 U.S. 224
(1988). |
|
46 |
See Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc. , 465 F.
Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y.), revd in part and remanded on other
grounds , 607 F. 2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied , 446 U.S.
946 (1980); Naye v. Boyd , CCH 92,980 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 20,
1986); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand , CCH 96,952 (E.D. Pa. 1979);
SEC v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. , 297 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Fischer v. Kletz , 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Generally, however, there is no duty to correct statements
issued by a third party unless the statements are attributable
to the company. See Electronic Specialty Co. v. Intl Controls
Corp. ,
409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969); Zucker v. Sable , 426 F.
Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Under certain circumstances courts
have found a duty to update information previously disclosed
when it is rendered misleading by subsequent developments. See
In re Time Warner, Inc. ,
9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993). |
|
47 |
See NYSE Listed Company Manual §202.05
stating that "(a) listed company is expected to release quickly
to the public any news or information that might reasonably be
expected to materially affect the market for its securities";
and American Stock Exchange, Listing Standards, Policies and
Requirements §402 requiring disclosure of material information
"likely to have a significant effect on the price of any of the
companys securities or . . . likely to be considered important
by a reasonable investor in determining a choice of action,"
providing as an example information regarding mergers and
acquisitions. See also the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. ("NASD") M anual, Rules 4310(c)(16) and
4320(e)(14). |
|
48 |
In the takeover heyday of the 1980s, the
price of participants stock frequently dropped following the
announcement of the transaction. This also can happen today, but
market reaction can be positive when a deal appears to make
business sense. Steven Lipin, "Corporations Dreams Converge in
One Idea: Its Time to Do a Deal," Wall St. J. (February 26,
1997). |
|
49 |
"Wall Street may require education due to the
complexity of the transaction, the non-apparent nature of its
value or the obscure nature of the business. In any case,
assuring that the value created by a transaction is properly
appreciated by Wall Street, and reflected in stock price, may be
both a matter of responsibility to shareholders as well as
protecting the deal itself." Brownstein & Cohen at p. 6. Indeed,
commentators have argued that "winning the immediate favor of
the market through disclosure of projections and other
forward-looking information can be an essential element in
ensuring the transactions success." See , e.g. , Victor I.
Lewkow and Paul J. Shim, Law Puts Parties in a Bind When
Announcing Merger , Natl. L. J. (Feb. 10, 1997), at p. B9. |
|
50 |
The Williams Act was enacted in 1968 as an
amendment to the Exchange Act (Sections 13(d)-(e) and
14(d)-(f)). The Williams Act regulates tender offers and imposes
beneficial ownership reporting requirements. 15 U.S.C.
78m(d)-(e) and 15 U.S.C. 78n(d)-(f). |
|
51 |
Section 2(a)(3) of the Securities Act broadly
defines "offer" as including every attempt or offer to dispose
of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest
in a security, for value. 15 U.S.C. 77b. Offers are prohibited
during the pre-filing period and restricted during the waiting
period. |
|
52 |
The term "prospectus" is defined in Section
2(a)(10) to include any prospectus, notice, circular,
advertisement, letter of communication, written or by radio or
television, that offers any security for sale or confirms the
sale of the security, except for communications that are
preceded or accompanied by a statutory prospectus. 15 U.S.C.
77b. |
|
53 |
"Solicitation" is broadly defined by the
Commission to include "the furnishing of a form of proxy or
other communication to security holders under circumstances
reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding
or revocation of a proxy." See Rule 14a-1( l ) (17 CFR
240.14a-1( l )). The Williams Act provides that only very
limited information can be announced without either commencing a
cash tender offer or requiring the filing of a registration
statement in a stock offer. |
|
54 |
See the discussion of proposed Form C in Part
II.D.2.d below. |
|
55 |
If the proposals in the Securities Act Reform
Release are not adopted, then the proposals presented in this
release could be limited to companies that are Form S-3
eligible, including the requirement that the aggregate market
value of voting and non-voting common equity held by
non-affiliates equal or exceed $75 million. |
|
56 |
See Part II.B.5 below. Written communications
include communications that are published in electronic media,
such as videos and CD-ROMs. |
|
57 |
The legend also would advise investors that
they can obtain copies of the filed documents for free at the
Commissions web site and explain which documents are available
for free from the issuer. See proposed Securities Act Rule
421(e) in the Securities Act Reform Release, as well as proposed
Rules 14a-12(a)(2), 13e-4(c) and 14d-2(b)(2) in this release. |
|
58 |
As discussed below, free pre-filing
communications are permitted under the current scheme only in
contested proxy solicitations under Rules 14a-11 and 14a-12.
Those rules require that certain basic information (the identity
of the participants in the solicitation and a description of
their interest in the transaction) be disclosed in each
communication, whether written or oral. |
|
59 |
See Part II.E.6 below. |
|
60 |
This is the way Form B issuers would be
treated in capital-raising transactions, as proposed in the
Securities Act Reform Release. |
|
61 |
Of course, nothing in the proposal would
affect a persons liability for trading on inside information.
See Rules 10b-5 and 14e-3 (17 CFR 240.14e-3). |
|
62 |
The current safe harbor in Securities Act
Rule 145(b)(2), discussed below, is limited to written
communications. |
|
63 |
Proposed Rule 169. Also as proposed in the
Securities Act Reform Release, there would be a safe harbor for
regularly released forward-looking information (which would be
filed under Rule 425), and the safe harbors for the publication
of research reports by broker-dealers would be revised. All of
these would apply to business combination | |