Company Name: Bank of America
Public Availability Date: January 4, 2008
Document Sections:
INQUIRY LETTER
APPENDIX
STAFF REPLY LETTER
[INQUIRY LETTER]
December 26, 2007
BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY
Securities and Exchange Commission
Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance
100 F. Street, N.E.
Washington, DC 20549
Re: Stockholder Proposal Submitted by the Central Laborers' Pension, Welfare &
Annuity Funds
Ladies and Gentlemen:
Pursuant to Rule 14a-8 promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended (the "Exchange Act"), and as counsel to Bank of America Corporation, a
Delaware corporation (the "Corporation"), we request confirmation that the staff
of the Division of Corporation Finance (the "Division") will not recommend
enforcement action if the Corporation omits from its proxy materials for the
Corporation's 2008 Annual Meeting of Stockholders (the "2008 Annual Meeting")
for the reasons set forth herein, the proposal described below. The statements
of fact included herein represent our understanding of such facts.
GENERAL
The Corporation has received a proposal and. supporting statement dated November
16, 2007 (the "Proposal") from the Central Laborers' Pension, Welfare & Annuity
Funds (the "Proponent") for inclusion in the proxy materials for the
Corporation's 2008 Annual Meeting of Stockholders (the "2008 Annual Meeting").
The Proposal is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The 2008 Annual Meeting is
scheduled to be held on or about April 23, 2008. The Corporation intends to file
its definitive proxy materials with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"Commission") on or about March 19, 2008.
Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j) promulgated under the Exchange Act, enclosed are:
1. Six copies of this letter, which includes an explanation of why the
Corporation believes that it may exclude the Proposal; and
2. Six copies of the Proposal.
A copy of this letter is also being sent to the Proponent as notice of the
Corporation's intent to omit the Proposal from the Corporation's proxy materials
for the 2008 Annual Meeting.
SUMMARY OF PROPOSAL
The Proposal requests that the Corporation's Board of Directors "adopt and
disclose a written and detailed succession planning policy ...," which should
include the following specific features:
"The CEO and the Board will collaborate on the CEO succession planning process
and will review the plan annually;"
"The Board and CEO will develop criteria for the CEO position which will
reflect the Company's business strategy and will use a formal assessment process
to evaluate candidates;"
"The Board and CEO will identify and develop internal candidates;"
"The Board will begin non-emergency CEO succession planning at least 3 years
before an expected transition and will maintain an emergency succession plan
that is reviewed annually;"
"The Board will annually produce a report on its succession plan and will
solicit feedback on the plan from key constituents, such as long-term investors,
analysts, customers or suppliers."
REASON FOR EXCLUSION OF PROPOSAL
The Corporation believes that the Proposal may be properly omitted from the
proxy materials for the 2008 Annual Meeting pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(7) because
it deals with a matter relating to the ordinary business of the Corporation.
References in this letter to Rule 14a-8(i)(7) shall also include its
predecessor, Rule 14a-8(c)(7). The core basis for exclusion under Rule
14a-8(i)(7) is to protect the authority of a company's board of directors to
manage the business and affairs of the company. In the adopting release to
amended stockholder proposal rules, the Commission stated that the "general
underlying policy of this exclusion is consistent with the policy of most state
corporate laws: to confine the resolution of ordinary business problems to
management and the board of directors, since it is impracticable for
shareholders to decide how to solve such problems at an annual shareholders
meeting." See Exchange Act Release No. 34-40018 (May 21, 1998) ("Adopting
Release").
In evaluation proposals under Rule 14a-8, one must consider the subject matter
of the proposal. Proposals that deal with matters so fundamental to management's
ability to run a company on a day-to-day basis cannot, as a practical matter, be
subject to direct stockholder oversight. Id. Additionally, one must consider the
degree to which the proposal seeks to "micro-manage" the company by probing too
deeply into matters of a complex nature upon which the stockholders, as a group,
would not be in a position to make an informed judgment. This consideration may
come into play in a number of circumstances, such as where the proposal involves
intricate detail or methods for implementing complex policies. Id. As set forth
below, the Proposal runs afoul of both of these considerations.
Succession planning, in effect, relates to employee management, because it
involves the promotion of employees. The Division has consistently found that
proposals relating to management of the workforce and employment related matters
are excludableat all levels of a company, including its senior management and
executive officers. Specifically, as discussed further below, the Corporation
believes that succession planning inherently involves the promotion of employees
and decisions regarding placement of employees within the Corporation's
management structure.
Succession planning, which is essentially employee staffing, of the Corporation
is clearly a matter of its ordinary business. Notwithstanding these facts, the
Proposal attempts to allow not only stockholders, but also "key constituents"
(including analysts, customers and suppliers) of the Corporation, to intervene
in the day-to-day management of the Corporation's workforce. The Proposal seeks
to usurp management's authority and permit stockholders to govern the ordinary
business of the Corporation.
The Proposal Infringes on Management's Ability to Run the Corporation on a
Day-to-Day Basis.
In the Adopting Release, the Commission described certain tasks that are so
fundamental to management's ability to run a company on a day-to-day basis that,
as a practical matter, they cannot be subject to direct stockholder oversight.
The Commission cited specific examples of such fundamental tasks, including the
management of the workforce by hiring, promoting and terminating employees.
Consistent with the Adopting Release, the Division has consistently found that
proposals relating to employment decisions and employee relations dealt with
ordinary business matters and, thus, were excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(7).
This has been the case even with respect employment decisions pertaining to
executive officers. Succession planning inherently involves employment
decisions, particularly the promotion of employees. As such, succession planning
is a day-to-day management matter that is not appropriate for direct stockholder
oversight.
The Proposal relates to the hiring and promotion of executive officers, both
matters of ordinary business. In Willow Financial Bancorp, Inc. (August 16,
2007) ("Willow Financial"), a proposal recommended that an executive search be
retained to locate a "replacement for president and chief executive officer and
chief financial officer." The Division found that the proposal was excludible
under Rule 14a-8(i)(7) because it related to "the termination, hiring or
promotion of employees," which were matters of ordinary businessnotwithstanding
the fact that the proposal related to the executive officers of the company. In
The Boeing Company (February 10, 2005), a proposal urged a committee of
independent directors to approve the hiring of certain senior executives. Again,
the Division found that the proposal was excludible under Rule 14a-8(i)(7)
because it related to "the termination, hiring or promotion of employees," which
were matters of ordinary business. See also, The Walt Disney Co. (December 16,
2002) (concurring in the exclusion of a proposal to remove the company's
chairman, chief executive officer and other management personnel and hire a
particular individual as chief executive officer because the proposal related to
the company's ordinary business operations, specifically "the termination,
hiring or promotion of employees"); Wachovia Corporation (February 17, 2002)
(concurring in the exclusion of a proposal instructing the board to "seek and
hire" a new chief executive officer because the proposal related to the
company's ordinary business operations, specifically "the termination, hiring or
promotion of employees"); Spartan Motors, Inc. (March 13, 2001) (concurring in
the exclusion of a proposal requesting the board to remove the company's chief
executive officer and begin a search for a replacement because the proposal
related to the company's ordinary business operations, specifically "the
termination, hiring or promotion of employees"); E*Trade Group, Inc. (October
31, 2000) (concurring in the exclusion of a proposal that the board establish a
Shareholder Value Committee of independent board members and current
shareholders for advising the board on certain topics, including particularly
the topic of "dismissal and replacement of Executive Officers (CEO, COO, CFO
etc.)" because the proposal related to the company's ordinary business
operations); The TJX Companies, Inc. (March 24, 1998) (proposal requesting the
board to make all possible lawful efforts to implement or increase activity on
certain employment policy principles); see also, Exxon Corporation (January 26,
1990) (proposal to remove company's chairman and chief executive officer dealt
with matter relating to the company's ordinary business operations);
Philadelphia Electric Company (January 29, 1988) (proposal to dismiss chairman,
vice chairman and president is a matter relating to the company's ordinary
business operations); UAL Corporation (March 15, 1990) (decision to request
censure and resignation of executive officer related to conduct of company's
ordinary business operations); and Deere & Company (August 30, 1999) (proposal
to censure chief executive officer related to the company's ordinary business
operations).
In addition, the Corporation believes that the decisions and policies
surrounding succession plans involve similar considerations to a company's
decisions and policies concerning expansion of and cuts in its workforce. The
Division has characterized proposals concerning a company's decision to relocate
jobs within the United States and to oversea markets as "management of the
workforce" and found such proposals to be excludable. In Bank of America,
(February 4, 2005), the proponent requested detailed disclosure concerning the
"elimination of jobs within Bank of America and/or the relocation of U.S.-based
jobs by Bank of America to foreign countries, as well as any planned jobs cuts
or offshore relocation activities." The Division found such proposal to concern
issues of "management of the workforce" and therefore be excludable pursuant to
Rule 14a-8(i)(7). In International Business Machines Corporation (February 3,
2004) ("IBM"), a proposal requested that the board "establish a policy that IBM
employees will not lose their jobs as a result of IBM transferring work to lower
wage countries." The Division concurred in IBM that the proposal could be
excluded because it related to the company's "ordinary business operations
(i.e., employment decisions and employee relations)." In Allstate Corporation
(February 19, 2002), a proposal was excludable that requested the company to
cease all operations in Mississippi. Allstate Corporation argued that it was the
nation's largest publicly held personal lines insurer with thousands of
employees and that they were in the best position to determine whether to
operate in a particular state. See also, Capital One Financial Corporation
(February 3, 2005); Mattel, Inc. (February 4, 2005); JPMorgan Chase & Co.
(February 4, 2005); and Citigroup Inc. (February 4, 2005) (proposals requesting
information relating to the elimination of jobs and /or relocation of U.S.-based
jobs to foreign countries were excludable pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(7) as they
related to "management of the workforce"). Similar to the foregoing letters,
succession planning involves employee staffing decisions. As the above letters
dealt with a company's decision regarding where to locate its workforce
geographically, the Proposal deals with the Corporation's decisions regarding
where to position individual employees within the levels of management of the
Corporation.
Furthermore, the responsibility for overseeing employee matters, such as
decisions regarding staffing, is a complex task with respect to which
stockholders are not in a position to make an informed judgment. The complexity
of this task is magnified by the ever-evolving nature of the banking and finance
sectors and need for visionary leadership in such a complex business landscape.
The Proponent recognizes the importance and complexity of succession planning
when it states, "`[a] board's biggest responsibility is succession planning.
It's the one area where the board is completely accountable, and the choice has
significant consequences ... for the corporation's future.'" (emphasis added).
Such statement underscores the central role that a board of directors plays in
succession planning and points to the great amount of consideration that a board
of directors should devote to this complex topic, which has long-lasting
consequences for which the board is largely responsible. The Proponent wants it
both waysthe Proponent wants stockholders to be involved in succession
planning, but also wants to hold the Board completely accountable.
The complex decisions that are made and policies that are crafted concerning
succession planning involve sensitive and confidential information that should
not be shared with the stockholders or public at large. Detailed succession
planning policies concern the strategic business direction of the Corporation
and provide insight into which officers and departments will increase in
prominence and influence in the coming years. The Proponent expressly requests
that the Corporation address "the Company's business strategy" in its disclosure
of its succession policy. Competitors would therefore be in a better position to
assess the Corporation's long-term strategic objectives and plans, prepare
counter strategies and thereby gain an advantage over the Corporation. Indeed,
the Proposal specifically requests that the Corporation's Board of Directors and
Chief Executive Officer begin "non-emergency CEO succession planning at least 3
years before an expected transition." Specific information about such plans
appearing in the annual report requested by the Proposal would further provide
rival companies with strategic information regarding the approximate timing of a
change in management.
Releasing succession planning information, through both general policy
disclosure and annual reports as requested by the Proponent, could also serve to
impede the Corporation's recruiting and retention efforts of upper-management.
If employees knew it unlikely that they would be promoted beyond certain levels
under the succession plan, employee satisfaction, morale and retention would
likely decrease. Further, with a public succession plan, competitors would be
able to identify critical employees not currently slated to assume more
prominent roles and target such individuals in their recruitment efforts. By
calling for detailed succession planning policies and related reports to be made
public, the Proponent hinders the objective it seeks - "ensur[ing] a smooth
transition in the event of the CEO's departure" - as disappointed top executives
may look elsewhere for employment. The Proposal would also hinder the Board of
Directors' judgment in selecting appropriate candidates as it requires the
"Board and CEO [to] identify and develop internal candidates." While the
Corporation seeks to develop strong leaders at all levels of its workforce and
promote talent, when appropriate, from within, it is not always practical or
advisable to limit candidate searches to within the Corporation. Further, the
Proposal requires the solicitation of feedback from "key constituents, such as
long-term investors, analysts, customers or suppliers." The interests of such
"key constituents" may vary greatly from, if not conflict directly with, the
interests of the Corporation. Key constituents, especially customers and
suppliers, are also likely to lack the background, information and institutional
knowledge necessary to adequately evaluate both the Corporation's succession
planning policy and individual succession candidates. As it is not appropriate
for stockholders to "micro-manage" the company by probing too deeply into
complex matters upon which they would not be in a position to make an informed
judgment, neither is it appropriate for third parties with no direct ownership
interest in the Corporation to review and comment on corporate policy.
The Proposal, as was the case in the letters cited above, relates to the
management of the workforce, namely the promotion of the Corporation's
management pursuant to its succession policy.
Accordingly, as clearly stated by the Commission in the Adopting Release, the
Proposal deals with matters of ordinary business.
The Proposal Micro-Manages By Requesting Intricate Detailed Disclosure.
The Division has found that proposals seeking detailed disclosure (whether in
Exchange Act filings or special reports) may be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(7)
(or its predecessor Rule 14a-8(c)(7)). See Johnson Controls, Inc. (October 26,
1999). Exemplified by many of the letters discussed above, the Division has
permitted the exclusion of proposals that request highly detailed reports. In
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (April 4, 1991), a proposal asking the company to
disclose detailed equal employment opportunity data and describe affirmative
action program was found excludable on appeal to the full Commission. In
reversing the Division's original finding, the Commission reasoned that the
proposal involved detailed information about the company's workforce and
employment practices, and thus related to matters of ordinary business and could
be excluded. See also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (April 10, 1991) (permitting
exclusion of a proposal seeking a detailed report on racial and gender
composition of the company's workforce, affirmative action program and other
similar programs). In Ford Motor Company (March 24, 2004) and General Motors
Corporation (April 7, 2004), proposals were excludable that requested a very
detailed report entitled "Scientific Report on Global Warming/Cooling" that
required detailed information on temperatures, atmospheric gases, sun effects,
carbon dioxide production, carbon dioxide absorption and costs and benefits at
various degrees of heating and cooling. In these examples, the Division agreed
that the proponents were seeking to micro-manage companies by probing too deeply
into matters of a complex nature upon which stockholders, as a group, were not
in a position to make an informed judgment.
As with the proposals that the Division found excludable above, the Proposal
involves a matter of complex nature - key personnel succession planning. With
approximately 57 million customer relationships, over 203,000 full-time
employees and presence in 175 countries, the Corporation's Board of Directors
must carefully and strategically select the individuals who are to lead the
Corporation in its multifaceted and global business. The Proposal specifically
requests an inordinate amount of detailed disclosure regarding the management of
employees through the Corporation's succession plan, information that it is
neither beneficial or prudent to release to stockholders and the public at
large. Stockholders of the Corporation are simply not in a position to properly
assess the detailed elements of a succession planning policy.
The Proposal seeks a very detailed level of disclosure regarding the
Corporation's succession policy, including:
information regarding CEO and Board collaboration on the CEO succession
planning process;
information regarding an annual review of the CEO succession planning process
by the CEO and the Board;
information regarding how the Board and CEO will work together to develop
criteria for the CEO position;
discussion of a formal assessment process by which CEO candidates are
evaluated;
information regarding the procedures by which the Board and CEO will identify
and develop internal candidates;
information regarding non-emergency CEO succession planning, which is to occur
at least three years prior to any expected transition; and
information regarding an annual review of the emergency CEO succession plan.
The Proposal also calls for annual reports regarding the succession plan, which
would presumably include specific information regarding each of the above-listed
points. The Proposal clearly requests a "detailed succession planning policy,"
eliminating any doubts regarding the level of disclosure sought.
In sum, the Proposal closely resembles the detailed requests included in the
proposals that the Division found excludable in each of the foregoing letters.
The Proposal seeks to probe deeply into matters of a complex nature - key
personnel succession planning - upon which stockholders, as a group, are not in
a position to make an informed judgment.
The Proposal's Excludability is Not Overridden by a Significant Policy Issue.
The Corporation recognizes that certain proposals could transcend day-to-day
business matters and raise policy issues so significant that they could be
appropriate for stockholder vote. Although workforce management is significant
to the Corporation, the Proposal does not raise any significant policy issues.
As noted above, the Proposal is merely seeking additional information regarding
the promotion of individual employees within the Corporation's management
structure. The Proposal is clear - it is a request for information regarding the
Corporation's succession policy and its implementation. The Proponent's request
relates solely to gaining more detailed disclosure regarding the Corporation's
workforce decisions, which involves the day-to-day management of the
Corporation's workforce. The Proponent seeks to involve not only itself but also
"key constituents" in the micro-management of the Corporation's business, and
does not raise issues of significant policy.
Summary
The Proposal seeks to address the Corporation's succession planning, which is a
workforce policy issue that is part of the Corporation's ordinary business
operations. The Board of Directors and management are in the best position to
determine what policies are prudent to service the Corporation's client and
maintain the financial strength of the Corporation. Finally, the Board of
Directors and management are in the best position to implement internal policies
and procedures with regard to workforce decisions. The Proposal seeks to take
this authority from management. Consistent with the foregoing discussion and
prior statements by the Commission, the Corporation believes that the Proposal
should be excluded pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(7).
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing and on behalf of the Corporation, we respectfully
request the concurrence of the Division that the Proposal may be excluded from
the Corporation's proxy materials for the 2008 Annual Meeting. Based on the
Corporation's timetable for the 2008 Annual Meeting, a response from the
Division by February 3, 2008 would be of great assistance.
If you have any questions or would like any additional information regarding the
foregoing, please do not hesitate to contact me at 704-378-4718 or, in my
absence, Teresa M. Brenner, Associate General Counsel of the Corporation, at
704-386-4238.
Please acknowledge receipt of this letter by stamping and returning the enclosed
receipt copy of this letter. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.
Very truly yours,
/s/
Andrew A. Gerber
cc: Teresa M. Brenner
Barry McAnarney
[APPENDIX]
EXHIBIT A
Resolved: That the shareholders of Bank of America Corporation ("Company")
hereby request that the Board of Directors initiate the appropriate process to
amend the Company's Corporate Governance Guidelines ("Guidelines") to adopt and
disclose a written and detailed succession planning policy, including the
following specific features:
The CEO and the Board will collaborate on the CEO succession planning process
and will review the plan annually;
The Board and CEO will develop criteria for the CEO position which will
reflect the Company's business strategy and will use a formal assessment process
to evaluate candidates;
The Board and CEO will identify and develop internal candidates;
The Board will begin non-emergency CEO succession planning at least 3 years
before an expected transition and will maintain an emergency succession plan
that is reviewed annually;
The Board will annually produce a report on its succession plan and will
solicit feedback on the plan from key constituents, such as long-term investors,
analysts, customers or suppliers.
Supporting Statement
CEO succession is one of the primary responsibilities of the board of directors.
A recent study published by the NACD quoted a director of a large technology
firm: "A board's biggest responsibility is succession planning. It's the one
area where the board is completely accountable, and the choice has significant
consequences, good and bad, for the corporation's future." (The Role of the
Board in CEO Succession: A Best Practices Study, 2006). The study also cited
research by Challenger, Gray & Christmas that "CEO departures doubled in 2005,
with 1228 departures recorded from the beginning of 2005 through November, up
102 percent from the same period in 2004."
In its 2007 study What Makes the Most Admired Companies Great: Board Governance
and Effective Human Capital Management, Hay Group found that 85% of the Most
Admired Company boards have a well defined CEO succession plan to prepare for
replacement of the CEO on a long-term basis and that 91% have a well defined
plan to cover the emergency loss of the CEO that is discussed at least annually
by the board.
Our Company's Guidelines contain only a general statement regarding succession
planning: "The Board shall annually review the succession plan for the position
of Chief Executive Officer." This is not enough disclosure to allow shareholders
to evaluate the strength of the Company's succession planning process.
The NACD report identified several best practices and innovations in CEO
succession planning. The report found that boards of companies with successful
CEO transitions are more likely to have well-developed succession plans that are
put in place well before a transition, are focused on developing internal
candidates and include clear candidate criteria and a formal assessment process.
Our proposal is intended to have the board adopt a written policy containing
several specific best practices in order to ensure a smooth transition in the
event of the CEO's departure. We urge shareholders to vote FOR our proposal.
[STAFF REPLY LETTER]
January 4, 2008
Response of the Office of Chief Counsel Division of Corporation Finance
Re: Bank of America Corporation
Incoming letter dated December 26, 2007
The proposal requests that the board of directors initiate the appropriate
process to amend Bank of America's corporate governance guidelines to adopt and
disclose a written and detailed succession planning policy, including features
specified in the proposal.
There appears to be some basis for your view that Bank of America may exclude
the proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(7), as relating to Bank of America's ordinary
business operations (i.e., the termination, hiring, or promotion of employees).
Accordingly, we will not recommend enforcement action to the Commission if Bank
of America omits the proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule
14a-8(i)(7).
Sincerely,
/s/
John R. Fieldsend
Attorney-Adviser |