Company Name: Angelica Corp.
Public Availability Date: August 20, 2007
Document Sections:
INQUIRY LETTER
INQUIRY LETTER
APPEXDIX
STAFF REPLY LETTER
[INQUIRY LETTER]
July 18, 2007
Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20549
Re: Omission of Shareholder Proposal of Jolly Roger Fund LP
Dear Ladies and Gentlemen:
We are writing on behalf of our client, Angelica Corporation, a Missouri
corporation (the "Company"), to respectfully request that the Staff of the
Division of Corporation Finance (the "Division"), concur with the Company's view
that, for the reasons set forth below, the shareholder proposal, consisting of a
resolution and supporting statement (collectively, the "Proposal" which is
included in the letter attached hereto as Exhibit A) submitted by Jolly Roger
Fund LP (the "Proponent"), may be properly omitted by the Company, pursuant to
Rule 14a-8(i)(10) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the
"Exchange Act"), from its proxy materials in connection with its 2007 annual
meeting of stockholders (the "2007 Proxy Materials") which is currently
scheduled to be held on October 30, 2007.
Pursuant to Rule 14-8(j)(2), we are enclosing six copies of this letter and all
exhibits thereto. In accordance with Rule 14a-8(j), a copy of this submission is
being sent to the Proponent.
BACKGROUND
I. The Proposal
Although the Proposal is attached to the copy of the enclosed letter, for your
convenience, we set forth the text of the Proposal below:
RESOLVED, that the shareholders of Angelica Corporation recommend that the Board
of Directors immediately engage a nationally recognized investment banking firm
to explore all strategic alternatives (outside of the ordinary course of
business) to increase shareholder value, including, but not limited to, the sale
of Angelica Corporation, sales of assets or another extraordinary transaction.
The Proponent asserts the following reasons in support of the Proposal: (A) the
Proponent believes that the retention of a "nationally recognized investment
banking firm will cause the Board and management to focus on opportunities
outside the ordinary course of business that will enhance shareholder value;"
(B) the Proponent is "impressed with the current market for mergers and
acquisitions and the appetite of private equity firms" and a sale of the Company
"could draw interest from well capitalized strategic parties or financial buyers
who are willing to pay a meaningful premium for a quality business with positive
cash flows;" and (C) the Proponent believes that the present "is a good time for
the [sale] because the debt markets continue to support mergers and acquisitions
activity."
II. Engagement of Morgan Joseph & Co. Inc.
A. Engagement Letter
On February 21, 2006, the Company executed an engagement letter (the "Engagement
Letter") with the nationally recognized investment banking firm of Morgan Joseph
& Co. Inc. ("Morgan Joseph") pursuant to which the Company retained. Morgan
Joseph to provide "financial advisory and investment banking services." The
Engagement Letter specifically requires that Morgan Joseph (1) familiarize
itself with the Company's "business, operations, properties, financial
condition, management and prospects" and (2) prepare a report for the Company's
Board of Directors (the "Board of Directors") reviewing the Company's "current
financial projections and the implications thereof for building shareholder
value." To the extent the Company requests that Morgan Joseph provide other
services to the Company besides those set forth in the Engagement Letter, the
Company and Morgan Joseph are required to enter into a separate agreement
setting forth the scope of the proposed services and the customary fees
associated with such services. The Engagement Letter originally provided for a
two year term.
B. Amendment No. 1 to the Engagement Letter
On June 30, 2006, the Company and Morgan Joseph amended the Engagement Letter
to, among other things, expand the scope of the engagement and shorten the term
of the engagement ("Amendment No. 1"). The range of strategic alternatives being
reviewed by the Board of Directors, with the assistance of Morgan Joseph
pursuant to the amended Engagement Letter, includes a possible sale, merger,
consolidation, reorganization or other business combination, or other
extraordinary transaction. Furthermore Amendment No. 1 provides that Morgan
Joseph will perform various tasks related to the engagement including: (1) "advis[ing]
the Company with respect to process, structure and financial terms of a possible
transaction and the negotiating strategy to be [employed];" (2) assisting with
the preparation of a memorandum for distribution to potential buyers that
describes the Company's business, operations, properties, financial condition
and prospects; (3) "seek[ing] to introduce the Company to companies and persons
who might be interested in a transaction involving the Company;" (4) "assist[ing]
the Company in any discussions and negotiations which may ensue with any parties
interested in consummating a [t]ransaction;" and (5) rendering a fairness
opinion customary in such type of transaction. Amendment No. 1 changed the
termination date of the Engagement Letter to June 30, 2007 and sets forth fee
requirements and "tail" provisions customary for this type of investment banking
engagement letter. This amendment is clear evidence of the intention of the
Board of Directors to actively consider and explore, among other alternatives,
the strategic alternatives set forth in the Proposal.
C. Amendment No. 2 to the Engagement Letter
Between June 30, 2006 and May 15, 2007, Morgan Joseph assisted the Board of
Directors with its review of strategic alternatives. During this period, Morgan
Joseph and the Company's chief executive officer held informal discussions with
potential financial and strategic acquirers regarding the possibility of a
business combination, sale of the Company or sale of certain assets. Based on
these activities, the analysis and recommendations of Morgan Joseph regarding
these discussions and other means of maximizing shareholder value, the Board of
Directors decided not to conduct an active market canvass at that time because
the anticipated improvement in Company performance would enhance shareholder
value in a later sale.
Later in June, Stephen M. O'Hara, President and CEO of the Company, began
discussions with Morgan Joseph regarding the possibility of Morgan Joseph
providing financial advisory services for another year. Mr. O'Hara initiated
these discussions because he and the other members of management believed the
Company should continue its process of reviewing strategic alternatives. On June
25, 2007, Morgan Joseph and Mr. O'Hara, on behalf of the Company, executed a
second amendment ("Amendment No. 2") to the Engagement Letter, as amended, to
extend the engagement through June 30, 2008. Amendment No. 2 maintains the same
scope of engagement set forth in Amendment No. 1. This new amendment provided
that the Engagement Letter, as amended, would terminate if Amendment No. 2 was
not ratified by the Board of Directors by July 17, 2007. Thus, the ultimate
decision as to whether the Company would continue its process of reviewing and
exploring strategic alternatives rested with the Board of Directors and occurred
after the receipt of the Proponent's Proposal.
On July 2, 2007, the Company received the Proposal from the Proponent. The
Company provided a copy of the Proposal and a copy of Amendment No. 2 to the
Board of Directors for review in advance of its regularly scheduled meeting on
July 17, 2007. At that meeting, the Board of Directors ratified Amendment No. 2
with the scope of engagement described above. The Board of Directors also
determined at its July 17 meeting that it will continue, on an ongoing basis, to
actively consider and explore all strategic alternatives, including a sale of
the Company and other extraordinary transactions that are fully inclusive of all
of those referenced in the Proposal.
In a letter dated July 17, 2007, which was filed as an exhibit to a Form 8-K
filed on the same date, the Company informed the Proponent that it had extended
the engagement of Morgan Joseph and that the scope of such engagement rendered
the Proposal moot because it had already been fully implemented. In a letter
dated July 18, 2007 from Pirate Capital LLC ("Pirate"), the Proponent's
investment adviser, which was filed as an exhibit to Amendment No. 12 to the
Schedule 13D of Pirate and its manager Thomas R. Hudson, Jr., Pirate attempts to
rewrite the Proposal so that it would require the hiring of a new investment
banking firm and that the mandate be made more specific than exploring
extraordinary transactions such as a sale of the Company. This letter did not
take issue with recognition of Morgan Joseph as a nationally recognized
investment banking firm and does not refute the essential conclusion that the
engagement of Morgan Joseph is fully inclusive of the action requested by the
Proposal. The letter is also inaccurate in suggesting that either the Board of
Directors or Morgan Joseph will not actively focus on extraordinary
transactions. They will actively consider and explore those alternatives but in
the context of the Board of Directors' fiduciary obligations which require the
Board of Directors to consider all reasonably available alternatives in
determining a course of action that is designed to maximize shareholder value.
In order to reach a fully informed business judgment in selecting among those
alternatives, the Board of Directors needs advice from the financial advisor on
which of the reasonably available alternatives is most likely to maximize
shareholder value. Accordingly, it would not be appropriate to limit the scope
of Morgan Joseph's engagement to only reviewing and evaluating extraordinary
transactions.
THE PROPOSAL MAY BE EXCLUDED PURSUANT TO RULE 14A-8(i)(10) BECAUSE THE PROPOSAL
HAS BEEN "SUBSTANTIALLY IMPLEMENTED" BY THE COMPANY
Rule 14a-8(i)(10) provides that a shareholder proposal may be excluded from a
company's proxy materials if the proposal has already been "substantially
implemented" by the company. The purpose of this exclusion is to avoid
potentially confusing the company's shareholders and wasting company funds by
having the shareholders vote on a matter that is moot. As the SEC previously
stated, the exclusion basis provided by Rule 14a-8(i)(10) "is designed to avoid
the possibility of shareholders having to consider matters which have already
been favorably acted upon by the management...." See Release No. 34-12598 (July
7, 1976).
In the present case, the Proposal calls for the Board of Directors to
immediately engage a nationally recognized investment banking firm to explore
all strategic alternatives (outside of the ordinary course of business),
including a sale of the Company or other extraordinary transaction. The
supporting statement asserts several reasons why it would be advantageous for
the Company to presently pursue a sale.
As noted above, the Company and Morgan Joseph entered into Amendment No. 2 on
June 25, 2007, subject to ratification by the Board of Directors. On July 17,
2007 (more than two weeks after the Company received the Proposal), the Board of
Directors ratified Amendment No. 2 and approved a twelve month extension of the
engagement of Morgan Joseph to assist the Board of Directors in its review and
exploration of all strategic alternatives, including a possible sale, merger,
consolidation, reorganization or other business combination, or other
extraordinary transaction. As noted above, in connection with this engagement,
Morgan Joseph will (A) "advise the Company with respect to process, structure
and financial terms of a possible transaction and the negotiating strategy to be
[employed];" (B) assist with the preparation of a memorandum for distribution to
potential buyers that describes the Company's business, operations, properties,
financial condition and prospects; (C) "seek to introduce the Company to
companies and persons who might be interested in a transaction involving the
Company;" (4) "assist the Company in any discussions and negotiations which may
ensue with any parties interested in consummating a [t]ransaction;" and (5)
render a fairness opinion customary in such type of transaction.
Morgan Joseph is a nationally recognized investment banking firm that regularly
advises companies on the evaluation, exploration and implementation of strategic
alternatives, including sales, mergers and other extraordinary transactions. It
will actively assist the Board of Directors in fulfilling the mandate of
maximizing shareholder value.
It is clear that the actions of the Company fully implement the action requested
in the Proposal. This conclusion is consistent with the relevant no action
letter precedent summarized below.
In Longview Fibre Co. (October 21, 1999), a sharcholder submitted a proposal
recommending that Longview Fibre Co. ("Longview") "engage the services of a
nationally recognized investment banker specifically to explore all alternatives
to enhance the value of [Longview], including but not limited to, possible sale,
merger, or other transaction for any or all assets of the [Longview]." At the
time of the proposal, Merrill Lynch was serving as Longview's financial advisor.
This general engagement started in November 1996. Following receipt of the
shareholder proposal, Longview engaged Merrill Lynch to review its financial and
strategic plans. The proposed study was supposed to identify and evaluate "all
reasonably available alternatives to enhance the value of [Longview]," including
a sale, merger or recapitalization. In light of this, Longview sought to exclude
the proposal and the Division concurred that Longview could exclude the proposal
under Rule 14a-8(i)(10).
The facts in Longview Fibre Co. are similar to those found in the present
instance. As with the prior engagement of Merrill Lynch by Longview, the Company
had previously engaged Morgan Joseph to provide advisory services. Furthermore,
following receipt of the Proposal, the Board of Directors approved a twelve
month extension of the engagement with Morgan Joseph pursuant to which Morgan
Joseph would assist the Board of Directors in reviewing and exploring a range of
strategic alternatives, including a sale of the Company and other extraordinary
transactions of the type contemplated by the Proposal. This is similar to the
manner in which Longview engaged Merrill Lynch to advise on strategic
alternatives following receipt of the proposal.
In BostonFed Bancorp, Inc. (March 17, 2000), BostonFed Bancorp, Inc.
("BostonFed") received a shareholder proposal requesting that it "engage an
investment banking firm to advise [BostonFed] on ways to maximize shareholder
value, including a potential sale or merger of [BostonFed]." At the time,
BostonFed had already engaged Sandler O'Neil & Partners, L.P. ("Sandler") to act
as its financial advisor for the purpose of identifying and advising BostonFed
on strategies to maximize shareholder value, including the potential sale or
merger of BostonFed. In addition, Sandler had previously acted as BostonFed's
financial advisor on matters of strategic planning. In light of the foregoing,
BostonFed sought to exclude the proposal and the Division concurred that
BostonFed could exclude the proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(10).
The facts in BostonFed Bancorp, Inc. are substantially similar to those found in
the present instance. Similar to the prior engagement of Sandler by BostonFed,
the Company had engaged Morgan Joseph to assist the Company in reviewing and
exploring a range of strategic alternatives, including a sale of the Company and
other extraordinary transactions. At the time of the proposal to BostonFed, the
engagement with Sandler was ongoing. In both instances, the actions requested by
the shareholder proponent were satisfied by the engagement of a nationally
recognized investment banking firm and the scope of such engagement.
In addition to the Division's decision in Longview Fibre Co. and BostonFed
Bancorp, Inc., the Division has consistently held in similar situations that a
shareholder proposal was moot or substantially implemented when the respective
company had retained an investment banking lirm addressing the substance of the
shareholder proposal. See The MacNeal-Schwendler Corp. (April 2, 1999) (allowing
the company to exclude a similar shareholder proposal because the board of
directors had previously retained an investment banking firm and such firm had
conducted activities similar to most of the activities suggested by the
shareholder); DBA System, Inc. (September 4, 1997) (allowing the company to
exclude a similar shareholder proposal because the board of directors retained
an investment banking firm, for purposes inclusive of those advocated by the
shareholder, following receipt of the shareholder proposal even though the
process for retaining an investment banking firm started prior to receipt of the
proposal); Peerless Manufacturing Co. (August 7, 1997) (allowing the company to
exclude a similar shareholder proposal because the board of directors retained
an investment banking firm, for purposes inclusive of those advocated by the
shareholder, following receipt of the shareholder proposal even though the
process for considering the retention of an investment banking firm started
prior to receipt of the proposal); Baldwin Piano & Organ Co. (March 27, 1997)
(allowing the company to exclude a similar shareholder proposal because the
board of directors retained an investment banking firm, for purposes inclusive
of those advocated by the shareholder, following receipt of the shareholder
proposal); Stone & Webster, Inc. (February 22, 1996) (allowing the company to
exclude a shareholder proposal because the board of directors had previously
retained an investment banking firm and such investment banking firm had
recently conducted activities suggested by the shareholder); Monarch Machine
Tool Co. (March 6, 1996) (allowing the company to exclude a similar shareholder
proposal because the board of directors retained an investment banking firm
following receipt of the shareholder proposal); Health Insurance of Vermont,
Inc. (February 28, 1995) (allowing the company to exclude a similar shareholder
proposal because the board of directors retained a financial advisory firm
several months later on terms inclusive of those suggested by the shareholder).
The present circumstances are different from those situations in which the
Division declined to concur with a company's exclusion of a shareholder proposal
similar to the Proposal on the basis that the proposal has been "substantially
implemented." In EDO Corp. (February 16, 1995), EDO Corp. ("EDO") sought to
exclude a similar shareholder proposal on the basis that it had been
"substantially implemented" because (1) EDO regularly consulted with investment
banking firms to explore alternatives for enhancing shareholder value and (2) it
intended to continue to do so in the future. The Division did not concur with
EDO excluding the shareholder proposal on the basis that it had been
"substantially implemented" as a result of prior and promised future
consultations with investment banking firms. See also Kiddie Products Inc.
(February 9, 1989) (preventing the company from excluding a proposal to retain
an investment banking firm because the consideration of retaining an investment
banking firm, without actually hiring an investment banking firm, was not
sufficient to render the proposal moot). Unlike the situations in EDO Corp. and
Kiddie Products Inc., the Company has actually and presently retained a
nationally recognized investment banking firm for purposes inclusive of those
advocated by the Proponent.
The present instance is also distinguishable from MSB Bancorp, Inc. (February
20, 1996) where MSB Bancorp, Inc. ("MSB") received a shareholder proposal
requesting the engagement of "a qualified, untainted, independent investment
banking firm to explore alternatives for maximizing shareholder value, including
but not limited to the sale of the institution." Bear Stearns & Co. Inc. ("Bear
Stearns") was currently acting as the financial advisor to MSB and had been
involved in such engagement for two years at the time of the proposal. The range
of advisory services provided by Bear Stearns applied to various activities,
including an acquisition and proposed equity issuance. In that case, the
Proponent stated that the engagement of Bear Stearns did not satisfy his
Proposal because it did not qualify as "independent and untainted" due to its
prior services and the compensation it had received from MSB. In addition, MSB
argued that the Proponent disagreed with the results of MSB's process of
evaluating strategic alternatives during the preceding two years and that MSB
should not be required to hire another investment banker to repeat that process.
The Commission declined to agree with MSB that the prior retention of Bear
Stearns rendered the proposal moot. Unlike that situation, the Proposal does not
contain conditions regarding the independence and lack of "taint" of the
investment banking firm and there is no question, in any event, regarding Morgan
Joseph's independence or integrity. Moreover, the record here shows that the
Company extended the engagement of Morgan Joseph after the receipt of the
Proposal and will continue to evaluate and explore its strategic alternatives.
In Lifeline Systems, Inc. (April 6, 2000), the Division declined to allow
exclusion of a shareholder proposal involving a similar but distinguishable
purpose. In that case, the company had made internal and external statements
that it would exclusively pursue a path of remaining independent which
contradicted statements made to the Division in its request for no action relief
that it would continue to seek strategic alternatives. The record here is
clearly distinguishable in that the Board of Directors extended the term of
Morgan Joseph's engagement and reaffirmed its desire to review and explore
strategic alternatives that are inclusive of those expressed in the Proposal
after the receipt of the Proposal.
Similarly, Gyrodyne Company of America (September 26, 2005) involved a proposal
requesting the company to engage an investment banking firm to pursue a sale of
the company. After receipt of the proposal, the company retained an investment
banking firm to (i) analyze the company's business, operations, financial
condition and prospects, (ii) assess the market value of the company's assets
under various scenarios, and (iii) assist the company in reviewing and making
recommendations regarding various types of transactions. The scope of engagement
in that case therefore did not encompass pursuing a sale of the company and thus
did not satisfy the request in the proposal. The Proposal in this case does not
go so far as to request pursuing a sale, but rather exploring a sale. This
situation is therefore like the circumstances in other favorable no action
precedents referenced above which involved a mere exploration of strategic
alternatives such as a sale of the Company.
Like Gyrodyne, Capital Senior Living Corp. (March 23, 2007) involved a proposal
recommending the engagement of an investment banking firm to pursue a sale of
the company rather than a mere evaluation of strategic alternatives such as sale
of the company. The company in that case had retained an investment banking firm
prior to receipt of the proposal to merely advise on the appropriateness of
various strategies and, thus, did not satisfy the specific action requested in
the proposal. In addition, the company's board of directors had already
concluded that it would not pursue a sale of the company at that time and gave
no assurance it would continue to actively consider and pursue such alternatives
in the future. These facts are clearly distinguishable because (i) the
engagement of Morgan Joseph would have expired if the Board of Directors had not
ratified it after receipt of the Proposal, (ii) the scope of Morgan Joseph's
engagement is inclusive of the action requested by the Proposal, and (iii) the
Board of Directors determined after receipt of the Proposal that it will
continue, on an ongoing basis, to actively consider and explore all strategic
alternatives, including a sale of the Company and other extraordinary
transactions.
It is clear that the Company has fully implemented the Proposal and, thus, has
gone further than is required to satisfy the test in Rule 14a-8(i)(10) of a
proposal only being "substantially implemented." Based on the applicable no
action precedent and the reasons set forth above, the Company respectfully
submits that the Proposal may be excluded from the Company's 2007 Proxy
Materials under Rule 14a-8(i)(10).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Company requests that the Staff not recommend any
enforcement action if the Proposal is excluded from the 2007 Proxy Materials. We
request that the Staff deliver its response to this letter via U.S. mail and
facsimile: (314) 854-3949 for the Company, (816) 691-3495 for company counsel
and (203) 854-5841 for the Proponent. We hereby agree to promptly forward to the
Proponent any Staff response to this no action request that the Staff transmits
by facsimile to us only.
We recognize that the Staff has not interpreted Rule 14a-8 to require proponents
to provide the Company and its counsel a copy of any correspondence that the
proponent submits to the Staff. Therefore, in the interest of a fair and
balanced process, we request that the Staff notify the undersigned if it
receives any correspondence on the Proposal from the Proponent or other persons,
unless that correspondence has specifically confirmed to the Staff that the
Company or its counsel have timely been provided with a copy of the
correspondence.
Should the Division disagree with our conclusions or need additional information
or further explanation, we request the opportunity to confer with the Division
prior to issuance of its response. Please do not hesitate to call me at the
number listed on the first page of this letter if I can be of any assistance to
the Division in connection with this request.
Sincerely,
STINSON MORRISON HECKER LLP
/s/
John A. Granda
Enclosures
cc: Angelica Corporation
Jolly Roger Fund LP
[INQUIRY LETTER]
July 2, 2007
VIA HAND DELIVERY & FACSIMILE (314-854-3949)
Angelica Corporation
424 South Woods Mill Road
Chesterfield, Missouri 63017-3406
Attn: Steven L. Frey, Corporate Secretary
RE: Shareholder Notice Pursuant to Rule 14a-8
Ladies and Gentlemen:
Pursuant to rule 14a-8 promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended ("Rule 14a-8") and in accordance with the definitive proxy statement of
Angelica Corporation (the "Company") released on or about October 6, 2006 to
shareholders in connection with its 2006 Annual Meeting of Shareholders, Jolly
Roger Fund LP, a Delaware limited partnership (the "Fund"), hereby submits this
written notice (this "Notice") to the Company of its desire to have the
shareholder proposal (the "Proposal") together with the supporting statement
(the "Supporting Statement") attached hereto in Annex A included in the
Company's proxy statement in connection with its 2007 annual meeting of
shareholders (including any adjournments or postponements thereof or any special
meeting that may be called in lieu thereof) (the "Annual Meeting"). In
accordance with Rule 14a-8 the undersigned representative of the Fund hereby
represents that (i) the Fund is record and beneficial holder of at least $2,000
in market value of the Company's shares of Common Stock (as defined below) and
has held such shares for the one-year period prior to the date hereof, and (ii)
the Fund intends to hold such shares through the date of the Annual Meeting.
The name and address of the Fund as we believe it to appear in the Company's
stock transfer books is Jolly Roger Fund LP, 200 Connecticut Avenue, 4th Floor,
Norwalk, Connecticut 06854. The Fund is the record and beneficial owner of 100
shares of common stock, $1 par value per share ("Common Stock"), of the Company
and the beneficial owner of an additional 148,090 shares of Common Stock (such
148,190 shares representing approximately 1.55% of the outstanding shares of
Common Stock). Pirate Capital LLC ("Pirate Capital"), whose principal business
is providing investment management services, is the general partner of the Fund.
The undersigned, Thomas R. Hudson Jr., is the Manager of Pirate Capital. Pirate
Capital is also the investment adviser to Jolly Roger Offshore Fund LTD, an
investment fund (collectively with the Fund, the "Funds"), which is the
beneficial owner of 786,957 shares of Common Stock (approximately 8.21% of the
outstanding shares). Mr. Hudson is also a director of Jolly Roger Offshore Fund
LTD. Pirate Capital and Mr. Hudson, as the Manager of Pirate Capital, may be
deemed to be the beneficial owners of the 935,147 shares of Common Stock
(approximately 9.75% of the outstanding shares) that are directly owned by the
Funds. In addition to the Fund's record and beneficial ownership of shares of
Common Stock sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 14a-8(b)(2),
additional documentary support for the Fund's claim of beneficial ownership is
set forth in Annex B attached hereto.
The Proposal and the Supporting Statement relate to the Fund's desire to have
the Board of Directors of the Company hire a nationally recognized investment
banking firm to consider strategic alternatives that will enhance shareholder
value. The Supporting Statement describes the Fund's reasons for making the
Proposal at the Annual Meeting. The Fund has no interest in the Proposal to be
brought before the Annual Meeting other than the interest it shares in common
with all other owners of Common Stock, namely, its participation through its
shares of Common Stock in the creation of shareholder value. A representative of
the Fund intends to appear in person at the Annual Meeting to make the Proposal.
The information included in this Notice and in the annexes attached hereto
represents the Fund's best knowledge as of the date hereof. The Fund reserves
the right, in the event such information shall be or become inaccurate, to
provide corrective information to the Company as soon as reasonably practicable,
although the Fund does not commit to update any information which may change
from and after the date hereof.
If the Company believes that this Notice for any reason is defective in any
respect, the Fund requests that you so notify it on or prior to 10:00 a.m. (EST)
on July 16, 2007 by contacting our legal counsel, Frank E. Lawatsch, Jr. ((212)
297-5830), or Todd B. Zarin ((212) 297-2473), of Day Pitney LLP, 7 Times Square,
New York, New York 10036-7311. Please be advised that neither the delivery of
this Notice nor the delivery of additional information, if any, provided by or
on behalf of the Fund or any of its affiliates to the Company from and after the
date hereof shall be deemed to constitute an admission by the Fund or any of its
affiliates that this Notice or any such information is required or is in any way
defective or as to the legality or enforceability of any matter or a waiver by
the Fund or any of its affiliates of its right to, in any way, contest or
challenge any such matter.
Please direct any questions regarding the information contained in this Notice
to our legal counsel, Frank E. Lawatsch, Jr., ((212) 297-5830), or Todd B. Zarin
((212) 297-2473), of Day Pitney LLP, 7 Times Square, New York, New York
10036-7311.
Very truly yours,
JOLLY ROGER FUND LP
By: Pirate Capital LLC, its General Partner
By: /s/
Name: Thomas R. Hudson Jr.
Title: Manager
Cc: Frank E. Lawatsch, Jr., Esq.
Todd B. Zarin, Esq.
[APPEXDIX]
Annex A
Proposal Regarding Increasing Shareholder Value through Alternatives Outside the
Ordinary Course of Business and Supporting Statement
RESOLVED, that the shareholders of Angelica Corporation recommend that the Board
of Directors immediately engage a nationally recognized investment banking firm
to explore all strategic alternatives (outside of the ordinary course of
business) to increase shareholder value, including, but not limited to, the sale
of Angelica Corporation, sales of assets or another extraordinary transaction.
Supporting Statement
Pirate Capital LLC, as the investment advisor to a number of funds, is one of
the largest beneficial owners (according to its public filings) of Angelica
Corporation ("AGL" or the "Company") and has been a long-term investor in AGL.
We provide this supporting statement to encourage our fellow shareholders to
vote FOR the proposal regarding increasing shareholder value by consideration of
a sale of the Company, sales of assets, or another extraordinary transaction and
to thereby recommend that the Board and management of AGL take immediate steps,
which we believe would unlock long-term shareholder value, by retaining a
nationally recognized investment banking firm to explore extraordinary strategic
alternatives, such as a sale of the Company, sales of assets or another
extraordinary transaction.
We believe that hiring a nationally recognized investment banking firm will
cause the Board and management to focus on opportunities outside the ordinary
course of business that will enhance shareholder value. We continue to be
impressed by the current market for mergers and acquisitions and the appetite of
private equity firms. We believe that a sale process for AGL could draw interest
from well capitalized strategic parties or financial buyers who are willing to
pay a meaningful premium for a quality business with positive cash flows. We
believe this is a good time for a transaction because the debt markets continue
to support mergers and acquisitions activity.
PLEASE VOTE "FOR" THE PROPOSAL TO SEEK ALTERNATIVES OUTSIDE THE ORDINARY COURSE
OF BUSINESS TO INCREASE SHAREHOLDER VALUE
[319 words]
[STAFF REPLY LETTER]
August 20, 2007
Response of the Office of Chief Counsel Division of Corporation Finance
Re: Angelica Corporation Incoming letter dated July 18, 2007
The proposal recommends that the board engage a nationally recognized investment
banking firm to explore all strategic alternatives to increase shareholder
value, including, but not limited to, the sale of Angelica, sales of assets or
another extraordinary transaction.
There appears to be some basis for your view that Angelica may exclude the
proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(10). In this regard, we note your representation
that Angelica has engaged a nationally recognized investment banking firm to
assist Angelica in exploring a range of strategic alternatives, including a sale
of Angelica. Accordingly, we will not recommend enforcement action to the
Commission if Angelica omits the proposal from its proxy materials in reliance
on rule 14a-8(i)(10).
Sincerely,
/s/
Tamara M. Brightwell
Special Counsel
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