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Company Name: Duke Energy Corp. (Massachusetts Laborers).
Public Availability Date: July 17, 2006

Document Sections:

INQUIRY LETTER
INQUIRY LETTER
APPENDIX 1
INQUIRY LETTER
APPENDIX 2
INQUIRY LETTER
INQUIRY LETTER
STAFF REPLY LETTER


[INQUIRY LETTER]

June 23, 2006

HAND DELIVERY

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Division of Corporation Finance
Office of Chief Counsel
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20549

Re: Omission of Shareholder Proposal Submitted to Duke Energy Corporation

Dear Sir or Madam:

Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j)(1) promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"), Duke Energy Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the "Company" or "Duke Energy"), requests confirmation that the Staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission will not recommend any enforcement action if Duke Energy omits from its proxy solicitation materials ("Proxy Material") for its 2006 Annual Meeting of Shareholders (the "2006 Annual Meeting") a proposal (the "Proposal") submitted by the Massachusetts Laborers' Pension Fund (the "Proponent").

Duke Energy is a diversified energy company with a portfolio of natural gas and electric businesses, both regulated and unregulated, and an affiliated real estate company. Duke Energy supplies, delivers and processes energy for customers in the Americas.

Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j)(2) under the Exchange Act, we submit six (6) copies of this letter and the Proponent's resolution and supporting statement (as Exhibit A) as well as the Earlier Proposal (as defined below) (as Exhibit B). By copy of this letter, Duke Energy is notifying the Proponent of its intention to omit the Proposal from its Proxy Material for the 2006 Annual Meeting.

The Proposal requests that Duke Energy's Board of Directors initiate the appropriate process to amend the Company's articles of incorporation to provide that director nominees shall be elected by the affirmative vote of the majority of votes cast at an annual meeting of shareholders.

Duke Energy believes that the Proposal properly may be excluded from its Proxy Material pursuant to (i) Rule 14a-8(i)(11) because the Proposal substantially duplicates the Earlier Proposal, which will be included in the Company's Proxy Material for the 2006 Annual Meeting, as well as (ii) Rule 14a-8(i)(3) because the Proposal violates Rule 14a-9.

Introduction

On June 22, 20061, the Proponent submitted the Proposal for inclusion in the Proxy Material for the 2006 Annual Meeting. The Proposal requests that the Company's Board of Directors "initiate the appropriate process to amend the Company's articles of incorporation to provide that director nominees shall be elected by the affirmative vote of the majority of votes cast at an annual meeting of shareholders."

The Proposal is substantially duplicative of a stockholder proposal received on June 1, 2006, from the Sheet Metal Workers' National Pension Fund (the "Earlier Proposal"), which Duke Energy intends to include in its Proxy Material for the 2006 Annual Meeting.

For your convenience, we have set forth below the resolution portion of each Proposal.

Earlier Proposal (received on June 1, 2006)

Resolved: That the shareholders of Duke Energy ("Company") hereby request that the Board of Directors initiate the appropriate process to amend the Company's articles of incorporation to provide that director nominees shall be elected by the affirmative vote of the majority of votes cast at an annual meeting of shareholders.

Proposal (received on June 22, 2006)

RESOLVED: That the shareholders of Duke Energy Corporation ("Company") hereby request that the Board of Directors initiate the appropriate process to amend the Company's articles of incorporation to provide that director nominees shall be elected by the affirmative vote of the majority of votes cast at an annual meeting of shareholders.

Discussion

A. The Proposal is Excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(11)

Rule 14a-8(i)(11) provides that a stockholder proposal may be excluded if it "substantially duplicates another proposal previously submitted to the company by another proponent that will be included in the company's proxy materials for the same meeting." The Commission has stated that "the purpose of Rule 14a-8(i)(11) is to eliminate the possibility of shareholders having to consider two or more substantially identical proposals submitted by proponents acting independently of each other." Exchange Act Release No. 12999 (Nov. 22, 1976).

When two substantially duplicative proposals are received by a company, the Staff has indicated that the company must include the first of the proposals in its proxy materials, unless it may otherwise be excluded. See, e.g., Great Lakes Chemical Corp. (avail. Mar. 2, 1998); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (avail. Jan. 6, 1994); Atlantic Richfield Co. (avail. Jan. 11, 1982). Duke Energy received the Earlier Proposal on June 1, 2006, approximately three weeks prior to receiving the Proposal on June 22, 2006. Consequently, if Duke Energy includes the Earlier Proposal in its Proxy Material for the 2006 Annual Meeting, then the Proposal is properly omitted as substantially duplicative of the Earlier Proposal.

In granting requests for no-action relief under Rule 14a-8(i)(11), the Staff has consistently taken the position that proposals that have the same "principal thrust" or "principal focus" may be considered substantially duplicative for purposes of Rule 14a-8(i)(11), even where such proposals differ in terms and scope. In a directly analogous situation, the Staff granted Occidental Petroleum Company's no-action letter request to omit a stockholder proposal relating to a majority vote election standard for directors, where the second proposal requested the board of directors to initiate a process to amend the company's governance documents to provide that director nominees shall be elected by the affirmative vote of the majority of votes cast at an annual shareholder meeting and the first proposal requested that stockholders amend the company's governance documents to provide that director nominees shall be elected by the affirmative vote of the majority of the votes cast at an annual meeting of shareholders. Further, although the supporting statement for the second proposal differed from that of the first proposal, both included similar arguments in support of a majority vote standard. See Occidental Petroleum Company (February 2, 2006). Another example of the Staff's stated position is Paychex, Inc. (July 18, 2005), in which the Staff concurred with the company's view that a second stockholder proposal (requesting an amendment to the company's governance documents to provide that directors shall be elected by the affirmative vote of the majority of votes cast at an annual meeting) was substantially duplicative of a previously submitted stockholder proposal requesting an amendment to the company's bylaws to provide for the election of directors by a majority of the votes cast at a meeting.

In the instant matter, both the Earlier Proposal and the Proposal have the same "principal thrust" or "principal focus." As in Petroleum Occidental and Paychex, the "principal thrust" or "principal focus" of each Proposal is adoption of a majority vote standard for the election of the Company's directors. In addition, the Proposals do not differ in terms and scope and the supporting statements are virtually identical.

Consistent with the stated purpose of Rule 14a-8(i)(11), if the Company were required to include both Proposals in its Proxy Material, the identical nature of the Proposals would create the potential for confusion for its stockholders. If a majority of the stockholders were to vote in favor of one of the Proposals, but not the other, the Company's Board of Directors would not have a clear understanding of the stockholders' intent with respect to the issue of majority voting in the election of the Company's directors.

B. The Proposal is Excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(3)

The Company may exclude the Proposal in its entirety under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) because the Proposal contains numerous false or misleading statements. Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(3), a company may exclude a shareholder proposal if the proposal or supporting statement would violate any of the Commission's proxy rules, including Rule 14a-9, which prohibits materially false or misleading statements in proxy soliciting materials. In addition, the Staff has allowed companies to exclude shareholder proposals pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(3) that are vague and indefinite. See Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B (September 15, 2004) ("SLB 14B").

As discussed below, the Proposal contains numerous false or misleading statements that will require detailed and extensive editing to comply with proxy rules. Thus, in accordance with SLB 14B, we believe that the Company may exclude the Proposal in its entirety. In the alternative, if the Staff is unable to concur with our conclusion that the Proposal may be excluded in its entirety because of the numerous false or misleading statements, we respectfully request that the Staff recommend exclusion or revision of the statements discussed below.

Specifically, the Company finds the following portions of the Proposal to be objectionable:

Supporting StatementParagraph One, First Sentence;

Supporting StatementParagraph One, Second Sentence;

Supporting StatementParagraph Four, First Sentence; and

Supporting StatementParagraph Four, Second Sentence.

1. Supporting StatementParagraph One, First Sentence

The first sentence of the first paragraph of the supporting statement is incorrect. The sentence states that the Company is incorporated in North Carolina. The Company, however, is incorporated in Delaware. This inaccuracy in the state of incorporation has continuing significance with respect to the Proposal because the subject matter of the Proposal is directly impacted by state law. In fact, the Proponent goes on to discuss North Carolina law and the implications that such law has on the required election of directors. A shareholder reading this proposal and supporting statement would be misled into believing the requirements of North Carolina law are applicable to the Company in this matter, which they are not, and therefore a shareholder may be misled into believing the proposed resolution has a different impact or more significance on the Company.

2. Supporting StatementParagraph One, Second Sentence

The second sentence of the first paragraph of the supporting statement is misleading. This sentence cites a provision of the North Carolina Business Corporation Act regarding election of directors. As discussed above, the Company is incorporated in Delaware, not North Carolina, and therefore North Carolina law is inapplicable in this matter. A discussion of the provisions of North Carolina law can only serve to confuse and possibly mislead shareholders. For example, the North Carolina statute provides that the proposed change in the voting standard of director elections would have to be accomplished through an amendment to the Company's articles of incorporation. However, because the Company is incorporated in Delaware, not North Carolina, this is not true with respect to Duke Energy. A Delaware company could effectuate such a change in voting standards other than through amendment to the articles of incorporation.

3. Supporting StatementParagraph Four, First Sentence

The first sentence of the fourth paragraph of the supporting statement is misleading. It states that "[t]he majority vote proposal received high levels of support last year, winning majority support at Advanced Micro Devices, Freeport McMoRan, Marathon Oil, Marsh and McClennan, Office Depot, Raytheon, and others." The statement is misleading for two reasons. First, it suggests that this proposal was presented at the Company and received a high level of support. Setting aside the fact that it does not clarify what is meant by "high levels," this proposal was not voted on at the Company and therefore the reference and implication is misleading. In addition, the listing of companies where the proposal received a majority support suggests that there is some relationship between Duke Energy and these companies such that the issues facing these companies and the related shareholder sentiment is somehow relevant to the Company. This is not true. Duke Energy has no relevant business relationship with any of these companies and their business initiatives and shareholder actions have no relevance to the Company's processes and policies. To suggest that these voting results are relevant to our shareholders' deliberations is misleading.

4. Supporting StatementParagraph Four, Second Sentence

The second sentence of the fourth paragraph of the supporting statement "Leading proxy advisory firms recommended voting in favor of the proposal" is misleading. Proxy advisory firms base their recommendations on a variety of factors and assumptions. A recommendation on how to vote on a particular proposal is generally not made in a vacuum and is not a "one size fits all." Although the statement may be true, and we don't even know whether the statement is true or not because the Proponent has not identified the specific proxy advisory firms being referenced or indicated for which companies it is basing such statement, a recommendation to vote in favor of a proposal at one company has no bearing on how a proxy advisory firm may recommend voting on the same proposal at another company. In fact, leading proxy advisory firms have recommended voting against this same proposal in a number of instances. Without providing a detailed explanation of each company's relevant governance policies and how the proxy advisory firm voted with respect to the particular combination of policies and how such comparison relates to Duke Energy's governance policies, a reference to recommendations at other companies is meaningless, and a reference to a favorable recommendation is misleading.

In light of the foregoing, we believe that the false or misleading statements contained in the Proposal justify the Company's exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(3).

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Duke Energy respectfully requests that the Staff advise that it will not recommend any enforcement action if the Company excludes the Proposal from its Proxy Material for the 2006 Annual Meeting.

* * *

In the event that the Staff disagrees with the conclusions reached in this letter, we would appreciate the opportunity to confer with you before the issuance of a response. In such case, or if you have any questions or desire any further information, please contact the undersigned at (513) 287-3108.

Sincerely yours,

/s/

David S. Maltz
Associate General Counsel

cc: Ms. Jennifer O'Dell

-----FOOTNOTES-----

1 We note that the Proponent's letter is dated June 9, 2006. However, the Company did not receive the Proposal until it was submitted on June 22, 2006 via facsimile. Nonetheless, even if the Proposal had been received on June 9, 2006, it still would have been submitted after the earlier proposal, which was received on June 1, 2006.


[INQUIRY LETTER]

June 9, 2006

Julia S. Janson
Vice President, Corporate Secretary,
Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer
Duke Energy Corporation
526 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28202

Dear Ms. Janson:

On behalf of the Massachusetts Laborers' Pension Fund ("Fund"), and in conjunction with the Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund, I hereby submit the enclosed shareholder proposal ("Proposal") for inclusion in the Duke Energy Corporation ("Company") proxy statement to be circulated to Company shareholders in conjunction with the next annual meeting of shareholders. The Proposal is submitted under Rule 14(a)-8 (Proposals of Security Holders) of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's proxy regulations.

The Fund is the beneficial owner of approximately 8,668 shares of the Company's common stock, which have been held continuously for more than a year prior to this date of submission. The Proposal is submitted in order to promote a governance system at the Company that enables the Board and senior management to manage the Company for the long-term. Maximizing the Company's wealth generating capacity over the long-term will best serve the interests of the Company shareholders and other important constituents of the Company.

The Fund intends to hold the shares through the date of the Company's next annual meeting of shareholders. The record holder of the stock will provide the appropriate verification of the Fund's beneficial ownership by separate letter. Either the undersigned or a designated representative will present the Proposal for consideration at the annual meeting of shareholders.

If you have any questions or wish to discuss the Proposal, please contact Jennifer O'Dell, Assistant Director of Corporate Affairs at (202) 942-2359. Copies of correspondence or a request for a "no-action" letter should be forwarded to Ms. O'Dell at the following address: Laborers' International Union of North America Corporate Governance Project, 905 16thStreet, NW, Washington, DC 20006.

Sincerely,

/s/

Thomas P. V. Masiello
Administrator

TPVM/gdo

Enclosure

cc: Jennifer O'Dell


[APPENDIX1]
Director Election Majority Vote Standard Proposal

RESOLVED:

That the shareholders of Duke Energy Corporation ("Company") hereby request that the Board of Directors initiate the appropriate process to amend the Company's articles of incorporation to provide that director nominees shall be elected by the affirmative vote of the majority of votes cast at an annual meeting of shareholders.

SUPPORTING STATEMENT:

Our Company is incorporated in North Carolina North Carolina law provides that directors are elected by a plurality of the votes cast by the shares entitled to vote in the election at a meeting at which a quorum is present unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation. (See Ch. 55 North Carolina Business Corporation Act, section 55-7-28 (a), Voting for directors; cumulative voting).

Our Company presently uses the plurality vote standard to elect directors. This proposal requests that the Board initiate a change in the Company's director election vote standard to provide that nominees for the board of directors must receive a majority of the vote cast in order to be elected or re-elected to the Board.

We believe that a majority vote standard in director elections would give shareholders a meaningful role in the director election process. Under the Company's current standard, a nominee in a director election can be elected with as little as a single affirmative vote, even if a substantial majority of the votes cast are "withheld" from that nominee. The majority vote standard would require that a director receive a majority of the vote cast in order to be elected to the Board.

The majority vote proposal received high levels of support last year, winning majority support at Advanced Micro Devices, Freeport McMoRan, Marathon Oil, Marsh and McClennan, Office Depot, Raytheon, and others. Leading proxy advisory firms recommended voting in favor of the proposal.

Some companies have adopted board governance policies requiring director nominees that fail to receive majority support from shareholders to tender their resignations to the board. We believe that these policies are inadequate for they are based on continued use of the plurality standard and would allow director nominees to be elected despite only minimal shareholder support. We contend that changing the legal standard to a majority vote is a superior, solution that merits shareholder support.

Our proposal is not intended to limit the judgment of the Board in crafting the requested governance change. For instance, the Board should address the status of incumbent director nominees who fail to receive a majority vote under a majority vote standard and whether a plurality vote standard may be appropriate in director elections when the number of director nominees exceeds the available board seats.

We urge your support for this important director election reform.


[INQUIRY LETTER]

June 1, 2006

Julia S. Janson
VP, Corp. Secretary, Chief Ethics & Compliance Officer
Duke Energy Corporation
526 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28202

Re: Director Election Majority Vote Standard Proposal

Dear Julia S. Janson:

On behalf of the Sheet Metal Workers' National Pension Fund ("Fund"), I hereby submit the enclosed shareholder proposal ("Proposal") for inclusion in the Duke Energy Corporation ("Company") proxy statement to be circulated to Company shareholders in conjunction with the next annual meeting of shareholders. Our Fund is co-filing this proposal with the Massachusetts Laborers Pension Fund. The Proposal relates to an amendment to the Company's governance documents to provide that director nominees shall be elected by the affirmative vote of the majority of votes cast at an annual meeting of shareholders. The Proposal is submitted under Rule 14(a)-8 (Proposals of Security Holders) of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission proxy regulations.

The Fund is the beneficial owner of approximately 38,472 shares of the Company's common stock that have been held continuously for more than a year prior to this date of submission. The Fund and other Sheet Metal Worker pension funds are long-term holders of the Company's common stock. The Proposal is submitted to initiate a change to the director election vote standard to provide that in director elections a majority vote standard will be used in lieu of the Company's current plurality vote standard.

The Fund intends to hold the shares through the date of the Company's next annual meeting of shareholders. The record holder of the stock will provide the appropriate verification of the Fund's beneficial ownership by separate letter. Either the undersigned or a designated representative will present the Proposal for consideration at the annual meeting of shareholders.

If you have any questions or wish to discuss the Proposal, please contact me at (703) 739-7000. Copies of correspondence or a request for a "no-action" letter should likewise be directed to me at Sheet Metal Workers' National Pension Fund, 601 N. Fairfax Street, Suite 500, Alexandria, VA 22314. Copies should also be forwarded to Mr. Craig Rosenberg, ProxyVote Plus, Two Northfield Plaza, Northfield, IL 60093.

Sincerely,

/s/

Matthew Hernandez
Corporate Governance Advisor

Enclosure

cc: Craig Rosenberg


[APPENDIX2]
Director Election Majority Vote Standard Proposal

Resolved: That the shareholders of Duke Energy ("Company") hereby request that the Board of Directors initiate the appropriate process to amend the Company's articles of incorporation to provide that director nominees shall be elected by the affirmative vote of the majority of votes cast at an annual meeting of shareholders.

Supporting Statement: Our Company is incorporated in North Carolina. North Carolina law provides that directors are elected by a plurality of the votes cast by the shares entitled to vote in the election at a meeting at which a quorum is present unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation. (See Ch. 55 North Carolina Business Corporation Act, section 55-7-28 (a), Voting for directors; cumulative voting).

Our Company presently uses the plurality vote standard to elect directors. This proposal requests that the Board initiate a change in the Company's director election vote standard to provide that nominees for the board of directors must receive a majority of the vote cast in order to be elected or re-elected to the Board.

We believe that a majority vote standard in director elections would give shareholders a meaningful role in the director election process. Under the Company's current standard, a nominee in a director election can be elected with as little as a single affirmative vote, even if a substantial majority of the votes cast are "withheld" from that nominee. The majority vote standard would require that a director receive a majority of the vote cast in order to be elected to the Board.

The majority vote proposal received high levels of support last year, winning majority support at Advanced Micro Devices. Freeport McMoran, Marathon Oil, Marsh and McClennan, Office Depot, Raytheon, and others. Leading proxy advisory firms recommended voting in favor of the proposal.

Some companies have adopted board governance policies requiring director nominees that fail to receive majority support from shareholders to tender their resignations to the board. We believe that these policies are inadequate for they are based on continued use of the plurality standard and would allow director nominees to be elected despite only minimal shareholder support. We contend that changing the legal standard to a majority vote is a superior solution that merits shareholder support.

Our proposal is not intended to limit the judgment of the Board in crafting the requested governance change. For instance, the Board should address the status of incumbent director nominees who fail to receive a majority vote under a majority vote standard and whether a plurality vote standard may be appropriate in director elections when the number of director nominees exceeds the available board seats.

We urge your support for this important director election reform.


[INQUIRY LETTER]

July 14, 2006

VIA FACSIMILE

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Division of Corporation Finance
Office of Chief Counsel
100 F Street, N.E.
Washington, DC 20549

Re: Withdrawal of No-Action Request Concerning Omission of Shareholder Proposal

Ladies and Gentlemen:

On June 23, 2006, Duke Energy Corporation submitted a no-action request ("No-Action Request") to the Division of Corporation Finance of the Securities and Exchange Commission stating that Duke Energy Corporation intended to omit from its proxy solicitation materials for its 2006 Annual Meeting of Shareholders a proposal (the "Proposal") submitted by the Massachusetts Laborers' Pension Fund (the "Proponent"). The Proponent has since notified us that it has withdrawn its Proposal. A copy of the letter from the Proponent is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Accordingly, Duke Energy Corporation withdraws the No-Action Request at this time.

If you have any questions or desire any further information, please contact the undersigned at (513) 287-3108.

Sincerely yours,
David S. Maltz
Associate General Counsel

cc: Ms. Jennifer O'Dell


[INQUIRY LETTER]

July 7, 2006

Via facsimile
513-287-3810

Julia S. Janson
VP, Corp. Secretary, Chief Ethics & Compliance Officer
Duke Energy Corporation
139 East Fourth Street, 29 ATII
PO Box 960
Cincinatti, OH 45201

Dear Ms. Janson:

I hereby withdraw the shareholder resolution filed by the Massachusetts Laborers' Pension Fund and in conjunction with the Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund. to be included in the Company's 2006 Proxy Statement.

Should you have any further questions about this proposal, please contact Jennifer O'Dell, Assistant Director of the Laborers' Office of Corporate Affairs at (202) 942- 2359.

Sincerely,

/s/

Thomas P.V. Masiello
Fund Administrator

TPVM/gdo

cc: Jennifer O'Dell


[STAFF REPLY LETTER]

July 17, 2006

David S. Maltz
Associate General Counsel
Duke Energy Corporation
139 East Fourth St., 29 ATII
P.O. Box 960
Cincinnati, OH 45201-0960

Re: Duke Energy Corporation

Dear Mr. Maltz:

This is in regard to your letter dated July 14, 2006 concerning the shareholder proposal submitted by the Massachusetts Laborers' Pension Fund for inclusion in Duke Energy's proxy materials for its upcoming annual meeting of security holders. Your letter indicates that the proponent has withdrawn the proposal, and that Duke Energy therefore withdraws its June 23, 2006 request for a no-action letter from the Division. Because the matter is now moot, we will have no further comment.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ted Yu
Special Counsel

cc: Thomas P.V. Masiello
Fund Administrator
Massachusetts Laborers' Pension Fund
14 New England Executive Park
Suite 200
P.O. Box 4000
Burlington, MA 01803-0900

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