Company Name: Whole Foods Market, Inc.
Public Availability Date: December 14, 2005
Document Sections:
INQUIRY LETTER
APPENDIX 1
APPENDIX 2
INQUIRY LETTER
INQUIRY LETTER
STAFF REPLY LETTER
[INQUIRY LETTER]
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS
Securities and Exchange Commission
Division of Corporation Finance
Office of Chief Counsel
100 F. Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20549
Re: Whole Foods Market, Inc. - No-Action Letter Request Pursuant to Rule 14a-8
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Gentlemen:
On behalf of Whole Foods Market, Inc. (the "Company"), we are submitting the
subject no-action letter request in connection with the Company's definitive
proxy statement and proxy materials to be filed on or about January [20], 2006
("Proxy Materials") for its annual meeting of shareholders to be held on March
6, 2006 (the "Annual Meeting").
On October 3, 2005, the Company received a written request from Mr. John
Chevedden (the "Shareholder Proponent") to include his proposal (the
"Shareholder Proposal") in the Company's Proxy Materials. The Shareholder
Proposal requests that the Company's board of directors "take each step
necessary for a simple majority vote to apply on each issue that can be subject
to shareholder vote to the greatest extent possible."
A copy of the Shareholder Proposal is attached hereto as Attachment 1. A copy of
all other correspondence between the Company and the Shareholder Proponent is
attached hereto as Attachment 2.
Factual Background
The Company is a Texas corporation and as such is governed by the Texas
Business Corporation Act ("TBCA"). The TBCA generally provides that the vote of
2/3 of the outstanding shares of stock is required for certain actions including
(i) amendment of the articles of incorporation (Art. 4.02A(3)), (ii) adoption of
a plan of merger (Art. 5.03E), (iii) approval of the sale of substantially all
of the assets of the corporation (Art. 5.10A(4)) or (iv) adoption of a plan of
dissolution (Art. 6.03A(3)).
Article 2.28D of the TBCA allows a Texas corporation to amend its articles of
incorporation to provide for a lower threshold (but not less than a majority of
the outstanding shares) than the 2/3 vote threshold that the TBCA would
otherwise prescribe. This provision reads as follows:
"D. Changes in the Vote Required for Certain Matters. With respect to any matter
for which the affirmative vote of the holders of a specified portion of the
shares entitled to vote is required by this Act, the articles of incorporation
may provide that the act of the shareholders on that matter shall be the
affirmative vote of the holders of a specified portion, but not less than a
majority, of the shares entitled to vote on that matter, rather than the
affirmative vote otherwise required by this Act."
On October 20, 2005, the Company's board of directors adopted an amendment to
the Company's articles of incorporation, subject to the ratification by the
Company's shareholders, which would reduce the 2/3 voting requirement of the
TBCA to a majority of the outstanding shares. The amendment reads in relevant
part as follows:
"If, with respect to any action taken by the shareholders of the corporation,
any provision of the Texas Business Corporation Act would, but for this Article
VI, require the vote or concurrence of the holders of shares having more than a
majority of the votes entitled to be cast thereon, or of any class or series
thereof, the vote or concurrence of the holders of shares having only a majority
of the votes entitled to be cast thereon, or of any class or series thereof,
shall be required with respect to any such action."
The Company's board of directors directed that this amendment be included in
the Company's Proxy Materials as an agenda item (the "Company Proposal") at the
Annual Meeting for the proposed adoption by the Company's shareholders.
Conflict with Company Proposal; Rule 14a-8(i)(9)
We believe that the Shareholder Proposal may be excluded from the Proxy
Materials in reliance upon Rule 14a-8(i)(9) in that it directly conflicts with
the Company Proposal in the following respects.
Conflict as to action being requested. The Company Proposal requests that that
a specific action be undertakennamely, amendment of the Company's articles of
incorporation in the manner contemplated by Art. 2.28D of the TBCA. The
Shareholder Proposal, on the other hand, is unclear as to specific actions but
instead calls for the Company to "take each step necessary.... to the greatest
extent possible." Presumably, this might include actions such as reincorporating
to jurisdictions (such as Delaware) which do not have provisions such as those
contained in the TBCA, adopting additional bylaw provisions and perhaps listing
its shares on the New York Stock Exchange to the extent that these actions would
further assure the implementation of a majority vote standard. Adoption of both
the Company Proposal and the Shareholder Proposal would subject the Company to a
conflict as to whether filing the amendment of its articles of incorporation was
sufficient action to meet the "greatest extent possible" standard of the
Shareholder Proposal.
Conflict as to scope of application. The Company Proposal relates to the
specific situations in which the TBCA provides for a 2/3 vote requirement and
remedies those situations. The Shareholder Proposal relates to "each issue that
can be subject to shareholder vote." As virtually any matter can be brought
before the shareholders if the Company should choose to do so, the scope of the
Shareholder Proposal is far reaching. Adoption of both the Company Proposal and
the Shareholder Proposal would subject the Company to conflicts regarding
matters which are not required to be submitted to shareholders under law or
regulation but which are legally able to be submitted.
Conflict as to definition of a majority. By referencing the TBCA, the Company
Proposal is clear that, for purposes of the matters to which a 2/3 vote of
outstanding shares is currently required, a "majority vote" means a majority of
the outstanding shares of common stock. On the other hand, the Shareholder
Proposal provides no definition or reference in its use of the term "simple
majority." It may be referring to (i) a majority of outstanding stock, (ii) a
majority of shares represented at the meeting, (iii) a majority of shares voting
on a particular matter or (iv) some other calculation. Adoption of both the
Company Proposal and the Shareholder Proposal would subject the Company to
conflicts in determining the number of votes required to adopt certain measures
submitted to the shareholders.
General
Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j), we have submitted six copies of this no-action letter
request and all attachments thereto, including the Shareholder Proposal. We have
concurrently submitted one copy of this no-action letter request, together with
all attachments thereto, to the Shareholder Proponent.
In accordance with Staff Legal Bulletin 14 et seq., we are providing the
following contact information for the Shareholder Proponent and the Company:
Shareholder Proponent Address: 2215 Nelson Avenue, No. 205, Redondo Beach,
California 90278
Shareholder Proponent Fax: 310-371-7872
Company Address: 550 Bowie Street, Austin, Texas 78703 (Attention: General
Counsel)
Company Fax: 512-482-7217
Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing, we respectfully request that the Staff advise us that
it would not take any action if the Company were to exclude the Shareholder
Proposal from its Proxy Materials on the basis of Rule 14a-8(i)(9).
Very truly yours,
/s/
Bruce H. Hallett
Enclosures
cc: Albert Percival, Whole Foods Market, Inc. John Chevedden (Shareholder
Proponent)
[APPENDIX 1]
Attachment No. 1
Mr. John Mackey
Chairman
Whole Foods Market Inc. (WFMI)
601 N. Lamar, Suite 300
Austin, TX 78703
PH: 512-477-4455
FX: 512-477-1069
Dear Mr. Mackey,
This Rule 14a-8 proposal is respectfully submitted to advance the long-term
performance of our company. This proposal is submitted for the next annual
shareholder meeting. Rule 14a-8 requirements are intended to be met including
the continuous ownership of the required stock value until after the date of the
applicable shareholder meeting. This submitted format, with the
shareholder-supplied emphasis, is intended to be used for definitive proxy
publication.
Your consideration and the consideration of the Board of Directors is
appreciated in advancing the long-term performance of our company.
Sincerely,
/s/
October 3, 2005
John Chevedden
Shareholder
cc: Glenda Flanagan, Corporate Secretary
PH: 512-477-5566 ext. 1019
FX: 512-477-1301
FX: 512-482-7000
[APPENDIX 2]
[October 3, 2005]
3-Adopt Simple Majority Vote
RESOLVED: Recommend that our Board of Directors take each step necessary for a
simple majority vote to apply on each issue that can be subject to shareholder
vote to the greatest extent possible.
John Chevedden, 2215 Nelson Ave., No. 205, Redondo Beach, Calif. 90278 submitted
this proposal.
75% yes-vote
This topic won a 75% yes-vote average at 7 major companies in 2004. The Council
of Institutional Investors www.cii.org formally recommends adoption of this
proposal topic.
Terminate Frustration of the Shareholder Majority
Our current rule allows a small minority to frustrate the will of our
shareholder majority. For example, in requiring an 67% vote to amend our
company's charter, if 66% vote yes and only 1% vote noonly 1% could force their
will on the overwhelming 66% majority. This proposal does not address a majority
vote standard in director elections which is gaining increased support as a
separate topic.
Progress Begins with One Step
With our company's poison pill expiring Dec. 15, 2004 and no new pill adopted,
our company took a key step forward in improving corporate governance.
I believe that it is important to take another step forward and adopt the above
RESOLVED statement since our 2005 governance standards were not impeccable. For
instance in 2005 it was reported:
We had no Independent Chairman - Independent oversight concern.
A 67% shareholder vote was required to make certain key changes - Entrenchment
concern.
Cumulative voting was not permitted.
The Corporate Library, an independent investment research firm in Portland,
Maine lowered our company's overall Board Effectiveness Rating from "A" to "C"
in light of our company's actions accelerating out-of-the-money stock options to
evade the recognition of their cost.
Our full Board met only 6-times in a full year.
Our key Audit Committee met only 7-times in a full year.
Our board had not yet reported approval of a formal governance policy.
Two directors each owned either zero or 32 shares - Company confidence
concern.
One Step Forward
The above practices reinforce the reason to take one step forward to adopt
simple majority vote.
Notes:
The above format is the format submitted and intended for publication.
The company is requested to assign a proposal number (represented by "3" above)
based on the chronological order in which proposals are submitted. The requested
designation of "3" or higher number allows for ratification of auditors to be
item 2.
This proposal is believed to conform with Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B (CF),
September 15, 2004 including:
Accordingly, going forward, we believe that it would not be appropriate for
companies to exclude supporting statement language and/or an entire proposal in
reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3) in the following circumstances:
the company objects to factual assertions because they are not supported;
the company objects to factual assertions that, while not materially false or
misleading, may be disputed or countered;
the company objects to factual assertions because those assertions may be
interpreted by shareholders in a manner that is unfavorable to the company, its
directors, or its officers; and/or
the company objects to statements because they represent the opinion of the
shareholder proponent or a referenced source, but the statements are not
identified specifically as such.
Please note that the title of the proposal is part of the argument in favor of
the proposal. In the interest of clarity and to avoid confusion the title of
this and each other ballot item is requested to be consistent throughout the
proxy materials.
Please advise if there is any typographical question.
Stock will be held until after the annual meeting. Verification of stock
ownership will be forwarded.
[INQUIRY LETTER]
November 7, 2005
Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance
Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20549
Whole Foods Market Inc. (WFMI)
Shareholder Position on Company No-Action Request Rule 14a-8 Proposal:
Independent Committee
Shareholder: John Chevedden
Ladies and Gentlemen:
This is an initial response to the company no action request. The no action
request appears at least incomplete. The company fails to include a copy of the
purported amendment it cites. Also the company is evasive in answering the
shareholder question of how many pages are in the copies of its no action
request sent to the Staff. The company does not disclose the percentage vote
needed for adoption of the purported future company proposal. Plus the company
does not disclose whether the company will recommend a yes-vote, a no-vote or be
non-committal.
I believe that the company proposal will only obtain the necessary votes if the
company recommends a yes-vote and possibly does a solicitation. Yet the company
is also silent on a solicitation.
I do not believe the intention of Rule 14a-8(i)(9) is to keep shareholder
proposals off the ballot by allowing companies to submit sham proposals doomed
to a failing vote due to lack of genuine company support.
The following "High Risk Alert" from The Corporate Library may be somewhat
analogous to what Whole Foods is trying to do.
http://www.boardanalyst.com/alerts/alert_GT_051305.html
High Risk Alert
Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Goodyear's (GT) response to a 2002 shareholder proposal that received the
approval of 72% of the company's shareholders is underwhelming.
The 2002 proposal asked the board to "take the necessary steps to declassify the
Board of Directors and establish annual elections of directors." A 2001
proposal, also approved by a majority of Goodyear's shares voted, expressed a
similar sentiment. Three years later, in the 2005 proxy, the Goodyear board
finally responded:
The Board of Directors has adopted a resolution approving the submission to
shareholders of an amendment to Sections 1 and 2 of Article II of the Code of
Regulations that would declassify the Board of Directors and provide for the
annual election of all directors. The form of this amendment, called the "Annual
Election Amendment," is attached as Exhibit C. The Board of Directors makes no
recommendation regarding whether to vote for or against the Annual Election
Amendment. (Goodyear proxy report, March 24, 2005; italics added)
By submitting a binding proposal to shareholders, the Goodyear board performed
the bare minimum asked by the proposal, but by withholding its recommendation,
the board hexed the OEmanagement-sponsored' proposal from the start. The
following chart shows the difference in votes between the 2002 shareholder
proposal and management's 2005 proposal that they failed to endorse:
2002 Shareholder Proposal
2005 Management Proposal
Votes For
84,421,119
53.2%
81,495,897
46.4%
Votes Against
29,023,751
18.3%
9,091,639
5.2%
Votes Abstained
2,227,763
1.4%
5,755,299
3.3%
Broker Non-Votes
31,123,545
19.6%
64,986,877
37.0%
% of 158,760,734 shares outstanding
% of 175,780,313 shares outstanding
Small wonder, then, that the company reported this in its May 4, 2005 10-Q:
"The resolution, having failed to receive the affirmative vote of at least a
majority of the shares of Common Stock entitled to vote at the Annual Meeting,
was not adopted." This binding negative vote also gives the board carte blanche
to refuse to include future declassification proposals on the proxy. This 2005
coup d'|pi|qetat made for outstanding gamesmanship, but terrible governance.
It's hard to draw a conclusive link between management's lack of recommendation
and the staggering broker non-vote, but the shareholders who did vote deserve
credit for seeing through the ruse: votes against the proposal declined from 29
million votes to just 9 million, or 5.2% of shares outstanding.
We have long assigned Goodyear a low shareholder responsiveness rating; the
board also ignored two previous poison pill proposals approved by a majority of
the shares voted. We've now lowered the company's responsiveness grade to F, and
would lower it to even further if we could. The company's recent Sarbanes-Oxley
Section 404 reporting requirements violations also suggest that our Board
Effectiveness Rating of D is on target this board poses a high risk to
shareholder value.
Jennifer Pepin, Senior Ratings Analyst - 5/13/2005
It is respectfully requested that concurrence not be granted to the company. It
is respectfully requested that there be an opportunity for additional material
in support of inclusion of this shareholder proposal and that the shareholder
have the last opportunity to submit material since the company had the first
opportunity.
Sincerely,
John Chevedden
cc: Bruce Hallett
bhallett@hallettperin.com
[INQUIRY LETTER]
December 5, 2005
Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance
Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20549
Whole Foods Market Inc. (WFMI)
No. 2 Shareholder Position on Company No-Action Request Rule 14a-8 Proposal:
Independent Committee
Shareholder: John Chevedden
Ladies and Gentlemen:
The company has made no attempt to rebut the November 7, 2005 Shareholder
Position letter at least no attempt that has been forwarded to the proponent.
Additional material will be forwarded in the next letter to the staff to support
the shareholder position.
It is respectfully requested that concurrence not be granted to the company. It
is respectfully requested that the shareholder have the last opportunity to
submit material to the staff since the company had the first opportunity.
Sincerely,
John Chevedden
cc: Bruce Hallett
Bruce Hallett<bhallett@hallettperrin.com>
[STAFF REPLY LETTER]
December 14, 2005
Response of the Office of Chief Counsel Division of Corporation Finance
Re: Whole Foods Market, Inc. Incoming letter dated October 31, 2005
The proposal recommends that the board take each step necessary for a simple
majority vote to apply on each issue that can be subject to shareholder vote to
the greatest extent possible.
We are unable to concur in your view that Whole Foods Market may exclude the
proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(9). Accordingly, we do not believe that Whole Foods
Market may omit the proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule
14a-8(i)(9).
Sincerely,
/s/
Mary Beth Breslin
Special Counsel |