Company Name: Sun Microsystems, Inc.
Public Availability Date: July 21, 2005
Document Sections:
INQUIRY LETTER
APPENDIX
STAFF REPLY LETTER
[INQUIRY LETTER]
July 1, 2005
Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, D.C. 20549
Re: Shareholder Proposal Relating to Poison Pill Received May 24, 2005
Dear Sir or Madam:
This letter is submitted on behalf of Sun Microsystems, Inc. ("Sun" or the
"Company") pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended (the "Exchange Act"), to notify the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "Commission") of the intention of the Company to exclude certain
portions of the supporting statement of a shareholder proposal (the "Proposal")
submitted by Mr. William Steiner (directly or through his representative, John
Chevedden, the "Proponent") from the Company's proxy statement and form of proxy
for the Company's 2005 annual meeting of stockholders (the "Proxy Materials").
The Company respectfully requests that the Division of Corporation Finance not
recommend to the Commission that any enforcement action be taken if the Company
excludes portions of the supporting statement of the Proposal from the Proxy
Materials for the reasons set forth below. In accordance with Rule 14a-8(j)(2),
there are submitted herewith five additional copies of this letter and the
attached materials.
To meet printing and distribution requirements, the Company anticipates that it
will begin printing its Proxy Materials on or about September 12, 2005 and start
mailing its Proxy Materials to stockholders on or about September 19, 2005. The
Company currently anticipates filing its definitive Proxy Materials with the
Commission on or about September 19, 2005. The Company plans to hold its annual
meeting of stockholders on or about October 27, 2005.
I. The Proposal
The Company received correspondence containing a cover letter and the Proposal
from the Proponent on May 24, 2005, and subsequently received a Statement of
Ownership Record from the Proponent on June 7, 2005, copies of which have been
attached hereto as Attachment A. While the cover letter is dated September 28,
2004, the Company has no record of receipt of the Proposal until May 24, 2005.
The Proposal seeks shareholder approval for the adoption of a rule that the
Board of Directors of the Company (the "Board") will redeem any current or
future poison pill unless such poison pill is submitted to a shareholder vote.
The Proposal states in its entirety:
May 23, 2005
3Redeem or Vote Poison Pill
RESOLVED: Shareholders request that our Board adopt a rule that our Board will
redeem any current or future poison pill unless such poison pill is submitted to
a shareholder vote, as a separate ballot item, as soon as may be practicable.
William Steiner, 112 Abbotsford Gate, Piedmont, NY 10968 submitted this
proposal.
Pills Entrench Current Management
"Poison pill ... prevent shareholders, and the overall market, from exercising
their right to discipline management by turning it out. They entrench the
current management, even when it's doing a poor job. They water down
shareholders' votes and deprive them of a meaningful voice in corporate
affairs."
"Take on the Street" by Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman, 1993-2001
Progress Begins with a First Step
I believe the reason to take the above RESOLVED step is reinforced by our
directors' vulnerability when compared to best practices in corporate
governance. For instance in 2005 it was reported (concerns are inserted):
The Corporate Library, an independent investment research firm in Portland,
Maine, rated our company:
"D" in Accounting
Our company has a poison pill with a low 10% trigger
An overwhelming 75% super majority shareholder vote was required to make
certain key changesentrenchment concern
Four directors were CEOsover commitment concern
Two directors held 4 to 7 board seatsover commitment concern
Three directors had 17 to 23 years tenurelack of independence concern
One director owned no stocklack of commitment concern
One director failed on attendancelack of commitment concern
The chairman of our compensation committee had 23 years tenurelack of
independence concern
I believe the above slate of under-achievement practices reinforce the reason to
adopt the above RESOLVED statement to help improve our corporate governance
stature.
If a poison pill makes our stock difficult to sellthe value of our stock could
suffer.
Redeem or Vote Poison Pili
Yes on 3
* * *
For the reasons stated below, the Company would like to omit certain portions of
the Supporting Statement to the Proposal from its Proxy Materials.
II. Portions of the Supporting Statement May Be Omitted Under Rule 14a-8(i)(3)
Because They Contain Statements or Assertions That the Company Can Demonstrate
Objectively To Be Materially False or Misleading.
Rule 14a-8(i)(3) permits a company to exclude portions of a sharcholder proposal
or supporting statement from its proxy statement if such portions are contrary
to any of the Commission's proxy rules, including Rule 14a-9, which prohibits
materially false or misleading statements in proxy soliciting materials. Prior
to the Staff's September 15, 2004 Legal Bulletin (See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin
No. 14B (CF) (September 15, 2004)), this included factually false or misleading
statements, opinions stated as fact, and undocumented assertions of fact. See,
e.g., Monsanto Co. (Nov. 26, 2003) (false or misleading statements, opinions
stated as fact, and undocumented assertions of fact); Sysco Corp. (Aug. 12,
2003) (false or misleading statements and undocumented assertions of fact);
Kroger Co. (April 11, 2003) (false or misleading statements). Although in its
September 15, 2004 Bulletin the Staff announced that opinions stated as facts
and undocumented assertions of fact would no longer be excludable, it reaffirmed
that materially false or misleading factual statements may properly be excluded
under Rule 14a-8(i)(3). However, in order to exclude such statements, the Staff
declared that companies must demonstrate objectively that such statements are
false or misleading. In the Company's view, the Proposal's supporting statement
contains several statements that the Company believes are either false or
misleading for the reasons set forth below.
Beginning with "The Corporate Library", and ending with "had 23 years
tenurelack of independence", the supporting statement includes several false or
misleading statements. In relevant part, it reads as follows:
The Corporate Library ... rated our company: "D" in Accounting.
Our company has a poison pill with a "low" 10% trigger. [Emphasis Added]
An "overwhelming" 75% super majority shareholder vote was required to make
certain key changesentrenchment concern. [Emphasis Added]
Four directors were CEOsover-commitment concern.
One director owned no stocklack of commitment concern.
One director failed on attendancelack of commitment concern.
First, the Proponent's statement regarding the Company's accounting rating is
out of context. The Company received ratings on eight corporate topics from the
Corporate Library, including board composition, CEO compensation, shareholder
responsiveness, litigation and regulatory problems, takeover defenses,
accounting, strategic decision making and analyst adjustment. The Company
received an overall board effectiveness rating of "B" and a "best practices"
compliance score of 90%. The Proponent's use of one subcomponent of the overall
rating does not accurately portray the effectiveness of the Company's Board as
determined by the Corporate Library, and instead takes one portion of a
comprehensive study out of context, which has the potential to mislead the
Company's stockholders. Moreover, the report is not available to stockholders
generally because it can only be obtained by paying a fee, so stockholders will
not generally know or be able to readily determine that the Company received a
far more favorable overall score than the one score included in the Proponent's
Supporting Statement. Enclosed for your information is a copy of the Corporate
Library Report. The Company believes the statement, without further context, is
misleading and should be omitted from the Proposal.
The Company believes the use of the word "low" in the second bulleted item makes
that statement misleading. It is a fact that the Company has a poison pill with
a 10% trigger. However, by referring to it as a "low" trigger, a stockholder may
not appreciate all of the considerations that were made by the board in
selecting that threshold. The Company has numerous provisions in its certificate
of incorporation and bylaws that provide significant rights to stockholders that
are not necessarily typical for a Delaware corporation, including the ability of
stockholders to call special meetings and the ability of stockholders to elect
to cumulate votes in connection with the election of directors. Given these
substantial differences, the word "low" should be omitted because, without
context, it could mislead stockholders.
Next, the third bulleted item states that "An `overwhelming' 75% super majority
shareholder vote was required to make certain key changesentrenchment concern."
While it is true that the Company's bylaws provide that any amendment to the
Company's bylaws must be approved by the Board of Directors or 75% of the
Company's outstanding shares (the "Voting Requirement"), the Company believes
that the statement is misleading to stockholders because the Voting Requirement
does not present an entrenchment concern. As mentioned above, Sun's bylaws are
not necessarily typical for a Delaware corporation and include numerous
provisions designed to prevent entrenchment, including the ability of
stockholders to remove directors, with or without cause, the ability of
stockholders to act by written consent, the ability of stockholders to call
special meetings and the ability of stockholders to cumulate votes in connection
with the election of directors. Further, the provision in the bylaws with
respect to the ability of stockholders to call a special meeting can only be
amended with the approval of 75% of the Company's outstanding sharesnot by the
Board of Directorsprotecting the stockholders' right to call such meetings. As
a result, the Company believes that this statement should be amended or struck
from the Proposal to avoid misleading stockholders.
Next, the Proponent states that four of the Company's directors were CEOs,
causing the potential for over-commitment. In fact, one of these directors is
the CEO of the Company. As a result, the Proponent has overstated the potential
over-commitment concern, and the Company believes that the statement should be
amended or struck from the Proposal to avoid misleading stockholders.
The Proponent's statement regarding the lack of ownership of the Company's stock
by one of the directors is false, as the statement does not represent the
current facts. At the time the correspondence was apparently first written on
September 28, 2004, it is true that one of the directors of the Company, Lynn
Turner, did not own any of the Company's stock. However, as timely reported on a
Form 4 filing, on February 25, 2005, Mr. Turner purchased stock in the Company,
and presently continues to hold those shares. Because of a change in
circumstance, this statement included in the Proponent's supporting statement is
now false, and the Company believes it should be removed from the Proposal.
Finally, the lack of full disclosure of the circumstances surrounding a Company
director's inability to attend Board meetings makes the statement next to the
last bullet point misleading. During our 2004 fiscal year, our Board held ten
meetings. One of our Board members (who was not a member of any committee of the
Board during that year) missed four Board meetings in order to care for his
wife, who died that year after a long illness. This fact was disclosed publicly
by the Company in its last proxy statement and the director's attendance for the
past fiscal year was in excess of 75% of the aggregate number of meetings of the
board and the committee on which he served. As this statement does not provide
complete disclosure with respect to the director's absence from certain of the
Company's Board meetings, the Company believes it should be removed for its
potential to mislead the Company's shareholders to believe that the director
lacks commitment to his service as a Board member.
As stated above, the Company respectfully requests permission to exclude the
false or misleading statements noted above from the Proposal in its Proxy
Materials.
* * * * *
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Company respectfully requests that the Staff
confirm that it would not recommend enforcement action if the Company omits
portions of the supporting statement from its Proxy Materials. Attached hereto
is a redacted version of the supporting statement that the Company proposes to
include with the Proposal. If you have any questions or if the Staff is unable
to agree with our conclusions without additional information or discussions, we
respectfully request the opportunity to confer with members of the Staff prior
to issuance of any written response to this letter. Please do not hesitate to
call the undersigned at (650) 565-3522.
Please acknowledge receipt of this letter and its attachment by date-stamping
the enclosed copy of the first page of this letter and returning it in the
self-addressed stamped envelope provided for your convenience.
Sincerely,
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI
Professional Corporation
/s/
Katharine A. Martin
Enclosures: Letter from William Steiner dated September 28, 2004
Proposal and Supporting Statement
Statement of Ownership
Redacted version of Proposal's supporting statement
Corporate Library Report for the Company
cc: John Chevedden
2215 Nelson Ave., No. 205
Redondo Beach, CA 90278
[APPENDIX]
May 23, 2005
3Redeem or Vote Poison Pill
RESOLVED: Shareholders request that our Board adopt a rule that our Board will
redeem any current or future poison pill unless such poison pill is submitted to
a shareholder vote, as a separate ballot item, as soon as may be practicable.
William Steiner, 112 Abbottsford Gate, Piermont, NY 10968 submitted this
proposal.
Pills Entrench Current Management
"Poison pills ... prevent shareholders, and the overall market, from exercising
their right to discipline management by turning it out. They entrench the
current management, even when it's doing a poor job. They water down
shareholders' votes and deprive them of a meaningful voice in corporate
affairs."
"Take on the Street" by Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman, 1993-2001
Progress Begins with a First Step
I believe the reason to take the above RESOLVED step is reinforced by our
directors' vulnerability when compared to best practices in corporate
governance. For instance in 2005 it was reported (and concerns are inserted).
The Corporate Library, an independent investment research firm in Portland,
Maine, rated our company:
"D" in Accounting.
Our company has a poison pill with a low 10% trigger.
An overwhelming 75% super majority shareholder vote was required to make
certain key changesentrenchment concern.
Four directors were CEOsover-commitment concern.
Two directors held 4 to 7 board seatsover-commitment concern.
Three directors had 17 to 23 years tenurelack of independence concern.
One director owned no stocklack of commitment concern.
One director failed on attendancelack of commitment concern.
The chairman of our compensation committee had 23 years tenurelack of
independence concern.
I believe the above slate of under-achievement practices reinforce the reason to
adopt the above RESOLVED statement to help improve our corporate governance
stature.
If a poison pill makes our stock difficult to sellthe value of our stock could
suffer.
Redeem or Vote Poison Pill Yes on 3
Notes:
The above format is the format submitted and intended for publication.
The company is requested to assign a proposal number (represented by "3" above)
based on the chronological order in which proposals are submitted. The requested
designation of "3" or higher number allows for ratification of auditors to be
item 2.
This proposal is believed to conform with Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B (CF),
September 15, 2004 which includes:
Accordingly, going forward, we believe that it would not be appropriate for
companies to exclude supporting statement language and/or an entire proposal in
reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3) in the following circumstances:
the company objects to factual assertions because they are not aupported;
the company objects to factual assertions that, while not materially false or
misleading, may be disputed or countered;
the company objects to factual assertions because those assertions may be
interprated by shareholders in a manner that is Unfavorable to the company, its
directors, or its officers; and/or
the company objects to statements because they represent the opinion of the
shareholder proponent or a referenced source, but the statements are not
identified specifically as such.
Please note that the title of the proposal is part of the argument in favor of
the proposal. In the interest of clarity and to avoid confusion the title of
this and each other ballot item is requested to be consistent throughout the
proxy materials.
Please advise if there is any typographical question.
Stock will be held until after the annual meeting.
Redactions are denoted with [***], additions are left in brackets.
May 23, 2005
3Redeem or Vote Poison Pill
RESOLVED: Shareholders request that our Board adopt a rule that our Board will
redeem any current or future poison pill unless such poison pill is submitted to
a shareholder vote, as a separate ballot item, as soon as may be practicable.
William Steiner, 112 Abbotsford Gate, Piedmont, NY 10968 submitted this
proposal.
Pills Entrench Current Management
"Poison pills...prevent shareholders, and the overall market, from exercising
their right to discipline management by turning it out. They entrench the
current management, even when it's doing a poorjob. They water down
shareholders' votes and deprive them of a meaningful voice in corporate
affairs."
"Take on the Street" by Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman, 1993-2001
Progress Begins with a First Step
I believe the reason to take the above RESOLVED step is reinforced by our
directors vulnerability when compared to best practices in corporate governance.
For instance in 2005 it was reported (concerns are inserted).
[*************]
[*************]
Our company has a poison pill with a [***] 10% trigger
[*************]
[***] [Three] directors were CEOsover commitment concern
Two directors held 4 to 7 board seatsover commitment concern
Three directors had 17 to 23 years tenurelack of independence concern
[*************]
[*************]
The chairman of our comperisation committee had 23 years tenurelack of
independence concern
I believe the above slate of under-achievement practices reinforce the reason to
adopt the above RESOLVED statement to help improve our corporate governance
stature.
If a poison pill makes our stock difficult to sellthe value of our stock could
suffer.
Redeem or Vote Poison Pill
Yes on 3
[STAFF REPLY LETTER]
July 21, 2005
Response of the Office of Chief Counsel Division of Corporation Finance
Re: Sun Microsystems, Inc. Incoming letter dated July 1, 2005
The proposal requests that the board adopt a rule requiring the board to redeem
any current or future poison pill unless it is submitted to a shareholder vote.
We are unable to concur in your view that Sun may exclude portions of the
supporting statement under rule 14a-8(i)(3). Accordingly, we do not believe that
Sun may omit portions of the supporting statement from its proxy materials in
reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3).
Sincerely,
/s/
Mark F. Vilardo
Special Counsel
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