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Company Name: UGI Corp.
Public Availability Date: December 18, 2003

Document Sections:

INQUIRY LETTER
APPENDIX
INQUIRY LETTER
INQUIRY LETTER
STATE REPLY LETTER

[INQUIRY LETTER]

October 14, 2003

By Hand Delivery

Office of Chief Counsel

Division of Corporation Finance

Securities and Exchange Commission

450 Fifth Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20549

Re: UGI Corporation: Omission of Shareholder Proposal Submitted by Nick Rossi

Ladies and Gentlemen:

On behalf of UGI Corporation (the "Company" or "UGI"), we respectfully request that the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance (the "Staff") concur that it will not recommend any enforcement action to the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") if the Company omits from its 2004 proxy materials a shareholder proposal and statement of support submitted by Mr. Nick Rossi (the "Proponent") for inclusion in the Company's 2004 proxy materials. Mr. Rossi has appointed Mr. John Chevedden to be his representative for all issues pertaining to the Proposal. The proposal and supporting statement are collectively referred to as the "Proposal."

We have enclosed pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"), five additional copies of this letter, along with the Proposal. We are sending a copy of this letter to the Proponent as formal notice of UGI's intention to exclude the Proposal from its proxy materials.

"3Shareholder Opportunity to Vote Regarding a Poison Pill

Shareholders recommend a bylaw subjecting to a shareholder vote, the adoption or extension of any current or future poison pill.

This topic won a 60% average yes-vote at 50 companies in 2002 according to the Investor Responsibility Research Center.

Nick Rossi. P.O. Box 249, Boonville, Calif. 95415, submits this proposal.

With more than 10 years experience with published shareholder proposals I believe it is prudent to have a shareholder vote on any poison pill because poison pills can harm shareholder value.

A poison pill can give our board veto power over a bid for our stock that may be in our best interest.

Eliminating the poison pill is a way of ensuring that management faces the same accountability that other workers do. There are often reasons that hostile takeovers should fail. But anti-democratic schemes to flood the market with diluted stock are not one of them. Source: The Motley Fool.

The key negative of poison pills is that they can preserve the interests of management deadwood instead of protecting investors. Source: Morningstar.com.

Poison pills are akin to the argument of a dictator who says, "Give up more of your freedom and I'll take care of you," said T.J. Dermot Dunphy, CEO of Sealed Air for more than 25 years.

Since the 1980s Fidelity, a mutual fund giant with $800 billion invested, has withheld votes for directors at companies that have approved poison pills, Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2002.

Beware of substitutes: I believe that any bylaw or policy on the poison pill, which could allow the board to forego a shareholder vote requirement, would not be a substitute for implementing this proposal.

Council of Institutional Investors Recommendation

The Council of Institutional Investors www.cii.org, an organization of 130 pension funds investing $2 trillion, called for shareholder approval of poison pills. In recent years, companies have redeemed their pill or have provided for a shareholder vote. I believe that our company should follow suit and allow shareholders a vote on this key issue.

Yes on 3 Shareholder Opportunity to Vote Regarding a Poison Pill"

It is our opinion that this Proposal is excludable for the following reason: The Proposal violates the proxy rules, including Rule 14a-9, because it includes materially false and misleading statements and assertions that lack factual support and citation. Therefore, the Proposal may be excluded pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(3) under the Exchange Act.

A shareholder proposal that is materially false or misleading may be omitted from a registrant's proxy materials under Rules 14a-8(i)(3) and 14a-9, which prohibit the use of proxy materials containing any materially false or misleading statements. A shareholder proposal may violate Rule 14a-9and, thus, Rule 14a-8(i)(3)if it contains language which is materially false or misleading.

As you likely are well aware, Mr. Chevedden, either in his own name or through nominal proponents, has submitted numerous shareholder proposals to various companies each year for the past several years, resulting in numerous no-action requests. Yet, despite his familiarity with the requirements of Rule 14a-8, Mr. Chevedden persists in resubmitting in his proposals statements and assertions which the Staff has previously ruled are false and misleading and, therefore, excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(3). With respect to Mr. Chevedden's shareholder rights plan proposals, there are numerous recent no-action requests submitted by various companies where the Staff required Mr. Chevedden or the Proponent to revise various statements to provide additional factual support or citations or otherwise conform them to the Staff's specifications, or delete them as false and misleading. See, e.g., AMR Corporation (April 4, 2003); Moody's Corporation (February 18, 2003); Kimberly-Clark Corporation (January 27, 2003); The ServiceMaster Company (January 23, 2003); Weyerhaeuser Company (January 16, 2003); Genuine Parts Company (January 15, 2003); UST Inc. (December 26, 2002); and Hewlett-Packard Company (December 17, 2002).

We believe that the Staff should permit the Company to omit the Proposal for this reason alone. As Marty Dunn, Deputy Director of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance, stated at the beginning of the 2003 proxy season:

I think there's a category of proponents that tend to put in way too many unsupported broad statements. And then we have to deal with them every time, even though we said before that this doesn't have support or provides support or cast it as an opinionand every time we have to reinvent the wheel. I think that takes too much time.... [Last year,] [w]e had told everybody that if there were a lot of problems within the (i)(3) area relating to a proposalrather than requiring revisions at each sentencewe would allow the entire proposal to be excluded. We didn't follow through on that last year because we didn't think it was fair on such short notice to do that to proponents. Now, folks who repeatedly abuse this will find out that we don't think it's the best use of everybody's time.

Transcript of R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company Teleconference, "Shareholder Proposals: What to Expect in the 2003 Proxy Season," November 12, 2002, at 2 (emphasis added) (copy enclosed).

Even without the history described above, the Proposal is so replete with statements and assertions that are false and misleading that we believe that the Company may omit the entire Proposal from the Company's 2004 proxy materials pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(3). The Staff has indicated that, "when a proposal and supporting statement will require detailed and extensive editing in order to bring them into compliance with the proxy rules," the Staff may find it appropriate to grant relief without providing the proponent a chance to make revisions to the proposal and supporting statement. Division of Corporation Finance: Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14 (July 13, 2001). We urge the Staff to provide such relief here. See, e.g., The Swiss HelvetiaFund. Inc. (April 3, 2001) (proposal excluded in its entirety under Rule 14a-8(i)(3)); and General Magic, Inc. (May 1, 2000) (same). This relief is especially warranted where, as here, Mr. Chevedden and the Proponent are experienced in submitting shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8. See, e.g., Genuine Parts Company (January 15, 2003); Hewlett-Packard Company (December 17, 2002); General Motors Corporation (April 3, 2002); Sabre Holding Corporation (March 18, 2002); and Raytheon Company (March 13, 2002) (each of which was in reference to shareholder rights plan proposals submitted by Mr. Chevedden or the Proponent and each of which required the removal or revision of materially misleading statements).

While we consider there to be strong support to exclude the proposal in its entirety under Rule 14a-8(i)(3), in the alternative, if the Staff determines that it must depart from its position in Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14, we respectfully request that the Proposal be substantially revised under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) to exclude the specific statements identified below.

The following are examples of statements and assertions in the Proposal that are false and misleading within the meaning of Rules 14a-8(i)(3) and 14a-9:

The Proponent's initial statement addresses what "shareholders" in general "recommend." First, this language is false and misleading because it suggests that UGI's shareholders could directly effect a change in the Company's bylaws, when, in fact, the shareholders can only recommend that the board of directors initiate such a change. Section 8.07(a) of UGI's bylaws provides that "[t]he shareholders shall have the power to amend or repeal these bylaws, or to adopt new bylaws, only with the approval of the board of directors. A direction by the board that a shareholder proposal with respect to the bylaws shall be submitted to the shareholders for action thereon, or the sufferance by the board that such a proposal shall be so submitted, shall not constitute approval by the board of directors of the amendment, repeal or new bylaws." Second, because it is the Proponent alone who is presenting the Proposal, not the shareholders, any statements that cannot be properly attributed to others should be set forth solely as his belief. Therefore, this language is false and misleading under Rules 14a-8(i)(3) and 14a-9.

Finally, because the Proposal is imprecise as to how such bylaw amendment would be instituted, the Proposal fails to make it clear whether it is precatory in nature. Insofar as the vague Proposal may be interpreted to be mandatory rather than precatory, it may be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(1) because, in our opinion, it would not be a proper subject for action by shareholders under Pennsylvania law. See, e.g., PPL Corporation (February 19, 2002) (permitting exclusion of a shareholder proposal regarding director compensation under Rule 14a-8(i)(1) as not a proper subject for shareholder action under Pennsylvania law, unless the proponent revised the proposal); and Sl Handling Systems, Inc. (May 8, 2000) (permitting exclusion of a shareholder proposal to amend articles of incorporation under Rule 14a-8(i)(1) as not a proper subject for shareholder action under Pennsylvania law, unless the proponent revised the proposal).

The Proponent states that "[t]his topic won a 60% average yes-vote at 50 companies in 2002 according to the Investor Responsibility Research Center." This statement is misleading for a number of reasons: First, without a citation to a specific publication by the Investor Responsibility Research Center to permit shareholders to review the proposition in context, the reference is misleading and should be omitted in its entirety from UGI's proxy materials. See Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14 (the Staff notes that "shareholders should avoid making unsupported assertions of fact ... [and] should provide factual support for statements in the proposal and supporting statement or phrase statements as their opinion where appropriate").

Second, it is unclear from the Proponent's statement whether he is taking into account all companies at which a shareholder rights plan proposal was voted on, or whether he is only considering those companies at which such a proposal received a majority of the votes cast. Furthermore, if the Proponent is only considering those companies at which such a proposal received a majority of the votes cast, it is unclear whether the cited statistics take into account whether the proposal passed according to the respective company's vote requirements. The Proposal is thus inherently false and misleading because we are unable to determine how the Proponent decided which companies to consider in making his statement. In fact, our independent research of IRRC reports indicates that, of the 50 poison pill proposals that were tracked by IRRC in 2002, only 36 received majority votes and passed. See IRRC Corporate Governance Series 2003 Background Report E: Poison Pills, Maria Carmen S. Pinnell, Esq., February 2003 (relevant pages attached). Finally, it is unclear whether the percentage set forth by the Proponent is based solely on the number of yes/no votes cast, or takes into account the effect of abstentions where appropriate.

With respect to the particular statement at issue, the Staff has consistently permitted companies to omit in their entirety similar statements made in other proposals submitted by Mr. Chevedden, or for which he served as proxy for another shareholder, unless such proposals were revised in the manner specified by the Staff. See, e.g., Moody's Corporation (February 18, 2003) (permitting omission of statement in the Proponent's shareholder rights plan proposal, which stated that "[t]his topic won an average 60% yes-vote at 50 companies in 2002" unless the Proponent could provide a specific source for that sentence); Kimberly-Clark Corporation (January 27, 2003) (same); The ServiceMaster Company (January 23, 2003) (same); Weyerhaeuser Company (January 16, 2003) (same); Genuine Parts Company (January 15, 2003) (same); and UST Inc. (December 26, 2002) (same). Yet, in the instant Proposal, the Proponent reasserts the same type of statement that the Staff has previously found to be false and misleading.

The Proponent states that "[a] poison pill can give our board veto power over a bid for our stock that may be in our best interest." Under Pennsylvania law, the board of directors has a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company. See 15 Pa.C.S.A. Section 521(a). See, e.g., In re Main, Inc., 239 B.R. 281 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa. 1999), supp. 242 B.R. 574, aff'd in part. vacated in part 2000 WL 1796417. Subsection(b) of the Notes to Rule 14a-9 states, by way of example, that misleading materials include "[m]aterial which directly or indirectly impugns character, integrity or personal reputation, or directly or indirectly makes charges concerning improper, illegal or immoral conduct or associations, without factual foundation." To imply that the board might abdicate its fiduciary duties by "vetoing" a bid that is in the shareholders' best interests disregards the extensive statutory, regulatory and common law limits on the board's authority and implies without any factual basis that the board would not properly discharge its fiduciary duties. As such, the Proponent's statement is false and misleading under Rules 14a-8(i)(3) and 14a-9.

The Proponent cites The Motley Fool as the source for the assertion "[e]liminating the poison pill is a way of ensuring that management faces the same accountability that other workers do. There are often reasons that hostile takeovers should fail. But anti-democratic schemes to flood the market with diluted stock are not one of them." Although we have located "The Motley Fool" URL, http://www.fool.com, we have been unable to locate any information on that website that would support the Proponent's statement. Rather, upon entering the website, we were presented with a vast array of information about various topics of interest to investors as well as a search engine, a review of which failed to uncover information in support of the Proponent's statement. Without a specific citation and further factual foundation, the Proponent's statement is false and misleading under Rules 14a-8(i)(3) and 14a-9.

Because a specific cite is required, the Proponent likely will need to reference a website address to provide support for the proposition. The Staff has noted that, although website addresses are not per se excludable, "a website address could be subject to exclusion if it refers readers to information that may be materially false or misleading, irrelevant to the subject matter of the proposal or otherwise in contravention of the proxy rules." Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14. References to website addresses often can be misleading, given that a website (particularly a third-party website, such as the one cited in the Proposal) cannot be regulated for content and is always subject to change without notice. Indeed, false or misleading statements could be incorporated into the website after the date on which the proxy is mailed to UGI shareholders.

The Proponent cites Morningstar.com for the proposition that "[t]he key negative of poison pills is that they can preserve the interests of management deadwood instead of protecting investors." The Proponent's inclusion of such URL may be considered false and misleading under Rules 14a-8(i)(3) and 14a-9. As discussed above, the Staff has noted that "a website address could be subject to exclusion if it refers readers to information that may be materially false or misleading, irrelevant to the subject matter of the proposal or otherwise in contravention of the proxy rules." Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14. References to third-party website addresses such as Morningstar.com can be misleading, because such websites cannot be regulated for content and are subject to change without notice. Additionally, false or misleading statements could beincorporated into the website after the date on which the proxy is mailed to UGI shareholders.

Moreover, entering the URL http://www.morningstar.com brings up the home page, which is replete with information that is unrelated to the Proposal and does not reference any article or study supporting the Proposal. Shareholders who visit the website might not be able to determine which of the numerous pages within the website contain information that would support the Proponent's statement and, in searching for such information, would be exposed to an enormous amount of irrelevant data in the process. A proper citation is required in order to permit shareholders to conduct an independent review of the statement in context. Without a proper citation, the reference to the proposition is misleading and should be omitted in its entirety from UGI's proxy materials.

There are several recent no-action letters in which the Staff has required the Proponent to delete or revise a citation to a website address. See, e.g., Moody's Corporation (February 18, 2003) (requiring revision to website address to provide a citation to a specific source); Kimberly-Clark Corporation (January 27, 2003) (same); The ServiceMaster Company (January 23, 2003) (same); Weyerhaeuser Company (January 16, 2003) (same); Genuine Parts Company (January 15, 2003) (same); and Hewlett-Packard Company (December 17, 2002) (same).

We note that the following statement by the Proponent, attributed to T.J. Dermot Dunphy, also lacks factual foundation, thereby violating Rules 14a-8(i)(3) and 14a-9: "Give up more of your freedom and I'll take care of you." The Proponent provides no context, citation, or other form of factual foundation to support his assertions. As such, the statements are similarly false and misleading and may be omitted under Rules 14a-8(i)(3) and 14a-9.

The Proponent's inclusion of the URL "www.cii.org" is also false and misleading under Rules 14a-8(i)(3) and 14a-9. As noted above, in Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14, the Staff has indicated that "a website address could be subject to exclusion if it refers readers to information that may be materially false or misleading, irrelevant to the subject matter of the proposal or otherwise in contravention of the proxy rules." As previously discussed, references to third-party website addresses often can be misleading because they cannot be regulated for content and are always subject to change without notice. Further, entering the URL cited above brings up the "Welcome" page of a website about the Council. While the Council maintains other pages (some of which may be accessed through the Council's "Welcome" page) that may contain information that is potentially relevant to the Proposal, the "Welcome" page does not.

Indeed, there are several recent no-action letters that have required Mr. Chevedden or the instant Proponent to delete or revise a citation to a website address, including "www.cii.org," the very website cited in the instant Proposal. See, e.g., Moody'sCorporation (February 18, 2003) (noting that the website address "www.cii.org" may be omitted unless the Proponent provided a citation to a specific source); Kimberly-Clark Corporation (January 27, 2003) (same); The ServiceMaster Company (January 23, 2003) (same); Weyerhaeuser Company (January 16, 2003) (same); Genuine Parts Company (January 15, 2003) (same); Hewlett-Packard Company (December 17, 2002) (same); and AMR Corporation (April 3, 2002) (same). Once again, the Proponent has included language in the instant Proposal that the Staff has repeatedly asked him to revise or delete. Accordingly, the website address in the Proposal may be omitted under Rule 14a-8(i)(3).

The Proponent's inclusion of the sentence, "[i]n recent years, companies have redeemed their pill or have provided for a shareholder vote" is misleading. The Proponent cites no support for this proposition, and presenting such an unsupported statement may lead shareholders to place undue reliance on such statement, thereby materially misleading them. Because the Proponent cites no particular number of companies or examples of companies that have taken this action, it is misleading to shareholders because it implies, without providing any support, that a large number of companies have taken this action or that there exists a trend in companies doing so. Accordingly, the statement "[i]n recent years, companies have redeemed their pill or have provided for a shareholder vote" should be omitted, or alternatively, the Proponent should identify, with supporting documentation, the exact number of relevant companies and the source for that information.

* * *

We would very much appreciate a response from the Staff on this no-action request as soon as practicable, and in all cases no later than November 4, 2003, so that the Company can meet its timetable in preparing its proxy materials. If you have any questions or require additional information concerning this matter, please call me at (202) 739-5741. Thank you.

Very truly yours,

/s/

Catherine L. Ziobro

Enclosures

c: Margaret Calabrese, Managing Counsel and Corporate Secretary (w/ encls.)

John Chevedden (w/ encls.)

[APPENDIX]

3Shareholder Opportunity to Vote Regarding a Poison Pill

Shareholders recommend a bylaw subjecting to a shareholder vote, the adoption or extension of any current or future poison pill.

This topic won a 60% average yes-vote at 50 companies in 2002 according to the Investor Responsibility Research Center.

Nick Rossi, P.O Box 249, Boonville, Calif. 95415, submits this proposal.

With more than 10 years experience with published shareholder proposals I believe it is prudent to have a shareholder vote on any poison pill because poison pills can harm shareholder value.

A poison pill can give our board veto power over a bid for our stock that may be in our best interest.

Eliminating the poison pill is a way of ensuring that management faces the same accountability that other workers do. There are often reasons that hostile takeovers should fail. But anti-democratic schemes to flood the market with diluted stock are not one of them. Source: The Motley Fool.

The key negative of poison pills is that thy can preserve the interests of management deadwood instead of protecting investors. Source: Moringstar.com.

Poison pills are akin to the argument of a dictator who says, "Give up more of your freedom and I'll take care of you," said T.J. Dermot Dunphy, CEO of Sealed Air for more than 25 years.

Since the 1980s Fidelity, a mutual fund giant with $800 billion invested, has withheld votes for directors at companies that have approved poison pills, Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2002.

Beware of substitutes: I believe that any bylaw or policy on the poison pill, which could allow the board to forego a shareholder vote requirement, would not be a substitute for implementing this proposal.

Council of Institutional Investors Recommendation

The Council of Institutional Investors www.cii.org, an organization of 130 pension funds investing $2 trillion, called for shareholder approval of poison pills. In recent years, companies have redeemed their pill or have provided for a shareholder vote. I believe that our company should follow suit and allow shareholders a vote on this key issue.

Yes on 3 Shareholder Opportunity to Vote Regarding a Poison Pill

The above format includes the emphasis intended.

Please advise if the company needs further information on this proposal or the sources.

Please advise if there is any typographical question.

Please advise whether the company intends to modify or make omissions to this submitted format in publication.

The company is requested to assign a proposal number (represented by "3" above) based on the chronological order that proposals are submitted.

[INQUIRY LETTER]

Nick Ross,

P.O. Box 249

Boonville, CA 95415

Mr. Lon Greenberg

Chairman

UGI Corporation (UGI)

460 North Gulph Road

King of Prussia, PA 19406

Phone: (610) 337-1000

Fax: (610) 992-3259

Dear Mr. Greenberg,

This Rule 14a-8 proposal is respectfully submitted for the next annual shareholder meeting. This proposal is submitted to support the long-term performance of our company. Rule 14a-8 requirements are intended to be met including ownership of the required stock value until after the date of the applicable shareholder meeting. This submitted format, with the shareholder-supplied emphasis, is intended to be used for definitive proxy publication. This is the proxy for Mr. John Chevedden and/or his designee to act on my behalf in shareholder matters, including this shareholder proposal for the forthcoming shareholder meeting before, during and after the forthcoming shareholder meeting. Please direct all future communication to Mr. John Chevedden at:

2215 Nelson Ave., No. 205

Redondo Beach, CA 90278

PH: 310/371-7872

Your consideration and the consideration of the Board of Directors is appreciated.

Sincerely,

/s/

Aug 25-03

cc: Brendan P. Bovaird

Corporate Secretary

FX: 610/992-3258

[INQUIRY LETTER]

October 24, 2003

Via Airbill

6 Copies

7th copy for date-stamp return

Office of Chief Counsel

Division of Corporation Finance

Securities and Exchange Commission

Mail Stop 0402

450 Fifth Street, NW

Washington, DC 20549

UGI Corporation (UGI)

Response to Morgan Lewis No Action Request Letter

Nick Rossi

Ladies and Gentlemen:

This is in response to the Morgan Lewis October 14, 2003 no action request.

I believe that the company could have avoided this formal process by simply accepting the shareholder offer submitted with the proposal: "Please advise if the company needs further information on this proposal or the sources."

Supporting material is included for six proposal sentences marked to correspond with the numbers on the attached supporting material. These exhibits could have been forwarded to the company prior to October 14, 2003.

"Resolved:" is implicit in the first sentence of the proposal: "Shareholders recommend a bylaw subjecting to a shareholder vote, the adoption or extension of any current or future poison pill." This is an established text format for a precatory proposal. "Shareholders" is appropriate since more than one shareholder will likely vote for this proposal. The subject of the proposal is an established topic that experienced directors could be expected to know how to implement. "Shareholders recommend" is clearly precatory.

The enclosed Investor Responsibly Research Center table with 2002 voting results supports the "60% average yes-vote at 50 companies in 2002." This report indicates that no proposal results on this topic are pending. This "60%" statement was challenged and not excluded from a number of rule 14a-8 proposals in 2003.

It is fair to caution that less than adequate director performance is possible. A prudent shareholder should be alert for evidence of less than adequate director performance. Contrary to the company claim, the existence of extensive laws will not automatically preclude a violation of such laws.

The company complaints on accessing supporting information is challenged by the use of the Google search engine. Simply by inserting "motley fool poison pill" in Googlethe first article accessed supports the text of this shareholder proposal attributed to the Motley Fool.

I believe that the company effort to deny shareholder access to relevant and respected shareholder-focused websites is misplaced. I do not believe that the rule 14a-8 was intended to hinder shareholders access to investment-related information.

Division of Corporation Finance:

Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14

F. Other questions that arise under rule 14a-8

1. May a reference to a website address in the proposal or supporting statement be subject to exclusion under the rule?

Yes. In some circumstances, we may concur in a company's view that it may exclude a website address under rule 14a-8(i)(3) because information contained on the website may be materially false or misleading, irrelevant to the subject matter of the proposal or otherwise in contravention of the proxy rules. Companies seeking to exclude a website address under rule 14a-8(i)(3) should specifically indicate why they believe information contained on the particular website is materially false or misleading, irrelevant to the subject matter of the proposal or otherwise in contravention of the proxy rules.

The above requirement states "specifically indicate." The company has not provided one example of "false or misleading" material from any website. Speculation of possibility is not the same as "specifically indicate." I believe that each cited website is "regulated" by professional editorial oversight. The company argues for exclusion of website addresses yet cites numerous cases where website addresses were held not excludable.

I do not believe the company has met its burden of proving its allegations.

I believe that it would be helpful for the company to submit its management position statement at this time to evaluate whether the company plans to use the same standard of support for its own text.

For the above reasons this is to respectfully request that the Office of Chief Counsel not agree with the company no action request on each point.

Sincerely,

/s/

John Chevedden

cc:

Nick Rossi

Lon Greenberg, UGI Corporation

[STATE REPLY LETTER]

December 18, 2003

Response of the Office of Chief Counsel Division of Corporation Finance

Re: UGI Corporation

Incoming letter dated October 14, 2003

The proposal recommends "a bylaw subjecting to a shareholder vote, the adoption or extension of any current or future poison pills."

We are unable to concur in your view that UGI may exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(1). Accordingly, we do not believe that UGI may omit the proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(1).

We are unable to concur in your view that UGI may omit the entire proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(3). There appears to be some basis for your view, however, that portions of the proposal's supporting statement may be materially false or misleading under rule 14a-9. In our view, the proponent must:

provide a citation to a specific source for the sentence that begins "This topic won..." and ends "... according to the Investor Responsibility Research Center";

delete the sentence that begins "A poison pill can..." and ends "... may be in our best interest";

provide a citation to a specific source for the discussion that begins "Eliminating the poison pill..." and ends "... diluted stock are not one of them";

revise the sentences attributed to Morningstar.com to directly quote the sentence from the source;

revise the sentences attributed to T.J. Dermot Dunphy to clearly identify which sentences are direct quotes;

revise the reference to www.cii.org to provide a citation to a specific source; and

provide a citation to a specific source for the sentence that begins "In recent years...," and ends "... for a shareholder vote."

Accordingly, unless the proponent provides UGI with a proposal and supporting statement revised in this manner, within seven calendar days after receiving this letter, we will not recommend enforcement action to the Commission if UGI omits only these portions of the supporting statement from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3).

Sincerely,

/s/

Keir Devon Gumbs

Special Counsel

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