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Company Name: MGM Mirage
Public Availability Date: March 19, 2001

Document Sections:

LETTER OF INQUIRY
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
STAFF REPLY LETTER


[LETTER OF INQUIRY]

February 14, 2001

Securities and Exchange Commission
Division of Corporate Finance
Office Of The Chief Counsel
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Judiciary Plaza
Washington, D.C. 20549
Mail Stop: 0402

Re: Stockholder Proposal Submitted on Behalf of Mr. John J. Gilbert

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(g) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, enclosed please find as Exhibit A a copy of a proposal (collectively, with the supporting statement, the "proposal") submitted by J. Michael Schaefer on behalf of John J. Gilbert for inclusion in the 2001 proxy materials of MGM MIRAGE, a Delaware corporation (the "company" or "MGM MIRAGE"). The company presently intends to omit the proposal from its proxy materials for the company's annual meeting of shareholders scheduled to be held on May 1, 2001, on the grounds stated below and respectfully requests that the Staff confirm that it will not recommend any enforcement action against the company based on the omission of the proposal. To the extent that any reasons for omission stated in this letter are based upon matters of law, this letter shall serve as supporting opinion of counsel pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j)(2)(iii).

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

In order to understand the reasons why the company believes it may properly exclude the proposal, some background information is required. The proposal was initially received by the company on December 28, 2000 from J. Michael Schaefer on behalf of himself and Henry F. Wood. Mr. Schaefer failed to provide the company with evidence that he and Mr. Wood owned the requisite number of shares for the proposal to be included in the company's proxy materials. After inquiry from the company, Mr. Schaefer indicated that neither he nor Mr. Wood owned the requisite number of shares, and thus the company declined to include the proposal in its proxy materials. Subsequently, Mr. Schaefer stated that he had been authorized by his client John J. Gilbert to resubmit Mr. Schaefer's original proposal on behalf of Mr. Gilbert.

Mr. Schaefer has a checkered history with the company and Mirage Resorts, Incorporated ("Mirage"), the company's wholly owned subsidiary which was acquired in May 2000. This history includes:

(1) The Mirage Casino-Hotel and Bellagio canceled Mr. Schaefer's credit lines and check cashing privileges in early 1999 after reviewing his recent history.

(2) Mr. Schaefer sued the companies and one of the executives individually challenging this decision.

(3) Mr. Schaefer was barred from all Mirage properties as a result of his actions, and he was denied admittance to the 1999 Mirage Annual Shareholder's meeting.

(4) Mr. Schaefer filed an additional multi-count suit challenging all of the actions taken by Mirage and its subsidiaries.

(5) All of the suits were decided in favor of Mirage and its subsidiaries.

(6) Mr. Schaefer sought unsuccessfully to personally address the company's board of directors in December 2000.

In addition, in 2000 Mr. Schaefer requested a political contribution from the company in connection with his candidacy for political office. The company chose to contribute to Mr. Schaefer's opponent.

I. THE PROPOSAL MAY BE OMITTED UNDER RULE 14a-8(i)(4) AS IT IS RELATED TO A PERSONAL GRIEVANCE AND IS DESIGNED TO FURTHER A PERSONAL INTEREST NOT SHARED WITH OTHER SECURITY HOLDERS AT LARGE.

Based upon Mr. Schaefer's prior history with Mirage and the company and upon correspondence received from Mr. Schaefer, recent examples of which are included as Exhibit B to this letter, the company believes that the primary objective of the proposal is to further Mr. Schaefer's personal agenda in light of his apparent grievances against Mirage and the company. In addition, the company believes that Mr. Schaefer is using Mr. Gilbert's status as a shareholder of the company in an attempt to force inclusion of Mr. Schaefer's original proposal in the company's proxy even though Mr. Schaefer is not eligible to submit the proposal. The company believes that the true objective of the proposal is personal to Mr. Schaefer and is not an interest shared with the other shareholders at large.

In a No-Action Letter of January 31, 1994 re International Business Machines Corporation ("IBM"), the Division of Corporate Finance of the Commission found that a shareholder proposal may be excluded where the proposal relates to redress of a personal claim or grievance or is designed to result in a benefit to the proponent or to further a personal interest, which benefit or interest is not shared with the other security holders at large. Specifically, the proponent, who had a prior history with IBM relating to the subject matter of his proposal, was using the shareholder proposal process to request that IBM create reports disclosing political contributions in excess of $10,000 all in an effort to use that information for his own interests. From the proponent's history with IBM and from the language and personal nature of the proposal, the Department of Corporation Finance found there was "some" basis for excluding the proposal.

As in the IBM No-Action letter, the company believes that Mr. Schaefer is improperly using the shareholder proposal process to further his personal agenda, which is not shared by the company's shareholders at large. As such, the company believes the proposal may properly be omitted under Rule 14a-8(i)(4).

II. THE PROPOSAL MAY BE OMITTED UNDER RULE 14a-8(i)(3) AND RULE 14a-9 AS VAGUE AND INDEFINITE AND THEREFORE MISLEADING AND BEYOND THE POWER OF THE COMPANY TO EFFECTUATE.

Rule 14a-8(i)(3) permits the omission of proposals and supporting statements that are contrary to the federal proxy rules, including Rule 14a-9, which, in turn, prohibits false or misleading statements in proxy materials. The proposal violates Rule 14a-9 and may, therefore, be omitted pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(3) because (i) it is inherently vague and indefinite, subject to varying interpretations by shareholders of the company, and (ii) it contains false and misleading statements. In addition, Rule 14a-5(a), the application of which to stockholder proposals is also contemplated by Rule 14a-8(i)(3), requires, in pertinent part, that "the information in the proxy statement shall be clearly presented ..."

Specific examples of how the proposal is vague, indefinite and misleading are presented below:

1. The proposal states that the company contributes "substantial sums" of money for political contributions. The company believes that term "substantial sums" will mislead shareholders into believing that the political contributions made by the company are of an extraordinary nature and are disproportionate in amount to the company's revenues, assets and earnings, which the company believes is entirely inaccurate.

2. In the supporting statement, the proposal the proposal includes many statements which purport to describe the company's policy with respect to political contributions, such as "If someone with a family-member employed by the corporation is a candidate, we give to that candidate because of a family relationship." These statements are not an accurate description of the company's policies and, therefore, should not be included in our proxy materials.

3. The proposal also states "our [purporting to speak for the company] policies are unwritten and subject to a whim." All contributions made by the company are carefully considered, in particular to ensure such contributions comply with applicable law. The language in the proposal that suggests the company's contributions are "subject to a whim" is misleading because it suggests the company does not carefully consider such decisions.

The company believes that the proposal is misleading and should be omitted from the company's proxy materials because it fails to accurately describe the company's practices in making political contributions and has failed to disclose what the company believes to be the true objective for the proposal, namely to set a policy which could directly benefit Mr. Schaefef's personal political agenda not shared by the shareholders at large.

III. THE PROPOSAL MAY BE OMITTED UNDER RULE 14a-8(i)(7) AS RELATING TO ORDINARY BUSINESS OPERATIONS.

The company believes that the proposal may be omitted from the proxy materials for the 2001 annual meeting pursuant to the provisions of Rule 14a-8(i)(7) because it deals with matters relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the company.

If adopted, the proposal would require the company to create a set policy for something that has traditionally been left to the business discretion and judgment of management. The company believes that management must retain flexibility in determining which organizations and individuals should receive contributions from the company.

Under the Delaware General Corporation Law, the allocation of charitable contributions is a matter that a corporation is permitted to relegate to its ordinary business operations. Political contributions are specifically authorized by Section 122, "Specific Powers" of the Delaware law, which provides that corporations may "make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes ..." Under the Delaware law, decisions concerning the allocation of political contributions need not be approved by the shareholders or the board of directors and, as a result, are permitted to be treated by the company has a matter relating to the conduct of its ordinary business operations.

The company treats the allocation of its political contributions as a part of its ordinary business operations. The company contributes on a regular basis to numerous political campaigns and charitable causes as part of its ordinary business operations. As a general matter, the board of directors of the company has delegated to management the responsibility of selecting the political campaigns and charitable organizations to which the company contributes.

The proponent is asking the company to create additional reports and make additional disclosures to shareholders beyond the reporting requirements imposed by the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the reporting requirements of the gaming authorities that oversee the company's business and affairs.

The Staff has consistently taken the view that the determination of what disclosure to shareholders is desirable in addition to that necessary to meet the Commission's reporting requirements is properly left to the discretion of the board of directors and the management of the company as a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the company. (see No-Action Letters April 6, 1998, re Circuit City Stores, Inc.; February 17, 1998 re AT&T Corporation; February 9, 1998 re Burlington Northern Sante Fe Corp.; and June 10, 1998 re ConAgra, Inc.). Thus, the proposal is an improper subject for action by shareholders because it is a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the company.

In summary, for the reasons and on the basis of the authorities cited in Section I through III above, MGM MIRAGE respectfully requests your advice that the Division will not recommend any enforcement action to the Commission if the proposal is omitted from MGM MIRAGE's proxy materials for the 2001 annual meeting. I am sending Mr. Schaefer, on behalf of Mr. Gilbert, a copy of this letter, thus advising him of our intent to exclude his proposal from the proxy material for the 2001 annual meeting.

As previously announced in a press release, the company's annual meeting of stockholders is scheduled for May 1, 2001, which is more than 30 days before the date of the annual meeting in 2000. We plan to mail our proxy materials, and file them with the Commission, on or about March 31, 2001. We did not receive a copy of the letter from Mr. Gilbert's broker as to his status as a shareholder of the company for the past year until February 1, 2001. Therefore, we respectfully request, on behalf of the company that the staff of the Commission waive the requirement set forth in Rule 14a-8(j) that the company's reasons for excluding a proposal be submitted no later than 80 days before it files its definitive proxy materials with the Commission.

Enclosed are seven copies of this letter, together with exhibits. If the staff disagrees with the company's conclusion that the proposal may be omitted from the 2001 proxy materials, we request the opportunity to confer with the staff prior to the issuance of your position. If you wish any further information on this matter, please call the undersigned at (310) 282-6247 or Gary N. Jacobs, Executive Vice President and General Counsel of the company at (702) 693-7129.

Very truly yours,

Janet S. McCloud
Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP

cc: Gary N. Jacobs, Esq. (w/encl.)
Scott Langsner (w/encl.)


[APPENDIX]

BE IT RESOLVED by shareholders assembled in annual meeting in person and by proxy that it be recommended to the Board of Directors that it adopt a written policy with regard to the issue of political contributions to local, state, or national office, and that a list of contributions be prepared annually as to amount, date, and recipient and made available to shareholders and investors on request.

Statement in Support

Our corporation annually contributes substantial sums to local, state and federal candidates; we can give up to $10,000 to local candidates and virtually unlimited amount in gifts to various committees supporting election of a President, Senator or Congress-person. If someone with a family=member employed by the corporation is a candidate, we give to that candidate because of a 'relationship' Our business relates primarily to the state and county executive and legislative officials, thus support of judicial or educational-board candidates is minimal. Our policies are unwritten and subject to whim. The board should adopt some guidelines as to its support of good government, much as Chambers of Commerce do; supportive of those who support our industry and nonsupportive of those who do not. Because of the substantial amounts involved, and the affect on investors and the industry, our policy should not be a secret but should be formulated so that it can be modified, debated, applauded.


[APPENDIX]

February 17, 2001

Office of the Chief Counsel
SEC Dept. of Corp. Finance
Washington, DC 20549

Re: Shareholder Proposal Submitted on Behalf of John J. Gilbert

I am apprised of a February 14, 2001 letter to your office by a Los Angeles firm representing the issuer, MGM/MIRAGE, and respectively take issue with the contents.

Because one has a dispute with his corporation, that does not detract from the credibility or importance of the issue if it is not purely personal, if it is of general nature and one that is of interest to investors in general.

I am not trying to obtain a special benefit or privilege, there is no litigation pending with the issuer, and the same goes for John J. Gilbert, the sponsor as to qualifying shares. The problem is, the issuer simply cannot tolerate dissent.

This office apologizes for any inconvenience occasioned by the fantasy of Mr. Wood claiming to have sufficient shares when he does not; I do have sufficient shares but lack the required one year holding period as they were not purchased until after the Mirage liquidation a year ago. (I would think that liquidations ought give rise to special exceptions as to proposals to the successor corporate entities).

Please consider carefully the defamatory nature of the letter, one of pure advocacy playing footloose with the facts. As an officer of the Courts and member in good standing for decades of both the Nevada and California Bars, and as a former financial analyst with the Commission in 1962, working for Corporation Finance when Manny Cohen was its director and William Carey was Chairman, I represent to you as follows:

1. The cancellation of my credit lines at The Mirage and Bellagio, lines of $5,000 and $3,500, came at a time when my performance on credit lines with perhaps 15 casinos was perfect (and still is), never a late payment, and periodic play on the lineit was purely as a bully-tactic to punish me for having sought to seek equal treatment at both both Mirage and Bellagio.

a. I had a $3500 line at Bellagio, great rapport there.

b. Mirage would only cash checks for $1000, no credit line, when I applied for $5,000 there, like I had for many years at MGM, it was GRANTED, then the Chief Financial Officer Charles Nordling for all Mirage interests personally called me to cancel it; and when I wrote several letters seeking to have the same at Mirage I had a Bellagio, establishing the $3500 at Bellagio for years, all owned by same entity, his response was to ZERO ME OUT AT BOTH.

c. When I filed an action for declaratory relief, to establish as a matter of law that years of flawless credit relations as to the $3500 at Bellagio and $1,000 check cashing at Mirage I was entitled to maintain the status quounless there could be some basis for a change ...... general counsel simply had me 86d, or barred, for all-four-Mirage-Casinos, specifically banning my attendance with ladyfriend at a $1,000 UNLV FOUNDAT] annual charity dinner 4 days later, black tie, that I had all my plans made-for (offering to lift the ban, let me go to dinner if I'd dismiss my action for declaratory relief. How petty!

2. The fact that the declaratory relief and intentional infliction of emotional distress litigations (the barring from the UNLV charity dinner) cases were dismissed may well be a tribute to the 'muscle' of the town's largest casino corporation, Steve Wynn being a God to may people in power, than it is to unbiased consideration of the dispute.

3. The "unsuccessful attempt to address the board of directors" simply means my request to meet with them was ignored.

4. In 1999 I held proxies from 8 investors in Mirage Resorts, (including the Lewis & John J. Gilbert family interests), and Mirage demanded my barring/exclusion from the Annual Meeting pursuant to the Trespass Order issued as to the Charity Dinner (it being a nonreviewable lifetime discretionary total ban).

5. That Mr. Schaefer is a political activist, see attached nationally syndicated James J. Kilpatrick column, and this obviously upsets some of those who are in debate with Schaefer.

6. The contribution of money, $1,000, to my political opponent, is not at all criticized, most casinso do not contribute anything to judicial races, especially Justice of the Peace (under $7500 jurisdiction) but seek to buy favor or the "ear" of higher court judges, county commissioners having gaming/liquor jursidiction, and state and federal lawmakers who deal with gaming issues.

Mr. Schaefer strongly feels we need a $1,000 maximum on judicial contributions, or less, or a total bank, it is now $10,000 limits, and he'd like to see our gaming companies give to any credible candidate in runoff elections, to help with the costs of government. Mr. Schaefer in 1998 and in 2000 got 43% of the vote, each time against a younger attractive lady lawyerthe 1998 candidate Jennifer Togliatti was the daughter of Caesars Palace Vice President George Togliatti, and a good judge, conducted herself then and now with Class; the 2000 candidate was someone who had never been to court for a client, and who had goons ripping down Schaefer signs and putting up her signs, and she is today in small claims court (Justice Court) trying to explain the conduct of her campaign. The problem as to the contribution issue again is credibility:

a. Mirage insists that they had a "relationship" with the year 2000 candidate, Natalie Tyrrell, and that was the basis of the contribution of $1,000

b. This is not credible, as they have refused to respond to several inquiries to identify the 'relationship', i.e. is someone in her family an employee, or a good patron. (It was obvious in 1998 what the Caesars relationship was to Jennfier Togliatti). There simply is not a relationship of Mirage would have indicated what it was; it was simply the repudation by petty corporation counsel, who after banning this writer from a black-tie dinner he'd subscribed to, now they want to fuel the opponent.

Mr. Schaefer in 1998 obtained $1000 contributions from the Hilton Hotel interests, same from Mandalay Bay interests, and $500 contributio from the Riviera Hotel interests and others; this year he was supported financially by the MRT Gaming Co., the Tropicana Hotel, and others. Mirage/MGM is absent only because of the pettiness of their perspective

Mr. Schaefer does not need the money, he is a multimillionare, his firm owning 114 rentals in adjacent Nye County, and blocks of securitiessuch as 30,000 shares of Service Corp. Intl, on the NYSE (now $4). He does need and demands integrity, disclosure, and candor.

It should be obvious to the Commission that "other security holders at large" have an interest in knowing just who gets our corporate political money. Mr. Schaefer wants no money, he just insists that information be available, and since it is not available to the individual investor, like himself, it should be an issue that the "security holders at large" should decide as to its desirabili

It should be obvious to the Commission that "substantial", if a vague term, is of course made specific when the dollar amounts are disclosed. Let the amounts be dislosed, if that is what security holders at large feel is warranted, and each investor can draw his or her own conclusion.

It is noteworthy that issuer counsel has not suggested to Mr. Schaefer that the wording be modified, or that vaguess give way to clarity in some respect; the issuer simply wants to slam the door and turn-off-the-light.

It should be obvious to the Commission that the level of political involvement by any investor-owned company is a policy issue, and subject to input by those who own the enterprise. Whether money is given to democrats, or republicans, or nonpolical matters such as ballot issues, or to defeat Congressman Frank Wolf (R.Va.), perhaps that is administration. But whether it is done at all, or done extensively, and in what amounts, is something crying out for disclousre.

If Mirage, or MGM/Mirage, had simply indicated that they really don't have a 'relationship' with Natalie Tyrrell in the Justice of the Peace election, but that they madeoa contribution at the request of a corporate officer (Mr. Russell, Mirage Counsel who did the Charity Dinner trespass order is suspected, and that is his right to be a bully), then it would appear that there is both candor and crediblity in the political funder area; there is neither.

Mr. Schaefer has not objection to issuer contributing to his opponents, they probably need the money and he does not. But if an Investor is going to be stonewalled when making an inquiry, that itself suggests that annual disclosure is something that the 'security holders in general' have a right to evaluate, as to whether it is desirable or necessary. Let the issuer state its case in its proxy material.

(Oh, that is academic, with Mr. Kerkorian owning maybe 60% we know that the issuer will get its way 100%, but let us not deprive the minority investors, and the media, and the academics, the opportunity to debate the issue of political disclosure)

The undersigned request the opportunity to meet with Staff, in Washington DC or elsewhere, in person or by phone, if staff finds that there is some personal issue or gain that outweighs public disclosure here. Thanks for listening.

Very truly yours,

J. MICHAEL SCHAEFER
Public Interest Attorney

cc: Christensen,Miller, Fink,
Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro LLP
Attention: Janet J. McCloud, Esq.

cc: Gary N. Jacobs, Esq., General Counsel
Scott Langsner,/Secretary


[STAFF REPLY LETTER]

March 19, 2001

Response of the Office of Chief Counsel

Division of Corporation Finance

Re: MGM MIRAGE

Incoming letter dated February 14, 2001

The proposal recommends that the board of directors adopt a written policy with regard to political contributions and provide shareholders, upon request, with a list that includes the amount, date, and recipient of contributions.

Based on the facts presented, there appears to be some basis for your view that MGM MIRAGE may exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(4) because John J. Gilbert is a nominal proponent for J. Michael Schaeffer, and the proposal relates to the redress of a personal claim or grievance or is designed to result in a benefit to Mr. Schaeffer or further a personal interest, which benefit or interest is not shared with the other security holders at large. Accordingly, we will not recommend enforcement action to the Commission if MGM MIRAGE omits the proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(4). In reaching this position, we have not found it necessary to address the alternative bases for omission upon which MGM MIRAGE relies.

We note that MGM MIRAGE did not file its statement of objections to including the proposal at least 80 calendar days before the date on which it will file definitive proxy materials as required by rule 14a-8(j). Noting the circumstances of the delay, we grant MGM MIRAGE's request that the 80-day requirement be waived.

Sincerely,

Michael D.V. Coco
Attorney-Advisor

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