Company Name: Mentor Income Fund, Inc.
Public Availability Date: September 7, 2000
Document Sections:
LETTER OF INQUIRY 1
APPENDIX
LETTER OF INQUIRY 2
LETTER OF INQUIRY 3
STAFF REPLY LETTER
[LETTER OF INQUIRY 1]
August 17, 2000
VIA FACSIMILE
Mr. Briccio S. Barrientos
Division of Investment Management
Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20549
Re: Mentor Income Fund, Inc.
Dear Mr. Barrientos:
I am writing on behalf of the Mentor Income Fund, Inc. (the "Fund") in response
to a letter dated August 15, 2000, sent to you by Ms. Sherry Flax, attorney for
Karpus Management, Inc. d/b/a Karpus Investment Management ("Karpus"). In her
letter, Ms. Flax argues that the Fund should be obligated to include in its
proxy materials for an upcoming Shareholders Meeting a shareholder proposal
submitted by Karpus. As discussed more fully below, the Fund properly excluded
the Karpus proposal from its proxy materials.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The factual background of this matter is set forth in my earlier letter to you
dated August 10, 2000. For your convenience, I have enclosed a copy of that
letter. It appears that the only factual dispute raised by Ms. Flax is whether a
copy of the Karpus proposal was included in the package received by the Fund on
July 24, 2000. Mr. Leonard Davis, assistant to Mr. Douglas Munn, president of
the Fund, personally opened the package and did not find the Karpus proposal in
the package.1 Nevertheless, the disposition of this matter is not dependent upon
a resolution of this factual dispute. Even if the Karpus proposal had been
received on July 24, 2000, it was excludable both on substantive grounds and
also on the basis of its untimeliness.
DISCUSSION
As discussed in my earlier letter, under Rule 14a-8(i) a company may exclude a
proposal if, among other things, it relates to a special interest of the
shareholder or it directly conflicts with one of the company's own proposals.
The Karpus proposal may be excluded on both bases. In addition, Rule 14a-8(e)
permits exclusion of a proposal that is not submitted a "reasonable time" before
a company prints and mails its proxy materials. The Karpus proposal can be
excluded on this basis as well.
A. Rule 14a-8(i)(4)
Rule 14a-8(i)(4) provides that a company may exclude a shareholder proposal from
the company's proxy statement where the proposal is designed to result in a
benefit to the shareholder, or to further a personal interest to the proposing
shareholder, which is not shared by the company's other shareholders. The
Commission has explained that the intention of this rule is to ensure that the
Rule 14a-8 process would not be abused by proponents attempting to achieve
personal ends that are not necessarily in the common interest of the company's
shareholders generally. Release No. 34-20091 (Aug. 16, 1983). The Karpus
proposal explicitly proposes to have Karpus hired as the Fund's adviser. Karpus
would receive management fees from serving as adviser, a benefit not shared by
the Fund's other shareholders. In Liberty All-Star Equity Fund (Mar. 6, 1990)
and USLIFE Income Fund, Inc. (Oct. 29, 1999), the Commission staff permitted
investment companies to exclude shareholder proposals that explicitly or
implicitly sought to have an affiliate of the shareholder hired as the
companies' advisers.
B. Rule 14a-8(i)(9)
Rule 14a-8(i)(9) permits a company to exclude a proposal that directly conflicts
with one of company's own proposals. In this case, the Fund has proposed to
shareholders that they approve a new investment advisory agreement between the
Fund and U.S. Bank National Association. Clearly, the Karpus proposal, that the
Fund enter into a new investment advisory agreement with Karpus, conflicts with
the Fund's own proposal. Only one of the two entities may serve as the Fund's
investment adviser. Moreover, including both proposals in the same proxy
materials would generate considerable confusion. There is also a possibility
that shareholders could approve both proposals, leaving it unclear which entity
should act as adviser.
Accordingly, the Karpus proposal may be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(9). See
Scudder New Europe Fund, Inc, (avail. Apr. 29, 1999) (an investment company
could exclude a shareholder proposal requesting that the company conduct a
no-fee in-kind tender offer prior to the company's conversion from a closed-end
fund to an open-end fund where the company's own proposal would impose a 2%
redemption fee during the first year after the conversion).
C. Rule 14a-8(e)
Rule 14a-8(e) requires that, in order to be considered for inclusion in a
company's proxy materials, a shareholder proposal must be received "a reasonable
time before the company begins to print and mail its proxy materials."
The Commission staff has consistently declined to object to the exclusion of
shareholder proposals where, as here, the proposal was submitted after the
company had filed preliminary proxy materials for the meeting. See, e.g.,
Scudder New Europe Fund, Inc. (avail. Nov. 6, 1998) (proposal received the same
day the company filed its preliminary proxy materials); Greyhound Lines, Inc.
(avail. Jan. 9, 1999) (proposal received 14 days after the company filed its
preliminary proxy materials); The United Kingdom Fund Inc. (avail. Jan 12, 1998)
(proposal received 5 days after the company filed its preliminary proxy
materials); Mass Mutual Mortgage and Realty Investors (avail. Apr. 19, 1985)
(proposal received 1 day after the company filed its preliminary proxy
materials).
Ms. Flax, in her letter, attempts to restate the standard as being a reasonable
time after the shareholder becomes aware of the meeting. In none of the letters
cited by Ms. Flax does the Commission staff accept such an interpretation.
****
For these reasons and for the reasons set forth in my August 10th letter to you,
there is no basis for Ms. Flax's request that the Fund be required to revise and
resubmit its proxy materials or delay its Shareholders Meeting. Please feel free
to contact me if you would like any additional information concerning this
matter.
Respectfully submitted,
David C. Mahaffey
Enclosures
cc: Sherry Flax, Esq.
-----FOOTNOTES-----
1 Mr. Davis would be prepared to submit an affidavit to that effect if you
believe that is necessary. It should be noted that, in Rule 14a-8(e), the
Commission recommends that a shareholder submit a proposal by electronic means,
in order to permit the shareholder to prove the date of delivery. If Karpus had
sent the proposal by facsimile, not only would there be no dispute as to when
the proposal was received, but the Fund would have had four additional days to
consider the proposal.
[APPENDIX]
July 20, 2000
Mr. Geoffry B. Sale, Secretary
Mentor Income Fund
Mentor Investment Advisors, LLC
Riverfront Plaza,
901 East Byrd Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
Re: Mentor Income Fund
Dear Mr. Sale:
Karpus Management, Inc d/b/a Karpus Investment Management (KIM), is the
beneficial owner of 6,550 shares of the Mentor Income Fund, Inc. (MRF). We have
been the beneficial owners of shares valued of more than $1,000 for more than
one year and expect to continue ownership through the date of the next meeting
of the Fund be it an annual meeting or special meeting.
Pursuant to Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, we (KIM) are
hereby submitting the following proposal and supporting statement for inclusion
in proxy material at the next meeting of stockholders.
PROPOSAL
In the event that the existing investment advisory contract shall be terminated,
is terminated, or assigned, the Fund shall enter into a new investment
management contract with Karpus Investment Management.
SUPPORTING STATEMENT
Karpus Investment Management (KIM) is committed to enhancing the value of Fund's
shares. KIM would recommend either, any, or all of the following: an aggressive
share buy back program in the open market, a share repurchase offer at net asset
value, or conversion of the Fund from the current closed end to an open ended
format.
The discount to net asset value at which the Fund has historically traded has
averaged -12.87% from July 3, 1997 through June 30, 2000. It is the opinion of
KIM that the Fund's management should be making recommendations to the Board to
close this wide discount. Shareholders of the Fund are entitled to have their
investment trade at a market value closer to what it is actually worth (net
asset value).
It is the opinion of KIM that the price performance of the Fund should not be
acceptable to the shareholders. From June 30, 1997 through June 30, 2000 the
simple price appreciation (depreciation) of the Fund has been an annual
equivalent of -6.1866%. If dividends had be re-invested in the Fund the annual
equivalent would be 2.5512%.
It is also the opinion of KIM that the net asset performance of the Fund should
not be acceptable to the shareholders. From June 30, 1997 through June 30, 2000
the net asset value performance equaled an annual simple price depreciation
equivalent of -3.8187% (with dividends reinvested in the Fund for the same time
period equaled 3.8976%).
Karpus has gained national recognition in being ranked by "A Worlds Best Money
Managers" according to Nelson Information. For U.S. Intermediate Duration Fixed
Income, Karpus was ranked for the 40 quarters ending 3/31/00 8\th/ out of 94
managers. For the 20 quarters ending 3/31/00 Karpus was ranked 3\rd/ out of 148
managers and for the 12 quarters ending 3/31/00, Karpus was ranked 8\th/ out of
165 managers.
It is the opinion of Karpus that Fund shareholders' would benefit by the
experience and superior performance that KIM could provide.
Karpus Investment Management is proposing that if approved as the new investment
advisor to the Fund, management fees would be at the same current rate, however
will be based on the lowest value of either net asset value or market price.
This reduction in investment management fees could help increase shareholder
returns. The manager would be rewarded based on market performance of the Fund.
Since the Fund has historically traded at a discount, the present management in
the opinion of KIM has been over-rewarded for inferior market price performance.
Based on the current discount to NAV there would be a fee reduction of 12.01%
(based on NAV 7/6/00 $8.95 and market price $7.875 7/5/00).
KIM is confident that it can significantly increase the value of the Fund's
shares, while retaining the philosophy of protecting the interest of the
shareholders. A vote [for] the Karpus proposal is a vote for increasing
shareholder value, lowering management fees and improving performance.
END OF PROPOSAL
Should your Board of Directors recommend any new Investment Advisor contract be
approved by the shareholders, this notice serves as our official proposal which
should be included in any filings you make with the SEC and which should be
included in any proxy materials.
Sincerely,
George W. Karpus
President/CEO
cc: NY Stock Exchange
cc: Brent Fields-SEC
[LETTER OF INQUIRY 2]
August 15, 2000
VIA FACSIMILE (202) 942-9659
Mr. Briccio S. Barrientos
Division of Investment Management
Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20549
Re: Mentor Income Fund, Inc. (the "Fund")
Dear Mr. Barrientos:
I am writing on behalf of Karpus Investment Management ("KIM"), pursuant to Rule
14a-8(j) promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in response to a
letter dated August 10, 2000 to you from David C. Mahaffey and Sullivan &
Worcester LLP, on behalf of the Fund (the "Fund Counsel Letter"). Enclosed are
six (6) copies of this letter of response.
KIM owns, directly or indirectly, 6,550 shares of the Fund, which constitute
more than 1% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Fund and have a market
value in excess of $2,000. KIM has owned these shares for at least one (1) year
and intends to hold them through the next meeting of shareholders of the Fund.
On Thursday, July 20, 2000, KIM prepared and on Friday, July 21, 2000 KIM mailed
by certified mail, postage pre-paid, and by Airborne overnight service four (4)
copies of KIM's shareholder proposal to approve a new investment management
contract with KIM (the "Proposal"), together with a written statement from U.S.
Bank verifying that KIM had owned those shares for at least one (1) year. See
Proposal and Written Statement of U.S. Bank dated July 20, 2000, attached as
Exhibits A and B, respectively. Two copies of the Proposal were mailed to the
Fund's secretary, Geoffry B. Sale, at the principal executive offices of the
fund in Richmond, Virginia, as set forth in the Fund's last periodic report, one
each by certified mail and Airborne overnight. As a precaution, a second pair of
copies were mailed by identical means to the principal executive offices of the
Fund's advisor, Evergreen Funds, in Boston, Massachusetts. The first two copies
were received and signed for by the Fund in Richmond on July 24 and July 27,
2000, respectively. A third copy was received at Evergreen's executive offices
in Boston on July 24, 2000.1 On August 2, 2000, the Fund, by letter from Douglas
Munn, President of the Mentor Income Fund, Inc., to George Karpus (the "Munn
Letter"), declined to consider the Proposal on the grounds that the Proposal was
not submitted in a reasonable time before the Fund begins to print and mail its
proxy materials.2 The Fund's position is reiterated in the Fund Counsel Letter.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On July 18, 2000, the Board of Directors of the Fund voted to approve a new
investment advisory agreement between the Fund and U.S. Bank National
Association ("U.S. Bank") and to submit the New Agreement to shareholders at a
special meeting of shareholders. The Board also voted to submit four other
actions to the shareholders at that meeting and to set the record date for the
meeting on July 28, 2000. On July 19, 2000, the Fund issued a press release from
Charlotte, North Carolina announcing the sale of certain assets to U.S. Bank
(the "Press Release"). The Press Release referred to Mentor as "[b]ased in
Richmond, Virginia." A copy of the Press Release is attached as Exhibit D.
On Thursday, July 20, 2000, only one day after the Press Release, KIM prepared
its Proposal and on Friday, July 21, 2000 KIM mailed its proposal in four (4)
separate packages to the Fund. See Affidavit of DeCarolis at Exhibit C. Also on
July 20, 2000, the Fund filed its preliminary proxy materials with the
Commission and its staff. On Monday, July 24, 2000, the Fund acknowledged
receipt of the Proposal in Boston and in Richmond by signing for the Airborne
packages. A copy of the Boston and Richmond Airborne confirmations are attached
as Exhibits E and F, respectively. On July 26, 2000, the staff provided comments
on the preliminary proxy materials to the Fund. On July 27, 2000, the Fund
receives the second Richmond package by certified mail and it is signed for in
Richmond. A copy of the Richmond certified mail return receipt is attached as
Exhibit G. On August 1, 2000, a KIM representative contacted the Fund to inquire
as to the status of the Proposal. After being told that the Fund did not receive
the Proposal in Boston, but only the U.S. Bank Statement, KIM faxed a copy of
the Proposal to the Fund in Boston on August 2, 2000.
Also on August 2, 2000, the Fund responded to the Proposal with the Munn Letter.
On August 3, 2000, KIM responds to the Munn Letter by letter, a copy of which is
attached as Exhibit H. On July 10, 2000, Sullivan & Worcester filed the Fund
Counsel Letter with the Commission and the staff. The Fund Counsel Letter noted
that when the Fund filed its preliminary proxy material with the Commission it
expected to mail the proxy material on or about August 9, 2000 and that in order
to do so, the Fund would be required to begin printing on or about August 4,
2000. The definitive proxy statement, filed with the Commission on or about
August 9, 2000, contained a notice of special meeting dated August 11, 2000. On
August 11, 2000, with this dispute pending before the Commission, the Fund
apparently mailed the proxy materials to holders of record as of July 28, 2000.
As of the date of this letter, the Fund is apparently unaware of the whereabouts
of either Richmond package.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Rule 14a-8(g) provides in pertinent part that: "the burden is on the [Fund] to
demonstrate that it is entitled to exclude a proposal."
Rule 14a-8(f) provides in pertinent part:
The [Fund] may exclude your proposal, but only after it has notified you of the
problem, and you have failed adequately to correct it. Within 14 calendar days
of receiving your proposal, the [Fund] must notify you of any procedural or
eligibility deficiencies, as well as the time frame for your response. Your
response must be postmarked or transmitted electronically, no later than 14 days
from the date you receive the [Fund's] notification. A [Fund] need not provide
you such a notice of a deficiency if the deficiency cannot be remedied, such as
if you fail to submit a proposal by the [Fund's] properly determined deadline.
Rule 14a-8(e)(3) provides in its entirety that:
If you are submitting your proposal for a meeting of shareholders other than a
regularly scheduled annual meeting, the deadline is a reasonable time before the
[Fund] begins to print and mail its proxy materials.
DISCUSSION
The issuance of the Press Release on Wednesday, July 19, 2000 presents the
earliest possible time that KIM knew or could have known that a special meeting
would be called.3 KIM did not delay when it learned of the Fund's intentions. It
acted the very next day, preparing the Proposal on Thursday, July 20, 2000, and
mailing it to the Fund in four (4) separate packages, the following day, Friday,
July 21, 2000. Indeed, the Fund acknowledges receipt of the KIM package the
following Monday, July 24, 2000. See Fund Counsel Letter at 2. Given the
circumstances, KIM could not have acted with any greater reasonableness, or
prudence, by preparing and sending the Proposal immediately.
Nonetheless, counsel to the Fund takes the position that "[e]ven if the Fund had
received the [Proposal] when Karpus intended to submit it (July 24, 2000), it
would have been received only after the Fund had prepared and filed its proxy
materials and only 11 calendar days before the fund intended to print its proxy
materials. Eleven days is clearly not enough time for the Fund to convene a
meeting of the Board of Directors to consider inclusion of the proposal, and
then to either (1) prepare a response to the proposal ... or (2) to prepare and
file a submission with the Commission requesting that the Fund be permitted to
exclude the proposal." Fund Counsel Letter at 3. Counsel to the Fund would have
the staff believe that the standard is whether the Fund will have enough time to
react to a proposal, when it is the Fund that controls the timing, and, indeed,
that is pushing for expedited timing. Adequate time is not determined by whether
the Fund has "enough time;" but, rather, by whether the proponent made his
proposal within a "reasonable time" under the circumstances.4
Fund counsel continues: "Moreover, it cannot have been the Commission's
intention that Karpus' submission of [the Proposal] after the Fund had filed its
preliminary proxy materials cause the Fund to delay printing and mailing its
proxy materials and, in all likelihood, to postpone the Shareholders Meeting."
Fund Counsel Letter at 4. It is the Fund, and not the shareholder, that is
controlling the timing of the proposed special meeting. More fundamentally,
however, if a shareholder who acts at the first instant he or she becomes aware
of or could have become aware of a proposed meeting has not acted in a
reasonable time within the meaning of Rule 14a-8(e)(3), then that Rule is
virtually meaningless. It cannot have been the Commission's intention to
promulgate a Rule that has no meaning or effect. Counsel to the Fund's
interpretation creates just that result because funds and companies, controlling
the timing as they do, could structure their transactions so that proposals
could never be made at meetings other than annual meetings. If that was the
Commission's intention, it could have stated that shareholders have no right to
submit proposals other than at regularly scheduled annual meetings.
Since Rule 14a-8 was revised and became effective on June 29, 1998, only six no
action letters have addressed the meaning of a reasonable time in Rule
14a-8(e)(3).5 In two of those cases, the Company avoided the Rule 14a-8(e)(3)
issue by opting to hold an annual meeting instead of a special meeting. See
Captec Net Lease Realty, Inc., 2000 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 687 (avail. June 15, 2000)
and Bull & Bear U.S. Government Securities Fund, Inc., 1998 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
931 (avail. Oct. 8, 1998). In the remaining four cases, the proponents each
waited between 25 and 43 days after they should have known a special meeting was
likely to be called before making their proposals. See Allied Signal, Inc., 1999
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 645 (avail. July 22, 1999)(proponent knew or should have known
of the need for a meeting 25 days before proponent mailed proposal); Interlinq
Software Corporation, 1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 453 (avail. April 20,
1999)(proponent knew or should have known of the need for a meeting 27 days
before company submitted preliminary proxy materials and 41 days before
proponent mailed proposal); Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 15
(avail. Jan. 8 1999)(proponent knew or should have known of the need for a
meeting 28 days before company submitted preliminary proxy materials and 43 days
before proponent mailed proposal); Scudder New Europe Fund, Inc., 1998 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 1003 (avail. November 10, 1998)(proponent knew or should have
known of the need for a meeting six weeks before the proponent mailed proposal).
In no case did the proponent act even in a matter of a week,6 let alone within
two days.
For these reasons, KIM respectfully requests that the Commission require the
Fund to revise and resubmit the Fund's proxy materials, provide KIM with a
reasonable opportunity to formulate a revised proposal to be included in the
Fund's revised materials, mail the revised proxy materials, and delay the
proposed September 27, 2000 special meeting.
If you have any questions, please call me.
Very truly yours,
Sherry H. Flax
cc: George Karpus
David C. Mahaffey, Esq.
-----FOOTNOTES-----
1 KIM vehemently disputes the Fund's claim that the July 20, 2000 letter signed
for by the Fund on July 24, 2000 in Boston omitted the Proposal. Attached as
Exhibit C is an Affidavit of Patricia A. DeCarolis confirming that she
personally placed the Proposal in all four envelopes. Indeed, KIM suspects that,
with all of the office moving and position changing (KIM was told at various
times during the July 20-24 time frame that Mr. Munn was taking over for Mr.
Sale as Secretary of the Fund and that Mr. Leonard Davis was taking over as
Secretary) as Evergreen, that Evergreen likely misplaced the "hot potato"
Proposal. Finally, with respect to the contents of the July 20, 2000 envelope,
the burden is on the Fund to demonstrate that it is entitled to exclude the
Proposal. Rule 14a-8(g).
2 We do not address in this response the merits of the Fund's claims that the
Proposal would have been excludable under either Rule 14a-8(i)(4) or Rule
14a-8(i)(9). Had the Fund been relying on either of those bases in excluding the
Proposal, the Fund would have been required, under Rule 14a-8(f): (i) to provide
KIM with notice of these procedural or eligibility defects within fourteen (14)
days of receiving the Proposal; (ii) to permit KIM fourteen (14) days to respond
to the defect, including an opportunity to correct the defect; (iii) and to
notify KIM in writing of the time for its response. The Munn Letter, while
noting that the Fund would have moved to exclude the Proposal under Rule
14a-8(i)(9) had it been timely, relied only on Rule 14a-8(e) to exclude the
Proposal and failed to notify KIM of any date for response or opportunity to
correct any alleged defects. Moreover, the Fund's claim that the Proposal would
have been excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(4) was not asserted until the Fund
Counsel Letter, more than fourteen days after the July 24, 2000 receipt by the
Fund of the Proposal. As a result, KIM respectfully requests the staff to find
that the Fund has waived its rights to object to the Proposal under either Rule
14a-8(i)(4) or 14a-8(i)(9) for failing to comply with Rule 14a-8(f).
3 Nowhere do the Fund or counsel to the Fund suggest that KIM should have known
about the need for a special meeting before July 19, 2000.
4 Ironically, counsel to the Fund submitted a request to the Commission for
permission to exclude the Proposal in only a few days and requested that the
Commission waive the requirement that such a submission be filed at least 80
days prior to the filing of the definitive proxy materials, noting "[c]ompliance
with that deadline would have been impossible...."
5 Based upon a Lexis database search of federal administrative interpretations
and no-action letters in the securities area for "14a-8(e)(3)" and "reasonable
time" as of August 14, 2000.
6 In one case, Bull & Bear U.S. Government Securities Fund, Inc, 1998 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 931 (avail. Oct. 8, 1998), the proponent did act within six days,
but that proposal was treated as one made within Rule 14a-8(e)(2) when that fund
cancelled its plans for a special meeting.
[LETTER OF INQUIRY 3]
August 10, 2000
VIA FACSIMILE
Mr. Briccio S. Barrientos
Division of Investment Management
Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20549
Re: Mentor Income Fund, Inc.
Dear Mr. Barrientos:
I am writing on behalf of the Mentor Income Fund, Inc. (the "Fund") in response
to your inquiry concerning a shareholder proposal submitted to the Fund by
Karpus Management, Inc. d/b/a Karpus Investment Management ("Karpus"). As
discussed more fully below, the Fund declined, pursuant to Rule 14a-8(e) under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to consider the Karpus shareholder proposal
for inclusion in the Fund's proxy statement for a shareholder meeting to be held
September 27, 2000 (the "Shareholders Meeting") on the grounds that the proposal
was not submitted in a reasonable time before the Fund began to print and mail
its proxy materials.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Fund is a Virginia corporation that is registered as a closed-end management
investment company under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the "1940 Act"),
and its shares are traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Mentor Investment
Advisors, LLC ("Mentor"), a registered investment adviser and a wholly-owned
subsidiary of First Union National Bank, serves as investment adviser to the
Fund pursuant to an advisory agreement dated January 31, 1992.
At a meeting of the Board of Directors of the Fund held July 18, 2000, the
Directors voted to approve a new investment advisory agreement (the "New
Agreement") between the Fund and U.S. Bank National Association ("U.S. Bank")
and to submit the New Agreement to shareholders at the Shareholders Meeting. The
Board also voted to submit four other proposals to shareholders at the same
meeting: (1) election of directors; (2) approval of an amendment to the Fund's
Articles of Incorporation to change the Fund's name to "American Income Fund
Inc."; (3) an amendment to the Fund's Articles of Incorporation to delete a
provision that restricts certain transfers of Fund shares; and (4) ratification
of accountants. The Board set the record date for the meeting as July 28, 2000.
The Fund filed preliminary proxy materials with the Commission pursuant to Rule
14a-6(a) on July 20, 2000. The Fund received comments from the Commission staff
on or about July 26, 2000. As stated in the preliminary proxy materials, the
Fund expected to mail proxy materials to shareholders on or about August 9,
2000, approximately six weeks before the Shareholders Meeting. Mailing by that
date required that printing of the proxy materials begin on or about August 4,
2000. The Fund believes that this six week solicitation period (which is the
standard timeframe used by investment companies) is particularly necessary in
this instance in order to obtain the required vote for the New Agreement (which
requires a "majority vote," as that term is used in the 1940 Act) and for the
two amendments to the Fund's Articles of Incorporation (each of which requires
the vote of a majority of the outstanding shares pursuant to state law).
Meanwhile, on or about July 24, 2000, the Fund received an overnight package
from Karpus. Apparently, the package should have contained a copy of the Karpus
proposal; however, the package contained only a letter dated July 20, 2000 from
U.S. Bank certifying that Karpus owned 6,550 shares of the Fund. On or about
August 1, 2000, Sharon Thornton of Karpus called concerning the Fund's
preliminary proxy materials. In the course of that conversation, she inquired
whether the Fund had received a shareholder proposal from Karpus. Upon being
told that the Fund had not received such a proposal, Ms. Thornton faxed a copy
of the proposal to the Fund's office on August 2, 2000. (The Karpus proposal is
enclosed as Enclosure A.)
Douglas Munn, President of the Fund, replied to Karpus by letter dated August 3,
2000. (A copy of Mr. Munn's letter is enclosed as Enclosure B.) As Mr. Munn's
letter states, the Fund determined that the Karpus proposal had not been
submitted in time to be considered for inclusion in the Fund's proxy statement.
DISCUSSION
Rule 14a-8 sets forth the regulatory framework concerning inclusion of
shareholder proposals in management proxy materials. Paragraph (e) provides, in
relevant part, as follows:
The proposal must be received at the company's principal executive offices not
less than 120 calendar days before the date of the company's proxy statement
released to shareholders in connection with the previous year's annual meeting.
However,... if the date of this year's annual meeting has been changed by more
than 30 days from the date of the previous meeting, then the deadline is a
reasonable time before the company begins to print and mail its proxy
materials....
If you are submitting your proposal for a meeting of shareholders other than a
regularly scheduled annual meeting, the deadline is a reasonable time before the
company begins to print and mail its proxy materials.
Thus, the general rule is that shareholders must submit their proposals at least
120 days before the expected mailing date for a company's proxy materials;
however, when, as in this instance, a shareholders meeting will be held on a
date that is more than 30 days from the anniversary of last year's meeting,
shareholders must submit their proposals within a "reasonable time."
In this instance, Karpus did not submit its proposal within a reasonable time.
Even if the Fund had received the Karpus proposal when Karpus intended to submit
it (July 24, 2000), it would have been received only after the Fund had prepared
and filed its proxy materials and only 11 calendar days before the Fund intended
to print its proxy materials. Eleven days is clearly not enough time for the
Fund to convene a meeting of its Board of Directors to consider inclusion of the
proposal, and then to either (1) prepare a response to the proposal (which might
have required a resubmission to the Commission of preliminary proxy materials)
or (2) prepare and file a submission with the Commission requesting that the
Fund be permitted to exclude the proposal.1 Presumably, the Commission's
determination that the general rule is 120 days indicates that a "reasonable
time" is a comparable period, not 11 days.2 Moreover, it cannot have been the
Commission's intention that Karpus' submission of a shareholder proposal after
the Fund had filed its preliminary proxy materials cause the Fund to delay
printing and mailing its proxy materials and, in all likelihood, to postpone the
Shareholders Meeting.
For these reasons, the Fund determined that the Karpus proposal had not been
timely submitted. Accordingly, the Fund excluded the proposal pursuant to Rule
14a-8(f).
Moreover, because the Karpus proposal was excluded on a procedural deficiency
and the deficiency could not be corrected, the Fund believed that it was not
required to make a submission to the Commission pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j). If,
however, such a submission is required in this case, the Fund requests that this
letter be treated as the required submission. The Fund requests that the
Commission waive the requirement that such a submission be filed with the
Commission at least 80 calendar days before the Fund's filing of its definitive
materials. Compliance with that deadline would have been impossible because
Karpus submitted its proposal less than 80 days before the Shareholders Meeting.
Please feel free to call me if you have any questions or require further
information.
Very truly yours,
David C. Mahaffey
DCM:mh
Enclosures
cc: George Karpus
-----FOOTNOTES-----
1 Based upon precedent, it appears that the Commission would have concluded, if
asked, that the proposal could be excluded pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(9) on the
grounds that the proposal (that Fund shareholders approve an advisory agreement
with Karpus) conflicted with one of management's proposals (that Fund
shareholders approve the New Agreement with U.S. Bank). See Scudder New Europe
Fund, Inc. (avail. Apr. 29, 1999) (an investment company could exclude a
shareholder proposal requesting that the company conduct a no-fee in-kind tender
offer prior to the company's conversion from a closed-end fund to an open-end
fund where the company had a proposal to impose a 2% fee on shareholder
redemptions during the first year after the conversion). The Karpus proposal
would likely also be excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(4) as providing a special
benefit to Karpus. See USLIFE Income Fund, Inc. (avail. Oct. 29, 1999) (an
investment company could exclude a shareholder proposal to change its investment
objective where the proposal was part of the shareholder's plan to have the
shareholder's affiliate selected as adviser to the company).
2 In fact, because the Fund did not actually receive the proposal until August
2, 2000, the Fund was only 2 days away from its planned printing date and 7 days
away from its planned mailing date.
[STAFF REPLY LETTER]
September 7, 2000
David C. Mahaffey, Esq.
Sullivan & Worcester LLP
1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Re: Mentor Income Fund, Inc.
File No.: 811-5642
Shareholder Proposal of Karpus Investment Management
Dear Mr. Mahaffey:
In a letter dated August 17, 2000, you notified the Securities and Exchange
Commission of the intent of Mentor Income Fund, Inc. to omit from its proxy
soliciting materials for the special meeting of the fund's shareholders
scheduled for September 27, 2000 a proposal and supporting statement submitted
by Karpus Investment Management (the "proponent"). The proposal states: "In the
event that the existing investment advisory contract shall be terminated, is
terminated, or assigned, the fund shall enter into a new investment management
contract with Karpus Investment Management." In support of this proposal, the
proponent submitted a supporting statement.
You request our assurance that we would not recommend enforcement action if the
fund omits the proposal in reliance on Rules 14a-8(e), 14a-8(i)(4), and
14a-8(i)(9) under the Securities Act of 1934.1
There appears to be some basis for your view that the subject proposal and
supporting statement may be omitted from the fund's proxy materials under Rule
14a-8(i)(4) under the Exchange Act.2 You state that, if the proposal were
adopted, the proponent would receive management fees from serving as adviser, a
benefit not shared by the fund's other shareholders. Under these circumstances,
we will not recommend any enforcement action to the Commission if the fund omits
the subject proposal from its proxy material.3 In reaching this conclusion, we
have not found it necessary to reach your alternative bases for omission.
The staff notes that the fund did not file its statement of objection(s) to the
proposal at least 80 days prior to the date on which definitive materials will
be filed as required under Rule 14a-8(j)(1). Noting the circumstances of the
delay, the staff grants the fund's request that the 80-day requirement be
waived.
Attached is a description of the informal procedures followed by the Division in
responding to shareholder proposals. If you have any questions or comments
concerning this matter, please call me at (202) 942-0620.
Sincerely,
Briccio B. Barrientos
Senior Accountant
Office of Disclosure and Review
-----FOOTNOTES-----
1 In connection with this request, we also have received and considered letters
from Sullivan & Worcester dated August 10, 2000 and Saul, Ewing, Weinberg &
Green, counsel for the proponent, dated August 15, 2000.
2 Rule 14a-8(i)(4) provides that a proposal may be excluded if it "relates to
the redress of a personal claim or grievance against the company or any other
person, or if it is designed to result in a benefit to you, or to further a
personal interest, which is not shared by the other shareholders at large."
3 See Liberty All-Star Equity Fund (pub. avail. Mar. 6, 1990).
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