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Page 311
92 A.2d 311
33 Del.Ch. 262
FIDANQUE et al.
v.
AMERICAN MARACAIBO CO. et al.
Court of Chancery of Delaware, New
Castle County.
Nov. 5, 1952.
Page 313
William S. Potter and James L.
Latchum, of Berl, Potter & Anderson,
Wilmington, and Robert B. Block and Francis
S. Levien, New York City, for plaintiffs.
Alexander Nichols, of Morris
Steel, Nichols & Arsht, and Stanley Law
Sabel, and Daniel E. Chieco of Chadbourne,
Hunt, Jaeckel & Brown, New York City, for
defendant American Maracaibo Co.
Henry M. Canby, of Richards,
Layton & Finger, Wilmington, for defendant
Frederick R. Ryan.
BRAMHALL, Vice Chancellor.
Maracaibo is engaged in the
production of crude oil and is the owner of
royalties and other oil interests in west
Texas, Venezuela and Colombia. The holdings
in Venezuela and Colombia are designated
respectively as the San Antonia de Guanipa
concession and the Barco concession. For
several years prior to February, 1951, by
reason of a substantial indebtedness,
Maracaibo was unable to expand its holdings
in the oil field. In February of 1951, when
this indebtedness was paid in full,
Maracaibo then had sufficient cash with
which to invest in any oil project which
might seem attractive to its management and
board of directors. With this purpose in
mind it was considered advisable to place on
the board of directors men with more
experience in the oil industry. Around the
middle of 1951 George Easley was made a
director. Somewhat later Hadley Case was
also added to membership of the board of
directors.
It was also recognized that in
such an expansion program more aggressive
management would be required, since the then
president, Frederick R. Ryan, who had
Page 314
been a director of Maracaibo since [33
Del.Ch. 266] 1924, and its president since
1935, was then over 70 years of age, in poor
health, and was admittedly unable to carry
on in any project for the expansion of
Maracaibo's interests. A standing committee
was also created to consider the
advisability of accepting any worthwhile
project which might be offered. A number of
projects were considered, all of which were
for one reason or another eventually
rejected. Hadley Case, who was about to
become a member of the board of directors of
Maracaibo, suggested that Maracaibo acquire
his companies, stating that he would only be
interested in such a proposition in the
event that the management of Case Pomeroy
should participate in the management of
Maracaibo.
The directors of Maracaibo agreed
to consider Case's proposal. It employed one
Richard C. Dennis, an expert in appraising
values of oil properties, to make a
preliminary investigation of the Case
Pomeroy properties, to use the result of
another appraisal on the domestic properties
of Maracaibo with respect to reserves, and
to use his own studies and the report of
another appraiser of the de Guanipa
concession in appraising the South American
properties. Dennis was further instructed to
get in touch with the management of Case
Pomeroy and obtain their basic data with
reference to their properties.
Subsequent to the completion of
his appraisal but prior to his report to the
board of directors of Maracaibo, Dennis was
informed by Easley, a director of Maracaibo,
of the occurrence of certain events on the
Case Pomeroy properties which Case claimed
should be considered in the appraisal.
Dennis was instructed by Easley to
reconsider the properties involved by reason
of this later development and make whatever
appraisal he considered proper in the light
of the later information. As a result of
these later instructions, Dennis modified
the appraisement by increasing the value
which he had placed upon the properties of
Case Pomeroy in question by the sum of
$321,809.
Subsequently, after checking
Dennis' report and obtaining advice from
others experienced in the oil industry, the
board of directors approved the execution of
an agreement for the exchange of a block of
stock of Maracaibo, amounting to 36.5764 per
cent of its stock to be outstanding, to the
stockholders of Case Pomeroy in exchange [33
Del.Ch. 267] for all of the outstanding
stock of Case Pomeroy, subject, however, to
the approval of the stockholders of
Maracaibo, at a meeting to be called for
that purpose. At the same time the board of
directors, in like manner, also approved a
contract providing for the employment of
Ryan as a consultant at a salary of $25,000
per year, and, further, that upon the death
of Ryan, his widow, if she should then be
living, should receive annually the sum of
$5,000 for a period of five years or until
her death, whichever event should first
occur. A further consideration set forth in
this contract was the agreement of Ryan not
to engage, directly or indirectly, in any
business competing with Maracaibo.
The board of directors of
Maracaibo, after due notice, called a
meeting of the stockholders of Maracaibo for
May 20, 1952, to consider the advisability
of these proposals. Prior to the meeting
plaintiffs, as stockholders in Maracaibo,
brought this action to enjoin Maracaibo from
carrying into effect the exchange of stock
as provided in the agreement for exchange of
stock and from carrying into effect the
employment of Ryan as a consultant. A
restraining order was issued by this court
in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint. At the meeting of stockholders
the agreement for exchange and the contract
with Ryan were ratified by approximately 85
per cent of the shares of stock represented
and approximately 57 per cent of the total
outstanding stock of Maracaibo. A few days
prior to the date set for the trial, by
stipulation of counsel, Ryan was added as a
party defendant to the cause.
The depositions, testimony and
exhibits offered in evidence in the trial of
this case are so voluminous that a
discussion of the evidence in detail would
be more confusing than helpful. I shall
therefore confine my discussion of the
testimony to the evidence which, in the
consideration of the particular question, I
shall consider to be pertinent.
Page 315
Plaintiffs contend that the
consummation of the agreement for the
exchange of stock should be enjoined by
reason of:
(1) The gross neglect of
Maracaibo's interest on the part of the
management and board of directors and in
particular the alleged fraudulent actions of
the director Hadley Case;
[33 Del.Ch. 268] (2) The fact
that the agreement for exchange of stock
would in effect accomplish a merger of
Maracaibo with the Case Pomeroy companies
without compliance with the statutory
requirements;
(3) The fact that the
ratification of the action of the board of
directors by the stockholders is ineffective
because of inadequate consideration, the
lack of knowledge on the part of
stockholders of all the pertinent facts
surrounding the adoption by the board of
directors of the agreement for exchange and
the fraud of Hadley Case.
Defendants contend:
(1) That the agreement for
exchange was entered into in good faith and
with due diligence, based upon full and
adequate facts and the advice of independent
and qualified experts;
(2) That the over-all values of
the stock of the two companies are highly
favorable to Maracaibo;
(3) That any issues which might
have been raised as to the action of the
board of directors of Maracaibo have been
removed by the ratification of its
stockholders.
In the determination of this case
I am called upon to consider:
(1) Is the agreement for exchange
of stock in effect a merger without
compliance with the statutory requirements;
(2) Was there any fraud on the
part of Hadley Case or others involved in
the transaction;
(3) Did the directors of
Maracaibo act in good faith and with due
diligence;
(4) Does the contract between
Maracaibo and Frederick R. Ryan constitute a
gift or waste of corporate assets;
(5) What effect, if any, does the
ratification by the stockholders of
Maracaibo have upon the agreement for
exchange of stock or the contract with Ryan?
1. Does this transaction
constitute a merger?
Obviously the transaction is not
a merger under Sec. 59, [33 Del.Ch. 269]
Rev.Code 1935, § 2091, since no attempt has
been made to comply with that section of the
General Corporation Law. Even if there had
been such an attempt, it would not have been
successful because the agreement was not
ratified by two-thirds of the stockholders
of Maracaibo as required by the statute.
Since the statute sets forth in detail the
procedure to be followed in the event of a
merger, it is not a common law merger.
Argenbright v. Phoenix Finance Co. of Iowa,
21 Del.Ch. 288, 187 A. 124, 126. Neither
can I agree with plaintiffs' contention that
it is a de facto merger. Strictly speaking,
a merger means the absorption of one
corporation by another, which retains its
name and corporate identity with the added
capital, franchises and powers of the merged
corporation. It is the unit of two or more
corporations by the transfer of property to
one of them, which continues in existence,
the others being merged therein. Argenbright
v. Phoenix Finance Co. of Iowa, supra;
Fletcher Cyc. Corp., (Perm.Ed.) Vol. 15,
Sec. 7041, p. 8.
In this case Maracaibo acquired
all the outstanding capital stock of the
Case Pomeroy companies, issuing in exchange
therefor its own stock. The agreement is
between Maracaibo and the stockholders of
Case Pomeroy. There is no provision for the
liquidation or dissolution of Case Pomeroy.
On the contrary, they are continuing to
operate as independent units. According to
the plan of the management of Maracaibo,
because of an unfavorable tax situation, the
management of Maracaibo intends to develop
its holdings through Case Pomeroy, in which
this tax situation does not exist. It is
therefore conceivable that Case Pomeroy in
the future might even be more active than
formerly.
Whether a particular transaction
is in reality a merger or otherwise depends
to a great extent on the circumstances
surrounding each particular case and in
determining
Page 316
the question all the elements of the
transaction must be considered. There is no
magic in the words applied to the
transaction. Calling it a merger does not
necessarily make it so and giving it another
name does not prevent it from being a
merger. Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. (Perm. Ed.)
Vol. 15, Sec. 7044, p. 20, n. 62.
Vale v. Dupont, 7 W.W.Harr. 254, 182 A. 668,
103 A.L.R. 946; Metropolitan Edison
Company v. [33 Del.Ch. 270] Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 3 Cir., 98 F.2d 807, 809.
See also 19 C.J.S., Corporations, § 1604, p.
1367.
It is well settled that ownership
alone of the capital stock in one
corporation by another does not create an
identity of corporate interests between the
two companies, or render the stockholding
company the owner of the property of the
other. Owl Fumigating Corporation v.
California Cyanide Co., D.C.Del., 24 F.2d
718.
The transfer of the assets of one
corporation to another does not, of itself,
create a merger.
Butler v. New Keystone Copper Co., 10
Del.Ch. 371, 93 A. 380; Argenbright v.
Phoenix Finance Co., supra.
Plaintiffs apparently admit the
force of these decisions but argue that the
instant case presents the unique situation
of a transaction contemplating merger in
every respect, averring that the statutory
formalities were admittedly dispensed with
only to escape compliance with an undesired
tax consequence. Assuming this contention to
be correct, I do not agree with plaintiffs'
conclusion that a de facto merger is
created. As heretofore stated, the identity
of the Case Pomeroy Corporations and the
assets of those corporations, either in type
or amount, are not impaired to changed in
the slightest respect. The issuance of stock
for the stock of these corporations is
authorized by Sec. 14 of the General
Corporation Law, Rev.Code 1935, § 2046. The
proportionate share acquired by the
stockholders is not at all in proportion to
the interest which they had
Case Pomeroy. See Lackey v. State School Tax
Department, 5 W.W.Harr. 507, 168 A. 194;
Vale v. Dupont, supra.
If the transaction had been one
in which in some manner the assets of Case
Pomeroy would have been so impaired that the
rights of creditors or dissenting
stockholders might have been jeopardized,
there would then have been merit to
plaintiffs' contention.
Drug, Inc. v. Hunt, 5 W.W.Harr. 339, 168 A.
87;
Finch v. Warrior Cement Corporation, 16
Del.Ch. 44, 141 A. 54. Since in the
instant case there is no impairment of the
rights of either creditors or dissenting
stockholders, the Drug and Finch cases do
not apply.
[33 Del.Ch. 271] I conclude
therefore that a de facto merger has not
been effected.
2. Was there any fraud in this
transaction?
Hadley Case, at the time that he
submitted to Maracaibo his proposition that
Maracaibo acquire the Case Pomeroy
companies, was the indirect owner of a large
percentage of the stock of the Case Pomeroy
companies, was a director of Maracaibo, and
was serving as a member of a special
committee to investigate any proposals for
the acquiring of oil properties or interests
therein which might be considered. At the
request of the other members of the
committee he gave to the committee such
information as it desired relative to the
Case Pomeroy companies and participated in
the discussions of the committee and of the
board of directors as to the advisability of
accepting or rejecting this proposition. He
did not attend the final meeting of the
committee in which this proposal was
approved and did not vote on the transaction
at the meeting of directors.
Plaintiffs contend that not only
was Case not dealing at arm's length in the
negotiations which took place prior to the
execution of the agreement for exchange of
stock, but that in his efforts to further
the proposed transaction he was guilty of
actual fraud as well. As contended by
plaintiffs, the major breaches of fiduciary
duties by Case may be enumerated as follows:
1. The concealment by Case of the
fact that a key-man in the Case Pomeroy
companies, named Haskell, had planned to
retire and would only be available as a
half-time employee;
2. That Case deliberately
concealed from the committee certain
expenses relative
Page 317
to the so-called 'New York overhead'
amounting to approximately $40,000 a year;
3. That he failed to disclose to
the committee the oil reserve estimates of
Case Pomeroy used for tax and accounting
purposes;
4. That through certain employees
of Case Pomeroy, Case was able to influence
Dennis in Dennis' appraisal of the Case
Pomeroy companies by overvaluing the
properties of Case Pomeroy;
[33 Del.Ch. 272] 5. That Case was
afforded an advance review of Dennis'
report, a fact which he denied at the
meeting of stockholders.
Plaintiffs contend that the
failure on the part of Case to disclose
fully to the board of directors of Maracaibo
the fact that Haskell would only be
available as a part-time employee was a
fraud on Maracaibo. I do not agree. In the
first place, Haskell is remaining as a
part-time employee. In the second place,
considering the nature of this whole
transaction, Case's omission may well have
been an inadvertence. Moreover, the record
shows that at some stage of the transaction
Case mentioned this fact to Easley, who was
the only director, outside of Case himself,
who had any great background in the oil
business and who seemed to be the leading
figure in the negotiation on the part of
Maracaibo. Haskell was only a small part of
the management. Apparently the man whose
services Maracaibo most desired was Case
himself. I do not consider the actions of
Case in this respect deliberately
misleading.
As to the concealment of the New
York overhead, the appraisal made by Dennis
and the other appraisals referred to in this
case, were all appraisals of properties. It
is true that the water and ditching business
was appraised on an earnings basis and that
undoubtedly some consideration should have
been given to this item in making this
appraisement. There is no evidence in this
case to indicate that this omission was
intentional. In fact, the circumstances
would seem to indicate otherwise. In view of
the fact that Dennis made certain large
deductions for administrative expenses
exceeding $50,000 per annum, it may well be
that all parties concerned considered that
item of administrative expenses well
covered. I therefore do not consider this
omission on the part of Case, if it was an
omission, as indicating lack of good faith
on Case's part.
I do not entirely understand
plaintiffs' allegation that Case concealed
the oil reserve estimates which Case Pomeroy
used for tax and accounting purposes. I do
not recall anything in the record to show
that any request was ever made for his
information. The appraisement which Dennis
was making was an appraisement of what he
considered to be the actual value of these
properties, not [33 Del.Ch. 273] to check
other figures as to their correctness. The
only testimony relative to the matter is
that they were conservative figures, made
for tax purposes. While this information
might or might not have been of some
assistance, I fail to see how these figures
could or should have been controlling. In
fact, they might well have been misleading.
Certainly there is no evidence here of any
fraud.
Relative to the charges that Case
secretly influenced Dennis' valuation
through Case Pomeroy employees at Fort
Worth, Texas, I find nothing amounting to
more than suspicion in this contention.
Dennis was instructed to proceed to Fort
Worth and to contact these men and obtain
from them the information which they had
relative to the properties of Case Pomeroy
and their location. He did exactly as he was
instructed and again I find nothing more
than suspicion to show that he was in any
manner influenced improperly by either or
both of these men. In fact, all of the
positive testimony is directly to the
contrary.
At a conference in Dennis' office
with Case and Rice, Dennis' report was lying
on his desk. Case saw the report and did get
a glance at some of the figures. There is
nothing to show in the record that he
examined the report. There is nothing to
show that he attempted to persuade Dennis to
make any changes in the report before its
submission to the board of directors. At the
meeting of the stockholders, in a rather
heated discussion with one of the
stockholders, Case made the statement that
Page 318
he had not seen the report. Obviously, what
he intended to imply was that he had not
examined the report. There is nothing in the
record to show that he had. I see no merit
in this contention.
This is not a case where a
majority of the board of directors are
officers of the other company involved. In
such a case, if there had been no
ratification by the stockholders, the burden
would be on those who were asserting the
validity of the transaction to prove that
the transaction was an arm's length
transaction and that the interests of the
corporation were fully protected. Kerbs v.
California Eastern Airways, Del.Ch., 83 A.2d
473; Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp.,
Del.Ch., 83 A.2d 595. Here, while it is true
that Case was acting in a dual capacity,
there were nine other directors on
Maracaibo's board and Case was only one of
[33 Del.Ch. 274] several directors on the
committee which recommended the transaction.
All of these directors were prominent in
financial, legal, and business affairs in
the City of New York and vicinity. It would
be difficult to conceive that Case could
deceive or mislead all of them to the extent
that they would permit him to take an unfair
advantage of Maracaibo. It is not unusual
for corporations to have directors who are
also directors in other corporations in a
similar line of business. This is frequently
advisable in order to secure directors who
will function properly. Bearle and Means,
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
(1933), p. 231, see n. 15.
It is perhaps unfortunate that
Case continued as a member of the committee
after the beginning of these
negotiations--although he did not attend the
meeting of the committee at which the
proposal was approved,--and it is the duty
of this court to scrutinize carefully his
actions while acting in such a dual
capacity. Nevertheless, a careful
examination of the record does not disclose
anything amounting at most to more than a
suspicion of overreaching or fraud on the
part of Case or any failure on his part to
give to Maracaibo in this transaction every
right to which it was entitled.
I conclude that Hadley Case did
not attempt to take any unfair advantage or
to perpetrate any fraud upon Maracaibo in
those negotiations.
3. Did the directors of Maracaibo
act in good faith and with due diligence?
In the consideration of this
proposal the directors of Maracaibo employed
one Richard C. Dennis, a geologist of some
repute. Dennis had previously appraised the
Maracaibo properties for Maracaibo.
Apparently it was for this reason that
Dennis was employed by the board of
directors to make this appraisement. After
the completion of Dennis' report, but before
it was submitted to the directors of
Maracaibo, Dennis, at the request of Easley,
one of the directors of Maracaibo seemingly
in charge of these negotiations, re-examined
several properties of Case Pomeroy and as a
result thereof increased his valuation
thereon to the extent of [33 Del.Ch. 275]
$321,809. Upon receipt of the appraisement
the special committee and the president had
the report examined by another geologist and
by the vice-president in charge of the oil
and gas department of the Empire Trust
Company of New York City. They agreed that
Dennis' report was favorable to Maracaibo.
Plaintiffs contend that Dennis'
report is incomplete, in particular, in that
it does not contain a complete list of all
the Case Pomeroy companies; that it is
unfavorable to Maracaibo in that the
properties of Maracaibo are under-appraised
and the properties of Case Pomeroy are
over-valued; that Dennis improperly raised
the appraisement of certain Case Pomeroy
companies to the extent of $321,809; that
the shares of Maracaibo issued to Case
Pomeroy amount to approximately 36 per cent
of the total Maracaibo stock to be
outstanding; that no consideration was given
by the board of directors of Maracaibo to
the fact that the stock of Maracaibo was
listed on the New York Curb Exchange,
whereas, the stock of Case Pomeroy was sold
'over the counter'; that there is a gross
disparity between the value of 1,103,526
shares of Maracaibo stock and all the stock
of the Case Pomeroy companies and that the
Page 319
board of directors should have known of such
disparity; that the directors permitted
themselves to be misled by the
representations of Case to the extent that
in their deliberations and in their
decisions the board of directors exhibited a
reckless indifference to the interests of
Maracaibo.
Plaintiffs contend specifically
that there is such a gross over-valuation of
Case Pomeroy companies as to amount to
waste. They call attention to the admitted
mis-valuation of property of Case Pomeroy in
Crane County, Texas, amounting to $43,500.
They aver that the revision of $321,809
above referred to was unwarranted.
Plaintiffs also advert to an appraisal of a
group of royalities appraised by the witness
Wheeler at $231,007.25, whereas the
valuation placed thereon by Dennis amounted
to $730,498. Plaintiffs also excepted to the
valuation of the so-called 'water and
ditching business' of Case Pomeroy, on which
plaintiffs' witness Fuellhart placed a
valuation of $258,000, whereas the valuation
placed thereon by Dennis amounted to
$852,000. Defendants' experts took exception
to these valuations.
[33 Del.Ch. 276] The discrepancy
between these figures, according to
plaintiffs, was due to improper methods used
by Dennis. In making his appraisement of the
water and ditching business Dennis
multiplied the average cash earnings over a
period of four years by six, before
depreciation and without deducting 'New York
overhead'. Plaintiffs contend that both
depreciation and 'New York overhead' should
have been deducted. Plaintiffs also contend
that the multiple used by Dennis should have
been somewhat less than six. Another factor
entering into these computations was the
discrepancy in the testimony of experts as
to the estimated life of the Bradford Field,
in which at least a substantial part of this
business was located. Plaintiffs contended
that the estimated life of the business was
approximately four years; defendants averred
that it was approximately fifteen years.
Defendants also averred that if the property
were valued at a replacement price or on the
theory of a ready buyer and a ready seller
this business would be worth fully
$1,000,000.
It is impossible for me to
determine the correctness of this testimony
with respect to certain definite items,
since it is highly technical and in hopeless
conflict. Fortunately, I do not find it
necessary to do so, since I do not have any
difficulty in arriving at conclusions as to
certain important items in dispute. I am
convinced that the estimated life of the
business in Bradford Field is much nearer
the period of fifteen years as figured by
defendants' experts than the four-year
period as figured by plaintiffs' experts.
The earnings of the business are adequate
and sufficient to warrant an appraisement at
a figure much closer to the figure of Dennis
and the other experts called by defendants
than it is to the figure reached by
plaintiffs' experts. I therefore do not find
the appraisement of Dennis as to the water
and ditching business so excessive as to
amount to waste.
As to Dennis' re-examination of
certain Case Pomeroy companies I find the
facts to be as follows: Case spoke to Easley
about certain developments occurring in Case
Pomeroy which Case felt required revision of
Dennis' memorandum. Easley advised Case to
take up these revisions with Dennis. Easley
further instructed Dennis to re-examine his
appraisement as to these properties. The [33
Del.Ch. 277] amount of the suggested new
appraisement of Case was $366,511. Dennis'
new appraisement amounted to $321,809. This
is objected to by plaintiffs on the ground
that such revision was unwarranted and also
on the ground that the revision was made
because of circumstances occurring since
December 1, 1951, the date as of which the
appraisement was to be made.
It is true that the appraisement
was to be made as of December 1, 1951. It is
also true that Dennis' supplemental report
covering these revisions was very meager.
However, Dennis' report was submitted to the
board of directors and approved. It was
later approved by the stockholders as a part
of the action of the board of directors. I
see no reason why the board of directors
might not, in good faith and as a matter of
fairness, agree to permit a new appraisement
of these properties if the circumstances
should warrant. The accuracy
Page 320
of Dennis' supplemental report is not
affirmatively attacked. The only evidence
offered to refute it amounts only to
suspicion. I cannot therefore say that
Dennis' revision of the Case Pomeroy
properties amounted to waste.
There are other items in Dennis'
report questioned by plaintiffs, in which
the amounts involved are considerably less.
For the same reasons herein set forth, I
cannot say that the board of directors in
approving these items, as they did, after
apparently careful investigation, exhibited
a reckless indifference to the rights of
dissident stockholders or amounted to waste.
Defendants offered another reason
for the acceptance of Dennis' original and
supplemental appraisement, namely: the fact
that Dennis' appraisement of the properties
of Maracaibo was greatly in excess of the
appraisement of these properties made by De
Golyer and McNaughton for Maracaibo a short
time previously and the appraisement made by
Ralph Davis of these properties for Case
Pomeroy. According to the testimony, both of
the latter firms are very highly regarded in
the oil appraisal field.
The record shows that the
appraisement of Maracaibo properties by
Dennis amounted to $16,562,219, having a
present worth value based upon a discount of
six per centum of $12,409,274. The report of
De Golyer and McNaughton shows a total
valuation of the same properties in the sum
of $14,928,902; the present [33 Del.Ch. 278]
worth value, figured in the same manner,
would be $11,223,215. The report of Ralph
Davis shows a valuation of $10,621,975,
which would have a present worth value on a
comparable basis of $7,874,443. The clear
weight of the evidence is to the effect that
the high appraisal of Maracaibo properties
by Dennis would more than overcome any
deficiencies in Dennis' report otherwise.
The testimony also shows that it was so
considered by the board of directors, after
securing the opinion of a number of expert
witnesses. I must therefore accept it as a
fact. I cannot therefore say that the action
of the board of directors of Maracaibo in
considering Dennis' alleged over-valuation
of Case Pomeroy properties was improper or
amounted to waste or reckless indifference.
4. Does the contract between
Maracaibo and Frederick R. Ryan constitute a
gift or waste of corporate assets?
The considerations for the
employment of Ryan, as set forth in the
contract, are: (1) the services which Ryan
would render to Maracaibo as a consultant;
and, (2) Ryan's agreement not to compete
with Maracaibo. However, the fact that these
considerations are set forth in the
agreement does not prevent the plaintiffs
from showing by parol evidence a contrary
intention. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical
Corp., supra. The depositions offered in
evidence by both plaintiffs and defendants
(It was stipulated by counsel that the
depositions, with the exhibits attached
thereto, should constitute the whole of
plaintiffs' testimony as far as the Ryan
contract was concerned) indicate strongly
that the principal, if not the paramount,
consideration was the intent of the board of
directors of Maracaibo to pay Ryan for
services previously rendered. While the
testimony of these witnesses varied somewhat
in extent, all of them testified frankly
that Ryan was being paid for past services
as well as for future services. I am
convinced that by far the larger part of the
compensation provided under this contract
for Ryan was in payment for past services.
In arriving at this conclusion, I have
considered certain essential facts which to
me are controlling, namely: the fact that
Ryan was over 70 years of age at the time of
the execution of the contract; Ryan's state
of health--he had sustained a stroke in
1950, from which he had not entirely
recovered, all of which was very noticeable
from the record of his deposition; the fact
that nowhere in the agreement is there any
[33 Del.Ch. 279] attempt to 'spell-out' the
work which Ryan would be expected to
perform; the fact that the record does not
disclose that there was any such definite
arrangement; the fact that Ryan's salary as
a consultant would be equally as great as
his salary as president and general manager
of Maracaibo (this does not include the
amount which he received as general counsel,
a position which Ryan has relinquished); the
fact that in spite of Ryan's age and
condition of health, although the contract
Page 321
is for life, it fails to provide as to what
would be Ryan's position in relation to this
employment should be again become
incapacitated and be unable to perform his
duties. Such a contract constitutes an
illegal gift of corporate assets. The fact
that there may be some consideration for the
contract is not controlling. If the value of
the compensation to be paid to Ryan is so
out of all proportion to the value of the
services which he would be expected to
render that no reasonable person would
consider that the corporation would receive
a quid pro quo, then the contract would
constitute a gift of corporate funds and
would be illegal. Gottlieb v. Heyden
Chemical Corp., supra. The fact that the
contract may constitute a gift in part only
does not help Ryan, since a totally
inadequate consideration would invoke the
same principles of law as the absence of any
consideration.
Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 53 S.Ct. 731,
77 L.Ed. 1385. Since the payment to Ryan
constitutes an illegal gift of corporate
funds and amounts to waste, the fact that
the contract was ratified by the
stockholders of Maracaibo does not cure its
illegality. Kerbs v. California Eastern
Airways, supra; Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical
Corp., supra; Rogers v. Hill, supra.
5. What effect, if any, does the
ratification by the stockholders of
Maracaibo have upon the agreement for
exchange of stock or the contract with Ryan?
Under such circumstances, unless the action
of the stockholders constituted a gift, was
ultra vires, illegal or fraudulent, this
action would cure any defect. Kerbs v.
California Eastern Airways, supra;
Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp., 30
Del.Ch. 538, 64 A.2d 581.
Mere inadequacy of price, unless
so gross as to lead the court to conclude
that it was due not to an honest error of
judgment but rather to bad faith or to a
reckless indifference to the rights [33
Del.Ch. 280] of others interested, will not
reveal fraud. Cole v. National Cash Credit
Ass'n, 18 Del.Ch. 47, 156 A. 183;
Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Refining Corp.,
14 Del.Ch. 193, 126 A. 46;
Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 16
Del.Ch. 157, 142 A. 654.
Even in cases, such as a case
involving interlocking directorates, where
the burden is upon the directors to prove
the validity of their action and their good
faith, a stockholder ratification shifts the
burden of proof to the objector. Gottlieb v.
Heyden Chemical Co., supra.
Relative to the agreement for the
exchange of stock, I find nothing in the
record to suggest a gift, or that the
agreement was ultra vires or illegal. I have
already determined that there was no fraud.
I must therefore conclude that the
stockholder ratification of the agreement
for the exchange of stock cured any defect
which may have existed in this transaction.
It is therefore a legal and binding
agreement.
As to the contract with Ryan, for
the reasons heretofore given, I conclude
that the salary arrangement with Ryan
constituted a gift of corporate funds
amounting to waste. Kerbs v. California
Eastern Airways, supra; Gottlieb v. Heyden
Chemical Corp., supra; Rogers v. Hill,
supra. I therefore find that the agreement
with Ryan was not cured by the ratification
of the stockholders of Maracaibo and that it
is therefore null and void.
Objection was made at the trial
to a question put to the witness Kenneth
Meyer, vice-president and general manager of
the water and ditching business of Case
Pomeroy, on the ground that he was not an
expert and that the question was not proper
in re-direct examination. Later, in
plaintiffs' brief they objected upon the
further ground that the answer of the
witness was not proper to prove value.
Permitting such a question in
re-direct examination is within the
discretion of the court. Throughout the
trial I permitted questions at any stage in
the proceedings where it seemed that the
answers thereto would have evidential value.
There is no merit to the objection on this
ground.
[33 Del.Ch. 281] The witness had
had many years of experience in this
particular business. The owner of property
is deemed qualified by reason of his
relationship as owner to give estimates of
the value of what he owns. The weight of
such testimony is, of course,
Page 322
affected by his knowledge of the values. See
cases cited in 20 Am.Jur., Sec. 892, p. 751,
N.S. 14, 15, 16 & 17. The managing director
of a corporate owner has been held to come
within this rule. Jones on Evidence, Vol. 2,
Sec. 363, p. 680. This practice has been
long followed in this state.
Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube
Co., 14 Del.Ch. 64, 122 A. 142; Sterling
v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., Del.Ch.1952, 89
A.2d 862, 870.
Plaintiffs made no objection to
the answer of the witness as not responsive,
as evidenced by the following question put
to the witness by plaintiffs' counsel: 'And
in arriving at the value that you just
testified to what method did you use?' The
answer of the witness was intended to place
a value upon the business and was so
accepted at the time by counsel and by the
court. Since the witness was qualified to
give such testimony, it should not now be
stricken.
Objection was also made at the
trial to the admission of an oral report
which the witness Fitting, a geologist,
testifying as an expert, made to the
management and directors of Maracaibo
relative to his examination of portions of
Dennis' report.
One of the defenses in this case
is the allegation that the board of
directors of Maracaibo had the advice of
experts who had checked Dennis' report. This
testimony is clearly admissible to show that
the board of directors of Maracaibo received
such a report. See 6 Wigmore, Evidence (3d
Ed.1940), Sec. 1788.
An order will be entered no
notice in accordance with this opinion.
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