| Page 1351 535 A.2d 1351
56 USLW 2327 In the Matter of the Appraisal of
ENSTAR CORPORATION,
Respondent below, Appellant,
v.
Lucie SENOUF, and Prudential-Bache
Securities Inc. for
Margaret S. Earle, Claimants Below,
Appellees. Supreme Court of Delaware.
Nov. 30, 1987.
Page 1352
Charles F. Richards, Jr., Samuel
A. Nolen, (argued) of Richards, Layton &
Finger, Wilmington, for appellant.
Michael D. Goldman, James F.
Burnett (argued), Kathleen T. Furey, and
Laurie A. Silverstein of Potter, Anderson
and Corroon, Wilmington, for appellee
Prudential-Bache.
Lawrence C. Ashby (argued) and
Stephen E. Jenkins of Ashby, McKelvie &
Geddes, Wilmington, for appellee Senouf.
Before CHRISTIE, C.J., MOORE and
HOLLAND, JJ.
MOORE, Justice:
This appeal by Enstar Corporation
(Enstar) presents issues relating to the
perfection of stock appraisal rights under 8
Del.C. § 262 (1983) by persons whose shares
are held in "street" or nominee names. Thus,
we are required to address the definition of
the term "stockholder" in Section 262(a).
Plaintiffs Lucie Senouf and
Margaret S. Earle brought these consolidated
appraisal actions in the Court of Chancery
against Enstar following a merger between
Enstar and Unimar Subsidiary, Inc. (Unimar).
The plaintiffs' shares were registered in
the name of a nominee, CEDE & Co., (CEDE),
but their demands for appraisal were not
made by or on behalf of the actual holder of
record, CEDE. The Court of Chancery,
nonetheless, ruled that plaintiffs' demands
for an appraisal were valid since the
corporation had "reasonable constructive
notice" that plaintiffs' shares were held by
a nominee. Thus, we confront the phrase in
Section 262(a) that "the word 'stockholder'
means a holder of record of stock in a stock
corporation" for purposes of demanding an
appraisal.
The statutory language, statutory
history and prior judicial decisions all
make clear that only a stockholder of record
may demand an appraisal.
1
Accordingly, we reverse.
I.
On September 4, 1984 Enstar
issued a proxy statement seeking shareholder
approval of a merger with Unimar. The terms
of the merger involved an exchange of Enstar
shares for those of another company plus
cash.
As required by Section 262(d),
Enstar's proxy material specifically
informed fiduciaries or custodians, agents
and nominees of the manner by which each was
to perfect an appraisal on behalf of a
beneficial owner. It made clear that only a
holder of record could demand an appraisal:
Only the holder of record of Common
Shares or Preferred Shares (as the case may
be) is entitled to seek appraisal of the
fair value of the Common Shares or Preferred
Shares (as the case may be) registered in
such holder's name. The demand for appraisal
must be executed by or for the holder of
record, fully and correctly, as such
holder's name appears on the holder's stock
certificates. If the
Page 1353 stock is owned of record in a fiduciary
capacity, such as by a trustee, guardian or
custodian, the demand should be made in that
capacity, and if the stock is owned of
record by more than one person, as in a
joint tenancy or tenancy in common, the
demand should be made by or for all owners
of record. An authorized agent, including
one or more joint owners, may execute the
demand for appraisal for a holder of record;
however, such agent must identify the record
owner or owners and expressly disclose in
such demand that the agent is acting as
agent for the record owner or owners.
A record holder such as a broker
who holds Common Shares or Preferred Shares
as nominee for beneficial owners, some of
whom desire to demand appraisal, must
exercise appraisal rights on behalf of such
beneficial owners with respect to the stock
held for such beneficial owners. In such
case, the written demand for appraisal
should set forth the number of Common Shares
or Preferred Shares covered by it. Unless a
demand for appraisal specifies a number of
Common Shares or Preferred Shares, such
demand will be presumed to cover all Common
Shares or Preferred Shares (as the case may
be) held in the name of such record owner.
A. The Senouf Demand
Lucie Senouf, a French national
residing in Morocco, owned 20,000 shares of
Enstar. Her stock was held by Drexel Burnham
Lambert Incorporated (Drexel), who in turn
deposited the shares with the Depository
Trust Company (DTC) for registration.
2 Consistent with its
normal practice, DTC registered the shares
in the name of CEDE, a partnership used by
DTC solely as a nominee to hold the shares
of its participants.
By a letter dated September 15,
1984 Phillipe Champy, acting under a general
power of attorney, purported to demand an
appraisal of Mrs. Senouf's stock. The letter
specified that Mrs. Senouf owned 20,000
shares which were held in her account at
Drexel.
It is undisputed that neither Mr.
Champy nor Mrs. Senouf were stockholders of
record of Enstar, and that Drexel held only
200 Enstar shares of record. No demand for
an appraisal of Mrs. Senouf's shares was
made by or on behalf of CEDE, the actual
holder of record.
B. The Earle Demand
Mrs. Margaret Earle owned 10,441
shares of Enstar, which were on account at
Prudential-Bache Securities Inc.
(Prudential-Bache). She specifically chose
to have her shares registered in a "street
name" in order to take advantage of her
broker's "command account." Prudential-Bache
deposited the shares with DTC which then
registered them in the name of CEDE.
On September 24, 1984
Prudential-Bache demanded an appraisal of
Mrs. Earle's shares in a letter signed (in
facsimile) by Charles M. Karasek, a
Prudential-Bache employee. It is undisputed
that neither Mrs. Earle nor Prudential-Bache
were the stockholders of record, and that
the demand was not made by, or on behalf of,
the stockholder of record, CEDE.
The Court of Chancery nonetheless
held that the demands were effective,
because Enstar had reasonable constructive
notice that the Earle and Senouf shares were
listed on the corporation records under the
name "CEDE & Co." In re Appraisal of Enstar
Corp., Del. Ch., C.A. No. 7802, slip op. at
14 (July 17, 1986) .
II.
A. The Development of Section 262(a)
The General Corporation Law
explicitly details the mechanism for
perfecting
Page 1354 appraisal rights. In its present form 8
Del.C. § 262(a) provides:
(a) Any stockholder of a
corporation of this State who has complied
with subsection (d) of this section and has
neither voted in favor of the merger or
consolidation nor consented thereto in
writing pursuant to § 228 of this title
shall be entitled to an appraisal by the
Court of Chancery of the fair value of his
shares of stock under the circumstances
described in subsections (b) and (c) of this
section. As used in this section, the word
"stockholder" means a holder of record of
stock in a stock corporation and also a
member of record of a nonstock corporation;
the words "stock" and "share" mean and
include what is ordinarily meant by those
words and also membership or membership
interest of a member of a nonstock
corporation.
8 Del.C. § 262(a) (1983)
(Emphasis added).
While the "holder of record"
provision was added to Section 262 in the
1967 revision of the General Corporation
Law, for decades this Court had consistently
defined the term "stockholder" as a holder
of record.
3 Salt
Dome Oil Corp. v. Schenck, Del.Supr., 41
A.2d 583, 589 (1945). See also Carl M. Loeb,
Rhoades & Co. v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,
Del.Supr., 222 A.2d 789 (1966); Olivetti
Underwood Corp. v. Jacques Coe & Co.,
Del.Supr.,
217 A.2d 683 (1966).
Since the 1967 revisions, Section
262 has been amended several times,
including a major redrafting in 1981. See 63
Del.Laws, ch. 25, § 14 (1981).
4
Significantly, none of those changes
affected the definition of a stockholder.
This statutory history also is
consonant with other basic precepts of
corporation-stockholder relationships under
the General Corporation Law. Thus, 8 Del.C.
§ 220(a) (1983), relating to the inspection
of books and records, defines stockholder as
a "stockholder of record". This is
reinforced by 8 Del.C. § 219(c) (1983),
providing that a company may look to its
stock ledger as the sole evidence of who is
entitled to vote at a stockholders' meeting.
5 See Rainbow
Navigation, Inc. v. Pan Ocean Navigation,
Inc., Del.Supr., 535 A.2d 1357 (1987),
decided today. Section 262 also is
harmonious with the Uniform Commercial Code.
Under 6 Del.C. § 8-207(1) (Supp.1986) a
corporation "may treat the registered owner
as the person exclusively entitled to vote,
to receive notifications and otherwise to
exercise all the rights and powers of an
owner." (emphasis added).
B. The Use of Nominees
The use of security depositories
by brokerage firms now is a common practice.
The decision in that regard, however, is a
matter which is strictly between the broker
and its clients. As Mr. Karasek, the
Prudential-Bache employee who signed the
Earle demand, testified:
If the client wants their (sic)
stock in street name, then Prudential-Bache
will buy the securities for the client ...;
the client has determined she wants it in
street name. That's how it's done.
* * *
The choice is up to the client.
In making that choice, the burden
must be upon the stockholder to obtain the
advantages of record ownership.
Lewis v. Corroon & Reynolds Corp., Del. Ch.,
57 A.2d 632, 634 (1948);
Nickles v. United Nuclear Corp., Del. Ch.,
192 A.2d 628 (1963). The legal and
practical effects of having one's stock
registered in street name cannot be visited
upon the issuer. The attendant risks are
those of the stockholder, and where
appropriate, the broker.
Page 1355 As this Court stated in American Hardware
Corp. v. Savage Arms Corp., Del.Supr.,
136 A.2d 690 (1957):
Under the General Corporation Law, no one
but a registered stockholder is, as a matter
of right, entitled to vote, with certain
exceptions not pertinent here. If an owner
of stock chooses to register his shares in
the name of a nominee, he takes the risks
attendant upon such an arrangement,
including the risk that he may not receive
notice of corporate proceedings, or be able
to obtain a proxy from his nominee. The
corporation, except in special cases, is
entitled to recognize the exclusive right of
the registered owner to vote. It has been
held in this State that an unregistered
stockholder may not dissent from a merger
and demand appraisal of his stock.... The
corporation has ordinarily discharged its
obligation under Delaware law when it mails
notice to the record owner.
Id. at 692. (Citations omitted).
Here, the problem is one between
the plaintiffs and their brokers. Enstar
cannot, and should not, be blamed for the
failure of a nominee or broker to correctly
perfect appraisal rights for a beneficial
owner. Several other brokers properly
instructed CEDE & Co. to demand an appraisal
on behalf of their customers. The failures
of Prudential-Bache or Drexel in that regard
should not be shifted to, or borne by,
Enstar. The dispute, if any, is between
these brokers and their clients.
III.
In its decision the Court of
Chancery relied on a theory of notice
discussed in Raab v. Villager Industries,
Inc., Del.Supr., 355 A.2d 888 (1976). We
think, however, that the trial court
misinterpreted Raab.
That case addressed problems,
which arose under the pre-1976 version of
Section 262, involving a two-step perfection
process: prior to the merger vote the
dissenting stockholder filed a written
objection with the corporation; after the
vote the dissenting stockholder made a
written demand for payment. Significantly,
Raab's holdings are prefaced by a brief
statement comparing the relative formality
required to execute each of those steps:
The validity of the claims here
under review involved pre-vote written
objections--not written demands for payment.
We distinguish between the two writings in
determining the requisite formality and
technicality of execution. The purpose of
the objection is of lesser importance than
the demand for payment. "The only purpose of
requiring an objection in writing prior to
the stockholders' meeting is to give some
advance notice [to corporate officers and
other stockholders] of possible
dissentients. The purpose is not to make
known to a certainty those who will dissent,
for as has been pointed out, a stockholder
who objects in writing is still at liberty
to vote his shares in favor of the merger,
or even to vote his shares against the
merger and then conclude to accept its
benefits. The purpose of the statute in
requiring an objection in writing is merely
to give notice."
355 A.2d at 891 (quoting Zeeb v.
Atlas Powder Co., Del.Supr., 87 A.2d 123,
127 (1952)).
Later the court continued:
A demand for payment under §
262(b), on the other hand, requires the
formality and legal technicality befitting a
last step in the final transaction between
the corporation and its dissenting
stockholder. A demand for payment must be
properly and formally signed by or for all
stockholders of record.
Id. at 892.
As Raab noted, each of the
claims, except one, related to the written
objection requirement, which involved a less
exacting formality of execution than the
demand. Thus, the Court concluded that a
written objection signed by one joint owner,
but not the other, was sufficient to fulfill
the notice objective of Section 262. 355
A.2d at 892. Likewise, the Court held that
an objection filed by a broker was
sufficient to give the corporation notice,
even though the shares were owned of record
by the customer. Id. at 893. Significantly,
the Court denied the
Page 1356 one claim involving a demand, because it was
not signed by both joint owners. Id. at 892.
Thus, Raab reinforces our holdings here.
The effect of the 1976 amendments
to Section 262 was to combine the pre-vote
written objection and the post-vote written
demand into a single step. Thus, the present
pre-vote demand acts both as a notification
to the corporation of the stockholder's
dissent, and as a formal demand for an
appraisal. Given Raab 's recognition of the
important policy behind the requisite
formality of executing the demand, our
conclusions reached here are in harmony with
that object.
Section 262 seeks an expedient
and certain appraisal of stock. This goal
was enunciated long ago in Salt Dome Oil
Corp. v. Schenck, Del.Supr., 41 A.2d 583
(1945):
With respect to matters intracorporate
affecting the internal economy of the
corporation, or involving a change in the
relationship which the members bear to the
corporation, there must be order and
certainty, and a sure source of information,
so that the corporation may know who its
members are and with whom it must treat, and
that the members may know, in a proper case,
who their associates are. Especially is this
true in a merger proceeding which is
essentially an intracorporate affair. The
merging corporations are entitled to know
who the objecting stockholders are so that
the amount of money to be paid to them may
be provided. The stockholders in general are
entitled to know the dissentients and the
extent of the dissent.
Stephenson v. Commonwealth & Southern
Corporation, 18 Del.Ch. 91, 156 A. 215.
The corporation ought not to be involved in
possible misunderstandings or clashes of
opinion between the non-registered and
registered holder of shares. It may
rightfully look to the corporate books as
the sole evidence of membership.
Id. at 588-89.
We reaffirm those principles.
While not discussed by the trial court, we
also note two of its own cases that reach
results consistent with our ruling today.
Raynor v. LTV Aerospace Corp., Del. Ch., 331
A.2d 393 (1975), and Engel v. Magnavox
Co., Del. Ch., C.A. No. 4896 (April 21,
1976) , demands for appraisals made by the
beneficial owners of stock, rather than the
stockholders of record, were invalidated,
even though the identity of the holder of
record was known.
Thus, in the interest of
promoting certainty in the appraisal
process, and consistent with Raab, a valid
demand must be executed by or on behalf of
the holder of record, whether that holder is
the beneficial owner, a trustee, agent or
nominee. Any other result would embroil
merging corporations in a morass of
confusion and uncertainty, none of which was
of their making.
IV.
Finally, claimants contend that
Enstar's notice to stockholders was
insufficient to advise beneficial owners of
the means for perfecting their appraisal
rights. Again, plaintiffs rely on Raab v.
Villager Industries, Inc., which mandates
the issuance of specific instructions as to
"the manner in which one may purport to act
for a stockholder of record such as a joint
owner, a partnership, a corporation, a
trustee or a guardian." 355 A.2d at 895.
This presents questions of materiality
rather than establishing a mechanistic rule
of disclosure.
The Delaware disclosure standard
for proxy materials is stated in Rosenblatt
v. Getty Oil Co., Del.Supr.,
493 A.2d 929
(1985).
6 Under
that rule the trial court's
Page 1357 analysis should have focused on the question
whether the Enstar proxy statement failed to
disclose a material fact necessary to permit
a reasonable person to perfect his or her
(or a customer's) appraisal rights.
7 The trial court did not
apply this standard, but instead held that a
proxy statement should provide step-by-step
instructions as to how a nominee can perfect
an appraisal demand for the shares of a
beneficial owner. Granting that proper
instructions are material, they were in fact
given here. Beyond that, the relationship
between a beneficial stockholder and a
nominee are not relevant matters of concern
to the merging corporations.
The judgment of the Court of
Chancery is REVERSED.
1 Section 262 has been amended since this
case was argued. The amendments do not
affect the definition of a "stockholder" or
the outcome of this case, but they reinforce
the requirement that one seeking an
appraisal must be a stockholder of record.
2 The use of DTC and similar central
security depositories is a common method for
holding publicly traded securities. Such
depositories serve their participant
brokerage houses by providing a central
storage facility for large numbers of stock
certificates. This allows participants to
buy and sell shares without the burdens of
transferring certificates and reregistering
shares in the name of the new buyer after
each transaction. Whether a beneficial
stockholder participates in a depository
system is a matter between the beneficial
stockholder and his broker, and is not a
consideration for issuers.
3 Prior to the 1967 amendments, Section
262(a) provided in pertinent part:
[T]he word "stockholder" means and
includes a holder of stock in a stock
corporation.
Similar language appeared in an even
earlier statute.
See Del.Rev.Code § 2093, Sec. 61 (1935).
4 See also footnote 1.
5 8 Del.C. § 219 provides in pertinent
part:
(c) The stock ledger shall be the only
evidence as to who are the stockholders
entitled to examine the stock ledger, the
list required by this section or the books
of the corporation, or to vote in person or
by proxy at any meeting of stockholders.
6 "[T]he standard ... contemplate[s] ...
a showing of a substantial likelihood that,
under all the circumstances, the omitted
fact would have assumed actual significance
in the deliberations of the reasonable
shareholder. Put another way, there must be
a substantial likelihood that the disclosure
of the omitted fact would have been viewed
by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the 'total mix' of
information made available." Rosenblatt v.
Getty Oil Co., Del.Supr., 493 A.2d 929,
944-45 (1985) (quoting
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 449, 96 S.Ct. 2126, 2132, 48
L.Ed.2d 757 (1976)).
7 It follows that
Tabbi v. Pollution Control Industries, Inc.,
Del. Ch., 508 A.2d 867 (1986) is
implicitly overruled in part. The Tabbi
court incorrectly relied upon Raab in
determining the sufficiency of disclosures
in a proxy statement. Whether the particular
facts of Tabbi would withstand the
Rosenblatt standard we need not decide. |