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504 N.Y.S.2d 967 504 NYS2d 967

132 Misc.2d 606

INTERNATIONAL CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRIES, INC., Plaintiff,
v.
NORTON & CO., INC. and B. Roy Norton III, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Special Term,
New York County, Part I.

June 4, 1986.

        Finley, Kumble, Wagner Heine, Underberg, Manley, Casey, New York City, for plaintiff.

        Dreyer & Traub, New York City, for defendant.

        HAROLD BAER, Jr., Justice:

        Plaintiff, International Consolidated Industries, Inc., ("ICI") seeks an order pursuant to CPLR 3213 granting summary judgment in lieu of complaint.

        On December 31, 1984, ICI agreed to purchase shares of Norton & Co., Inc., stock for $600,000 (the "Agreement") with the option to sell back or "put" to Norton & Co. all stock at the original purchase price plus all accrued dividends.

        On March 31, 1985, ICI, in writing, exercised its option to sell all of the preferred shares back to Norton & Co. on the terms specified in the Agreement. Norton & Co. repurchased only one-half of ICI's hsares and thus now seeks $300,000--the amount claimed due and owing under the Agreement.

        Defendants first urge that the Agreement is not an instrument for the payment of money only since proof outside the instrument is required to establish a valid course of action. However, the instrument and proof of non-payment here make out a prima facie case. Interman Industries Prod. v. R.S.M. Electron Power, Inc., 37 N.Y.2d 151, 371 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1975). Proof of the demand to repurchase the shares held by ICI is included in the moving papers, and defendants do not deny that Norton & Co. failed to repurchase all of ICI's shares. Moreover, the put option was a severable agreement from the original purchase contract and as such constitutes a separate instrument for the payment of money only. Wickham Contracting Co., Inc., v. Gevyn Construction Corp., 64 A.D.2d 982, 408 N.Y.S.2d 814 (2d Dept.1978).

        Defendant next contends that a material issue of fact exists because under section 160 of the Delaware General Corporations Law ("DGCL") a corporation is prohibited from redeeming its own shares if the redemption would impair the corporation's capital. The 1974 amendment, however, to Section 160 specifically allows a corporation to pledge to repurchase its own shares "if at the time such note, debenture or obligation was delivered by the corporation, its capital was not then impaired or did not thereby become impaired".

        The language of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit construing this amendment In re Reliable Mfg. Corp., 703 F.2d 996, 1002 (7th Cir.1983), is instructive:

"The language of this amendment strongly suggests that the relevant time at which to evaluate whether a corporation's capital has been impaired is the time at which the challenged obligation was entered into."

        From the papers before me, Norton & Co. was adequately capitalized on the day it

obligated itself to repurchase its stock and therefore may not rely on Section 160 to invalidate that obligation. The cases cited by defendants are inapposite; they either relate to Delaware law prior to the 1974 amendment or state statutes substantially different from Section 160, as amended.

        Accordingly, plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 3213 for summary judgment in lieu of a complaint is granted as to the value of the unpurchased shares.

        This constitutes the decision and order of the court; the clerk is directed to enter judgment in the amount of $300,000.00 plus appropriate interest. The claim for attorneys' fees is severed as against B. Roy Norton III and upon payment of any fees, the filing of a Note of Issue and Request for Judicial Intervention, the matter will be assigned for a hearing.

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