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Page 293
328 U.S. 293
66 S.Ct. 1100 90 L.Ed. 1244 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
v.
W. J. HOWEY CO. et al.
No. 843.
Argued May 2, 1946.
Decided May 27, 1946.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 14, 1946.
See 67 S.Ct. 27.
Page 294
Mr. Roger S. Foster, of
Philadelphia, Pa., for petitioner.
Messrs. C. E. Duncan, of
Tavares, Fla., and George C. Bedell, of
Jacksonville, Fla., for respondents.
Mr. Justice MURPHY delivered
the opinion of the Court.
This case involves the
application of § 2(1) of the Securities Act
of 19331 to an offering of units
of a citrus grove development coupled with a
contract for cultivating, marketing and
remitting the net proceeds to the investor.
The Securities and Exchange
Commission instituted this action to
restrain the respondents from using the
mails and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce in the offer and sale of
unregistered and nonexempt securities in
violation of § 5(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 77e(a). The District Court denied the
injunction, 60 F.Supp. 440, and the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment, 151 F.2d 714. We granted
certiorari, 327 U.S. 773, 66 S.Ct. 821, on a
petition alleging that the ruling of the
Circuit Court of Appeals conflicted with
other federal and state decisions and that
it introduced a novel and unwarranted test
under the statute which the Commission
regarded as administratively impractical.
Most of the facts are
stipulated. The respondents, W. J. Howey
Company and Howey-in-the-Hills Service
Page 295
Inc., are Florida corporations under
direct common control and management. The
Howey Company owns large tracts of citrus
acreage in Lake County, Florida. Duringt he
past several years it has planted about 500
acres annually, keeping half of the groves
itself and offering the other half to the
public 'to help us finance additional
development.' Howey-in-the-Hills Service,
Inc., is a service company engaged in
cultivating and developing many of these
groves, including the harvesting and
marketing of the crops.
Each prospective customer is
offered both a land sales contract and a
service contract, after having been told
that it is not feasible to invest in a grove
unless service arrangements are made. While
the purchaser is free to make arrangements
with other service companies, the
superiority of Howey-in-the-Hills Service,
Inc., is stressed. Indeed, 85% of the
acreage sold during the 3-year period ending
May 31, 1943, was covered by service
contracts with Howey-in-the-Hills Service,
Inc.
The land sales contract with
the Howey Company provides for a uniform
purchase price per acre or fraction thereof,
varying in amount only in accordance with
the number of years the particular plot has
been planted with citrus trees. Upon full
payment of the purchase price the land is
conveyed to the purchaser by warranty deed.
Purchases are usually made in narrow strips
of land arranged so that an acre consists of
a row of 48 trees. During the period between
February 1, 1941, and May 31, 1943, 31 of
the 42 persons making purchases bought less
than 5 acres each. The average holding of
these 31 persons was 1.33 acres and sales of
as little as 0.65, 0.7 and 0.73 of an acre
were made. These tracts are not separately
fenced and the sole indication of several
ownership is found in small land marks
intelligible only through a plat book
record.
Page 296
The service contract, generally
of a 10-year duration without option of
cancellation, gives Howey-in-the-Hills
Service, Inc., a leasehold interest and
'full and complete' possession of the
acreage. For a specified fee plus the cost
of labor and materials, the company is given
full discretion and authority over the
cultivation of the groves and the harvest
and marketing of the crops. The company is
well established in the citrus business and
maintains a large force of skilled personnel
and a great deal of equipment, including 75
tractors, sprayer wagons, fertilizer trucks
and the like. Without the consent of the
company, the land owner or purchaser has no
right of entry to market the crop;2
thus there is ordinarily no right to
specific fruit. The company is accountable
only for an allocation of the net profits
based upon a check made at the time of
picking. All the produce is pooled by the
respondent companies, which do business
under their own names.
The purchasers for the most
part are non-residents of Florida. They are
predominantly business and professional
people who lack the knowledge, skill and
equipment necessary for the care and
cultivation of citrus trees. They are
attracted by the expectation of substantial
profits. It was represented, for example,
that profits during the 19431944 season
amounted to 20% and that even greater
profits might be expected during the 1944
1945 season, although only a 10% annual
return was to be expected over a 10-year
period. Many of these purchasers are patrons
of a resort hotel owned and operated by the
Howey Company in a scenic section adjacent
to the groves. The hotel's advertising
mentions the fine groves in the vicinity and
the attention of the patrons is drawn to the
Page 297
groves as they are being escorted about
the surrounding countryside. They are told
that the groves are for sale; if they
indicate an interest in the matter they are
then given a sales talk.
It is admitted that the mails
and instrumentalities of interstate commerce
are used in the sale of the land and service
contracts and that no registration statement
or letter of notification has ever been
filed with the Commissioni n accordance with
the Securities Act of 1933 and the rules and
regulations thereunder.
Section 2(1) of the Act defines
the term 'security' to include the commonly
known documents traded for speculation or
investment.3 This definition also
includes 'securities' of a more variable
character, designated by such descriptive
terms as 'certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing
agreement,' 'investment contract' and 'in
general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a 'security." The legal issue in
this case turns upon a determination of
whether, under the circumstances, the land
sales contract, the warranty deed and the
service contract together constitute an
'investment contract' within the meaning of
§ 2(1). An affirmative answer brings into
operation the registration requirements of §
5(a), unless the security is granted an
exemption under § 3(b), 15 U.S.C.A. §
77c(b). The lower courts, in reaching a
negative answer to this problem, treated the
contracts and deeds
Page 298
as separate transactions involving no
more than an ordinary real estate sale and
an agreement by the seller to manage the
property for the buyer.
The term 'investment contract'
is undefined by the Securities Act or by
relevant legislative reports. But the term
was common in many state 'blue sky' laws in
existence prior to the adoption of the
federal statute and, although the term was
also undefined by the state laws, it had
been broadly construed by state courts so as
to afford the investing public a full
measure of protection. Form was disregarded
for substance and emphasis was placed upon
economic reality. An investment contract
thus came to mean a contract or scheme for
'the placing of capital or laying out of
money in a way intended to secure income or
profit from its employment.'
State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn.
52, 56, 177 N.W. 937, 938. This
definition was uniformly applied by state
courts to a variety of situations where
individuals were led to invest money in a
common enterprise with the expectation that
they would earn a profit solely through the
efforts of the promoter or of some one other
than themselves.4
By including an investment
contract within the scope of § 2(1) of the
Securities Act, Congress was using a term
the meaning of which had been crystallized
by this prior judicial interpretation. It is
therefore reasonable to attach that meaning
to the term as used by Congress, especially
since such a definition is consistent with
the statutory aims. In other words, an
investment contract for purposes of the
Securities Act means a contract, trans-
Page 299
action or scheme whereby a person invests
his money in a common enterprise and is led
to expect profits solely from the efforts of
the promoter or a third party, it being
immaterial whether the shares in the
enterprise are evidenced by formal
certificates or by nominal interests in the
physical as ets employed in the enterprise.
Such a definition necessarily underlies this
Court's decision
Securities Exch. Commission v. C. M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 64 S.Ct. 120,
88 L.Ed. 88, and has been enunciated and
applied many times by lower federal courts.5
It permits the fulfillment of the statutory
purpose of compelling full and fair
disclosure relative to the issuance of 'the
many types of instruments that in our
commercial world fall within the ordinary
concept of a security.' H.Rep.No.85, 73rd
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 11. It embodies a
flexible rather than a static principle, one
that is capable of adaptation to meet the
countless and variable schemes devised by
those who seek the use of the money of
others on the promise of profits.
The transactions in this case
clearly involve investment contracts as so
defined. The respondent companies are
offering something more than fee simple
interests in land, something different from
a farm or orchard coupled with management
services. They are offering an opportunity
to contribute money and to share in the
profits of a large citrus fruit enterprise
managed and partly owned by respondents.
They are offering this opportunity to
persons who reside in distant localities and
who lack the equip-
Page 300
ment and experience requisite to the
cultivation, harvesting and marketing of the
citrus products. Such persons have no desire
to occupy the land or to develop it
themselves; they are attracted solely by the
prospects of a return on their investment.
Indeed, individual development of the plots
of land that are offered and sold would
seldom be economically feasible due to their
small size. Such tracts gain utility as
citrus groves only when cultivated and
developed as component parts of a larger
area. A common enterprise managed by
respondents or third parties with adequate
personnel and equipment is therefore
essential if the investors are to achieve
their paramount aim of a return on their
investments. Their respective shares in this
enterprise are evidenced by land sales
contracts and warranty deeds, which serve as
a convenient method of determining the
investors' allocable shares of the profits.
The resulting transfer of rights in land is
purely incidental.
Thus all the elements of a
profit-seeking business venture are present
here. The investors provide the capital and
share in the earnings and profits; the
promoters manage, control and operate the
enterprise. It follows that the arrangements
whereby the investors' interests are made
manifest involve investment contracts,
regardless of the legal terminology in which
such contracts are clothed. The investment
contracts in this instance take the form of
land sales contracts, warranty deeds and
service contracts which respondents offer to
prospective investors. And respondents'
failure to abide by the statutory and
administrative rules in making such
offerings, even though the failure result
from a bona fide mistake as to the law,
cannot be sanctioned under the Act.
This conclusion is unaffected
by the fact that some purchasers choose not
to accept the full offer of an investment
contract by declining to enter into a
service contract with
Page 301
the respondents. The Securities Act
prohibits the offer as well as the sale of
unregistered, non-exempt securities.6
Hence it is enough that the respondents
merely offer the essential ingredients f an
investment contract.
We reject the suggestion of the
Circuit Court of Appeals, 151 F.2d at page
717, that an investment contract is
necessarily missing where the enterprise is
not speculative or promotional in character
and where the tangible interest which is
sold has intrinsic value independent of the
success of the enterprise as a whole. The
test is whether the scheme involves an
investment of money in a common enterprise
with profits to come solely from the efforts
of others. If that test be satisfied, it is
immaterial whether the enterprise is
speculative or non-speculative or whether
there is a sale of property with or without
intrinsic value. See S.E.C. v. C. M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., supra, 320 U.S. 352, 64 S.Ct.
124, 88 L.Ed. 88. The statutory policy of
affording broad protection to investors is
not to be thwarted by unrealistic and
irrelevant formulae.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice JACKSON took no
part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER
dissenting.
'Investment contract' is not a
term of art; it is conception dependent upon
the circumstances of a particular situation.
If this case came before us on a finding
authorized by Congress that the facts
disclosed an 'investment contract' within
the general scope of § 2(1) of the
Securities Act, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. §
77b(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(1), the Securities
and Exchange Commission's finding would
govern, unless, on the record, it was wholly
unsupported. But
Page 302
that is not the case before us. Here the
ascertainment of the existence of an
'investment contract' had to be made
independently by the District Court and it
found against its existence. 60 F.Supp. 440.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit sustained that finding. 151 F.2d
714. If respect is to be paid to the wise
rule of judicial administration under which
this Court does not upset concurrent
findings of two lower courts in the
ascertainment of facts and the relevant
inferences to be drawn from them, this case
clearly calls for its application.
Allen v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 326 U.S. 630,
66 S.Ct. 389. For the crucial issue in
this case turns on whether the contracts for
the land and the contracts for the
management of the property were in reality
separate agreements or merely parts of a
single transaction. It is clear from its
opinion that the District Court was
warranted in its conclusion that the record
does not establish the existence of an
investment contract:
'* * * the record in this case
shows that not a single sale of citrus grove
property was made by the Howey Company
during the period involved in this suit,
except to purchasers who actually inspected
the property before purchasing the same. The
record further discloses that no purchaser
is required to engage the Service Company to
care for his property and that of the
fifty-one purchasers acquiring property
during this period, only forty-two entered
into contract with the Service Company for
the care of the property.' 60 F.Supp. at
page 442.
Simply because other
arrangements may have the appearances of
this transaction but are employed as an
evasion of the Securities Act does not mean
that the present contracts were evasive. I
find nothing in the Securities Act to
indicate that Congress meant to bring every
innocent transaction within the scope of the
Act simply because a perversion of them is
covered by the Act.
1 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. §
77b(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(1).
2 Some investors visited their
particular plots annually, making
suggestions as to care and cultivation, but
without any legal rights in the matters.
3 'The term 'security' means
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in
any profit-sharing agreement,
collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of
deposit for a security, fractional undivided
interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a 'security,'
or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of,
or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing.'
4
State v. Evans, 154 Minn. 95, 191 N.W. 425,
27 A.L.R. 1165;
Klatt v. Guaranteed Bond Co., 213 Wis. 12,
250 N.W. 825;
State v. Health, 199 N.C. 135, 153 S.E. 855,
87 A.L.R. 37;
Prohaska v. Hemmer-Miller Development Co.,
256 Ill.App. 331;
People v. White, 124 Cal.App. 548, 12 P.2d
1078;
Stevens v. Liberty Packing Corp., 111
N.J.Eq. 61, 161 A. 193.
Moore v. Stella, 52 Cal.App.2d 766, 127 P.2d
300.
5 Atherton v. United States, 9
Cir.,. 128 F.2d 463; Penfield Co. of
California v. S.E. C., 9 Cir., 143 F.2d 746;
S.E.C. v. Universal Service Association, 7
Cir., 106 F.2d 232; S.E.C. v. Crude Oil
Corp., 7 Cir., 93 F.2d 844; S.E.C. v.
Bailey, D.C., 41 F.Supp. 647; S.E.C. v.
Payne, D.C., 35 F.Supp. 873; S.E.C. v.
Bourbon Sales Corp., D.C., 47 F.Supp. 70;
S.E.C. v. Wickham, D.C., 12 F.Supp. 245;
S.E.C. v. Timetrust, Inc., D.C., 28 F.Supp.
34; S.E.C. v. Pyne, D.C., 33 F.Supp. 988.
The Commission has followed the same
definition in its own administrative
proceedings.
In re Natural Resources Corporation, 8
S.E.C. 635.
6 The registration
requirements of § 5 refer to sales of
securities. Section 2(3) defines 'sale' to
include every 'attempt or offer to dispose
of, or solicitation of an offer to buy,' a
security for value. |