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Page 943
326 F.Supp. 943
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.
HARWYN INDUSTRIES CORPORATION et al.,
Defendants. No. 70 Civ. 2693. United States District Court, S. D.
New York. March 29, 1971.
Page 944
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Page 945
Kevin Thomas Duffy, Regional
Administrator, S.E.C., New York City, for
plaintiff; William D. Moran, Donald N.
Malawsky, Marvin G. Pickholz, and Ira Lee
Sorkin, New York City, of counsel.
Segal & Hundley, New York City,
for defendants Harwyn Industries Corp. and
Harvey R. Siegel; Marvin B. Segal and Robert
L. Beerman, New York City, of counsel.
Gartenberg, Ellenoff, Lehrer &
Stein, New York City, for defendant Irving
L. Gartenberg.
Feldshuh & Frank, New York City,
for defendant Academic Development Corp.;
Sidney Feldshuh, Richard Weinberger, Donald
P. Miller, New York City, of counsel.
Weinstein & Levinson, New York
City, for defendant Hyman Temkin; Samuel
Weinstein, New York City, of counsel.
Steven B. Duke, New Haven, Conn.,
for defendants James W. Feeney, Xanadu
Properties, Inc., Ramon N. D'Onofrio.
Royall, Koegel & Wells, New York
City, for defendants JKM Industries, Inc.
and J. Kevin Murphy; Norman S. Ostrow and
James J. Maloney, New York City, of counsel.
Bittel, Langer, Blass & Corrigan,
Miami, Fla., for defendant Motel Trailer
Distributors, Inc.;. Gerald J. Beyer, Miami,
Fla., of counsel.
Kronish, Lieb, Shainswit, Weiner
& Hellman, New York City, for defendant
Stephen Kirshner; Reginald Leo Duff, New
York City, of counsel.
Penn & Burns, New York City, for
defendant Wayne Slockbower; Richard E.
Burns, New York City, of counsel.
Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Yound,
Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants FSI, Inc.
and Harold C. Yates; Webster, Sheffield,
Fleischmann, Hitchcock & Brookfield, New
York City, of counsel.
MANSFIELD, District Judge.
In this action the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("the Commission") seeks
to plug up what some have treated as a
loophole in the federal securities laws
permitting a company, by "spinning-off" its
subsidiary's shares to the parent's
stockholders without registration, to
convert the subsidiary into a public
corporation whose unregistered shares would
be actively traded on the market. The suit
is brought under § 22(a) of the 1933
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a), and § 27
of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78aa. The Commission alleges
violations of the registration requirement
of § 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S.C. § 77e,
and of the antifraud provisions of both the
above securities acts, § 17(a) of the 1933
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) and § 10(b) of the
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5. Preliminary injunctive relief is
sought, Rule 65, F.R.Civ.P., § 20(b) of the
1933 Act, § 21(e) of the 1934 Act, against
all 15 defendants on the basis of their
participation in a series of transactions
involving stock distributions by Harwyn
Industries Corporation ("Harwyn") to its
shareholders.
The scheme involved three
coordinated steps: (1) the acquisition by
the subsidiaries of assets of other
corporations in exchange for issuance of
controlling interests in the subsidiaries to
those contributing such assets, (2) the
"spin-off" distribution by the parent,
Harwyn, to its stockholders of the
unregistered
Page 946
shares of its subsidiary owned by it, and
(3) the development of an over-the-counter
trading market in the unregistered shares
thus spun-off. Although the motion for a
preliminary injunction was made many months
ago, we deferred decision because of the
pendency of settlement discussions. No such
settlement, however, was reached, despite
several conferences in open court. Because
there is little dispute over the basic facts
on which the litigation is based, our
decision relies on undisputed facts
appearing from the affidavits and other
voluminous papers submitted by the parties.
SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.
1968).
Harwyn was incorporated in 1958
under the name Harwyn Publishing Corporation
and engaged in the printing business. In
1965 it changed its name by substituting
"Industries" for "Publishing." On June 22,
1961, a registration statement filed
pursuant to the requirements of the 1933
Securities Act, Form S-1, became effective,
covering a public offering of 131,000 shares
of its common stock. The stock is traded
over-the-counter, and Harwyn has
approximately 600 public shareholders.
Harwyn is not a public reporting company in
that it is not required to file reports with
the Commission. Harvey R. Siegel ("Siegel")
is its President and Chairman of its Board
of Directors. Irving L. Gartenberg
("Gartenberg"), an attorney, is, and has
been since 1962, its Secretary, a member of
its Board of Directors, and general counsel.
The actions of which the
Commission complains involved four
corporations which were wholly-owned
subsidiaries of Harwyn as of November
1968Cleopatra Cosmetics Corporation
("Cleopatra"), NTRR, Inc. ("NTRR"), Motel
Trailer Distributors, Inc. ("Motel"), and
Prospectus Press, Inc. ("Prospectus").
Cleopatra was incorporated on May
13, 1963, and was an active subsidiary of
Harwyn in the business of distributing
cosmetics. Counsel for Harwyn inquired of
the Commission, both in New York and in
Washington, regarding the need for
registering a "spin-off" distribution of
Cleopatra stock to the Harwyn shareholders,
but there is no indication that any view on
the question was offered by the Commission
in reply. On November 21, 1968, the Board of
Directors of Cleopatra authorized a
distribution of 127,500 Cleopatra shares
held by Harwyn to its shareholders, one
share of Cleopatra being distributed for
every four shares of Harwyn held as of
December 6, 1968. The distribution was
payable December 30, 1968, and was effected
on that date. Seventy-five thousand five
hundred shares were distributed to Harwyn
insiders (presumably Siegel and Gartenberg),
and the remaining 52,000 shares were
distributed to the public shareholders of
Harwyn. A notice as to the source of the
distribution, required by N.Y. Business
Corporation Law, McKinney's Consol.Laws, c.
4, § 510(c), was sent to the shareholders of
Harwyn.
On November 7, 1968, well before
the distribution had been authorized, an
attorney in Gartenberg's office wrote to the
National Quotation Bureau to arrange for
trading in the shares of Cleopatra. The
letter set forth basic but somewhat skimpy
information concerning Cleopatra, i. e., its
name, address, state of incorporation,
number of shares issued, etc., and did not
reveal anything about the business of the
company. Beginning on January 6, 1969,
Cleopatra stock was quoted on the
over-the-counter listings, or "pink sheets,"
published by the National Quotation Bureau.
The Harwyn insiders who received
Cleopatra shares were prevented by law from
trading their Cleopatra shares without
registering them pursuant to § 5 of the 1933
Securities Act. Stop transfer orders with
respect to such shares were placed with
Cleopatra's transfer agent, Bankers Trust
Company.
On approximately January 13,
1969, negotiations were commenced concerning
the possibility of an exchange of investment
stock between Harwyn and certain individuals
who were to become, after completion of the
exchange, the principals of Cleopatra, the
name of which was to be changed to Academic
Development
Page 947
Corporation ("Academic"). These
individuals included Hyman Temkin
("Temkin"), who became President and
Chairman of the Board of Academic, James W.
Feeney ("Feeney"), who succeeded Temkin as
President and a director of Academic, and
Ramon D'Onofrio ("D'Onofrio"), who was to
become Secretary-Treasurer and a director of
Academic. It appears that D'Onofrio may have
been the most active in conducting these
negotiations. A 16-page agreement was signed
on January 18, 1969, embodying the terms of
the exchange. Cleopatra was to issue 872,500
new shares of common stock (amounting to 87%
of the stock in Cleopatra after issuance) in
exchange for stock in two publicly traded
companies49,000 shares of Educational
Science Programs ("ESP") and 53,000 shares
of Academic Systems and Management Corp.
("Systems"). Of the 872,500 Cleopatra
shares, 254,000 were to go to Temkin,
254,000 to Feeney, and 253,500 to. Xanadu
Properties, Inc. ("Xanadu"), a corporation
engaged primarily in holding securities.
Xanadu's President, Muriel Barter, is
D'Onofrio's wife. D'Onofrio acted as
"attorney-in-fact" for Xanadu and all of the
parties who participated in the above
transaction. Sixty-nine thousand shares were
paid to Hill, Thompson, Magid & Co., Inc.
("Hill, Thompson") as a finders fee. The
remaining 42,000 Cleopatra shares were
distributed among three associates of the
D'Onofrio group.
The agreement, Art. 3(d),
recognized that the shares of ESP and
Systems obtained by Cleopatra were to be
acquired for investment, and Cleopatra
consented to their being legended with the
statement that they were not registered
under the 1933 Securities Act. The agreement
further provided, Art. 4(c), that the
Cleopatra shares newly issued in exchange
for the ESP and Systems stock were acquired
for investment and would be similarly
legended. There is no evidence that the
restriction implicit in the legending has
been violated in any way. Temkin has,
however, made certain transfers which are
allegedly exempt.
Article 9 of the agreement
provided that if Cleopatra were to register
any stock for sale to the public, e. g.,
stock held by D'Onofrio and his group, the
Harwyn insiders could register up to 40,000
shares of their Cleopatra stock. After two
years, Cleopatra agreed to file a
registration statement covering the shares
held by Harwyn insiders and those held by
Hill, Thompson. In the event of any such
registration, each selling shareholder was
to pay his pro rata portion of the
underwriting and registration costs.
Cleopatra was required to adopt a
name other than Cleopatra pursuant to the
agreement, Art. 8, Harwyn reserving to
itself "all right, title and interest" in
the name Cleopatra Cosmetics. As a result of
the "spin-off" distribution to Harwyn
shareholders, the letter from Gartenberg's
office to the National Quotation Bureau, and
the listing of Cleopatra shares on the pink
sheets, described above, Cleopatra stock
became publicly traded. Although the name
"Cleopatra" was reserved by Harwyn, the
advantages of being a public corporation
remained with the "spun-off" company. On
January 9, 1969, the price of Cleopatra was
$3 bid per share. By February 28, 1969, the
price had risen to $15 bid per share, and
on March 28, 1969, the price reached $22 bid
per share. On June 30, 1970, the price of
Cleopatra (then known as Academic) was $1
bid per share. Approximately five broker
dealers made the market in Cleopatra stock.
In March 1969, Cleopatra changed
its name to Academic. Since then it has been
active in the field of education. The
controlling persons have assertedly lent
Academic amounts of money and have
guaranteed as yet unpaid bank loans in
substantial amounts.
We now turn to the second
transaction involving the Harwyn subsidiary
known as NTRR and J. Kevin Murphy
("Murphy"), which followed closely the
pattern of the Cleopatra (Academic)
arrangement. NTRR, the Harwyn subsidiary,
was incorporated on October 16,
Page 948
1962, as a sales agency for radio and
television time. Until early 1969 Murphy was
the sole stockholder and chief executive
officer of two California corporations
engaged in the business of general
construction and leasing of construction
machineryJ. K. Murphy Associates and M & S
Equipment Company. He had operated these
companies profitably for about three years,
but in late 1968 he concluded that it would
be advantageous to have public shareholders
and an active trading market for his stock
in order to expand the business of his
companies. He was advised that a legitimate
method of achieving this goal without the
expense of registration with the Commission
might be to acquire a controlling interest
in an inactive corporation which had public
stockholders.
In late 1968, through the
assistance of a consultant, Alvin K.
Sweitzer ("Sweitzer") of AKS Consultants,
Murphy learned of NTRR. A meeting was
arranged by Sweitzer at which Murphy, his
California counsel, and Siegel were present.
A deal was discussed whereby Murphy would
transfer all the shares of his corporations
to NTRR, receiving in exchange a controlling
interest in NTRR. Beset by a lingering
concern about the legality of the proposed
transaction, Murphy then consulted New York
counsel and was assured that, although the
Commission was concerned that the "spin-off"
device not be used by unscrupulous persons
to defraud the public, no Commission release
or prior litigation indicated that the
proposed transaction would be unlawful.
On the basis of the foregoing
legal advice, as well as the advice of other
experienced businessmen, on February 12,
1969, Murphy entered into a 22-page
agreement with Harwyn for the purchase of
650,000 shares of common stock to be issued
by NTRR, for which NTRR was to receive all
the stock in the two abovementioned
California corporations (J. K. Murphy
Associates and M & S Equipment). In Art.
3.12 of the agreement, Murphy warranted that
he was taking the NTRR stock for investment
and not with a view to its distribution, and
Art. 5.2(vi) set forth explicitly the legend
which such stock was to bear. There is no
evidence that Murphy has sold or otherwise
transferred or encumbered any of his NTRR
stock.
On February 29, 1969, as had been
expressly covenanted in Art. 7.1 of the
agreement, the Board of Directors of Harwyn
authorized the "spin-off" distribution of
Harwyn's 200,000 shares of NTRR to Harwyn
shareholders of record as of March 14, 1969,
payable April 7, 1969. The Harwyn
shareholders were to receive one share NTRR
for each four shares of Harwyn. The
distribution was effected April 7, with
Harwyn insiders receiving 125,000 shares and
Harwyn public shareholders receiving 75,000
shares. Under the terms of the agreement,
Art. 7.4, the Harwyn insiders (in this case,
Siegel and one Garson Reiner) were required
to give Murphy irrevocable proxies on their
shares of NTRR for a period of two years and
were prohibited from selling their shares
during that period without the consent of
NTRR. In Art. 8.2, NTRR agreed that, after
two years had elapsed, it would file a
registration statement with the Commission
covering all shares held by any insider at
the request of such insider. The expenses of
such registration and of underwriting were
to be shared pro rata by the insiders whose
shares were being registered. Pursuant to
Art. 8.1 of the agreement, NTRR changed its
name to J.K.M. Industries, Inc. ("JKM") in
May 1969. Under that same provision Harwyn
retained all right, title and interest in
the name NTRR.
A release was sent to Harwyn
shareholders on March 7, 1969, informing
them of the impending dividend and
describing enough of the contract with
Murphy to indicate that after the
transaction closed on March 21, 1969, Murphy
would become the controlling stockholder of
NTRR. Another release, undated but
apparently mailed out with the distribution
of NTRR shares to Harwyn stockholders on or
about April 7, paralleled the Cleopatra
release in form
Page 949
but stated that the distribution would
not affect the stated capital, capital
surplus, or earned surplus of Harwyn, as
NTRR had no assets or liabilities.
NTRR (JKM) shares were listed on
the pink sheets for March 18, 1969, more
than two weeks before the distribution of
NTRR (JKM) shares. NTRR (JKM) stock was
quoted in the pink sheets by 10 broker
dealers. The price of the stock was $7 bid
per share on April 30, 1969, rising to $9
bid per share on May 30, 1969, then falling
to $4 bid per share on November 21, 1969,
and finally reaching $ bid per share on
June 30, 1970. Murphy thus succeeded in
creating public (over-the-counter) trading
in JKM stock without registration.
Turning to the third of these
almost identical "spin-off" transactions,
Motel, the Harwyn wholly-owned subsidiary
involved in the third transaction, was
incorporated on December 31, 1963. Motel was
originally engaged in the distribution of
motel trailers but never seems to have
conducted any significant business. Group V,
the outside group in this case, had been
operating since 1968 as an unincorporated
business by John N. Valianos ("Valianos"),
Stephen Kirshner ("Kirshner"), and Wayne
Slockbower ("Slockbower"). It engaged in
market research and sales promotions. Group
V found that most of the companies that it
dealt with were public companies, as were
most of its competitors. These public
companies were able to give their employees
stock options and other inducements to
employment. Valianos, et al., considered
making Group V a public corporation through
the conventional processi. e., by
incorporating, filing a registration
statement and making a public offering of
Group V stock. This course was rejected
because of the expense of registration and
the fact that Group V did not need public
funds.
In April 1969 Kirshner read an
article in the March 29, 1969, issue of
Business Week which outlined the
"spin-off" technique for becoming a public
corporation without the necessity of filing
a registration statement. The article did
indicate the Commission's growing concern
over the spin-off practice, but what
Kirshner found more interesting were four
paragraphs devoted to Harwyn's recent
distributions of Cleopatra (Academic) and
NTRR (JKM).
Kirshner met Siegel through
mutual friends. Siegel referred Kirshner to
Gartenberg. Presumably after some
negotiation, and as Kirshner states in his
affidavit after consultation with attorneys
and accountants concerning the legality of
the transaction, on June 13, 1969, Motel
entered into a 21-page formal agreement with
Valianos, Kirshner and Slockbower whereby
these individuals received a total of
675,000 shares to be issued by Motel; in
exchange, Motel received all the issued and
outstanding stock of Group V, Inc., a New
Jersey corporation which had been
incorporated by Valianos and company at
about the same time. Four days earlier on
June 9, 1969, possibly while informal
negotiations for the Motel transaction were
in progress, the Board of Directors of
Harwyn had authorized the distribution of
one share of its Motel stock for every three
shares of Harwyn stock owned by Harwyn
shareholders of record on July 1, 1969,
payable on July 31, 1969.
The June 13 agreement, Art. 3.11,
provided that the shares of Motel stock to
be issued and delivered to the Group V
principals were being acquired for
investment and not for distribution. The
Motel stock issued to insiders was also to
bear a legend, Art. 5.2(vi), stating that
the shares were not registered pursuant to
the 1933 Securities Act and could not be
sold, transferred, pledged or hypothecated
without such registration. It does not
appear that any of this stock has been sold
or transferred in violation of the legend;
indeed, on July 10, 1969, Kirshner purchased
500 additional shares of Motel on the
over-the-counter market at $7 per share.
Harwyn agreed to declare and distribute the
Motel stock dividend to its shareholders at
a one-for-three ratio, Art. 7.1. A change of
name provision was included, Art. 8.1, and
Motel's name has now been
Page 950
changed to Group V. Harwyn retained all
right, title and interest in the words
"Motel Trailer." Finally, Siegel, Reiner,
and other insiders were granted the right,
as of two years after the agreement, to
require Motel to file a registration
statement covering their shares, Art. 8.2,
the cost of such registration to be paid by
them pro rata.
Siegel notified the Harwyn
shareholders of the Motel transaction and of
the resulting transfer of control to the
Group V principals on June 16, 1969. On July
31, 1969, Harwyn made a spin-off
distribution to its shareholders of Harwyn's
236,000 shares of Motel. In an accompanying
notice, Harwyn shareholders were told that
Motel had no assets or liabilities, and that
the distribution would not affect Harwyn's
stated capital, capital surplus, or earned
surplus.
A form-type notice was sent by
Gartenberg to the National Quotation Bureau,
and Motel shares appeared on the pink sheets
for July 2, 1969, at $2 or $3.50 bid, $5
asked. Group V has conducted a modest amount
of promotional business since its shares
became publicly traded.
The fourth of these Harwyn
spin-offs involved its wholly owned
subsidiary Prospectus, which had been
incorporated on September 26, 1961, and
during its early years had engaged in the
printing business. The outside principal
interested in acquiring control of a public
company without registration was Harold C.
Yates ("Yates"), a principal stockholder of
the Eastern Empire Corporation ("Eastern
Empire"), a holding company organized under
Pennsylvania law which owned real estate, a
life insurance company, and a brokerage
house. On or about June 9, 1969, Yates met
with Richard J. Kirschbaum ("Kirschbaum"),
who had played a small part in the Cleopatra
(Academic) transaction described above, to
discuss a method whereby Yates and certain
of his associates could acquire a public
corporation. Kirschbaum arranged for Yates
to meet with D'Onofrio on June 19, 1969.
Soon thereafter D'Onofrio informed Yates
that a public company was available and
introduced Yates to Harwyn, Siegel and
Gartenberg.
On June 20, 1969, G. Thomas
Roberts, attorney for Yates, wrote to
Gartenberg confirming a telephone
conversation to the effect that Yates would
exchange 300,000 shares of Eastern Empire
stock in exchange for 1,800,000 shares of
Prospectus. Siegel responded with a letter
of intent dated June 24, 1969, clarifying
the proposed transaction.
It should be noted here that on
July 2, 1969, the Commission issued its
Release No. 4982 (1933 Act) and No. 8638
(1934 Act), commenting on spin-offs of
inactive or shell corporations.
On August 4, 1969, a 21-page
agreement was entered into between
Prospectus and Yates providing for the
exchange of stock outlined above except
that, at closing, the number of shares of
Prospectus received by Yates and his
associates was reduced from 1,800,000 to
1,731,568, and the number of Eastern Empire
shares received by Prospectus was reduced
from 300,000 to 240,000. Both the amount of
Prospectus stock (about 90% of the shares
outstanding) and the amount of Eastern
Empire stock (about 15% of the shares
outstanding) constituted effective control
over the respective corporations. Shortly
before the signing of the agreement, on July
31, 1969, the Board of Directors of Harwyn
had authorized a spin-off distribution of
its 200,000 shares of Prospectus stock to
Harwyn shareholders on the basis of one
Prospectus share for every four shares of
Harwyn. The record date was fixed as August
29, 1969, and the shares were payable on
September 19, 1969. On September 17, just
before the actual distribution of the
Prospectus shares, members of the
Commission's staff contacted Siegel and
Gartenberg in an unsuccessful eleventh-hour
attempt to prevent the distribution of the
Prospectus stock.
By this point, as the result of
four virtually identical transactions, the
specific contents of the agreement signed
between Harwyn, its subsidiary (in this case
Prospectus) and the outside parties
Page 951
(in this instance Yates) had become
almost a standardized form contract. The
agreement between Harwyn and Yates contained
the same provisions concerning acquisition
for investment, legending of Prospectus
stock, the spin-off of Harwyn's interest in
Prospectus to Harwyn shareholders, change of
name (from Prospectus to FSI) and
registration as set forth in the three
preceding transactions. In addition,
D'Onofrio & Feeney, Inc., a firm
incorporated by D'Onofrio and Feeney (who
were involved in the Cleopatra (Academic)
transaction) on September 19, 1969, and
Kirschbaum were named as finders and were to
receive a total of 100,000 shares of
Prospectus from the shares to be received by
Yates and his associates.
The release which was sent to
Harwyn shareholders on August 18, 1969,
announcing the Eastern Empire transaction
was somewhat longer than the counterpart
releases relating to the earlier
transactions. It contained certain basic
information as to the business and
management of Eastern Empire, and financial
statements were enclosed. A brief notice as
to the source of dividends was sent out over
Gartenberg's name with the Prospectus stock
when it was distributed. This notice stated
that the distribution would not reduce the
stated capital, capital surplus, or earned
surplus of Harwyn. On September 22, 1969,
Prospectus stock appeared on the pink sheets
at $2 bid and $3.50 asked.
Subsequent to the consummation of
the agreement, the name of Prospectus was
changed to FSI. FSI has been actively
engaged in the wholesale and retail rental
of men's formal wear, the development of oil
and gas leases, and real estate development.
On June 29, 1970, FSI filed with the
Commission a registration statement on Form
10 pursuant to § 12 of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78l.
Shortly after acquiring control
of NTRR, Murphy retained a firm of certified
public accountants, Arthur Andersen & Co.,
to audit the financial records of the
company and prepare certified financial
statements. These statements, of course,
covered the activities of Murphy's two
California corporations, which constituted
the only assets of NTRR (JKM) after the
transaction. On February 23, 1970, Murphy
and JKM distributed to JKM's stockholders an
annual report for the year ending April 30,
1969. This report contained certified
financial statements for fiscal years ending
April 30, 1967, 1968 and 1969. In addition,
on September 3, 1970, JKM filed with the
Commission a Form 10 registration statement
pursuant to § 12 of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78l. Since
Murphy's purchase of a controlling interest
in NTRR, NTRR (JKM) has engaged actively in
the construction business.
Finally, the Commission has
brought to our attention through the
affidavit of Edward F. Myers ("Myers") the
subsequent "spin-off" distribution of stock
in Exten Ventures, Inc. ("Exten") to the
shareholders of Bicor Automation Industries,
Inc. ("Bicor"), a public corporation, in
July 1970. Myers stated that the firm of
D'Onofrio, Feeney and Kirschbaum was
instrumental in establishing the contact
between Tender Corporation (the name of
which was subsequently changed to Exten),
and Bicor, the parent of Exten. The
Commission contends that this involvement
shows a propensity to violate the securities
laws. The defendants dispute the extent of
their involvement, arguing that D'Onofrio,
et al., were merely involved as finders and
had nothing to do with the subsequent
spin-off. The Exten distribution was
accompanied by an information statement
containing more disclosure than that
provided in any of the Harwyn transactions.
Discussion
The 1933 Securities Act, §§ 5(a)
and 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) and (c),
broadly prohibits the sale of unregistered
securities by any person, subject to the
limitations of § 2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3),
which defines a sale as "every contract or
disposition of a security or interest
Page 952
in a security, for value" and of § 4(1),
15 U.S.C. § 77d(1), which provides that the
prohibition of § 5 shall not apply to any
person "other than an issuer, underwriter,
or dealer." The parties agree that the stock
in the Harwyn subsidiaries was not
registered under the Act and further that,
in the case of "conventional" stock
dividends, i. e., distribution of shares of
the issuer to its stockholders, City Bank
Farmers'
Trust v. Ernst, 263 N.Y. 342, 346, 189 N.E.
241 (1934); Matter of Rogers, 22
App.Div. 428, 432, 48 N.Y.S. 175, affd., 161
N.Y. 108, 55 N.E. 393 (1899), no sale occurs
within the meaning of § 2(3), as nothing is
given for value by the shareholders. They
also agree that the public shareholders of
Harwyn who received stock in the Harwyn
subsidiaries were not issuers, underwriters,
or dealers as those terms are used in §
4(1).
Where a conventional stock
dividend of its own shares is distributed by
a public company that has complied with the
registration requirements of the 1933 Act,
subsequent purchasers of the shares have the
benefit of detailed financial information
about the company making possible informed
investment decisions on their part. In the
present case, however, the transactions we
have described did not involve
"conventional" stock dividends, but the
distribution of a subsidiary's unregistered
shares as part of a scheme to use a spin-off
as a means of creating public trading of the
shares. The objective of the identical
series of steps followed in each of the four
spin-offs (i. e. (1) a basic agreement
infusing new assets into the subsidiary in
exchange for issuance of control to a new
management, (2) distribution of the balance
of the subsidiary's issued shares to
Harwyn's stockholders, and (3) the
development of public trading in the
latter's shares) was the immediate creation
in each case of a public held company whose
shares would be actively traded in the
market place without the investing public
having the benefit of disclosures that would
be required under the 1933 Act.
Upon the record before us the
foregoing objective is clearly established
and not seriously disputed by defendant.1
Putting aside for a moment the technical
niceties and precise language of the 1933
Act, the effect of each agreement and
spin-off was to convert a Harwyn subsidiary
into a publicly held company, with the
shares thus distributed to outside
stockholders, of whom there were more than
500, being actively traded over the counter.
The benefits to defendants were several.
They avoided registration costs. More
significant was the fact that although they
could not, as insiders, publicly sell their
own shares without registration, their
ability to market or hypothecate their
shares and to finance the subsidiary's
operations could be greatly facilitated by
the existence of an active trading market at
definite
Page 953
prices in the remaining issued shares.
That such a market would develop immediately
as a result of the spin-off was both
contemplated and confirmed. Even before the
first spin-off of Cleopatra (Academic)
shares had been effected, counsel for Harwyn
and the subsidiary were busily engaged in
laying the groundwork for public trading by
furnishing essential information to the
National Quotation Bureau (see Ex. 3). As a
result a market was made for the shares,
with the price starting at $2.50 per share
bid on January 6, 1969, and rising to $22
bid per share on March 28, 1969. Similar
trading markets were established for shares
of JKM (NTRR), Motel and FSI.
It is equally clear that in the
case of each spin-off defendants had
available to them all pertinent information
with respect to the issuing subsidiary and
its controlling stockholders and were
therefore in a position to file registration
statements setting forth such basic
information as the financial condition and
operating history of the subsidiary, the
identity and background of the new
management, and the terms and conditions of
the agreements between the defendants which
formed the basis of the spin-off. We are not
here faced with a situation of the type
which has prompted the enactment of
exemptions, such as the inability of an
individual who is not an issuer,
underwriter, or dealer to obtain essential
information required for preparation of a
registration statement, § 4 (1), 15 U.S.C. §
77d(1), or the fact that purchasers, by
reason of their position, already have
available to them the essential information
required for an intelligent investment
decision, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2).
Thus, regardless of the precise
language of the federal securities laws, it
is readily apparent that the Harwyn
spin-offs violated the spirit and purpose of
the registration requirements of § 5 of the
1933 Act, which is "to protect investors by
promoting full disclosure of information
thought necessary to informed investment
decisions,"
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119,
124, 73 S.Ct. 981, 984, 97 L.Ed. 1494 (1953);
Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 2 Cir., 267
F.2d 461, 463, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896,
80 S.Ct. 200, 4 L.Ed.2d 152 (1959).
Furthermore, the registration provisions are
designed not only to protect immediate
recipients of distributed securities (in
this case Harwyn's outside stockholders) but
also subsequent purchasers from them.
SEC v. Great American Industries, Inc., 407
F.2d 453, 463 (2d Cir. 1968);
Oklahoma-Texas Trust v. SEC, 100 F.2d 888,
892 (10th Cir. 1939). If the shares of
each of the four subsidiaries had been
registered, securities dealers would have
been required for at least 90 days after the
effective date of the registration statement
to furnish a prospectus to such subsequent
purchasers, § 4(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(3), and
those who purchased shares from outside
stockholders would not only have had the
benefit of the information contained in the
registration statement but also of the
continuing disclosures required under the
technical reporting provisions of § 15(d),
15 U.S.C. § 78o(d). As it was some
purchasers, not having such information as a
basis for making an informed investment
decision, paid high prices for their shares
only to see the market price drop sharply
within a year. For instance, the bid price
of Cleopatra (Academic) dropped from $22 per
share on March 28, 1969, to $1 per share on
June 30, 1970, and the bid price of Motel
dropped from $3.50 per share on August 10,
1969, to 1/8 bid on June 30, 1970.
Defendants take the position that
a long-standing loophole in the 1933 Act had
been recognized by the Commission and relied
upon by counsel as permitting spin-offs of
the type here involved to be made without
registration. Defendants' argument is based
upon the fact that § 5 prohibits the public
"sale" of unregistered securities, which is
defined in § 2 (3) of the Act as a
disposition "for value." Since each of
Harwyn's spin-offs to its shareholders of
unregistered shares of its subsidiary was
not for value received from such
shareholders and represented
Page 954
a distribution of what they already
owned, defendants contend that it amounted
to nothing more than a stock dividend, or
change in form of ownership, which
admittedly has always been considered exempt
from § 5 registration requirements. See
Commission's Interpretative Release No.
33-929 (July 29, 1936).
We must concede that defendants'
interpretation of §§ 2(3) and 5 is neither
frivolous nor wholly unreasonable and that
it appears to have been asserted and relied
upon by them in good faith. Apparently it
represented a view that evolved through the
years as a result of the Commission's
issuance in 1936 of Release No. 33-929 and
its failure thereafter to dispel the
interpretation generally put upon the
Release by the bar. Feeding upon itself the
view became accepted as a "loophole" that
could be closed only by Congress. It was not
until the recent sudden increase in the use
of the spin-off technique as a means of
converting private into public companies
that the Commission became alarmed and
sought to stop the abuse of what had
theretofore been considered a relatively
harmless crack in the integrated structure
of the securities laws.
Although (as we hold below)
defendants' good faith reliance upon their
counsel's interpretation of § 5 is a factor
warranting our denial of preliminary
injunctive relief, we believe that the
spin-off shares in the present case were
issued "for value" and should have been
registered under the Act. In interpreting
the statute we must look to its overall
purpose, which is to provide adequate
disclosure to members of the investing
public, rather than engage in strangulating
literalism.
SEC v. North American Research & Development
Corp., 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970);
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 861
(2d Cir. 1968);
United States v. American Trucking
Association, 310 U.S. 534, 543, 60 S.Ct.
1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1940). We see no
reason to construe §§ 2(3) and 5 as
requiring that the "value" requiring
registration must flow from the immediate
parties who received the stock, in this case
Harwyn's shareholders. Here the so-called
"dividends" were not isolated transactions;
they were intimately bound up with and in
the last three instances mandated by the
agreements which required the outside
defendants to infuse new value into the
subsidiaries and which contemplated that
upon distribution of the "dividend" shares
to existing Harwyn stockholders public
trading would occur as the result of some
selling their shares to new purchasers. In
such a context the chain of events must be
viewed as a whole, just as it was viewed by
the parties when they undertook the spin-off
ventures. As Judge Medina recently stated in
North American Research & Develop-Corp.,
supra:
"The supplementary provisions (to
the registration provisions) and definitions
were so designed as to prevent any
circumvention of the registration
requirement by devious and sundry means.
This is one of the reasons for the broad and
liberal interpretations the courts have
uniformly given to this particular phase of
the Securities Act of 1933." (emphasis
added) (424 F. 2d 71)
When the agreement, spin-off and
distribution is viewed as one transaction,
there was "value" received by Harwyn and the
inside defendants in the form of a
contribution of substantially new assets to
each subsidiary and the creation of a public
market in the shares with its resulting
benefits to the defendants, including
insiders.
Thus there was ample "value" to
bar Harwyn from acting as a conduit for
transformation of private companies into
public ones without registration. In each of
the four cases the spin-off, distribution of
shares, and trading in the after-market,
were inextricably bound together, with
benefits flowing to all defendants. The
subsidiary, of course, was the issuer of the
new unregistered
Page 955
shares. Harwyn, acting as the parent in
control of the subsidiary, was an
underwriter within the meaning of § 2(11).
15 U.S.C. § 77b(11). The other defendants
jointly participated in the violations. See
SEC v. North American Research & Development
Corp., supra. This construction does
not do violence to the language of the Act.
On the contrary it is in accord with the
Act's fundamental purposes. If spin-offs of
the type here involved were exempted from
registration, the purposes of the Act would
be subverted and corporations could obtain
public status by a novel shortcut at
discount rates with virtually all
corporations evading registration by the
disingenuous expedient of funnelling their
shares through a single public corporation.
Equitable Considerations
Turning to the question of what
equitable relief, if any, should issue, §
20(b) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §
77t(b), authorizes the Commission to obtain
injunctive relief in the federal courts upon
making a "proper showing." Although the
standards of the public interest, not those
of private litigation, must govern the
propriety and need for an injunction in this
case,
SEC v. Globus International, Ltd., 320 F.
Supp. 158 (S.D.N.Y.1970), we cannot
infer from the language of § 20(b) that
special weight is to be given to the
Commission's decision to allow its staff to
bring suit,
SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir.
1968). Thus in deciding whether or not
to issue injunctive relief as requested, we
are called upon to weigh all those
considerations of fairness and justice that
have been the historic concern of the equity
courts,
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 328-330,
64 S.Ct. 587, 88 L.Ed. 754 (1944). Upon
a review of the undisputed facts of this
case, we have decided in the exercise of our
discretion that injunctive relief should not
be granted. It appears to us that the
granting of an injunction here would be
basically inequitable, and thus we find that
the Commission has not made the "proper
showing" which § 20(b) requires.
The first of the facts which we
deem relevant is that defendants at all
times relied on the advice of counsel.
SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 251 (2d Cir.
1959) (advice of counsel not sought
until defendants learned of Commission's
investigation of them). This advice, that
the transactions were legal and no
registration was required, was rendered in
the light of prevailing business practice,
the ambiguity which surrounded the
applicability of the 1933 Act to stock
dividends, and the acquiescence in spin-offs
of unregistered stock dividends by the
Commission. The legislative history tends to
support this view, for the House version of
the 1933 Act included a clause, § 4(3),
specifically excluding stock dividends from
the requirements of § 5. See
H.R.Conf.Rep.No.152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 25
(1933). This provision was stricken by the
Conference Committee for the following
reason:
"The House provision (sec. 4(3))
exempting stock dividends and the sale of
stock to stockholders is omitted from the
substitute, since stock dividends are exempt
without express provision as they do not
constitute a sale, not being given for
value."
Not only did Congress remove most
doubt as to the need to register
conventional stock dividends; the Commission
buttressed the implicit exclusion of such
dividends from the operation of § 5 by its
Release No. 33-929 dated July 29, 1936, 17
C.F.R. 231.929, in which the Commission
considered the situation in which stock and
cash dividends were proposed to shareholders
as alternatives. Distinguishing the case in
which shareholders were offered stock in
lieu of a cash dividend previously declared
but not paid (to which the shareholders had
acquired vested rights), the Commission
stated that when cash and stock are
presented as alternatives, no vested right
Page 956
was sacrificed by the shareholder who
chose stock, and thus he gave up no value.
In our view the Commission's Release applied
only to conventional stock dividends or
splits in which there is little need for
registration as the shareholders receive
additional shares in a corporation whose
shares they already hold,
Hafner v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 345
F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1965) (under the
circumstances, no need for insider to reveal
impending stock dividend as material under §
10(b) of the 1934 Act.) There is evidence,
however, that sophisticated counsel have
construed the Release as applying also to a
"spin-off" distributions to an issuer's
stockholders of the unregistered shares of a
subsidiary. In the absence of clarification
by judicial decision (which we have
attempted above) or by further Commission
release, we cannot say that the view of
defendants' counsel was frivolous or taken
in bad faith.
The parties also refer us to the
Commission's Release No. 33-4982 dated July
2, 1969. This Release, issued subsequent to
three of the Harwyn distributions,
considered the hypothetical case in which a
privately-held company issues its
unregistered shares to a public company,
possibly for nominal consideration, and the
public company subsequently spins off these
unregistered shares to its shareholders as a
dividend. While holding that the dividend
itself, standing alone, might not constitute
a distribution for purposes of the Act, the
Commission stated that the role of the
public corporation in a process which was
intended to lead to public trading in stock
of the private company was that of an
underwriter under § 2(11) requiring
registration of the shares, since the public
company purchased the shares from the issuer
(private company) with a view to
distributing them as a stock dividend to the
issuer's own shareholders.
Unquestionably the July 2, 1969
Release might lead astute counsel to
question the legality of spin-offs of the
type here under consideration, in view of
the fact that the process used to create
public trading in the unregistered shares
was similar. However, there are differences
between the two situations, which are
somewhat compounded by the following
statement in the Commission's Release:
"This release does not attempt to
deal with any problems attributable to more
conventional spin offs, which do not involve
a process of purchase of securities by a
publicly-owned company followed by their
spin off and redistribution in the trading
markets."
On the basis of the legislative
history, the Commission's 1936 Release, the
silence of the Commission in the face of
various other unregistered stock dividends,
and the Commission's issuance of "no action"
letters in regard to certain stock
dividends, defendants' counsel were
convinced that the stock dividends which
their clients contemplated were not required
to be registered. While prior practice does
not estop the Commission from changing its
view in the interest of protecting the
public against possibly fraudulent
activities, SEC v. Culpepper, supra,
270 F.2d at 248, and a bona fide but
mistaken belief in the legality of a
transaction is no defense to an action by
the
Commission, SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S.
293, 300, 66 S.Ct. 1100, 90 L.Ed. 1244
(1946), prior practice is relevant to
the reasonableness of the advice of counsel
on which defendants relied, and defendants'
good faith reliance on legal advice has a
significant bearing on the likelihood that
additional violations will occur.
In addition, counsel for Harwyn
contacted both the New York and Washington
offices of the Commission in an effort to
learn the Commission's view as to the need
for registration in the Harwyn transactions.
Cf. SEC v. Culpepper, supra, 270 F.2d
at 251 (initially, no attempt made to
discover Commission's
Page 957
opinion). Despite its alleged growing
concern over the increasing use of stock
spin-offs as a means of avoiding the
registration requirements and its professed
desire to protect the public, the Commission
gave no answer to these inquiries by
Gartenberg. Had Gartenberg then been
informed of the Commission's position as it
was unfurled in the complaint and motion
papers in this action, which was many months
after his initial inquiry, we have no doubt
that he would not have condoned these
transactions. Had the Commission sought
preliminary injunctive relief promptly upon
learning from Gartenberg of Harwyn's
intentions and before the transactions
materialized, or had it given an opinion
with which Harwyn had not complied,
SEC v. Keller Corp., 323 F.2d 397, 399 (7th
Cir. 1963), we might have been disposed
to grant the preliminary injunction now
requested. Instead, the Commission waited
until the horse was goneindeed, watched it
amble awaybefore seeking to lock the barn
door.
Moreover, even when the
Commission made a belated statement of its
views in the 1969 Release, the Harwyn-type
transaction was not specifically considered.
The 1969 Release included an ambiguous
qualification (quoted above) which could be,
and has been by defendants' counsel, taken
to imply that the 1969 Release did not
venture any opinion as to the Harwyn-type
transactions. In view of the fact that the
Commission staff must have known of the
three transactions which Harwyn had
completed at the time when the Release was
issued, it is difficult to understand why
the Release did not deal with this problem.
In addition to acting upon advice
of counsel and to the Commission's failure
to dispel the inferences which could be, and
had been, drawn from its 1936 Release, all
defendants received legended stock. They
represented that they acquired this stock
for investment, and "stop transfer" orders
were placed with the transfer agent to
assure insofar as possible that their shares
would not enter the market. Although one
defendant, Temkin, has made certain exempt
gifts, the other defendants have not sold,
transferred, pledged or hypothecated any of
their stock. While the harm to the public
from trading in unregistered securities is
not thereby reduced, defendants have not
profited from their transactions. Two of the
spun off companies JKM and Eastern
Empireare now filing Form 10 registration
statements, which will provide information
to the public about these companies.
Finally, counsel for defendants
have assured the court that since the
Commission has made known its views by
commencement of this action their clients
will not engage in further distributions of
the type in question without registration.
We find this assurance significant in
considering "the critical question" of
"whether there is a reasonable expectation
that the defendants will thwart the policy
of the Act by engaging in activities
proscribed thereby," SEC v. Culpepper,
supra, 270 F.2d at 249. The evidence
presented by the Commission as to the
likelihood of repeated violation i. e.,
D'Onofrio's involvement in the Exten-Bicor
transaction and the alleged existence of
additional Harwyn subsidiaries is
unpersuasive. While cessation of illegal
activities is no bar to our issuance of a
preliminary injunction in this case,
United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S.
629, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953),
and past illegal conduct may give rise to an
inference that future violations will
nevertheless occur, SEC v. Keller Corp.,
supra, 323 F.2d at 402, we do not draw
such an inference in this case. Furthermore,
we must not forget that the issuance of an
injunction can sometimes have a harmful
impact on the personal reputations and
legitimate business activities of
defendants,
SEC v. Broadwall Securities, Inc., 240
F.Supp. 962, 967 (S.D.N.Y.1965) ("The
adverse effect of an injunction upon
defendants is, of course, a factor to be
considered
Page 958
* * *"). Moreover, at least in the cases
of Murphy and Yates, who are actively
engaged in operating their businesses, the
nature of the transaction complained
ofinvolving public distribution of shares,
which is now a fait accompli
suggests that it would be unreasonable to
expect further violations.
For all the foregoing reasons, in
the exercise of our discretion, we find that
the Commission has not made a showing under
§ 20(b) that warrants injunctive relief.
The Commission also moves, under
§ 21(e) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78u(e), for a preliminary
injunction restraining violations of § 10(b)
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b), and
Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R.
240.10b-5. Section 21 (e) employs
substantially the same language as § 20(b)
of the 1933 Act, and the standards for
issuance of an injunction under either Act
are substantially the same. Whether or not a
§ 10(b) violation would be found on the
basis of these facts, however, an injunction
under § 21(e) for violation of § 10(b) is
not warranted for reasons set forth in our
consideration of the Commission's claim
under the 1933 Act set forth above.
Accordingly, although we have expressed our
opinion as to the necessity for registration
of Harwyn-type spin-offs in order to furnish
guidance to the parties and others
contemplating similar transactions, there
appears to be no such necessity for passing
upon the question of whether defendants'
activities also violated the anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities laws.
The foregoing shall constitute
our findings of fact and conclusions of law
in compliance with Rule 52(a), F.R.Civ. P.
The Commission's motion for
preliminary injunctive relief is denied.
It is so ordered.
Notes:
1. In fact no other purpose has been
advanced for any of the Harwyn "stock
dividends." Harwyn had not previously
declared any dividends whatsoever, either in
stock or in cash. Nor does it appear that
the "dividends" were required by any
business purpose or necessity, such as
compliance with anti-trust law or a need to
segregate hazardous business activities. For
instance, in reviewing the factors that may
be probative of a genuine business motive
under 26 U.S.C. § 355, which provides for
tax-free distributions of corporate
securities in certain circumstances,
Professors Bittker and Eustice list the
foregoing two and three additional
considerations: (1) compliance with local
law requiring separation of two businesses,
(2) separation of a business to permit
employees to share in profits or ownership,
and (3) settlement of a shareholders dispute
by giving each group ownership of one
business. B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal
Income Taxation of Corporations and
Shareholders 484 (2d ed. 1966); see Note,
The Spin Off: A Sometimes Sale, 45
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 132, 143 n. 57 (1970).
The lack of any other business
purpose is further evidenced by the fact
that Harwyn retained the name of each
subsidiary and required the incoming control
persons of the subsidiary to adopt a new
corporate name, which in every case they
did. |