| Page 834 278 A.2d 834  Abraham KAPLAN, Administrator,
C.T.A. of the Estate of Nat
Gluck, Deceased, Plaintiff Below, Appellant,
v.
Martin FENTON, Jr., et al., Defendants
Below, Appellees. Supreme Court of Delaware.
June 2, 1971. Appeal from Court of Chancery in
and for New Castle County.
Irving Morris, of Cohen, Morris &
Rosenthal, Wilmington, Sidney B. Silverman
and Jewel H. Bjork, New York City, for
appellant; Henry M. Canby, of Richards,
Layton & Finger, Wilmington, for Christiana
Oil Company, Antonow, Fink, Gunther &
Epstein, Chicago, Ill., of counsel.
S. Samuel Arsht, of Morris,
Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Wilmington, for
certain defendants; Richard F. Corroon, of
Potter, Anderson & Corroon, Wilmington, for
certain defendants.
WOLCOTT, C.J., and CAREY and
HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.
WOLCOTT, Chief Justice:
This is an appeal from an order
of the Court of Chancery dismissing the
complaint in a stockholders' derivative
action. The action was brought on behalf of
Page 835 Christiana Oil Company against the directors
of Christiana and individuals who formerly
owned Class B stock of Huntington Harbor
Corporation.
Huntington owned a tract of low
undeveloped land near Los Angeles,
California. It had outstanding 40,000 shares
of Class A and 10,000 shares of Class B
stock. In 1960 Christiana acquired all of
the Huntington Class A stock in
consideration of 350,000 shares of
Christiana.
Christiana agreed to advance to
Huntington not in excess of $733,000 and to
lend it up to $500,000 on a demand basis. In
point of fact, Christiana exceeded its
commitment to Huntington and by June 30,
1963 Huntington was indebted to Christiana
in the amount of $5,168,608.09. No interest
was paid Christiana, but was accrued to its
account.
The money from Christiana was
used in the development of the principal
asset of Huntington, the land. No Class B
stockholder loaned or advanced any money to
Huntington, but all of them shared in the
benefit of the virtually interest-free loans
made by Christiana to Huntington.
The directors of Christiana
recognizing the unfairness to Christiana of
the resulting situation, i.e., the
benefiting of the Class B stockholders who
were making no contribution to the
development of the Huntington land, decided
the practical solution was the acquisition
by Christiana of the minority Class B stock.
On January 28, 1963 Christiana
received an offer from certain Huntington
Class B stockholders to sell to it 2200
Class B shares and 39,000 shares of
Christiana for $500,000. At a board meeting
on that day, at which all the directors were
present, the offer to sell was unanimously
declined. The reasons for the rejection were
that Christiana should acquire all or none
of the outstanding 10,000 Class B shares;
that Christiana's agreement with the bank
lending it money included a prohibition
against the purchase of its own securities;
and that, by reason of the cash needs of
Christiana, the full minority interest
represented by the Class B stock should be
acquired only in kind, i.e., for Christiana
stock.
Fenton, a director of Christiana,
who voted with the rest of the board in
rejecting the offer, nevertheless was in
favor of purchasing the 2200 Class B shares
if they could be acquired exclusive of the
39,000 Christiana shares.
Approximately a month later,
Fenton, through Banowit, a director of
Christiana and a Huntington Class B
stockholder, received an offer to sell 2,240
Class B shares and certain Christiana
shares. Fenton was not interested in the
Christiana shares, and a new offer was made
to sell the 2,240 Class B shares at $150 per
share. Ultimately, Fenton and his group
purchased 1,540 Class B shares, subject to
an option to Banowit to repurchase 20%,
which was later exercised, and Banowit
purchased the remaining 700 shares.
Fenton did not present the offer
to the board of Christiana because it had
turned down a similar offer only a month
before. He did, however, inform the
president and chief executive officer of
Christiana and asked if he wanted it
presented to the board. The answer was in
the negative.
Thereafter, the directors of
Christiana, in October, 1963, concluded to
try to acquire the entire 10,000 Class B
shares of Huntington in exchange for 360,000
shares of Christiana. Thereafter,
negotiations took place, mainly with
Banowit, which culminated on April 9, 1964
with the acquisition by Christiana of all
10,000 Class B shares, including those
acquired by Fenton, for 364,000 shares of
Christiana.
In this action it is sought to
compel Fenton and his group and Banowit to
account to Christiana for the profit they
made as a result of the purchase by them of
2,240 shares of Class B Huntington stock
bought by them in 1963 and ultimately sold
to Christiana. The Vice Chancellor held
against this contention.
Page 836
The theory of this action is that
Fenton and Banowit, who were directors of
Christiana, took to themselves an
opportunity to profit which rightfully
belonged to the corporation of which they
were directors. The leading case upon this
subject in this State is
Guth v. Loft, 23 Del.Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503
(1939). The following language from that
decision, we think, governs this case:
'It is true that when a business
opportunity comes to a corporate officer or
director in his individual capacity rather
than in his official capacity, and the
opportunity is one which, because of the
nature of the enterprise, is not essential
to his corporation, and is one in which it
has no interest or expectancy, the officer
or director is entitled to treat the
opportunity as his own, and the corporation
has no interest in it, if, of course, the
officer or director has not wrongfully
embarked the corporation's resources
therein. * * *' (5 A.2d at 510--511)
Johnston
v. Greene, 35 Del.Ch. 479,
121 A.2d 919
(1956) and
Equity Corporation v. Milton, 42 Del.Ch.
425, 213 A.2d 439 (1966).
By reason of the Guth case, if a
business opportunity comes to a corporate
director in his individual capacity, and if
the opportunity is not essential to his
corporation and in which his corporation has
no interest, and if the corporate resources
have not been wrongfully embarked therein,
the corporate director is free to treat the
opportunity as his own.
The facts of this case, as found
by the Vice Chancellor and which are fully
supported by the record, demonstrate that
the offer to Fenton was not a corporate
opportunity which he was duty-bound to pass
on to Christiana. Initially, the Christiana
board had unanimously rejected in almost
identical offer only one month before. The
objectionable features of this prior offer
were the offer to sell for cash and the
joining in of Christiana stock to be
purchased. Both of these conditions were
objectionable to the board. Secondly, the
offer to sell was for only a fraction of the
minority stock interest. This condition was
objectionable to all the directors with the
exception of Fenton. Thirdly, the offer to
Fenton was for a fraction of the Class B
stock for cash. This condition had been
previously rejected by the board. Finally,
Fenton asked the President of Christiana if
he wanted him to submit the offer to the
board and was answered 'no'.
It is clear to us, therefore,
that the offer to Fenton was not one in
which Christiana had an interest (indeed its
board had expressly disclaimed an interest);
was not one essential to Christiana, and was
not one in which Christiana's resources had
been wrongfully embarked.
The judgment below is accordingly
affirmed. |