| Page 427 249 A.2d 427  DAVID J. GREENE AND CO. et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DUNHILL INTERNATIONAL, INC., and A. G.
Spalding & Bros.,
Inc., Defendants. Court of Chancery of Delaware, New
Castle County. Dec. 24, 1968.
Page 429
Richard F. Corroon and Hugh L.
Corroon, of Potter, Anderson & Corroon,
Wilmington, and Julius Levy, of Pomerantz,
Levy, Haudek & Block, New York City, for
plaintiffs.
Louis J. Finger and David T.
Dana, III, of Richards, Layton & Finger,
Wilmington, for defendants.
DUFFY, Chancellor:
Plaintiffs collectively own
30,685 shares of defendant A. G. Spalding &
Bros., Inc., a Delaware corporation
('Spalding'); they seek an injunction
prohibiting the consummation of a proposed
merger between Spalding and Dunhill
Intenational, Inc., a Delaware corporation
('Dunhill'), in which the latter will be the
surviving corporation. Dunhill owns 80.3% Of
Spalding's stock. Plaintiffs contend that
the terms of the merger are grossly unfair
and unequitable to Spalding's minority
stockholders. This is the decision on the
motion for a preliminary injunction.
A.
Spalding is a name known to every
boy who ever owned or coveted a baseball or
glove. For present purposes it is sufficient
to say that it is one of the nation's
leading producers of athletic equipment,
with 1967 sales of approximately
$58,000,000. About $2,000,000 of these
resulted from sales made by its toy division
under the tradename 'Tinkertoy.'
Dunhill is a diversified
operating company which manufactures and
sells both automotive and infant-feeding
equipment and other products equally
different from both of those. It is a
conglomerate and still merger-minded.
Spalding's capitalization
consists of 858,170 issued and outstanding
shares of common stock. That stock is traded
over the counter, but the market is thin and
sporadic. Since 1963 Dunhill has been the
majority stockholder of Spalding. Dunhill
has outstanding 8,011,997 shares of common
stock and 1,744,961 shares of convertible
preferred. The common shares are listed and
traded on the New York Stock Exchange.
In May 1968 Dunhill decided that
a merger with Spalding would be beneficial
to both companies. It then engaged Duff,
Anderson and Clark, Inc., a company of
independent investment and financial
analysts registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, to survey both
companies and to suggest a ratio of exchange
involving cash, debentures or stock of
Dunhill which would be fair to the
stockholders on both sides. The Duff firm
recommended an exchange of one $2 preferred
share of Dunhill, convertible into 1.6
shares of its common (with a stated
redemption value of $50.00 per share and
with appropriate call protection) for each
share of Spalding. The Board of Directors of
each company approved the merger on those
terms after fixing December 31, 1970 as the
date after which redemption could begin.
On October 17 the Spalding
stockholders met and approved the merger. At
the meeting 90,759 shares (53.5%) of the
total minority (non-Dunhill) interest of
169,140 shares voted in favor, 52,740 shares
(31%) voted against, and the balance were
not voted.
B.
In their attack upon the merger
ratio as grossly unfair and inequitable,
plaintiffs argue from many premises. They
say that the majority of Spalding's
directors are Dunhill officers and
directors, that through them Dunhill
dominates and controls Spalding, and that in
exercising such control Dunhill has breached
fiduciary duties which it owes to Spalding
and the minority stockholders. Specifically,
it is stated that Dunhill diverted from
Spalding in May 1968 an opportunity to
acquire a new business which had a
significant relationship to Spalding's
Tinkertoy division. Other alleged breaches
involve payment of inadequate dividends,
consequent depression of the market price of
Spalding stock,
Page 430 and purchase of Spalding's stock by both
Dunhill and Spalding at depressed prices to
the benefit of Dunhill and the detriment of
Spalding's minority stockholders. Plaintiffs
say that the claimed diversion of a
corporate opportunity and other breaches of
fiduciary duty were neither disclosed in
Spalding's proxy material nor taken into
account in fixing the merger ratio.
Dunhill denies all allegations of
wrongdoing. As to the alleged corporate
opportunity, it asserts that there was
nothing to be usurped since the opportunity
was presented to Dunhill and not to
Spalding. It says that dividends have not
been paid by Spalding since July 1966
because cash outlay had to be restricted on
account of the need for working capital. It
contends that purchase of Spalding stock at
depressed prices was in fact beneficial to
plaintiffs and all stockholders. Finally,
Dunhill argues that not only was the
exchange ratio recommented by the Duff firm
but, in addition, two independent directors
of Spalding, H. Boardman Spalding and
Washington Dodge, both with substantial
direct and indirect investments in the
company, voted in favor of the merger and
recommended it to the stockholders as fair
and equitable.
C.
Plaintiffs in seeking a
preliminary injunction contend that the
pleadings and affidavits show that there is
a triable issue and a reasonable probability
of success on their part. I turn now to the
law.
When a Delaware court is called
upon to determine whether a proposed merger
between a parent corporation and a
subsidiary which it controls (and which has
minority stockholders) should be enjoined,
fairness is the established criterion for
judgment. That is the litmus test to which
the transaction must be submitted.
Thus in Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,
33 Del.Ch. 20, 29, 89 A.2d 862 (1952);
aff'd 33 Del.Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107, 108, 38
A.L.R.2d 425 (1952), the Supreme Court said,
in addressing itself to this inquiry:
'The principal question presented is
whether the terms of a proposed merger of
Mayflower Hotel Corporation * * * into its
parent corporation, Hilton Hotels
Corporation * * * are fair to the minority
stockholders of Mayflower.'
The approach to be taken in
resolving this question was formulated by
the Court in the following way:
'Plaintiffs' principal contention here,
as in the court below, is that the terms of
the merger are unfair to Mayflower's
minority stockholders. Plaintiffs invoke the
settled rule of law that Hilton as majority
stockholder of Mayflower and the Hilton
directors as its nominees occupy, in
relation to the minority, a fiduciary
position in dealing with Mayflower's
property. Since they stand on both sides of
the transaction, they bear the burden of
establishing its entire fairness, and it
must pass the test of careful scrutiny by
the courts.
Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del.Ch. 234, 2 A.2d
904, 120 A.L.R. 227; Gottlieb v. Heyden
Chemical Corp., (33 Del.Ch. 82),
90 A.2d 660.'
Relying upon
Cole v. National Cash Credit Association, 18
Del.Ch. 47, 156 A. 183 (Ch.1931),
Dunhill argues that plaintiffs must show
fraud, or something akin to it, to have the
merger enjoined and, quite accurately, they
point out that fraud is neither alleged nor
shown in the present record. It is true that
in Cole the Chancellor fixed fraud, or the
equivalent thereof, as the test for
determining whether the merger would be
enjoined. But in that case the corporation
proposed to merge with a third party and,
significantly, the same parties or persons
were not on both sides of that transaction.
In the absence of divided interests, the
judgment of the majority stockholders and/or
the board of directors, as the case may be,
is presumed made in good faith and inspired
by a bona fides of purpose. But when the
persons, be they stockholders or directors,
who control
Page 431 the making of a transaction and the fixing
of its terms, are on both sides, then the
presumption and deference to sound business
judgment are no longer present. Intrinsic
fairness, tested by all relevant standards,
is then the criterion.
In my judgment this is
unquestionably the substance of our
decisions and the spirit of the equitable
principles on which they are based. Compare,
for example,
Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 33
Del.Ch. 82,
90 A.2d 660 (1952);
Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del.Ch. 234, 2 A.2d
904 (1938);
Lofland v. Cahall, 13 Del.Ch. 384, 118 A. 1
(1922); and 3 Fletcher Cyclopedia
Corporations (Perm.) § 921.
Brundage v. The New Jersey Zinc Co., 48 N.J.
450, 226 A.2d 585 (1967); and
Abelow v. Midstates Oil Corporation, 41
Del.Ch. 145,
189 A.2d 675 (1963).
Defendants rely upon
Bruce v. E. L. Bruce Company, 40 Del.Ch. 80,
174 A.2d 29 (1961). It appears from the
opinion that plaintiffs there were relying
entirely upon a showing of fraud and, after
reviewing the record made at the preliminary
stage, the Court said they had not made out
'a case for injunctive relief against a
merger on the grounds of fraud.' Intrinsic
unfairness of the proposal was not alleged
nor was the Court called upon to discuss
Sterling.
As to Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corporation, 27
Del.Ch. 127, 32 A.2d 148 (1943), I need
only say that to the extent this Court
applied any principle inconsistent with
those later stated by the Supreme Court in
Sterling, I am bound by and I follow the
latter.
Since Dunhill stands upon both
sides of the proposed merger, it (a) has the
burden of proof, (b) to show that the
transaction is fair, (c) after a careful
scrutiny by the Court.
In focusing on what is meant by
fair under these circumstances, Dunhill
argues that the Court need only find that
the plan is one that 'disinterested men
would find reasonable' and that it 'has been
worked out on the basis of an honest report
submitted by competent disinterested
appraisers on a sound valuation basis.' If
this means that the Court should not examine
the Duff report and consider it (and its
contents) along with all other affidavits in
the record, then the argument is not sound.
What is to be considered was stated
precisely by Chancellor Seitz in Sterling:
'I conclude that all relevant value
figures of both corporations may be examined
and compared in order to arrive at a
decision as to the fairness of the plan.
Thus, while not determinative, nevertheless,
the value of each corporation for various
purposes, e.g., going concern value, book
value, net asset value, market value, is
pertinent to the issue presented.' (89 A.2d
at p. 867)
He then analyzed the report made
by the independent specialist, And the
affidavits, And the testimony. Compare
Porges, in which the Court said, in language
approved by the Supreme Court in Sterling:
"To arrive at a judgment of the fairness
of the merger, all of its terms must be
considered.' 27 Del.Ch. 134, 32 A.2d 151.'
(93 A.2d at p. 114)
Dunhill argues that the Duff,
Anderson report is, under 8 Del.C. § 141(e),
entitled to a presumption in its favor. That
statute 'protects' directors relying in good
faith upon certain reports made to the
corporation, but it has no application here.
Nor does it in any way weaken the
requirements fixed by Sterling.
D.
Before reviewing the economic
data and the related arguments, I want to
note that experts from nationally-known
independent firms submitted affidavits in
support of each side: Harold Benjamin, a
Vice-President of Arnold Bernhard & Co.,
Inc., which is the manager of the Value Line
group of mutual funds and related companies,
Page 432 for plaintiffs; Raymond C. L. Greer, Jr.,
Executive Vice-President of Duff, Anderson &
Clark, Inc., and Daniel W. Lufkin, Chairman
of the Board of Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette, Inc., both for defendants. Other
affidavits were filed by each side relating
to the fairness or absence thereof in the
proposed ratio. The Court's function is not
to choose one expert over another or to
reach a conclusion as to the competence or
judgment of any of the independent persons
or firms who have taken a position on the
merger. The Court's duty is to determine, on
the present record, whether the merger is
legally fair under the tests I have stated.
The Duff, Anderson report is the
heart of Dunhill's position and of that
report Mr. Greer states:
'* * * we conclude that consummation of
the proposed merger through issuance by
Dunhill of a $2.00 preferred convertible
into 1.6 shares of Dunhill common (with a
stated redemption value of $50 per share and
with appropriate call protection) for the
169,140 shares of Spalding not owned by
Dunhill on a share-for-share basis is fair
and equitable to the minority shareholders
of Spalding and to the shareholders of
Dunhill.'
Mr. Lufkin supports that
conclusion; he states that the 1 for 1.6
ratio is 'fair and equitable to all of the
shareholders of both companies.' Mr.
Benjamin has a contrary view; to him 'the
proposed merger is grossly unfair to the
minority shareholders of Spalding.'
First, I note that the call
protection of the proposed preferred extends
only to December 31, 1970; the $2 dividend
is substantially higher than the 80cents
presently paid on 1.6 shares of Dunhill
common. Hence, should the merger be
consummated, there would be good reason for
Dunhill to redeem the new preferred at $50
per share and so eliminate the $2 dividend.
Since the higher yield on the proposed
preferred vis-a-vis the Dunhill common is
assured for a relatively short time only, it
is reasonable to conclude that one share
will be substantially equal in value to the
1.6 shares of Dunhill common.
Dunhill argues that the Court
should give great weight to approval of the
merger terms by H. Boardman Spalding and
Washington Dodge, each of whom holds
substantial amounts of Spalding stock; both
are Spalding directors without any other
connection to Dunhill. These facts are
entitled to weight, of course, but they are
not conclusive nor do they in any way modify
the Sterling rule or this Court's duty in
applying it.
Next, Dunhill argues that
approval by a majority of so-called
'disinterested' stockholders creates a
presumption of fairness, thus shifting to
plaintiffs the burden of showing unfairness.
But such approval does not shift the burden
of proof. See the unreported opinion by
Chancellor Seitz in Stryker & Brown v. The
Bon Ami Company et al., C.A.1945 (3/16/64).
And compare Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel
Corp., supra.
I turn now to the affidavits and
the components of value. The experts differ
as to what are significant factors and the
inferences to be drawn from them. But all
agree that with limited trading activity the
current market for Spalding common is not a
fair measure of value. And as to differences
in approach taken and weight assigned by the
experts, I regard two elements as
particularly pertinent for present purposes:
the amount of the earnings base and the
multiplier to be applied to it.
First, as to earnings, Duff,
Anderson uses $3.00 per share as the
estimate of present annual 'earning power.'
Plaintiffs' expert argues that this should
be increased by some 40cents a share as a
partial allowance against losses Spalding
has regularly sustained in its United
Kingdom operations (and which may not be set
off against domestic income for Federal
income tax purposes) because management's
announced
Page 433 policy is to eliminate those losses. For
that reason, Mr. Benjamin says, the earnings
base should be enlarged by 40cents per
share.
It is settled law in Delaware
that earnings value is to be determined on
the basis of past and not on prospective
earnings. Application of Delaware Racing
Association, Del.Ch.,
213 A.2d 203
(Sup.Ct.1965). In this kind of proceeding
the purpose, of course, is to attempt to
arrive at a meaningful projection of
earnings and, in a given case, specific
factors may make the use of unadjusted past
earnings an unsatisfactory basis for
capitalization. Stryker & Brown v. The Bon
Ami Company, et al., supra. In short, we are
not obliged to blindly use past earnings
without reference to other factors of
record. Here, however, plaintiffs' argument
is based entirely upon the most general of
management objectives (understandable though
they are) and without reference to the cost
of eliminating the losses. The short of it
is that I think the Court should take
earnings as they are, and not as the parties
would like them to be. So, telling it as it
is, $3.00 is the earnings factor.
Next I consider the 'multiplier'
issue; choosing that factor is among the
most difficult of all technical issues.
Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 39
Del.Ch. 76, 159 A.2d 278 (1960). In its
approach Duff, Anderson developed a number
of quantitative comparisons of Spalding with
a group of twelve other companies 'generally
engaged in the broad athletic and
recreational equipment markets.' In that
group the Duff firm found Spalding low in
sales growth and in growth in earnings per
share on a reported basis; it noted that,
comparatively, Spalding has had an erratic
earnings record. And it was low in return on
invested capital. Since Spalding's
performance fell below average in the
thirteen-company group, Duff, Anderson
arrived at a below average multiplier. The
median ratio of the thirteen companies was
17.8, with a range as high as 41.7 (for Head
Ski Co.). Duff, Anderson capitalized
Spalding's $3.00 earnings at about 15--16
times and arrived at a value of $45--50 per
share.
The twelve companies used by the
Duff firm for comparative purposes include
Acushnet Company, Adirondack Industries,
Inc., and Wilson Sporting Goods Company, all
of which compete pretty much across the
board with Spalding. Four others are in the
athletic equipment market and three of them
compete with Spalding 'to a limited degree.'
The remaining five 'participate in the broad
recreational and leisure time field.' This
latter grouping consists of companies which
manufacture bicycles, boats, firearms and
playing cards. Thus, Outboard Marine
Corporation, one of the five, is the largest
domestic manufacturer of outboard motors; it
also produces power lawn mowers and golf
carts. Starcraft Corporation makes aluminum
and fiberglass boats, camper trailers and
farm equipment. Murray Ohio Manufacturing
Company produces bicycles, scooters and baby
walkers. Browning Arms Co. distributes
firearms made to its specifications. United
States Playing Card Company manufactures
cards and miscellaneous card games.
The record creates a reasonable
doubt about the fairness of subjecting the
Spalding stock for valuation purposes to
comparison with a cross-section of companies
that includes such a product mix. The Duff,
Anderson report does not show why these five
companies with their respective product
lines provide a more reasonable experience
for comparative purpose than others in the
'broad recreational and leisure time
field'--those in the field of photography
and other hobby arts, for example. And the
record does not show what the result would
be if the five companies to which I have
referred were eliminated from the
comparative studies.
Plaintiffs argue, the Dunhill
tacitly concedes, that among all the
companies considered Wilson Sporting Goods
Company is most similar to and competitive
with Spalding. In October 1968 its stock
sold
Page 434 at 23.5 times earnings. And Mr. Benjamin's
affidavit shows that, measured by average
earnings with 1962/1964 as a base,
Spalding's earning trend is at least as good
as Wilson's. It also shows that, after
adjustments, Spalding's growth in sales,
earnings and profit margins compare very
favorably or are superior in certain
respects to those of Wilson and Spalding's
other competitors. And the median price
earnings ratio for the five sporting goods
companies only was 23.4. These facts are, of
course, not controlling, but they do point
up the special significance of the choice of
comparisons in this case.
Without a market price for
reference the selection of an appropriate
multiplier takes on added import as a key
factor in determining value. The Court's
duty, as Dunhill argues, is not to select
the proper multiplier. But, given Dunhill's
burden here, I conclude that it has not made
such a record as to satisfy me that I can
now say that it is right as matter of fact
and law at this point in the case.
Specifically, after careful scrutiny I
cannot say that the five companies should
fairly be included in the facts fixing an
appropriate multiplier. Dunhill will have
full opportunity at final hearing to show
that they should be.
E.
I next consider plaintiffs'
contentions that Dunhill took over a
corporate opportunity which rightfully
belonged to Spalding. The law as to
corporate opportunity is settled in Delaware
by Supreme Court decisions. The cornerstone
case is
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del.Ch. 255, 5 A.2d
503 (1939), which was reaffirmed
Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del.Ch. 479,
121 A.2d 919 (1956), and more recently in Equity
Corporation v. Milton, Del.Ch.,
221 A.2d 494
(1966). In the latter case Chief Justice
Daniel Wolcott wrote:
'The rule of the Guth case is that when
there is presented to a corporate officer a
business opportunity which the corporation
is financially able to undertake, and which,
by its nature, falls into the line of the
corporation's business and is of practical
advantage to it, or is an opportunity in
which the corporation has an actual or
expectant interest, the officer is
prohibited from permitting his self-interest
to be brought into conflict with the
corporation's interest and may not take the
opportunity for himself.'
While our law on corporate
opportunity has developed around the duty
owned by directors and officers, I am of the
view that comparable duties and standards
should be imposed when the party whose
conduct is in question is a stockholder. In
some circumstances a stockholder has
opportunities to express and prefer his
self-interest to that of the corporation.
But we are concerned with circumstances in
which a stockholder, by virtue of his
control of corporate functions, makes a
choice advantageous to himself and against
the corporate interest. As to this, the
principle stated by
Chancellor Josiah Wolcott in Allied Chemical
& Dye Corporation v. Steel & Tube Co., 14
Del.Ch. 1, 120 A. 486 (1923) is
applicable; he wrote:
'When, in the conduct of the corporate
business, a majority of the voting power in
the corporation join hands in imposing its
policy upon all, it is beyond all reason and
contrary, it seems to me, to the plainest
dictates of what is just and right, to take
any view other than that they are to be
regarded as having placed upon themselves
the same sort of fiduciary character which
the law impresses upon the directors in
their relation to all the stockholders.
Ordinarily the directors speak for and
determine the policy of the corporation.
When the majority of stockholders do this,
they are, for the moment, the corporation.
Unless the majority in such case are to be
regarded as owing a duty to the minority
such as is owed by the directors to all,
then the minority are in a situation that
exposes
Page 435 them to the grossest frauds and subjects
them to most outrageous wrongs.'
See, also, Epstein v. Celotex
Corporation, Del.Ch., 238 A.2d 843 (1968).
And compare Chancellor Seitz's comment about
the duty of majority stockholders
Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 34
Del.Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236 (1953):
'As a starting point it must be conceded
that action by majority stockholders having
as its primary purpose the 'freezing out' of
a minority interest is actionable without
regard to the fairness of the price
(citation omitted).'
On the same point, see Condec
Corporation v. Lunkenheimer Company, Del.Ch.
230 A.2d 769 (1967).
The rule of Guth is applicable in
determining whether a majority stockholder,
acting as a result of his control of a
corporate function, has preempted an
opportunity which rightfully belongs to the
corporation.
Perlman v. Feldman,
219 F.2d 173 (2
Cir.1955), 3 Fletcher Cyclopedia
Corporations, § 861.1.
Child Guidance Toys, Inc., was
acquired by Dunhill on May 31, 1968; it
manufactures and distributes educational
toys and visual aid teaching devices. In
1967 Child Guidance had net sales of about
$8,000,000. Prior to the acquisition
Spalding had a toy division, which made and
sold 'Tinker-toys,' Dunhill did not make or
sell toys of any kind.
Plaintiffs allege that Dunhill
diverted to itself the opportunity to
acquire Child Guidance and that this was
done in violation of its fiduciary duty to
the public stockholders. Dunhill argues that
this issue is not relevant to the fairness
of the merger terms but I cannot say, on
this record, that as a matter of law it is
not. Duff, Anderson's valuation is based on
the inclusion of Child Guidance as part of
Dunhill and not of Spalding. And Mr.
Benjamin's uncontested affidavit states that
if Child Guidance belongs to Spalding 'this
would confer a significant advantage and an
additional element of value for Spalding.'
It follows that the contention is relevant
to valuation.
Next, Dunhill argues that
plaintiffs have not sustained their burden
of proof to show that there has been an
unlawful diversion. The record on this issue
is limited, but such as it is, I believe,
favors plaintiffs. Thus the affidavit filed
by Morris Shilensky, whose firm is counsel
to Dunhill, shows that shortly after a prior
merger by that company 'there was widely
circulated a description of a program for
acquisition of businesses for Dunhill as
well as for Spalding.' He states that the
Child Guidance opportunity came to Dunhill
and not Spalding. That is perfectly
understandable. The program Dunhill
publicized Included Spalding but asked that
proposals be submitted to Dunhill. A
reasonable inference from all of this is
that Dunhill had taken over any acquisition
program Spalding had. And in the same
literature the Platt & Munk division of
Dunhill, to which Child Guidance was later
assigned, is identified as a 'book
publishing company;' it was said that it had
areas of interest in 'book publishing
concerns * * * games, greeting cards and
book clubs.' Not a word about toys. And the
Tinker-toy operation of Spalding is
identified as the division interested in
educational toys and equipment. Finally, the
acquisition was apparently made for cash and
there is no dispute about Spalding's ability
to secure the amount actually paid.
In sum, the record makes out a
sufficient showing of a business opportunity
in the line of Spalding's business, which
would have been of practical advantage to it
and which it was financially able to
undertake; that opportunity was acquired by
Spalding's controlling stockholder.
Page 436
F.
Equating one share of Spalding
stock to 1.6 shares of Dunhill common and
computing 'pro forma' net earnings on that
basis, it appears that Spalding earnings on
a per share basis would be sharply reduced
after merger: from $2.69 to $1.74 for 1967
and from $2.12 to $1.07 for the first half
of 1968. On a similar basis, book value of a
Spalding share would be reduced from $34.08
to $17.49. It is obvious that Duff, Anderson
regards such factors as a call on a common
stock with an active New York Stock Exchange
listing, an equity position in a larger
industrial based company, and other factors
discussed in its report as more than
offsetting the 'near term paper dilution'
which it tacitly concedes will be the lot of
the Spalding minority. And so they may. But,
cumulatively, the uncertainty as to the
appropriate multiplier, the record facts as
to the Child Guidance opportunity and the
substantial dilution in earnings and book
value which will admittedly occur, persuade
me that plaintiffs have made out the
probability of success sufficient for their
motion. In other words, on the present
record Dunhill has not met its burden of
proof to show that the transaction is fair
after careful scrutiny by the Court.
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., supra. I
hasten to add that this is not a finding
that the merger is unfair. It simply means
that plaintiffs have established their right
to go to trial and so the motion for a
preliminary injunction will be granted. At
trial each side will have full opportunity
to develop the contentions made in the
present record. In view of the fact that
consummation of the merger will be enjoined,
Dunhill is entitled to and on request will
get a prompt trial on the merits.
Other contentions of the parties
have been considered although not
specifically referred to herein.
Order on notice. |