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Page 1193
232 F.Supp.2d 1193
In re SPRINT CORPORATION SECURITIES
LITIGATION.
This Document Relates To: All Actions.
No. 01-4080-CM. United States District Court, D.
Kansas. September 30, 2002.
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Karen D. Renwick, R. Frederick
Walters, Kip D. Richards, Walters, Bender,
Strohbehn & Vaughan, P.C., Kansas City, MO,
William S. Lerach, Amber L. Eck, Randall J.
Baron, Mary K. Blasy, Milberg, Weiss,
Bershad, Hynes & Lerach LLP, San Diego, CA,
David R. Scott, James E. Miller, Scott &
Scott, L.L.C., Colchester, CT, for
Plaintiffs.
J. Emmett Logan, Stinson Morrison
Hecker LLP, Mark A. Thornhill, Clayton L.
Barker, Spencer, Fane, Britt & Browne, R.
Lawrence Ward, Russell S. Jones, Jr.,
Shughart Thomson & Kilroy, Watkins Boulware
PC, N. Louise Ellingsworth, Michael D.
Pospisil, Daniel R. Young, Bryan Cave LLP,
Joseph M. Rebein Shook, Hardy & Bacon
L.L.P., Kansas City, MO, Christina M. Tchen,
Michele L. Walton, Eric J. Gorman, Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Chicago, IL,
Paul C. Curnin, Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett,
New York City, Catherine C. Whittaker,
Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P., Overland Park,
KS, M. Patrick McDowell, R. David Kaufman,
Brunini, Grantham, Grower & Hewes PLLC,
Jackson, MS, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MURGUIA, District Judge.
Plaintiffs bring this uncertified
class action alleging securities fraud in
relation to the failed merger of defendant
Sprint Corporation and defendant WorldCom,
Inc. The approximately thirty named
defendants are aligned, according to company
affiliation, into two groups for purposes of
representation. The first group ("Sprint
defendants") consists of Sprint Corporation
("Sprint"), Sprint directors, and Sprint
officers. The second group ("WorldCom
defendants") consists of WorldCom, Inc.
("WorldCom") and Bernard J. Ebbers. This
matter is before the court on Sprint
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs'
Consolidated Complaint (Doc. 94);
plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Certain
Exhibits and Impertinent Language Contained
in Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 105),
and Sprint Defendants' Motion to Strike the
Hakala Affidavit (Doc. 111).
Also before the court are motions
for Joinder of Linda Koch Lorimer and Warren
L. Batts in the Sprint Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 102); Joinder of Defendant Ron
Sommer in the Sprint Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 116); Joinder of Defendant
Michel Bon in the Sprint Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss (Doc. 120); and Joinder of
Defendant Andrew Sukawaty in the Sprint
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 127).
Plaintiffs have not opposed these
defendants' requests for joinder in Sprint's
Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, the court
grants defendants Linda Koch Lorimer, Warren
L. Batts, Ron Sommer, Michel Bon, and Andrew
Sukawaty's request to join Sprint's Motion
to Dismiss (Docs. 102, 116, 120, and 127).
WorldCom's Bankruptcy
As a preliminary matter, the
court notes that the WorldCom defendants
also have filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
89). However, the court declines to rule on
this motion due to WorldCom's subsequent
bankruptcy filing.
WorldCom filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy on July 21, 2002. As a result,
pursuant to § 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,
this proceeding against WorldCom is
automatically stayed. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
Accordingly, under the law of
Page 1200
this circuit, this court may not rule
upon WorldCom's pending motion to dismiss,
regardless of whether WorldCom would be
entitled to judgment in its favor.
Ellis v. Consol. Diesel Elec. Corp.,
894 F.2d 371, 372-73 (10th Cir.1990)
(holding district court decision granting
summary judgment two weeks after bankruptcy
petition was filed invalid and stating
"[t]he operation of the stay should not
depend upon whether the district court finds
for or against the debtor").
With respect to Bernard Ebbers,
the court is aware that § 362(a) extends the
automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy
Code only to the "debtor." The rule followed
in the Tenth Circuit is that the stay
provision does not extend to the third party
defendants or a debtor's co-defendants.
Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners,
747 F.2d 1324, 1330 (10th Cir. 1984).
However, under § 105(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code, courts may extend the protection of
the automatic stay to a debtor corporation's
officers, directors, and employees during
the pendency of a Chapter 11 case. 11 U.S.C.
§ 105(a) ("The court may issue any order, or
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to
carry out the provisions of this title.").
The rationale in extending the stay to
protect corporate officers, directors, and
employees is to prevent those individuals
from diverting their energies from the
reorganization effort to defending
themselves in litigation.
In re Arrow Huss, Inc., 51 B.R. 853,
855 (Bkrtcy.D.Utah 1985).
In this case, the court lacks
sufficient information to make a
determination whether this proceeding should
be stayed as to defendant Ebbers. The
parties have not briefed the issue, nor has
any party requested that this court impose
such stay. However, considering the
likelihood that this issue will arise in the
future, whether before the bankruptcy court
or this court, the court declines at this
point to rule on defendant Ebbers's motion
to dismiss.
II. Background
A. Parties
1. Defendants
Sprint is a diversified
telecommunications corporation which offers
long distance, local, and wireless
communication services.1
Sprint's operations are generally divided
into two sections: (1) the PCS group, which
markets and supplies wireless communication
services under the PCS brand name; and (2)
the FON group, which is a "catchall" group
consisting of all non-PCS business and
assets. At the relevant time period, Sprint
was the nation's third largest provider of
long distance telecommunication services.
At the time pertinent to this
lawsuit, WorldCom was the second largest
provider of international long distance
services to United States based customers
and the largest provider of
domestically-connected international private
voice and data lines.2
In 1998, WorldCom acquired MCI
Communications Corporation, the then second
largest provider of long distance
telecommunication services in the United
States. After WorldCom's acquisition,
approximately
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eighty percent of the domestic long
distance market was shared by just three
providers: AT & T, WorldCom, and Sprint.3
According to plaintiffs' Consolidated
Complaint ("Complaint"), by 1998-1999,
Sprint and WorldCom were:
The largest and second largest
of a small group of top-tier providers of
Internet "backbone" network services in the
United States and the world;
The second and third largest of
three providers who collectively dominated
long distance telecommunications within the
United States, and between the United States
and numerous overseas destinations;
The largest and third largest
of three providers who collectively
dominated international private line
services to business customers;
Two of three providers who
collectively dominated various date network
services to large business customers; and
Two of three providers who
collectively dominated custom network
telecommunications services to large
business customers.
(Complaint at 38).
2. Plaintiffs
This securities fraud class
action has been brought on behalf of all
persons and entities who purchased the
publicly-traded securities of Sprint between
October 4, 1999 and September 19, 2000 (the
"Class Period"). In its Memorandum and Order
(Doc. 45) dated September 28, 2001, the
court appointed six institutional investors
as lead plaintiffs.
In re Sprint Corp. Sec. Litig., 164
F.Supp.2d 1240 (D.Kan.2001). As noted
earlier, this class action has yet to be
certified pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
B. Proposed Merger
In the summer of 1999, Sprint's
board of directors began preliminary
investigations into a possible merger with
another telecommunications entity. (Sprint's
Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1 at
45). The leading candidates were BellSouth
Corporation, Deutsche Telekom, and WorldCom.
Through the summer, negotiations intensified
with WorldCom. Principally involved in the
negotiations were Sprint's Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer ("CEO"), William T.
Esrey, and WorldCom's President and CEO,
Bernard J. Ebbers. Eventually, on October 4,
1999, a merger agreement and related
documents were executed by Sprint and
WorldCom. The following morning, before the
opening of the markets, Sprint and WorldCom
issued a joint press release formally
announcing the merger agreement. Pursuant to
the merger agreement, Sprint was to be
acquired by WorldCom for approximately $129
billion, with WorldCom being designated the
surviving corporation. The combination of
the two companies was to be the largest
merger in history.
As will be discussed below, the
corporations issued a joint proxy
statement/prospectus ("Joint Proxy") on
March 9, 2000. Thereafter, Sprint and
WorldCom held simultaneous special meetings
on April 28, 2000, for the purpose of
seeking shareholder approval of the proposed
merger. At the meetings, shareholders of
both corporations approved the merger.
However, on June 27, 2000, the Department of
Justice ("DOJ") filed an antitrust lawsuit
to block the merger. The European Commission
("EC") followed by announcing its formal
opposition to the merger the next day.
Thereafter, on July 13, 2000, Sprint
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and WorldCom officially terminated their
merger agreement.
C. Plaintiffs' Allegations
1. General Scheme
Plaintiffs' Complaint principally
alleges that the Sprint and WorldCom
defendants perpetrated a fraud on the market
in an attempt to gain shareholder approval
of the merger, despite the fact that the
merger was destined from the beginning to
fail. More specifically, plaintiffs allege
as follows:
During the 1990s, as part of
Sprint's long-term stock incentive plan,
Sprint's top executives and directors had
been granted options to buy millions of
shares of Sprint FON/PCS common stock at
prices far below the market value. By 1998,
however, virtually all of these options
remained unvested, meaning the options were
not exercisable. Plaintiffs allege that the
Sprint defendants were concerned that, by
the time their options naturally vested, the
stock value would be greatly reduced due to
the enormous capital invested in PCS
combined with forecasts of increased
competition and slower growth. What was
needed, therefore, was a way to accelerate
the vesting of the options.
To accomplish this goal,
plaintiffs allege the Sprint defendants
undertook to modify the "change in control"
provision contained in their incentive plan.
Pursuant to the incentive plan, a "change in
control" of Sprint would immediately
accelerate almost all of the outstanding
options. According to plaintiffs, in late
1998, the Sprint defendants "secretly"
altered the incentive plan so as to define a
"change in control" to occur when "Sprint's
Stockholders approve a merger in which
Sprint is not the surviving entity." In
essence, under the newly modified incentive
plan, shareholder approval alone,
irrespective of the merger's actual
viability, would trigger a "change in
control." Upon a change in control, the
stock options would vest and become
exercisable. Plaintiffs allege that the
value of the individually named defendants'
options, once exercisable, totaled nearly
$600 million. Defendant Esrey's options
alone are alleged to have been valued at
over $300 million. Furthermore, because the
incentive plan covered executives throughout
Sprint, plaintiffs allege the total windfall
for all stock option participants was in
excess of $1.7 billion.
With respect to WorldCom,
plaintiffs allege that the WorldCom
defendants had an incentive to attempt a
merger with Sprint, regardless of whether
the merger would ever in fact occur.
Plaintiffs describe Ebbers as "an
exceptionally aggressive executive who was
willing to `play chicken' with the
Department of Justice and gamble on getting
an acquisition of Sprint past regulators."
(Complaint 42). Ebbers was allegedly
willing to challenge regulators, and whether
or not the merger survived was
inconsequential. If the merger was approved,
then WorldCom would acquire Sprint's
wireless PCS group, which was essential for
WorldCom's continued success. If the merger
was blocked, then Sprint, WorldCom's
competitor, would suffer the consequences of
$1.7 billion in accelerated options.
As alleged by plaintiffs, the
foremost goal of both the Sprint and
WorldCom defendants was to secure joint
shareholder approval of the merger. This was
achieved by misleading the market as to (1)
the viability of the merger and (2) the
financial performance of the two companies.
2. Regulator Reaction and
Defendants' Response
Considering the size of the
proposed merger and the state of competition
within the telecommunications industry,
regulators from the Federal Communications
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Commission ("FCC"), the DOJ Antitrust
Division, and the EC were interested in the
proposed merger. Even before the
corporations officially announced their
intent to pursue the merger, an official
with the FCC issued a cautionary statement.
On September 23, 1999, FCC Chairman Kennard,
when asked whether the FCC would approve a
possible merger between Sprint and WorldCom,
stated:
You don't hear me saying it's
going to be fine ... mergers are very, very
fact-specific. American consumers are
enjoying the lowest long distance rates in
history.... That's a function of one thing:
competition. We cannot allow any merger to
happen in this industry that turns back the
clock of competition.
(Complaint 43) (alterations in
original).
The Complaint goes on to detail
numerous statements and acts attributed to
domestic and foreign regulatory bodies,
which indicated the regulators' building
pessimism over the merger. Plaintiffs allege
both the Sprint and WorldCom defendants
issued false and misleading statements in
response to these reports in an effort to
reassure the market that the merger would in
fact be approved. For the sake of brevity,
the court will attempt to summarize
plaintiffs' allegations of misleading
statements and omissions as follows:
October 4, 1999 In formally
announcing the merger, the companies state
that they "anticipate that the merger will
close in the second half of 2000."
(Complaint 44).
October 5, 1999 FCC Chairman
Kennard ("Kennard") responds to the merger's
announcement by stating: "This merger
appears to be a surrender. How can this be
good for consumers? The parties will bear a
heavy burden to show how consumers will be
better off." (Complaint 45).
October 6 and 7, 1999 At a
joint news conference, in response to
Kennard's statements, Esrey and Ebbers
state: "We obviously would not have entered
into this transaction if we didn't feel very
confident that we could show this was
pro-competitive.... We feel very confident
that we will be able to show evidence that
this is a pro-competitive merger."
(Complaint 46) (citing the National
Post and Computer Wire, Inc.).
October 20, 1999 In a press
release, both companies commented that they
"anticipate that the merger will close in
the second half of 2000." (Complaint 48).
October 28, 1999 Ebbers
indicates he is "confident" that the merger
will gain regulatory approval. (Complaint
49) (citing Dow Jones News Service).
October 29, 1999 In a letter to
FCC commissioners, Tom Krattenmaker,
research director of the FCC's policy
office, writes that "any further
consolidation among the major long distance
providers would be intolerable...."
(Complaint 50).
November 5, 1999 At a
Prudential Technology Conference, Robert T.
LeMay, Sprint's President and Chief
Operating Officer, "expressed confidence"
that the merger would be approved.
(Complaint 52) (citing a Prudential
Securities report).
November 9, 1999 Kennard
reiterates his "misgivings" about the merger
by stating: "Now is the time, more than ever
before, to make sure any merger will serve
the public interest...." (Complaint 53)
(citing The Kansas City Star).
November 9, 1999 In a talk with
Kansas City, Missouri business leaders,
Esrey's remarks are reported as follows:
"Esrey said the merger would withstand
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the scrutiny of federal antitrust and
telecommunications regulators because the
consumer long distance market would not be
too concentrated as a result of the
combination. `We are comfortable that the
facts will be overwhelmingly convincing.'"
(Complaint 54) (citing The Kansas City
Star).
November 13, 1999 The
Washington Post reports that "[f]ederal
regulators are unlikely to approve the $129
billion merger proposed by MCI WorldCom Inc.
and Sprint Corp., ... viewing the
arrangement as a severe blow to
competition.... Sources said the fusion, as
announced, would violate antitrust
standards. ... In order to gain the blessing
of the Justice Department, which must
approve the merger along with the FCC, the
companies would have to persuade regulators
that special circumstances merit
disregarding the rule." (Complaint 55).
November 15, 1999 In response
to the Washington Post report, Ebbers
tells a Warburg Dillon Read conference in
New York City "that a `responsible' person
at the FCC has told him that the
Washington Post report wasn't accurate.
Ebbers also said Assistant Attorney General
Joel Klein told him `none of that could be
further from the truth....'" (Complaint
56) (citing Washington Telecom Newswire).
Plaintiffs allege Ebbers' statement was
false because no "responsible" person nor
Assistant Attorney General Klein had told
Ebbers what he claimed.
November 15, 1999 In a USA
Today article, the companies reported
that they "remained optimistic" that they
would win regulatory approval. (Complaint
57).
November 17, 1999 The companies
again report that they are "confident that
they would be able to convince regulators
that the deal serves the public interest."
(Complaint 58) (citing Washington Post).
November 18, 1999 As reported
by The Kansas City Star, the DOJ "has
already asked for more information from the
companies, indicating that it will be
conducting a full-blown antitrust review."
(Complaint 59).
December 1999 The DOJ hires an
experienced antitrust law firm to review the
merger for its anti-competitive nature.
According to plaintiffs, the last time the
DOJ took such a step was when it retained
David Boies to work on the Microsoft
antitrust litigation. (Complaint 60).
December 15, 1999 The FCC asks
Sprint and WorldCom to amend their
applications by providing a description of
the Internet services provided by the
companies, an assessment of the public
interest impact of the merger, and any
additional information regarding the
Internet market that they believed would
assist the FCC in its public interest
analysis. (Complaint 62).
December 16, 1999 In response
to the FCC's request for additional
information, Prudential Securities states in
a report:
[T]he FCC's letter, along with
the Justice Department's decision to retain
antitrust expert Stephen Axinn, reinforces
our views about what investors should expect
in the merger review process a tough,
skeptical, and prolonged set of
negotiations, likely taking a year,
involving a rigorous review of such issues
as the Internet backbone assets, the
definition of the market served by the
companies....
(Complaint 63).
January 12, 2000 During a
luncheon speech at the National Press Club
in Washington, D.C., Ebbers' remarks are
reported as follows: "[Ebbers] is confident
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he will gain approval with `minor
modifications' and that he expected the
merger to be completed sometime after June,
but before the end of the year." (Complaint
64) (citing The Wall Street Journal).
February 1, 2000 Sprint and
WorldCom management hold a conference call,
where they are reported to state they
"expect the merger to obtain approvals from
the DOJ and European authorities by mid
2000." (Complaint 66) (citing Prudential
Securities report).
February 11, 2000 In a
Communications Daily article, Ebbers
indicates the companies' meetings with DOJ
officials regarding the merger had "gone
very well." Plaintiffs claim this is false.
According to plaintiffs, during the
meetings, DOJ officials indicated it was
very unlikely they would let the merger go
through without significant divestitures.
(Complaint 67).
February 21, 2000 The EC's
antitrust authorities inform both companies
that it will take four months to review the
impact of the merger on global voice and
Internet services. EC Commissioner Monti
states: "The commission has raised serious
doubts as to the compatibility of the
proposed merger between MCI WorldCom and
Sprint, mainly ... [due to] Internet
connectivity." (Complaint 68).
February 28, 2000 In a joint
press release, the companies indicate "they
expect to close the deal in the second half,
after receiving regulatory and shareholder
approvals." (Complaint 69).
March 9, 2000 Sprint and
WorldCom issue their joint proxy. According
to plaintiffs, the proxy does not disclose
the "secret" modification to the "change in
control" provision. While the proxy does
include disclosures regarding the risks
associated with regulatory approval,
plaintiffs allege the disclosures are false
because they are couched in the abstract,
when in fact, defendants already knew there
was a substantial probability that the
various regulators would block the merger.
The proxy disclosures read as
follows:
The merger is subject to the
receipt of consents and approvals from
various governmental entities, which may
jeopardize or delay completion of the merger
or reduce the anticipated benefits of the
merger. Completion of the merger is
conditioned upon filings with, and the
receipt of required consents, orders,
approvals or clearances from various
governmental agencies, both foreign and
domestic, including the FTC, the Antitrust
Division, European antitrust authorities,
the Federal Communications Commission and
state public utility or service commissions.
These consents, orders, approvals and
clearances may impose conditions on or
require divestitures relating to the
divisions, operations, or assets of MCI
WorldCom or Sprint. Such conditions or
divestitures may jeopardize or delay
completion of the merger or may reduce the
anticipated benefits of the merger.
. . . . .
At any time before or after
completion of the merger, the Antitrust
Division could take such action under the
antitrust laws as it deems necessary or
desirable in the public interest, including
seeking to enjoin completion of the merger
or seeking divestiture of substantial assets
of MCI WorldCom or Sprint. The merger also
is subject to review under state antitrust
laws and could be the subject of challenges
by private parties under the antitrust laws.
(Complaint 73).
March 14, 2000 Scott Cleland, a
tele-communications analyst and managing
director with the LEGG Mason Precursor
Page 1206
Group, made the following prediction in a
conference call with institutional
investors: "We think that in the next
several months, the antitrust division of
the Justice Department is going to seek and
win a temporary injunction to halt this
merger, and that will effectively scuttle
this merger. ..." (Complaint 75).
March 15, 2000 In response to
Cleland's remarks, both companies issued
identical responses: "We remain convinced
that the merger will go through in the
second half of 2000." (Complaint 76)
(citing The Kansas City Star).
March 28, 2000 As reported in
The Kansas City Star, staff for the
Washington Utilities and Transportation
Commission ("WUTC") officially recommended
that the WUTC reject the merger. The staff
feared combination of two of the three
largest long distance providers would
"reasonably be expected to result in higher
prices and reduced innovation, which would
unambiguously harm consumers and the public
interest." (Complaint 79).
In response to the WUTC
announcement, a Sprint spokesman was
reported as stating: "We have many, many
months to go before any formal decision is
made.... We're completely confident that
when the time comes that the commission is
going to approve the transaction."
(Complaint 79).
March 2000 Sprint sends its
1999 annual report to shareholders, which
states: "The merger is expected to be
completed in the second half of 2000, with
approvals from appropriate regulatory
entities and shareholders of MCI WorldCom
and Sprint." (Complaint 80).
April 5, 2000 As reported by
analysts from Prudential Securities,
"[c]ritics of the merger between Sprint and
MCI WorldCom told the FCC during an April 5
three-hour meeting that the merger would
create dangerous levels of concentration in
long distance residential markets, ... and
among Internet backbone providers, a problem
that could not be solved by divestiture."
(Complaint 81).
April 6, 2000 Apparently
reporting on the previous day's FCC meeting,
The Kansas City Star noted:
"[O]fficials of the two companies denied
that combining their resources would harm
the marketplace. `This merger would not do
that,' said Michael H. Salisbury, executive
vice president and general counsel for MCI
WorldCom, based in Jackson, Miss. `We don't
see a problem.'" (Complaint 81).
April 2000 Plaintiffs allege
officials from both companies met with DOJ
authorities -throughout April of 2000.
Plaintiffs claim that, within these
meetings, the regulators indicated that the
DOJ "was very unlikely to approve the merger
under any circumstances and certainly not
without asset divestments that defendants
knew would make the transaction uneconomical
to the parties." (Complaint 85).
Plaintiffs further allege defendants failed
to disclose this information.
April 19, 2000 The FCC suspends
its 180-day investigation into the merger
until the companies supply the FCC with
further submissions and certain consultation
reports. According to plaintiffs, this
"demand came immediately after consultants
told the FCC that Sprint's and WorldCom's
claims that large business users would have
numerous options for voice and data services
were very dubious." (Complaint 86).
Furthermore, plaintiffs allege defendants
failed to disclose this information.
April 26, 2000 Sprint officials
were informed by the EC that the companies
would soon receive an outline of the EC's
concerns regarding the merger. Specifically,
one official from the EC noted the
Commission was "seriously concerned with the
possible anti-competitive aspects of this
deal." (Complaint 87). According
Page 1207
to plaintiffs, defendants did not
disclose this information.
April 27, 2000 As reported in
The Kansas City Star, in response to
the EC's statements, a Sprint spokesperson
stated: "the commission's statement was a
standard part of the European Commission
review process and not unexpected. `We feel
very confident that we will be able to
address the EC concerns to their
satisfaction. ... We're confident that the
merger will be approved by the EC.'"
(Complaint 87).
On that same day, the Economic
Policy Institute issued a report opining
that the merger would not survive the DOJ's
review.
April 28, 2000 Sprint and
WorldCom shareholders approve the merger. In
response, Sprint issues a press release
stating: "We look forward to completing the
merger later this year.... Department of
Justice and European Commission approvals
are expected within the next few months,
with the FCC and the majority of state
approvals occurring by the third quarter."
(Complaint 93).
WorldCom also issued a press
release, which stated: "The company
anticipates the merger to be approved by the
Department of Justice in the second quarter
of 2000, followed by approval by the Federal
Communications Commission, various state
government bodies and foreign antitrust
authorities in the third quarter of this
year. The company anticipates the merger to
close soon thereafter." (Complaint 93).
May 18, 2000 The DOJ staff
submits its formal recommendation that the
merger be blocked. (Complaint 95).
May 19, 2000 As reported by the
Wall Street Journal, in response to
the DOJ staff recommendation, the companies'
spokesman "said they still expect the deal
to proceed. `We feel confident that the
merger ultimately will go through, and that
all of the various regulatory reviews will
be concluded by fall.'" (Complaint 95).
June 13, 2000 At Sprint's
annual meeting, Esrey states: "it remains
unclear if we will or will not get the
necessary government clearances to implement
the merger." (Complaint 96).
June 21, 2000 Bloomberg
issues an article, which discusses Ebbers's
apparent knowledge of regulatory opposition:
Ebbers knew more than a year ago
that a proposed combination with Sprint
Corp. would meet significant regulatory and
antitrust fears.
He told a Paine Webber Inc.
investor conference on June 9 last year-four
months before the Sprint transaction that
regulators would oppose a union of the
second-and third-largest U.S. long distance
carriers, and the companies weren't in
merger talks.
(Complaint 97).
June 26, 2000 The EC circulates
a draft decision among EC governments
recommending the merger be blocked.
(Complaint 98).
June 27, 2000 The DOJ files
suit to block the merger. (Complaint 99).
June 28, 2000 The Wall
Street Journal also reports on Ebbers's
interaction with regulators after WorldCom's
1999 merger with MCI: "The regulators told
me not to come back with another big one,"
said Ebbers. "But by October, Mr. Ebbers was
back with an even brasher plan: a takeover
of No. 3 long distance carrier Sprint Corp.
valued at $115 billion. He should have
listened to the regulators." (Complaint
97). On the same day, the EC announces its
formal opposition to the merger. (Complaint
99).
July 13, 2000 Sprint and
WorldCom announce the merger has been
abandoned.
Page 1208
In sum, the Complaint alleges the
defendants knew the following "facts" and
failed to disclose them:
The Sprint/WorldCom merger
faced significant regulatory opposition and
was expected to be blocked by regulators;
The Sprint defendants had
secretly modified the "change in control"
definition in Sprint's [stock incentive]
plan, thereby allowing the Sprint defendants
to reap hundreds of millions of dollars in
ill-gotten proceeds via the acceleration of
vested stock options once the merger was
approved by shareholders, regardless of
whether the merger ever actually occurred;
At the time the defendants
issued the joint Merger Proxy, defendants
already knew that government entities,
including the DOJ, EC, and FCC were delaying
and/or preventing the consummation of the
merger;
The FCC had made a special
request for additional information and the
DOJ had retained special counsel to
investigate the antitrust aspects of the
merger;
DOJ and FCC officials would not
approve the merger unless defendants made
serious concessions, including asset
divestments, which defendants refused to
make, because doing so would render the
merger uneconomical;
The FCC had stopped the 180 day
approval clock in April 2000;
Sprint's and WorldCom's
financial prospects were in dire jeopardy;
Sprint's first quarter results
of 2000 artificially inflated Sprint's
profits by at least $50 million by refusing
to account for the timely reserves for
uncollectible accounts receivable, thus
boosting Sprint's reported "record" profits;
and
WorldCom's first quarter
results of 2000 improperly manipulated its
reserves for uncollectible accounts
receivable and failed to properly depreciate
its telecom equipment, thus boosting
WorldCom's profits.
(Complaint 106).
3. Financial Disclosures
Plaintiffs also allege Sprint and
WorldCom issued false and misleading
information regarding their respective
financial performances. According to
plaintiffs, these false disclosures were
necessary to induce shareholder approval and
"conceal the deterioration of Sprint's core
long distance business." (Complaint 82).
a. Sprint
On April 18, 2000, Sprint issued
a press release detailing its results for
the first quarter of 2000 (hereinafter
referred to as "1Q00"), which stated:
Sprint today announced record
first quarter results. Sprint's consolidated
net operating revenues for the quarter were
$5.48 billion, an 18 percent increase from
$4.65 billion in the first quarter of 1999.
The Sprint FON Group's core
businesses reported a strong increase in
earnings driven by double-digit growth in
operating income in each core business unit.
The PCS Group had another quarter of
outstanding subscriber growth, with net
customer additions of 831,000-the equivalent
of adding a new customer every 10 seconds in
the quarter. Sprint PCS ended the quarter
with more than 6.5 million customers
nationwide. The PCS Group also reached a
major milestone in the quarter by exceeding
the $1 billion quarterly revenue mark for
the first time.
(Complaint 82).
Also on April 18, Sprint
management held a conference call with
analysts to discuss its 1Q00 results. The
Complaint
Page 1209
details numerous reports generated by the
analysts after Sprint's release of its 1Q00
results. (Complaint 83). The favorable
reports all focus on Sprint's increased
operating performance and decreased "churn
rate." The churn rate is the percentage of
customers lost or cut off during a period of
time. For example, a report plaintiffs
credit to Bear Stearns states: "We upgrade
our rating on Sprint PCS to Attractive, as
management delivers fundamental improvement
on churn.... Lower churn helped Sprint add
90,000 more customers. The churn rate fell
to 3.0% per month, down from the mid 3%
range in 4Q99." (Complaint 83).
Plaintiffs allege these "record
results" were false due to Sprint's failure
to make proper and timely provisions for
doubtful accounts receivable. Sprint's
reported earnings "were overstated (and
PCS's loss was understated) due to Sprint's
improper manipulation of its reserves (or
allowances) for doubtful accounts
receivable." (Complaint 107). Such
manipulation, according to plaintiffs, was a
violation of Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles ("GAAP").
In brief, plaintiffs assert
Sprint failed to timely accrue losses
resulting from uncollectible receivables.
During 1Q00, the FON Group's accounts
receivables increased, and, at the same
time, Sprint was having problems with both
FON and PCS non-paying customers. Instead of
increasing its reserves for these doubtful
accounts, as plaintiffs allege was
warranted, Sprint actually decreased the FON
allowances. (Complaint 114). After 1Q00
results were announced, Sprint eventually
was required to record the charges and cut
off non-paying customers. By December 31,
2000, Sprint's allowances for doubtful
accounts under both FON and PCS had risen
dramatically. In short, plaintiffs allege
Sprint delayed cutting off non-paying
customers till after 1Q00 results were
released, consequently decreasing its churn
rate and concealing losses. According to
plaintiffs, Sprint's 1Q00 Earnings Per Share
("EPS") were overstated by its failure to
timely address the doubtful accounts.
b. WorldCom
As with their allegations against
Sprint, plaintiffs assert WorldCom falsified
its 1Q00 results by failing to timely accrue
losses from uncollectible receivables.
(Complaint 125 30). According to the
Complaint, WorldCom had significant doubtful
accounts but failed to timely raise its
allowances.
Plaintiffs also assert WorldCom
failed to properly depreciate its
telecommunication equipment. (Complaint
131). According to the Complaint, WorldCom
selected an unreasonably long depreciation
period for its telecommunication assets, so
reducing its depreciation expense and
increasing reported income.
4. Objective Activity
a. Exercised Options
According to plaintiffs, the
objective activity was obtaining shareholder
approval of the merger. Once the Sprint
shareholders had approved the merger, the
"change in control" clause was activated,
and the majority of unvested options
immediately accelerated. According to the
Complaint, by the end of July 2000, four of
Sprint's fifteen principal corporate
officers had left the company. These four
key executives left the company with over
$30 million in stock option benefits.
(Complaint 101). In all, plaintiffs assert
that, following the shareholder vote, Sprint
executives and employees exercised over 4.3
million options worth over $153 million.
(Complaint 102). Furthermore, within the
first six months of 2000, it is alleged
2,179 employees left Sprint.
Page 1210
b. Market
On September 20, 2000, Sprint
announced its 3Q00 results, which revealed
lower than forecasted revenues, earnings,
and PCS subscriber additions. In particular,
the lowered results were the product of a
higher than forecasted churn rate. Based on
this news, Sprint's PCS shares dropped to
$33.25, a forty-nine percent decrease from a
Class Period high of $65.50, and Sprint's
FON shares dropped to $26.81, a sixty-one
percent decrease from a Class Period high of
$68.76.
5. Plaintiffs' Claims
In sum, the Complaint alleges
that the public shareholders of Sprint lost
billions of dollars. The Complaint asserts
three claims: (1) that pursuant to § 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and
Rule 10b 5 thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b
5, all defendants disseminated or approved
of the allegedly false statements specified
above; (2) that pursuant to § 20(a) of the
Exchange Act, defendants Sprint, Esrey,
LeMay, Lorimer, Ausley, Batts, Bon,
Hockaday, Hook, Rice, Smith, Sommer, and
Turley have controller liability; and (3)
that pursuant to § 20(a) of the Exchange
Act, defendants WorldCom and Ebbers have
controller liability.
Motions to Strike
Motion to Strike Certain
Exhibits and Impertinent Language Contained
in Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Before addressing the Sprint
defendants' arguments for dismissal, the
court first must consider plaintiffs' Motion
to Strike Certain Exhibits and Impertinent
Language Contained in Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 105). Plaintiffs request the
court to strike numerous exhibits the Sprint
and WorldCom defendants have attached to
their respective motions to dismiss. Due to
WorldCom's pending bankruptcy, as discussed
above, the court declines to rule on
plaintiffs' motion to strike as it relates
to exhibits the WorldCom defendants attached
to their motion to dismiss. With respect to
the Sprint defendants' exhibits, the court
grants in part plaintiffs' motion to strike.
Within its review of a motion to
dismiss, the court generally must limit
itself to the facts stated in the complaint,
documents attached to the complaint as
exhibits, and documents incorporated by
reference. However, "[i]t is accepted
practice that, `if a plaintiff does not
incorporate by reference or attach a
document to its complaint, but the document
is referred to in the complaint and is
central to the plaintiff's claim, a
defendant may submit an indisputably
authentic copy to the court to be considered
on a motion to dismiss.'"
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Howsam,
261 F.3d 956, 961 (10th Cir. 2001),
cert. granted, 534 U.S. 1161, 122 S.Ct.
1171, 152 L.Ed.2d 115 (2002) (quoting
GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale
Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th
Cir.1997));
Prager v. LaFaver, 180 F.3d 1185,
1188-89 (10th Cir.1999) (quoting GFF
Corp.);
Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir.1997)
("[W]here the plaintiff refers to certain
documents in the complaint and those
documents are central to the plaintiff's
claim, ... the Court may consider the
documents part of the pleadings for purposes
of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, and the
defendants attaching such documents to the
motion to dismiss will not require
conversion of the motion into a motion for
summary judgment."). "If the rule were
otherwise, a plaintiff with a deficient
claim could survive a motion to dismiss
simply by not attaching a dispositive
document upon which the plaintiff relied."
GFF Corp., 130 F.3d at 1385. However,
the court is not obligated to consider such
extraneous documents, because the decision
Page 1211
to do so rests on the court's sound
discretion. Prager, 180 F.3d at 1189
(holding district court acted reasonably in
declining to consider documents attached to
the defendant's motion to dismiss).
Plaintiffs specifically request
the court to strike Sprint defendants'
exhibits 9, 11, 23, and 28, as well as
Sprint's March 12, 1987 Proxy and third
quarter 1997 SEC Form 10 Q. Each exhibit
will be discussed in turn.
Exhibit 9 is a Sprint press
release dated April 19, 2000. Sprint
contends that the court should consider the
press release because it includes a
cautionary statement regarding approval of
the Sprint/WorldCom merger. The Press
Release states as follows:
As part of the merger approval
process, the Department of Justice may
require that Sprint divest its Internet
assets. While discussions with the
Department of Justice are preliminary and no
decision has been reached, identifying and
consolidating those assets would simplify
divestiture, if it is required.
Specifically, the Sprint
defendants argue that the statement should
be considered to determine whether a "safe
harbor" warning was given.4
Pursuant to the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"), the court
must consider all information and documents
relevant to the question of whether a
defendant gave a safe harbor warning,
regardless of whether the information and
documents are cited in the complaint.
Karacand v. Edwards, 53 F.Supp.2d
1236, 1245 (D.Utah 1999). Specifically,
the safe harbor provision provides that "the
court shall consider ... any cautionary
statement accompanying [a] forward-looking
statement, which [is] not subject to
material dispute, cited by the defendant."
15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(e). With respect to oral
forward-looking statements, the safe harbor
provision explicitly provides that a written
cautionary statement contained in an
identified, "readily available document" may
be incorporated by reference. Id. §
78u-5(c)(3). The court finds that the April
19, 2000 press release is properly before
the court.
Exhibit 11 is an October 17, 2000
press release in which Sprint announced the
company's third quarter results. The Sprint
defendants argue that the October 17, 2000
press release is relevant to the plaintiffs'
accounting fraud claim because that claim
rests upon a comparison between the reserves
taken for doubtful accounts receivable in
the first and third quarters of 2000. In the
Complaint, plaintiffs set forth their
accounting fraud claim based upon a press
release dated September 20, 2000, the last
day of the putative class period, in which
Sprint announced its projections for the
third quarter. However, Sprint's actual
third quarter results, announced in the
October 17, 2000 press release, fared better
than the previously announced September 20
projections. The Sprint defendants argue
that the court should therefore consider the
October 17, 2000 press release because it is
a more accurate representation of Sprint's
third quarter results. The court looks to
the law in this circuit and holds that,
because the October 17, 2000 press release
is not attached to or referred to in the
Complaint, nor is it incorporated by
reference, plaintiffs' motion to strike the
October 17, 2000 press release is granted.
See GFF Corp., 130 F.3d at 1384.
Exhibit 23 is a December 13, 1999
Wall Street Journal article that
quotes an October 1999 letter from Tom
Krattenmaker, a research director at the
FCC's policy office.
Page 1212
The Sprint defendants point out that the
Complaint quotes directly from Mr.
Krattenmaker's letter without naming the
source. The Sprint defendants argue that,
given that plaintiffs have provided no
source for Mr. Krattenmaker's statements,
the court should consider the Wall Street
Journal article to determine the context
of those statements.
The court foremost notes that the
Wall Street Journal article is not
attached to or referred to in the Complaint,
nor is it incorporated by reference.
Moreover, it is not apparent from the
Complaint whether plaintiffs learned of the
contents of Mr. Krattenmaker's letter via
the Wall Street Journal article or
some other source. Thus, the court cannot
conclude that the Complaint implicitly
references the Wall Street Journal
article. As such, the court will not
consider the December 13, 1999 Wall
Street Journal article in ruling on
defendants' motion to dismiss.
Exhibit 28 is a March 15, 2000
Kansas City Star article. The Complaint
alleges, "Sprint and WorldCom issued
identical responses to Cleland's comments:
`We remain convinced that the merger will go
through in the second half of 2000,'
according to the March 15, 2000 Kansas
City Star." (Complaint 76). Clearly,
the court may consider the March 15, 2000
Kansas City Star article because it is
referenced in the Complaint.
Plaintiffs also move to strike
Sprint's March 12, 1987 Proxy and third
quarter 1997 SEC Form 10-Q. The court need
not elaborate on the Sprint defendants'
arguments because the court readily
concludes that these documents are not
attached to or referred to in the Complaint,
nor are they incorporated by reference.
Additionally, consideration of such
documents clearly would raise factual
issues. The court hereby strikes Sprint's
March 12, 1987 Proxy and third quarter 1997
SEC Form 10-Q.
Lastly, plaintiffs move to strike
several of defendants' arguments, which
plaintiffs contend mischaracterize certain
documents. Plaintiffs cite no authority
holding that it is appropriate for the court
to strike arguments contained in a motion to
dismiss simply because a party disagrees
with the other party's interpretation or
characterization of the documents.
Plaintiffs' motion to strike is denied with
respect to this issue.
Motion to Strike the Hakala
Affidavit
Plaintiffs submitted the
affidavit of Scott D. Hakala ("Hakala
Affidavit") in response to the Sprint
defendants' motion to dismiss. The Hakala
Affidavit states an opinion as to the
alleged value of certain stock options that
vested upon the shareholder vote to approve
the Sprint/WorldCom merger. The Sprint
defendants move to strike, arguing that the
Hakala Affidavit raises facts and expert
opinions. The court agrees and therefore
will not consider the Hakala Affidavit in
ruling on defendants' motion to dismiss.
Rather, the court will merely accept as true
all well-pleaded facts in the Complaint,
including the alleged value of the options
received by the Sprint defendants.
IV. Applicable Law
A. Motion to Dismiss Standard
The court will dismiss a cause of
action for failure to state a claim pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure only when it appears beyond
a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts in support of the theory of
recovery that would entitle him or her to
relief,
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46,
78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957);
Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc., 144
F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir.1998), or when
an issue of law is dispositive,
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
326, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338
Page 1213
(1989). The court accepts as true all
well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from
conclusory allegations, Maher, 144
F.3d at 1304, and all reasonable inferences
from those facts are viewed in favor of the
plaintiff,
Witt v. Roadway Express, 136 F.3d
1424, 1428 (10th Cir.1998). The issue in
resolving a motion such as this is not
whether the plaintiff will ultimately
prevail, but whether he or she is entitled
to offer evidence to support the claims.
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236,
94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974),
overruled on other grounds,
Davis v. Scherer,
468 U.S. 183, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139
(1984).
In the context of securities
litigation, the Tenth Circuit has warned
that dismissal is "difficult to obtain" due
to the fact-sensitive nature of the relevant
issues.
Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d
1112, 1118 (10th Cir.1997) (citing
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 240, 108 S.Ct. 978, 99 L.Ed.2d 194
(1988)). Dismissal is appropriate,
however, "where the alleged misstatements or
omissions are plainly immaterial," or where
the plaintiff has failed to satisfy
established pleading requirements. Id.
B. Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce or of the mails, or any
facility of any national securities exchange
. . . . .
(b) To use or employ, in
connection with the purchase of sale of any
security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of
investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j.
Read in conjunction with § 10(b),
Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any
person ...
. . . . .
(b) To make any untrue statement
of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the
statement made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading ...
. . . . .
in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
To state a valid claim under §
10(b) and Rule 10b 5, therefore, a plaintiff
is required to allege: "(1) a misleading
statement or omission of a material fact;
(2) made in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities; (3) with intent to
defraud or recklessness; (4) reliance; and
(5) damages." Grossman, 120 F.3d at
1118 (noting that in "fraud on the market"
cases, an investor's reliance on public
material misrepresentations is presumed).
Traditionally, Rule 9(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure governed the
pleading requirements for claims brought
under Rule 10b-5. See Fed.R.Civ.P.
9(b) ("In all averments of fraud or mistake,
the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake shall be stated with particularity.
Malice, intent, knowledge, and other
condition of mind of a person may be averred
generally.").
In 1995, however, Congress
reinforced Rule 9(b)'s pleading requirements
by enacting the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). 15 U.S.C. §
78u-4 et seq. Congress designed the
PSLRA to
Page 1214
deter perceived abuses of private
securities litigation.
City of Philadelphia v. Fleming, 264
F.3d 1245, 1258 (10th Cir. 2001). "The
PSLRA thus mandates a more stringent
pleading standard for securities fraud
actions in general, and for scienter
allegations in particular." Id.
First, with regard to material
misstatements and omissions, the PSLRA
requires:
In any private action arising
under this chapter in which the plaintiff
alleges that the defendant
(A) made an untrue statement of a
material fact; or
(B) omitted to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the
circumstances in which they were made, not
misleading:
the complaint shall specify each
statement alleged to have been misleading,
the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading, and, if an allegation regarding
the statement or omission is made on
information and belief, the complaint shall
state with particularity all facts on which
that belief is formed.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1). Second,
with regard to scienter, the PSLRA requires:
In any private action arising
under this chapter in which the plaintiff
may recover money damages only on proof that
the defendant acted with a particular state
of mind, the complaint shall, with respect
to each act or omission alleged to violate
this chapter, state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference
that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind.
Id. § 78u-4(b)(2).
Now, to sufficiently allege a
Rule 10b 5 claim under the PSLRA and Rule
9(b), a plaintiff must plead with
particularity not only facts constituting
fraud but also facts permitting a strong
inference that the defendant or defendants
acted with the requisite state of mind, or
scienter. "Consequently, defendants moving
to dismiss can now challenge the
particularity of allegations regarding both
the allegedly false or misleading
statements, and the alleged state of
mind."
In re Ribozyme Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig.,
119 F.Supp.2d 1156, 1162 (D.Colo.2000)
(emphasis in original).
V. Discussion
A. Defendants' Affirmative
Statements and Omissions Regarding the
Merger
As detailed above, plaintiffs'
Rule 10b 5 claim against the Sprint
defendants is based primarily on defendants'
allegedly false statements and omissions
regarding the viability of the
Sprint/WorldCom merger. As to misleading
statements, plaintiffs' claim relies almost
exclusively on the defendants' multiple
statements of "optimism" or "expectation"
regarding regulatory approval. Plaintiffs do
not argue, nor does the Complaint allege,
that any defendant proffered a guarantee or
promise that the merger would be approved.
Furthermore, the statements at issue do not
concern "hard" financial information
regarding corporate performance but rather
are forward-looking predictions or opinions
concerning on going regulatory proceedings.
Defendants contend that, even after
construing the Complaint's allegations as
true, the statements proffered by plaintiffs
fail to state an actionable claim under §
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
1. Opinions and Beliefs May
Support Liability
As a starting point, the court
acknowledges that merely packaging a false
or misleading statement as a belief or
opinion does not automatically insulate the
speaker from § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5
liability.
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,
501 U.S. 1083, 1093-94, 111 S.Ct. 2749, 115
L.Ed.2d 929 (1991), the Supreme Court
made clear that statements couched
Page 1215
as opinion or belief may be actionable if
the opinion is (1) known by the speaker to
be false when made or (2) made without a
reasonable basis in fact. See Grossman,
120 F.3d at 1120 n. 6 (discussing
Virginia Bankshares);
In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95
F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir.1996)
("Optimistic statements may constitute a
basis for a claim under Section 10(b).");
Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 639
(6th Cir.1993) ("Material statements
which contain the speaker's opinion are
actionable under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act if the speaker does
not believe the opinion and opinion is not
factually well-grounded.");
In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
9 F.3d 259, 266 (2d Cir.1993)
(acknowledging opinions or belief may be
actionable pursuant to Virginia
Bankshares).
In line with Virginia
Bankshares, plaintiffs allege that "(1)
defendants did not actually believe that the
merger would obtain regulatory approval; (2)
there was no reasonable basis for
defendants' statements that they "expected"
regulatory approval ...; and (3) defendants
were aware of facts both before and during
the Class Period tending to seriously
undermine the accuracy of their positive
reassurances. ..." (Pls. Response at 3).
While the court agrees that opinions or
beliefs may be actionable, the subject
matter of such opinion based statements must
first be material. As enumerated earlier,
the first element of a § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5
claim is a material misstatement.
Whether a statement was false is
inconsequential if the subject matter of the
statement is immaterial. See Basic,
485 U.S. at 238, 108 S.Ct. 978 ("[I]n order
to prevail on a Rule 10b-5 claim, a
plaintiff must show that the statements were
misleading as to a material
fact. It is not enough that a statement is
false or incomplete, if the misrepresented
fact is otherwise insignificant.") (emphasis
in original). In other words, unless the
defendants' professed optimism concerned a
material fact, merely alleging that
defendants did not believe their words of
confidence or that such confidence lacked
any reasonable basis is not sufficient to
state a § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 claim.
See Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82
F.3d 1194, 1217 (1st Cir.1996) ("[N]ot
every unfulfilled expression of corporate
optimism, even if characterized as
misstatement, can give rise to a genuine
issue of materiality under the securities
laws ...."), superseded by statute as
stated
Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc.,
194 F.3d 185 (1st Cir.1999). The
viability of plaintiffs' claim, therefore,
turns primarily on the issue of materiality.
2. Materiality Defined
The definition of materiality in
the context of securities litigation has
long been established. "A statement or
omission is only material if a reasonable
investor would consider it important in
determining whether to buy or sell stock."
Grossman, 120 F.3d at 1119 (citing
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438, 449, 96 S.Ct. 2126, 48 L.Ed.2d
757 (1976); Basic, 485 U.S. at
231-32, 108 S.Ct. 978). However, "[w]hether
information is material also depends on
other information already available to the
market; unless the statement `significantly
altered the total mix of information'
available, it will not be considered
material." Id. (quoting TSC
Indus., 426 U.S. at 449, 96 S.Ct. 2126).
In the context of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, the court is reminded that
materiality is a mixed question of law and
fact and ordinarily should be reserved for
the trier of fact.
Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1375
(9th Cir.1994) (stating that
"materiality" is a "fact-specific issue
which should ordinarily be left to the trier
of fact"). Only if defendants' statements
are obviously immaterial may the court grant
Page 1216
defendants' request for dismissal.
In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.,
7 F.3d 357, 369 n. 13 (3d Cir.1993). In
asserting that their statements of optimism
fail to satisfy the materiality threshold,
defendants offer several distinct but
interrelated arguments: (1) that their
statements represent immaterial corporate
optimism; and (2) that their statements or
alleged omissions were immaterial because
they failed to alter the "total mix" of
information available. The court will now
address these two related issues.
3. Corporate Optimism and the
"Total Mix" of Available Information
As described by the Tenth
Circuit, "[s]tatements classified as
`corporate optimism' or `mere puffing' are
typically forward-looking statements, or are
generalized statements of optimism that are
not capable of objective verification."
Grossman, 120 F.3d at 1119. Furthermore,
these "[v]ague, optimistic statements are
not actionable because reasonable investors
do not rely on them in making investment
decisions." Id.;
Raab v. Gen. Physics Corp.,
4 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir.1993)
("Analysts and arbitrageurs rely on facts in
determining the value of a security, not
mere expressions of optimism from company
spokesmen."). As the Grossman opinion
makes clear, statements of sales puffery do
not support a Rule 10b-5 claim because of
their inability to influence reasonable
investors not because of their inherent
optimistic nature. See also id.
("`Soft,' `puffing' statements ... generally
lack materiality because the market price of
a share is not inflated by vague statements
predicting growth.").
Federal courts weighing this
issue have found a wide array of statements
to be immaterial sales puffing. See,
e.g., Grossman, 120 F.3d at 1119-20
(company "had experienced `substantial
success;'" "merger presented a `compelling
set of opportunities' for the company;" and
company "`expects that network applications
will quickly reshape customer
expectations'"); Shaw, 82 F.3d at
1219 ("company `going reasonably well;'"
"company was `basically on track;'" and
defendant "was `confident that [company] was
pursuing the right strategy'"); Raab,
4 F.3d at 289 ("regulatory changes ... have
created a marketplace for the [company] with
an expected annual growth rate of 10% to 30%
over the next several years" and "the
[company] is poised to carry the growth and
success of 1991 well into the future");
In re Sun Healthcare Group, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 181 F.Supp.2d 1283, 1291
(D.N.M.2002) ("[the company] is well
positioned to thrive ..." and "`[w]e think
[the product] will give the company a unique
competitive advantage'");
Kas v. First Union Corp., 857 F.Supp.
481, 490 (E.D.Va.1994) ("defendants had
`agreed to use best efforts' to consummate
the merger").
On the other hand, several courts
have found statements of optimism uttered by
company insiders actionable under § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. See, e.g.,
Warshaw v. Xoma Corp.,
74 F.3d 955, 959-60 (9th Cir. 1996)
(regarding an on going application to the
FDA, defendants stated "we are encouraged by
the progress FDA is making in its review ...
[w]hen the trials are combined, we believe
the safety and effectiveness of E5 is
clearly demonstrated");
Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078,
1081 (9th Cir.1995) (company stating it
"anticipates a continuation of its
accelerated expansion schedule"); In re
Honeywell Int'l Inc. Sec. Litig., 182 F.
Supp 2d 414, 425-26 (D.N.J. 2002) (denying
motion to dismiss in case involving
statements described by the defendants as
merely "misguided optimism");
In re 2TheMart.com, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
114 F.Supp.2d 955, 961-62 (C.D.Cal.2000)
(defendants' "statements represented that
the web site was in `development,' that
[defendants] `expected' to have the web site
up
Page 1217
and running by the end of the second
quarter").
There is no bright-line test for
determining when an optimistic statement
crosses the line between immaterial puffery
and material misstatement. However, the
court has discerned several key factors for
consideration.
First, there is a distinction
between optimistic "spin" of presently
verifiable facts and optimistic forecasts of
future events. As a general rule, optimistic
opinions or beliefs regarding actual past or
present facts are more likely material than
statements couched as optimistic
predictions.
Malone v. Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d
471, 479 (4th Cir.1994) ("Misstatements
or omissions regarding actual past or
present facts are far more likely to
be actionable than statements regarding
projections of future performance.")
(emphasis in original); Raab, 4 F.3d
at 290 ("[W]e recognize that expressions of
belief or opinion concerning current
facts may be material. We do not believe,
however, that this materiality extends so
easily to opinions on uncertain future
events.") (emphasis in original) (internal
citation omitted).
The justification for this
general rule lies within the definition of
materiality itself, namely, whether a
"reasonable" investor would consider such
information important. TSC Indus.,
426 U.S. at 449, 96 S.Ct. 2126. As the
Grossman court noted, material
statements, as compared to immaterial
puffery, "could have and should have ...
some basis in objective and verifiable
fact." 120 F.3d at 1123. Opinions offered as
to uncertain outcomes are, by their very
nature, generally unverifiable by reasonable
investors. Unverifiable information
disseminated to the market bears little
materiality because reasonable investors do
not rely on such information. See id.
at 1122-23 ("These are the sort of soft,
puffing statements, incapable of
objective verification, the courts
routinely dismiss as vague statements of
corporate optimism.") (emphasis added);
In re Sun Healthcare Group, Inc., 181
F.Supp.2d at 1291 (finding statements
immaterial because, in part, "[i]t would be
impossible to objectively verify such soft
statements that merely convey the subjective
assertions of the speaker").
Second, the materiality of
optimistic statements should be closely
scrutinized when the § 10(b) and Rule 10b 5
claim at issue is premised on a "fraud on
the market" theory of liability. As the
First Circuit noted:
Review of vaguely optimistic
statements for immateriality as a matter of
law may be especially robust in cases
involving a fraud-on-the-market theory of
liability. In such cases, the statements
identified by plaintiffs as actionably
misleading are alleged to have caused
injury, if at all, not through the
plaintiffs' direct reliance upon them, but
by dint of the statements' inflating effect
on the market price of the security
purchased.
Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1218. The
Shaw court went on to state that a
"fraud on the market" claim "can draw no
sustenance from allegations that defendants
made overly-optimistic statements if those
statements are ones that any reasonable
investor (ergo, the market) would easily
recognize as nothing more than a kind of
self-directed corporate puffery." Id.
Third, as with any alleged
misstatement, an optimistic statement's
materiality must be adjudged in light of the
"total mix" of information available to the
market. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449,
96 S.Ct. 2126. In the majority of the cases
wherein courts have found optimistic
projections actionable, the courts also have
found accompanying ommissions of material
fact. For example, in Warshaw, a case
heavily relied upon by plaintiffs, the
defendant corporation was seeking FDA
approval
Page 1218
for one of its pharmaceutical products.
74 F.3d at 957. Before the FDA officially
released its decision, the defendants made
several statements assuring the market that
FDA approval was "imminent." Id. In
fact, as negative indications concerning
approval entered the market, the defendants
responded with optimistic forecasts. Id.
at 958. In the end, the FDA denied approval
of the drug. Id. Within their federal
securities claim, the plaintiffs alleged the
defendants "manipulated the market by
intentionally issuing ... false and
misleading representations...." Id.
at 958. In reversing the district court's
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, the Ninth Circuit
held:
The Complaint alleges that
[defendants'] optimistic statements about
[the drug], when taken in context, were
designed to prevent shareholder flight in
the aftermath of a damaging report regarding
the possible hazards of [the drug] and the
unlikelihood of FDA approval. These
optimistic statements allegedly contravened
the unflattering facts in [the defendants']
possession. On these facts, we believe
the Complaint alleged a sufficient basis for
a claim under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Id. at 959-60 (emphasis
added).
The "unflattering facts" alluded
to by the Warshaw court were based on
internal clinical studies performed by the
defendants, which revealed that the drug
"might not work and would never be approved
by the FDA." Id. at 959. The
plaintiffs in Warshaw alleged the
existence of the clinical studies as well as
the defendants' subsequent failure to
disclose the studies' results. Id. at
958. Due to the materiality of the omitted
information, the optimistic statements were
much more likely themselves to be material.
In other words, if investors had been fully
aware of the negative clinical studies, the
market could better have weighed the value
of the corporate insiders' statements, and
the securities would have been appropriately
priced. The court interprets the Warshaw
opinion as turning on this integral fact of
nondisclosure.
In reaching its conclusion in
Warshaw, the Ninth Circuit cited
extensively to its earlier opinion in
Fecht. In Fecht, also a § 10(b)
and Rule 10b 5 case, the plaintiffs alleged
the defendants "intentionally misrepresented
the financial condition of the Company, in
particular its expansion program's prospects
for enhancing the Company's earnings." 70
F.3d at 1080. The defendants had issued
numerous optimistic statements regarding its
business expansion, including a report
stating that they "anticipate[d] a
continuation of its accelerated expansion
schedule." Id. at 1081. The Fecht
complaint also included a list of material
information known, but undisclosed, by the
defendants, which strongly indicated the
expansion program's negative performance.
Id. at 1081 n. 2. In again reversing the
district court's dismissal, the Ninth
Circuit found:
The cautionary statements cited
by the district court, when considered
against the backdrop of the allegations [of
known but undisclosed adverse information]
allegations which at this stage we must
accept as true do not `so obviously'
render the challenged public documents not
misleading as to permit adequacy of the
disclosure to be determined as a matter of
law.
Id. at 1081 (internal
citation omitted). Once again, the Ninth
Circuit concluded the optimistic statements
in Fecht were actionable, in part,
because of the materiality of the
nondisclosed information undermining the
truth of the statements.5
Page 1219
With these factors established,
the court now turns to the statements and
omissions at issue in the present case.
Initially, the court notes that, without
question, defendants' statements of optimism
regarding the regulators' approval are
predictive in nature. Each statement
expresses "confidence" about or an
"expectation" of the outcome regarding an
uncertain proceeding. As such, the
statements would appear to fall outside the
normal spectrum of material statements under
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
In re PLC Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig.,
41 F.Supp.2d 106, 118 (D.Mass.1999) ("Mere
expressions of hope or expectation regarding
future approval, not worded as guarantees,
are not actionable.");
Kas v. First Union Corp., 857 F.Supp.
481, 490 (E.D.Va.1994) ("Because
defendants' statements were no more than
`expressions of optimism' about the future
consummation of the merger, they were not
actionable under Sec 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.").
However, to grant dismissal at this stage in
the proceedings, the court must be convinced
that the market could "easily" determine the
statements at issue to be nothing more than
immaterial puffery. Shaw, 82 F.3d at
1218.
Reviewing the "total mix" of
available information, the court finds that
the Complaint alleges three instances of
material omissions. (Complaint 85-87).
The first allegation of material
non-disclosure is the meetings and
communications throughout April of 2000
between officials from both companies and
DOJ authorities. (Complaint 85). According
to plaintiffs, at these meetings, both
companies were informed that the DOJ was
unlikely to approve of the merger.6
(Complaint 85). The Complaint alleges this
information was not disclosed. The second
instance of nondisclosure alleged by
plaintiffs is that both companies were
informed on April 19, 2000, nine days before
the shareholders' vote, that the FCC was
suspending its investigation into the merger
until further documentation was provided by
the companies. (Complaint 86) (stating FCC
suspended its 180-day investigation at day
seventy-five). According to the Complaint,
the decision to suspend the investigation
represented "an extremely negative
development," which the defendants failed to
disclose. (Complaint 86). Thirdly,
plaintiffs assert that on April 26, 2000,
the EC informed both companies of its
"serious concerns" regarding the merger,
which the defendants also failed to
disclose. (Complaint 87). Although aware
of this adverse information, the defendants
continued their release of optimistic
statements.
In line with Warshaw and
the cases discussed above, the court finds
the release of the above information,
especially the FCC's decision to suspend its
investigation, would have been seen by a
reasonable investor as significantly
altering the "total mix" of available
information. Although the market was aware
of the possibility
Page 1220
of regulatory opposition, the court finds
that the FCC's decision significantly
elevated the risk from threatened opposition
of the merger to preliminary blockage. In
light of such material omissions, the
defendants' optimistic statements reassuring
the market bear a stronger degree of
materiality.
In response, the Sprint
defendants draw the court's attention to
authority holding first, that a company is
under no duty to update a forward-looking
statement and second, that a company need
not update investors on the advance of
regulatory proceedings. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u 5(d) ("Nothing in this section shall
impose upon any person a duty to update a
forward-looking statement.");
Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d
1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Once a
utility has informed investors that it is
involved in a regulatory proceeding, it has
no affirmative duty to provide investors
with a further summary of the regulatory
process.") (quoting
Sailors v. N. States Power Co., 4
F.3d 610, 612 (8th Cir.1993)). The court
is unpersuaded. By voluntarily choosing to
speak about the merger's viability, the
defendants were under a duty to be honest
and forthright. Helwig, 251 F.3d at
562 ("With regard to future events,
uncertain figures, and other so-called soft
information, a company may choose silence or
speech elaborated by the factual basis as
then known-but it may not choose
half-truths.").
Significantly, the only material
omissions alleged in the Complaint occurred
well after the majority of the statements at
issue were uttered by the Sprint defendants.
The court therefore grants Sprint
defendants' motion in part. Those optimistic
statements occurring prior to April of 2000
are deemed to be immaterial as a matter of
law. These statements were predictive in
nature, and the court finds, based on the
"total mix" of information available at the
time they were made, an investor could
"easily" have recognized the statements as
merely puffing. The Complaint contains no
facts supporting plaintiffs' allegation
that, prior to April of 2000, the defendants
"knew" regulatory approval was not possible.
According to the facts alleged in the
Complaint, up to April of 2000, the
defendants knew what the market knew, namely
that regulators were going to be highly
critical of any such merger. Put succinctly,
prior to April of 2000, the Complaint fails
to allege any secret or otherwise unknown
information, which, if released by the
defendants, would have significantly altered
the "total mix" of available information.
See Wells v. Monarch Capital Corp.,
129 F.3d 1253 (1st Cir.1997) (affirming
district court's finding that alleged
misstatements of opinion were immaterial
because other public filings fully disclosed
the true nature of the underlying business
concern). Therefore, the court grants the
Sprint defendants' motions to dismiss as to
the statements contained in the following
paragraphs of the Complaint: 44, 46-49,
51, 52, 54, 57-58, 65, 66, 69, 71,72, and
76-81.
However, after April of 2000, the
Sprint defendants were in possession of
information, which, if released,7
would have altered the "total mix" of
available information. The court is unable
to conclude that the Sprint defendants'
nondisclosure of this information and their
optimistic statements predicting regulatory
approval were "obviously" immaterial.
Accordingly, the Sprint defendants'
optimistic statements and omissions which
the court will consider in the remainder of
this opinion are contained
Page 1221
in the following paragraphs of the
Complaint: 85-87 and 93-95.
Bespeaks Caution and the
PSLRA's Safe Harbor
Sprint defendants further assert
their optimistic statements made throughout
the class period were immaterial due to the
operation of the judicially crafted
"bespeaks caution" doctrine and the
legislatively drafted safe harbor provision
of the PSLRA.
Bespeaks Caution
In Grossman, the Tenth
Circuit specifically recognized the
"bespeaks caution" doctrine. 120 F.3d at
1121. The Grossman court identified
the doctrine as follows:
Forward-looking representations
are also considered immaterial when the
defendant has provided the investing public
with sufficiently specific risk disclosures
or other cautionary statements concerning
the subject matter of the statements at
issue to nullify any potential misleading
effect. This doctrine, which is called the
"bespeaks caution" doctrine, "provides a
mechanism by which a court can rule as a
matter of law (typically in a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action or a motion for summary judgment)
that defendants' forward-looking
representations contained enough cautionary
language or risk disclosure to protect the
defendant against claims of securities
fraud." However, not every risk disclosure
will be sufficient to immunize statements
relating to the disclosure, rather "the
cautionary statements must be substantive
and tailored to the specific future
projections, estimates or opinions ... which
the plaintiffs challenge."
Id. (quoting
In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig.,
35 F.3d 1407, 1413 (9th Cir.1994);
In re Donald Trump Sec. Litig., 7
F.3d at 371). The "bespeaks caution"
doctrine applies only to forward-looking
statements as compared to the "speakers'
beliefs concerning then-present factual
conditions." Id. at 1123.
The Sprint defendants direct the
court's attention to the Joint Proxy, which
contains certain warnings discussing the
risks associated with the completion of the
merger. (Complaint 73). The Sprint
defendants assert these warnings
sufficiently disclosed the risks involved.
Plaintiffs offer several arguments for why
the doctrine fails to immunize the Sprint
defendants.
First, plaintiffs argue the
statements at issue in this case, while
facially appearing to be forward-looking,
are in fact "statements of what [the Sprint
defendants] currently believe based upon
information at their disposal at the time
the statement is made." (Pls. Response at
35). The court disagrees. The defendants'
optimistic statements were clearly
predictive in nature, because the subject
matter of the speculative statements was
uncertain. If the court were to accept
plaintiffs' position, then all predictions
would necessarily fall outside the scope of
the doctrine.
Plaintiffs next assert the
disclosures contained in the Joint Proxy
were insufficient to immunize the Sprint
defendants' misleading optimistic
statements. As a starting point, the court
recognizes that "the mere presence of some
cautionary language does not in and of
itself neutralize untrue or misleading
statements as a matter of law."
In re Synergen, Inc. Sec. Litig., 863
F.Supp. 1409, 1415 (D.Colo. 1994). As
for temporal proximity,8
the
Page 1222
Tenth Circuit has made clear that the
cautionary disclosures need not be contained
in the same document or uttered in the same
statement to adequately "bespeak caution."
Grossman, 120 F.3d at 1122-23.
However, "[r]emote cautions are less likely
effectively to qualify predictions contained
in separate statements." Id. at 1123.
In addition, it is appropriate for the court
to consider the formality by which the
disclosures are dispersed to the market as
compared to how the misstatements were
disseminated. Id. Finally, "the
inclusion of general cautionary language
regarding a prediction would not excuse the
alleged failure to reveal known material,
adverse facts."
Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160,
171 (5th Cir.1994). See also Gabriel
Capital,
L.P. v. NatWest Fin., Inc.,
122 F.Supp.2d 407, 419 (S.D.N.Y.2000)
("The `bespeaks caution' doctrine, however,
does not apply where a defendant knew that
its statement was false when made.").
In light of these general
guidelines, the court finds that, as to the
three omissions discussed above, (Complaint
85-87), the court finds the "bespeaks
caution" doctrine to be inapplicable. As to
the remaining optimistic statements,
(Complaint 87 and 93-95), the court is
unable to determine, as a matter of law,
that the risk disclosures contained in the
Joint Proxy sufficiently nullified any
misleading effect. The Joint Proxy was
issued approximately seven weeks before the
first optimistic statement at issue.
Although the court recognizes the formal
nature of the Joint Proxy, the significant
time lapse weighs against operation of the
doctrine. Additionally, in light of the
Sprint defendants' alleged omission of the
FCC's decision to suspend its investigation,
merely warning the market that FCC
opposition "may jeopardize or delay
completion of the merger" fails to convince
the court that all possible risks were
adequately disclosed. Dismissal pursuant to
the bespeaks cation doctrine is not
appropriate.
PSLRA's Safe Harbor
Under the PSLRA, Congress
provided a "safe harbor" for certain
forward-looking statements by immunizing the
speaker from liability if the following
criteria are met: (1) the forward-looking
statement is "identified as a
forward-looking statement, and is
accompanied by meaningful cautionary
statements identifying important factors
that could cause actual results to differ
materially from those in the forward-looking
statement; or immaterial;" or (2) the
plaintiff fails to prove that the
forward-looking statement "if made by a
natural person, was made with actual
knowledge by that person that the statement
was false or misleading" or, if made by a
business entity, was "made by or with the
approval of an executive officer of that
entity; and made or approved by such officer
with actual knowledge by that officer that
the statement was false or misleading." 15
U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1).
Similar to the court's analysis
regarding the bespeaks caution doctrine, the
court concludes that the Sprint defendants
are not entitled to dismissal under the
PSLRA's safe harbor provision. The court
cannot say, as a matter of law, that the
actionable statements were "accompanied by
meaningful cautionary statements" since, as
the court already noted, the Joint Proxy was
issued approximately seven weeks before the
first optimistic statement at issue.
Moreover, in light of the omissions the
court has deemed material, the court
concludes that the Complaint adequately
pleads that the Sprint defendants
Page 1223
made statements that were, at least,
misleading. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
inappropriate on this issue.
5. Scienter
As previously discussed, the
PSLRA and Rule 9(b) require that all
elements of securities fraud be pled with
particularity. Specifically, a plaintiff
must plead with particularity facts
permitting a strong inference that the
defendants acted with fraudulent intent, or
scienter. The court already has determined
that the Complaint sufficiently alleges
material omissions and optimistic statements
(Complaint 85-87 and 93-95). The court
must therefore determine whether plaintiffs
have sufficiently pled scienter.
The PSLRA imposes strict pleading
requirements for scienter in securities
fraud cases. The PSLRA provides that in
securities fraud cases, "the complaint
shall, with respect to each act or omission
alleged to violate this chapter, state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind." 15 U.S.C. §
78u-4(b)(2). Thus, the PSLRA requires that
plaintiffs plead with particularity all
facts giving rise to a "strong inference"
that each defendant acted with scienter. A
district court, upon motion of the
defendant, "shall" dismiss any complaint
that does not meet this requirements. Id.
§ 78u-4(b)(3)(A).
The appropriate level of scienter
in securities fraud cases is "a mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud."
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 193 n. 12, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 47
L.Ed.2d 668 (1976). Recklessness, which is
sufficient to satisfy the scienter
requirement, is defined as "conduct that is
an extreme departure from the standards of
ordinary care, and which presents a danger
of misleading buyers or sellers that is
either known to the defendant or is so
obvious that the actor must have been aware
of it."
Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77
F.3d 1215, 1232 (10th Cir.1996).
Allegations of motive and opportunity are
typically not sufficient in themselves to
establish a strong inference of scienter.
Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1262. However,
allegations of motive and opportunity are
relevant to a finding of scienter and may
therefore be considered as part of the mix
of information. Id. at 1263. Thus, in
addition to motive and opportunity, the
court must examine plaintiffs' allegati |