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Page 444
201 N.E.2d 444
31 Ill.2d 297
George L. REILLY, Receiver of
Deerfield Lumber & Fuel Co.,
Inc., et al., Appellants,
v.
Edward F. SEGERT et al., Appellees.
Nos. 38367, 38372.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
Sept. 29, 1964.
Max Chill and Theodore D. Kahn,
Chicago (Max Chill and George D. Karcazes,
Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.
Altheimer, Gray, Naiburg,
Strasburger & Lawton, Chicago, and Runyard,
Behanna, Conzelman & Schultz, Waukegan (John
E. Schultz, Waukegan, and Howard L. Kastel,
Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.
[31 Ill.2d 298] SCHAEFER,
Justice.
Prior to the enactment of the
Business Corporation Act of 1933, it was
settled that a shareholder of a corporation
who sold his stock to the corporation while
it was insolvent was liable to an injured
creditor of the corporation for the amount
paid to the shareholder for his stock. (Singer
v. Hutchinson, 183 Ill. 606, 56 N.E. 388;
Johnson v. Canfield-Swigart Co., 292 Ill.
101, 126 N.E. 608.) This liability was
based upon the adverse effect of the
transaction upon creditors, and not upon the
guilt or innocence of the shareholder, who
was held liable even though there was no
evidence of fraud. (Clapp
v. Peterson, 104 Ill. 26, 31.) The
question for decision in this case is
whether or not this liability was repealed
by section 42 of the Business Corporation
Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, chap. 32, par.
157.-42.) The circuit court of Lake County
held that it was, the Appellate Court
affirmed (44 Ill.App.2d 343, 194 N.E.2d
544), and we allowed leave to appeal.
The plaintiffs are George L.
Reilly, the receiver of Deerfield Lumber &
Fuel Co., Inc. and three creditors of that
company. The defendants are the directors of
the company and five shareholders. The
complaint alleged that the directors
authorized purchases of stock from the
defendant shareholders at a time when the
corporation was insolvent and had no earned
surplus. The directors defaulted, and
judgments were entered against them for the
amounts paid to the defendant shareholders
for their stock. No appeal was taken from
the judgments so entered, and we are not
concerned with them.
Those counts of the complaint,
however, that asserted liability against the
defendant shareholders, were dismissed upon
motion, and final judgments were entered
Page 445
against the plaintiffs on those counts. The
judgments thus entered were based upon the
proposition that section 42 of the Business
Corporation Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, chap.
32, par. [31 Ill.2d 299] 157.42) affords the
only remedy available, and that it does not
authorize an action directly against
shareholders.
The portions of section 42 that
are relied upon to support the judgment are
as follows:
'In addition to any other
liabilities imposed by law upon directors of
a corporation:
'(a) Directors of a corporation
who vote for or assent to the declaration of
any dividend or other distribution of the
assets of a corporation to its shareholders
shall be jointly and severally liable to the
corporation for the amount of such dividend
which is paid or the value of such assets
which are distributed if, at the time of
such payment or distribution, the
corporation is insolvent or its net assets
are less than its stated capital.
'(b) The directors of a
corporation who vote for or assent to the
declaration of any dividend or other
distribution of assets of a corporation to
its shareholders which renders the
corporation insolvent or reduces its net
assets below its stated capital shall be
jointly and severally liable to the
corporation for the amount of such dividend
which is paid or the value of such assets
which are distributed, to the extent that
the corporation is thereby rendered
insolvent or its net assets are reduced
below its stated capital.
'Any director against whom a
claim shall be asserted under or pursuant to
this section for the improper declaration of
a dividend or other distribution of assets
of a corporation and who shall be held
liable thereon, shall be entitled to
contribution from the shareholders who
knowingly accepted or received any such
dividend or assets, in proportion to the
amounts received by them respectively.'
In our opinion section 42 does
not preclude this action against the
shareholders. Even as to the liability of
directors, its language makes it clear that
it was not designed to provide an exclusive
remedy, for the liability with which it [31
Ill.2d 300] deals are expressly stated to be
'(i)n addition to any other liabilities
imposed by law upon directors of a
corporation.' In the absence of this
specific disclaimer, the result would be the
same. 'Where a liability is imposed upon an
officer of (sic) a director by a state
statute, his common-law liability for
misfeasance and negligence in the
performance of his duties is not thereby
excluded.' 3 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of
Corporations, sec. 993.
In this case, moreover, we are
concerned with the direct liability of
shareholders, a subject with which section
42 does not purport to deal. The existence
of a statutory provision dealing with the
liability of directors does not preclude a
non-statutory liability on the part of
shareholders.
When Clapp v. Peterson, 104 Ill. 26, and
other decisions dealing with the liability
here asserted were decided, statutes which
provided specific liabilities for particular
misconduct of directors were in effect. Yet
those provisions of the Corporation Act of
1872 and the General Corporation Act of 1919
did not bar the creditor's common law action
against shareholders who sold their stock to
the corporation while it was insolvent.
A further word is appropriate to
prevent misapprehension as to our
understanding of section 42. Both parties
appear to have assumed that the section
applies to purchases by a corporation of its
own stock at a time when the corporation is
insolvent, and we have dealt with the case
on that assumption. The section does not,
however, expressly mention such
transactions, and it can apply to them only
if a 'distribution' of assets is construed
to include payment by the corporation to a
shareholder for his stock. From the language
of section 42 it seems likely that it
pertains to outright distributions of
corporate assets to all shareholders, by
dividend or otherwise, and questionable
Page 446
whether it includes as a corporate
'distribution' a corporation's purchase of
its stock from a particular shareholder.
That question has not been argued, however,
and we express[31 Ill.2d 301] no opinion
concerning it.
Precision Extrusions, Inc. v. Stewart, 36
Ill.App.2d 30, 43, 183 N.E.2d 547.
The judgment of the Appellate
Court is reversed, and the cause is remanded
to the circuit court of Lake County for
further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
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