| Page 167 173 A.2d 167  40 Del.Ch. 36 Aida ABELOW et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
Gardner SYMONDS, Midstates Oil Corporation,
a Delaware
Corporation, Middle States Petroleum
Corporation, a Delaware
Corporation, Tennessee Gas Transmission
Company, a Delaware
Corporation, et al., Defendants.
Court of Chancery of Delaware, New
Castle County. July 28, 1961. Daniel O. Hastings and Russell J.
Willard, Jr., of Hastings, Lynch & Taylor,
Wilmington, for plaintiffs.
[40 Del.Ch. 37] Henry M. Canby
and E. Norman Veasey of Richards, Layton &
Finger, Wilmington, for corporate
defendants.
MARVEL, Vice Chancellor.
Aida Abelow and Helen G. Hamburg
as stockholders of Midstates Oil Corporation
instituted this suit on December 29, 1958
for the purpose of enjoining a proposed sale
of all of the assets of such corporation to
its parent corporation, Middle States
Petroleum Corporation, pursuant to a
contract which by its terms was to be
consummated on or before January 1, 1959.
While a motion for an order restraining the
consummation of such proposed sale was
denied on December 29, 1958, a hortatory
rule simultaneously issued directing
Midstates to show cause why consummation of
the proposed sale should not be enjoined.
However, the interested parties defendant
proceeded as planned, and after the sale was
carried through the net assets of Midstates
Page 168 reduced to cash were speedily made available
to its stockholders including plaintiffs.
Thereafter the case was dismissed
inasmuch as the sole relief originally
sought by plaintiffs had been the enjoining
of a transaction which had since been
consummated. Leave to amend having been
reasonably sought, plaintiffs were granted a
limited time for taking appropriate action
under Rule 15, Del.C.Ann. and thereafter
prepared and filed several motions to which
were attached proposed amendatory and
supplemental pleadings in which additional
parties plaintiff were named. Plaintiffs'
case as redesigned in their revised
pleadings was no longer conceived of as a
derivative suit brought for the benefit of
their corporation but rather as an action of
individual stockholders to recover personal
money judgments for themselves and other
members of their class, Lebold v. Inland
Steel Co., 7 Cir., 125 F.2d 369. Their
motions were granted after argument, and in
conformity with the Court's opinion of
November 25, 1959, Del.Ch., 156 A.2d 416, an
order was entered on January 13, 1960
granting leave to plaintiffs to file their
proposed amendments and supplements to the
original complaint.
Midstates and Tennessee Gas
Transmission Company thereupon filed their
answers. Midstates denied plaintiffs' broad
allegation that the boards of Midstates and
Middle States were made up [40 Del.Ch. 38]
of the same or interlocking directors at any
time from 1930 until Midstates' dissolution
but conceded that one, and at times, two
directors served on both boards. It also
admitted that at the time of Midstates'
dissolution there were outstanding
22,175.6525 shares of its common stock of
which 21,270.685 shares or approximately
95.93% were owned by Middle States, leaving
outstanding in the hands of others 904.9675
shares or approximately 4.07% of its shares
outstanding. Midstates also admitted that
Middle States had on December 5, 1958
offered to buy the assets and properties of
Midstates and that on June 20, 1958,
Tennessee Gas had offered to exchange
1,084,054 shares of its own stock for the
then outstanding shares of Middle States,
said stock having at that time a market
value of $30,859,539. It was further
admitted that as a result of this latter
proposal Tennessee Gas stock was exchanged
for approximately 93% of the outstanding
shares of Middle States, a percentage which
by August 8, 1958 had resulted in 95.75% of
the stock of Middle States being deposited
with Tennessee Gas. These allegations were
also set forth in the answer of the latter
corporation filed the same date, and the
case moved into the pre-trial discovery
stage.
On August 18, 1960, plaintiffs
moved for summary judgment, supporting such
motion with an affidavit of one of their
counsel, Daniel O. Hastings, to which were
attached numerous exhibits. Countering such
motion, the corporate defendants also moved
for summary judgment, a motion which they in
turn supported with a number of counter
affidavits. Briefs having been thereafter
filed and argument had, such opposing
motions for summary judgment are now before
the court for decision.
While plaintiffs concede that §
271, Title 8 Del.C. permits a Delaware
corporation to sell its assets in a proper
case, they contend that in the transaction
here under attack they and others of their
class have not received an adequate sum of
money for their shares in liquidation,
having suffered such injury as a result of
actionable breaches of fiduciary duty on the
part of directors common to the boards of
Middle States and Midstates as well as on
the part of the stockholder in control of
Midstates, namely Middle States, which at
the time of the sale owned 95.93% of the
corporate stock of Midstates. [40 Del.Ch.
39] Plaintiffs argue that the directors of
each such corporation, who though named as
parties to this suit have not appeared, as
well as Middle States as the controlling
stockholder of Midstates owed a high degree
of fiduciary duty to plaintiffs and their
class not to profit at the expense of
plaintiffs and other minority stockholders
of Midstates in the transaction
Page 169 under attack, and accordingly the Court must
scrutinize such transactions with great
care. Plaintiffs insist that as a result of
the disregard of the rights of the minority
stockholders of Midstates by those in
control of the transactions under attack the
assets of such corporation were unfairly
acquired by Middle States for the benefit of
Tennessee Gas. They claim that the record
discloses that plaintiffs and others of
their class have not received what they are
clearly entitled to, namely amounts in
liquidation equivalent to what the
stockholders of Middle States received in
the overall transaction which culminated in
the merger of Middle States into Tennessee
Gas Transmission Company. Plaintiffs claim
this deficiency in payment to be the sum of
$733.36 per share, pointing out that the
unfairness of the treatment accorded them
and their class is demonstrated by a cursory
consideration of the price indirectly placed
by Tennessee Gas Transmission Company on the
assets of Midstates at the time a purchaser
for such assets was being sought in the
summer of 1958. In conclusion, plaintiffs
contend that in the final analysis Tennessee
Gas through its subsidiary, Middle States,
owed the same type of fiduciary duty to
plaintiffs and members of their class as was
owed to them by Middle States.
The appearing defendants reply
that while the price for the Middle States
shares set in the exchange transaction is
irrelevant to plaintiffs' claims, the same
ratio applied to a hypothetical
contemporaneous exchange of the shares of
Tennessee Gas and Midstates would have
netted the stockholders of Midstates less
than they actually received on their
corporation's liquidation. They further
contend that the only way in which Tennessee
Gas could be successfully charged with
having improperly benefited itself through
its instrumentality, Middle States, would
have been to have caused such corporation to
pay less for the assets of Midstates than
they were worth, a result which such
defendants contend [40 Del.Ch. 40] was
carefully avoided. They submit that the data
introduced by them in affidavit from
discloses that on December 9, 1958, the date
of the actual contract governing the basic
transaction under attack, the book value of
plaintiffs' stock was $802 per share, that
the going concern value per share was then
$913 per share, the market value per share
was $1,065.00 and the asset value per share
based on the Harrison appraisal was
$1,123.76. According to the corporate
defendants, plaintiffs have offered no
probative data to the contrary, allegedly
resting their case on epithets and the
unfounded accertion that they are entitled
to an amount computed on the theory that the
offer to exchange stock of Tennessee for
that of Middle States must be considered to
be the equivalent of a firm bid for the
assets of Midstates. It is argued that the
two separate transactions which preceded the
dissolution of Midstates can't be equated,
stock valuation being essentially foreign to
asset valuation or going concern valuation
and that even if the values involved in the
two transactions could be fairly equated,
Middle States had property other than the
stock of its subsidiary which Tennessee
wished to acquire. It is also pointed out
that the arrangement whereby the stock of
Tennessee Gas and Middle States was
exchanged avoided the expenses of an
underwriting and the market hazards which
would have been faced had the device of a
stock issue been employed rather than that
of an exchange. It is finally urged that the
Middle States offer for the assets of
Midstates was based on values fixed in the
so-called independent Harrison appraisal,
hereinafter referred to, which allegedly
corrected overestimates of reserves found in
the earlier Kravis report which had been
made at the request of Midstates. The
appearing defendants conclude that
plaintiffs merely differ with the judgment
of the individuals responsible for the steps
which resulted in the dissolution of their
corporation and that absent fraud or a
showing that the amount received for their
corporation's assets was grossly
disproportionate to their value, plaintiffs
have
Page 170 no standing under Delaware law to demand
that they be paid more than the amounts
already paid to them following the
liquidation of Midstates.
Turning now to the complicated
corporate changes here involved, it is
alleged by the corporate defendants that
they had their genesis [40 Del.Ch. 41] in
discussions designed to arrive at a plan for
counteracting a declining profit trend in
the business of Middle States. The directors
of Middle States preliminarily decided in
1957 to dispose of certain assets of
Midstates in order to raise needed cash.
This having been accomplished, a more
critical remedial step was decided on in the
spring of 1958, namely a plan either to sell
the assets of Middle States or to cause such
corporation to enter into a merger
agreement. The services of Dillon, Read &
Co., Inc., were engaged to seek out
appropriate opportunities and to make
recommendations and a number of offers were
received, the most attractive in the opinion
of the Middle States directors being that of
Tennessee Gas to trade its stock for that of
Middle States on the basis of .45 to 1. A
tender ensued, and by July 30, 1958
Tennessee Gas had acquired 93% of the stock
of Middle States and had installed directors
of its choice on the board of the latter
corporation as well as on the board of
Midstates which the avowed purpose in mind
of ultimately dissolving or otherwise
absorbing the assets of both Midstates and
Middle States.
Meanwhile the directors of Middle
States decided to offer to purchase the
assets of Midstates and the services of the
firm of Robert W. Harrison and Co. were
engaged to make an appraisal of the latter's
assets. On the basis of the value set in
such approaisal Middle States offered to
purchase the assets of Midstates for the sum
of $24,970,000 and to assume the liabilities
of such company. Such offer was accepted and
thereafter approved by the stockholders of
Midstates. At the time of such acceptance
and approval not only had a complete slate
of directors of the selling and buying
corporations been put into office by
Tennessee Gas but the buying corporation was
also the owner of almost 96% of the selling
corporation's stock. However, Middle States
and Tennessee Gas were independent of each
other at the time of the earlier exchange of
stock between them and the exchange was
clearly one between individual stockholders.
To be sure, such action on the part of the
stockholders of Middle States was taken on
the recommendation of their corporate
president, nonetheless it was, as just
noted, a transaction between individual
stockholders and not between the
corporations as such. The final step in the
emergence of Tennessee Gas as the [40
Del.Ch. 42] sole proprietor of what remains
of the assets of either Middle States or
Midstates and the disappearance of Middle
States as a corporate entity occurred in
mid-summer 1959 when it was merged into
Tennessee Gas.
The basic questions to be decided
are whether or not plaintiffs have been
actionably injured, and if so at whose
hands. The immediate question to be decided
is whether or not the issue of alleged
liability can be appropriately decided on
the pending motions. In dealing with these
questions I shall pass over plaintiffs'
contentions about lines of fiduciary duty
stemming from Tennessee Gas's controlling
position and turn preliminarily to the data
of record which is concerned with the value
of the assets of Midstates at the time of
their sale because if such assets are found
after careful scrutiny to have been sold for
a proper amount under Delaware law,
plaintiffs would appear to have no cause to
complain.
The basic position of the
corporate defendants is that under Delaware
law a sale of assets under § 271, Title 8,
Del.C. will withstand any stockholder
objection if it is made for a fair and
adequate price,
Allied Chemical & Dye Corporation v. Steel &
Tube Co., 14 Del.Ch. 1, 120 A. 486.
Defendants contend that the price offered
for the assets of Midstates, while based in
part on a study of accounting data prepared
by Arthur Anderson & Co., was
Page 171 basically derived from an independent survey
made by Robert W. Harrison, a well-known and
respected expert in appraising oil and gas
properties. It is pointed out that whereas
in the case of most industrial operations
the customary method of appraising assets
emphasizes capitalization of earnings, in
the petroleum industry valuation is
customarily arrived at in large part by
placing a dollar value on estimated reserves
of oil and gas. According to his affidavit,
Mr. Harrison made individual appraisals of
Midstates' twenty four major fields, a
project which allegedly required eighty five
man days to complete, and accepted the
Kravis figures as to scattered leasehold
interests after adjusting them to September
30, 1958.
After reducing the present
appraised worth of future net income of the
properties by twenty five to thirty per cent
in order to [40 Del.Ch. 43] arrive at the
fair market value of the reserves in
question, he fixed such value as of
September 30, 1958 at $24,000,000. Inasmuch
as no request had been made to appraise
undeveloped leaseholds of Midstates, such
properties were listed at book value, such
being the ordinary method of evaluating
underdeveloped leasehold and royalty
interests. A salvage value was also given to
well and lease equipment employed by
Midstates in its business.
Defendants argue, as noted
earlier, that plaintiffs rather than
directly attacking the objectivity and
fairness of the Harrison report stress the
cursory nature of the information given to
the stockholders of Midstates of the
proposed sale, the precipitate acceptance of
the $24,947,610 offer by the directors of
Midstates, and the fact that at the time of
the offr, which was formally tendered on
December 5, 1958, Tennessee Gas had
installed directors of its choice on the
boards of both the buyer and seller.
Indirectly the sale's figure is brought
under heavy attack by comparing it with two
other offers allegedly made for the assets
of Midstates either of which, according to
plaintiffs, if accepted would have netted
more for the Midstates stockholders than was
paid them in the transaction under attack.
Their principal contention is that one of
these offers, namely the Tennessee Gas
Transmission exchange proposal, when
translated into a fair price for the stock
of Midstates, clearly discloses that in May
of 1958 Tennessee Gas itself placed a
substantially higher price on the assets of
Midstates than it caused to be offered for
them in December of the same year. It is
argued, of course, that there has been no
showing that there was any appreciable
change in the value of the assets of
Midstates during the intervening months.
The difficulty with this
contention is that an offer to exchange
stock with the stockholders of an
independent corporation is not the same
thing as an offer to buy the assets of such
corporation's subsidiary after consummation
of the exchange. More specifically it has
been stated by this Court that:
'The worth of any testimony concerning
the selling price of shares of stock as a
safe reflection of the net value of the
corporate assets underlying the stock is of
extreme dubiousness. [40 Del.Ch. 44] This
was pointed out
Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube
Co., 14 Del.Ch. 1, 120 A. 486. See also
Bodell v. General Gas & Electric Co., supra
[15 Del.Ch. 119, 132 A. 442].'
Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 16 Del.Ch.
318, 147 A. 257, 262.
However, it is also settled law
in Delaware that when the price to be paid
in a sale of corporate assets case is under
attack, the question to be decided is what
is the value of such assets for sale
purposes, selling value having the quality,
according to the circumstances of the
particular transaction, of being more or
less than actual value. While the Harrison
affidavit is impressive, it is a
professional opinion and no more, the only
practical evidence of negotiations between a
willing 'buyer' and 'seller' being those
concerned with the
Page 172 stock of Middle States which the corporate
defendants say throw no relevant light on
the value of Midstates' assets in December
1958. The appearing defendants go on to
point out that in the case of
Gropper v. North Central Texas Oil Company,
35 Del.Ch. 198, 114 A.2d 231, the Court
relied in large part on expert appraisal
data in declining to enjoin a proposed sale
of assets. However, the sale here under
attack has long since been consummated and
the case is in a final hearing posture. In
view of what appears to me to be a bona fide
dispute as to value, which I feel cannot be
finally resolved on the present record, I
shall adopt the procedure followed by the
Chancellor after he preliminarily enjoined a
proposed sale of assets in Allied Chemical &
Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., supra.
Thereafter he caused testimony to be taken
on the issue of whether or not the price to
be paid was fair and adequate. I propose to
adopt a similar course of procedure, and
after a conference with counsel shall set a
hearing on the issue of the price herein
paid. Claims made by plaintiff as to what
was a fair value for the Midstates assets,
insofar as they are subject to being
properly established in an action such as
this, would, of course, be a matter for
consideration at such hearing.
In short, unless the corporate
defendants can prevail on some theory of
ratification or waiver, I see no way other
than a trial examination of the evidence to
reach a determination of whether or not the
price paid for the assets of Midstates can
withstand plaintiffs'[40 Del.Ch. 45] attack.
Such price will be judged in the light of
the peculiar facts of self-dealing inherent
in the transaction and the presumptions
flowing therefrom. To be sure summary
judgment was granted in an analogous
purchase of assets situation in Lewis v. Hat
Corporation of America, Del.Ch., 150 A.2d
750, but there the facts on valuation were
simple and not seriously challenged.
As to alleged ratification, I am
not satisfied that the vote of 302.108
minority shares of Midstates in favor of the
sale was on the present record effective,
knowledgeable ratification under Delaware
law. Finally, the receipt and retention by
plaintiffs and others of their class of the
liquidating dividends tendered on the
dissolution of Midstates does not estop them
from suing for the difference between the
tendered dividends and what they claim they
should have received had the assets of
Midstates been sold for a fair and adequate
price. See Opinion in this case of November
25, 1959, Del.Ch.,
156 A.2d 416 and Lebold
v. Inland Steel Co., supra.
On notice an order may be
submitted denying the pending motions for
summary judgment. |