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Page 559
130 A.2d 559
36 Del.Ch. 386
Matter of PLONEER DRILLING COMPANY,
Inc.
Court of Chancery of Delaware, New
Castle County.
April 1, 1957.
[36 Del.Ch. 387] William H.
Bennethum (of Morford & Bennethum),
Wilmington, for petitioner.
Hugh M. Morris, Alexander L.
Nichols, Andrew B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. (of
Morris, Steel, Nichols & Arsht), Wilmington,
Houston G. Williams and W. J. Wehrli,
Casper, Wyo., for Pioneer Drilling Co., Inc.
Page 560
SEITZ, Chancellor.
This is a petition by Ruth C.
Tschudin, ('petitioner') individually and as
an executrix of her husband's estate,
seeking a summary order under 8 Del.C. §
224, for the holding of a stockholders'
meeting to elect directors. In essence,
Pioneer Drilling Company, Inc.
('corporation') claims that petitioner is
estopped to request such relief because she
intentionally prevented the existence of a
quorum of stockholders at the annual meeting
by not attending and thus precluded the
election of directors.
At the time fixed for determining
those qualified to vote at the annual
meeting of stockholders called for April 18,
1956, the corporation had outstanding 1,000
shares of voting stock; 500 being in the
name of J. E. Burden, 300 in the name of
Walter G. Tschudin and 200 in the name of
his wife, the petitioner. Walter G. Tschudin
had died on March 31, 1956, but letters were
not granted to petitioner as his executrix
until May 7, 1956. Thus no one was qualified
to represent those shares at the meeting
called for April 18, 1956.
On the day prior to the meeting
date, petitioner's attorney notified the
corporation that petitioner would not be
present or represented and asked for a
month's adjournment. However, the 'meeting'
was held but since only 500 shares were
represented, being less [36 Del.Ch. 388]
than a majority, there was no quorum
present. The annual meeting therefore was
adjourned without any vote for the election
of directors.
After the adjournment the
petitioner made numerous demands upon the
corporation to call a stockholders' meeting
for the election of directors. In fact the
corporation at one time definitely agreed to
call a meeting at a fixed date but
subsequently, for the convenience of its own
personnel, put off the meeting.
Consequently, no annual meeting was called
and this action was commenced on February
18, 1957, seeking such a meeting.
Affidavits were filed by the
parties and thereafter this matter came on
for decision on cross-motions for summary
judgment.
The sole substantial basis for
the corporation's argument that the
petitioner is estopped to seek the relief
requested arises from the contention that
she deliberately failed to attend the annual
meeting in order to prevent an election of
directors at that time. Otherwise stated,
the corporation contends that the
petitioner, knowing that she would not be
able to vote the 300 shares in her husband's
estate because she had not yet qualified as
executrix, abstained from participation in
order to prevent a quorum and the consequent
election of directors.
Preliminarily, I have serious
doubt that the facts in the affidavits which
would be admissible at trial warrant the
conclusion that petitioner failed to attend
the meeting in person or by proxy in order
to prevent the presence of a quorum.
However, since the matter may be open to
some doubt, I do not rest my conclusion on
this ground.
First off, I cannot see how the
corporation can rely upon estoppel to
prevent the holding of an annual meeting.
Estoppel suggests that the corporation has
been misled to its detriment by petitioner's
inaction. The corporation has not suggested
and I fail to see what detriment it has
suffered by the failure to hold the election
at the time originally fixed. Generally
speaking, the right of stockholders to
insist that an annual election be held is a
continuing one.
The corporation would be in a
different position were petitioner attacking
corporate acts on the basis that they had
been performed by [36 Del.Ch. 389] hold-over
officials. I should point out that the
principal cases relied upon by the
corporation are not controlling. Thus,
Commonwealth ex rel.
Sheip v. Vandegrift, 232 Pa. 53, 81 A. 153,
36 L.R.A.,N.S., 45, dealt with the breaking
of a quorum--not our situation. Moreover,
the statement that the stockholders have a
legal duty to participate in the annual
election is contrary to Delaware law. See
Ringling
Page 561
Bros.-Barnum
& Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling, 29
Del.Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441. The other case
of substance cited by the corporation is
In re Keogh, Inc., 192 App.Div. 624, 183
N.Y.S. 408. That case involved the
waiver doctrine. It dealt with a failure to
vote at a meeting where a valid election
actually took place--certainly not our case.
I conclude that the defense of
estoppel is not here available to the
corporation. This renders it unnecessary to
decide whether in any event the doctrine
would be applicable to petitioner in her
capacity as executrix.
I next consider whether the court
should in the exercise of its discretion
order an election.
Generally speaking, the motive
that the stockholder may have for not
attending the meeting or voting his shares
is irrelevant. Even if petitioner
deliberately failed to attend because she
did not want to create a quorum, her reason
for abstaining, if relevant, is not of a
character which should preclude the relief
requested. It appears to be agreed that
petitioner was at the time of the meeting
the beneficial owner of 500 shares. I can
see no fundamental inequity even if she
abstained from voting so as to prevent a
quorum until such time as she would be in a
position to vote the entire 500 shares.
The corporation also suggests
that no such meeting should be called
because the next annual meeting will be held
in a few weeks. Normally, I would be
inclined to accord this great weight but
under the undisputed facts here I believe
petitioner is entitled to relief. I say this
because petitioner for many months sought to
have an annual meeting called and indeed one
was called then put off. These facts
militate against penalizing petitioner for
the apparent delay. Moreover, it is apparent
that the petitioner looks, without
impropriety, to [36 Del.Ch. 390] the time
when she may seek other relief to break the
apparent deadlock which exists and which
will probable continue. Furthermore, this
action cannot upset the status quo in any
event.
I conclude that petitioner's
motion for summary judgment should be
granted and the corporation's motion should
be denied. Petitioner is entitled to an
order directing the corporation forthwith to
call a stockholders' meeting on the shortest
possible legal notice for the purpose of
electing directors to serve at least until
the next annual election. However, I shall
be glad to discuss other mechanics of
implementation with counsel.
Present order on notice.
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